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 1
1 Introduction 
 
 
One might have thought of sight, but who could think of what it sees? 
Wallace Stevens Esthetique du Mal (1944) 
 
 
1.1 The Problem 
 
What does it mean to be able to see and to be seen by others?  What do we do with 
our eyes when we talk to one other? This dissertation investigates how people use their eyes 
and their body during face-to-face interactions and outlines the orderliness of their behavior. 
In particular, it shows how individuals from a specific culture (Italians from Emilia-
Romagna, a region in Northern Italy) deploy their gaze during dyadic naturally occurring 
interactions in their homes. The aim is to outline some of the practices and norms that those 
individuals are sensitive to, with the goal of providing a detailed description of the 
orderliness of gaze behavior in human interaction and refining our understanding of 
participation in social situations. Investigating gaze in face-to-face interaction helps us better 
understand how participants manage rights and obligations in interaction, specifically with 
respect to cooperation, agency and the accountability of social behavior. It also highlights the 
fine-grained calibration and organization of turns-at-talk and sequences of social actions. A 
more specific goal of the analysis is to demonstrate that gaze behavior may differ when all 
other aspects of the interactional scene but the sequential context remain the same. The 
analysis focuses on how participants use their gaze at the beginning, middle and end of 
sequences of talk. The findings are situated in a comparative and evolutionary context, 
contributing to a more general framework for the understanding of how human beings use 
their eyes in interaction. Additionally, they provide important information for computer 
scientists and experts in artificial intelligence, in terms of the predictability of gaze behavior 
in humans and its potential reproducibility in robots or avatars. 
First, it is useful to take a closer look at the phenomena that will be discussed here. 
Example 1.1 is an extract from a conversation between two young women (a university 
student, A, and a recent graduate, B, both in their early twenties). This conversation occurs in 
the kitchen of the student’s house. The two participants are good friends, have known each 
1
2other for several years and are sitting at a table, at a 90-degree angle from each other. When 
the conversation begins they both have an empty glass and a can of soft drink in front of 
them. For the moment, the focus should be on how they use their eyes while they are talking 
to each other, considering what kinds of social action they are performing during their 
conversation. The conventions used in the transcript and in particular the meaning of the oval 
symbols are explained in Appendix B and in § 1.5.1, but basically, the arrows show whether 
the interlocutors are looking at each other, up, down, or at specific objects in the surrounding 
environment.
(1.1) 2GGOSS-stasera 00:151 
                               
01 B:  .hh A(h)l l o r a stas(h)era cos’ e’ che  fate 
           So            tonight    what is that do.2s 
       .hh S(h)o t(h)onight what are you doing 
                   
02 A:  Eh    andiamo a  Villa Chiara= 
       Eh    go.1p   to Villa Chiara 
       Eh    we go to Villa Chiara= 
                               
03 B:  =Ma  a  che   ora  vi  incontrate 
        But at which hour you meet.2p 
       =But at what time do you meet 
                                
04 A:  Vado  alle nove e   mezza dalla Gloria. 
       Go.1s at   nine and half  to    Gloria 
       I go to Gloria’s (house) at nine thirty. 
          
05    ((B annuisce)) 
((B nods)) 
                                               
1 See Appendix A for more information concerning this and all the other interactions analyzed in this 
dissertation. 
3
06   ((some turns with side sequence omitted)) 
                                                                                    
07 B:             [Nove e   mezza ma] andate subito      a  Villa  
                   Nine and half  but go.2p  immediately to Villa  
                  [Nine thirty but] do you go immediately to Villa  
                
08     Chiara alle nove e   mezza?= 
       Chiara at   nine and half 
       Chiara at nine thirty?= 
                          
09 A:  =Con- le  dieci con  gli altri. 
        With the ten   with the others 
       =With- at ten with the others. 
        
10     (0.4) 
          
11 A:  Ci  incontriamo. 
       Cl. meet.1p 
 We meet.   
12     (0.6) 
            
13 A:  Ci [v i e n i? 
       Cl. come.2s 
      Will [you come? ((to Villa Chiara)) 
                                                       
14 B:    [Io   esco       alle nove_ (0.5) ah io pero’ se arrivo  
          I    get.1s out at   nine        oh I  but  if arrive.1s 
        [I    get out (of work) at nine_ (0.5) oh but if I come 
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3
4               
15     arrivo    a mezzanotte eh 
       arrive.1s at midnight eh 
      I arrive at midnight eh 
          
16    (0.6) ((A displays shocked facial expression see Fig. 1.1)) 
       
Figure 1.1. A’s facial expression during line 16. 
            
17 A:  Alle nove esci? 
       At   nine get.2s out 
      At nine you get out (of work)? 
      
18 B:  E[h 
       Eh 
      Y[es ((confirming something already said)) 
       
19 A:   [Cazzo ((Poi A annuisce, guardando in basso)) 
         Dick 
       [Shit ((and then A nods, looking down)) 
     
      Figure 1.2              Figure 1.3 
5
                               
20     (0.6) (Fig. 1.2)     (1.2)  (Fig. 1.3)            
                (1.8) 
                
21 A:  Domani   sera    che  fai? 
       Tomorrow evening what do.2s 
Tomorrow evening what do you do?
       
22     (0.5) 
The first things to note concerning this interaction are the setting and the spatial 
configurations that make this social situation possible. This interaction occurs in the kitchen 
room of a house, with the two participants sitting at a table with soft drinks available (see 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the transcript). It is known that the place where a conversation takes 
place, the seating arrangements, the possible occurrence of drinking and eating, the socio-
economic status of the participants and the kind of relationship that exists between them are 
all factors that might affect their conversation. Many studies have shown, for example, that 
participants tend to arrange themselves according to the interactions they plan to have 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Kendon, 1977; Sommer, 1959, 1962). While it is true that the 
physical structure of the environment constrains interactional positioning (Goffman, 1971; 
Goodwin, 1981), these physical arrangements tend to directly reflect preferred cultural 
patterns. It is clear, indeed, that a number of these aspects might be typical of specific 
cultures such as Western ones (e.g., the fact that when two friends want to have an extended 
conversation they tend to sit at a table and have food or drinks available). Yet, what might be 
culturally specific about the environment and the modalities through which this meeting is 
arranged should not hide a more generic fact, which is that when participants want to have a 
conversation, they arrange their bodies close to each other with a specific function, beyond 
hearing better what the other might be saying.  Usually, they position themselves in “an eye-
to-eye ecological huddle, which tends to be carefully maintained, maximizing the opportunity 
to monitor one another’s mutual perceivings” (Goffman, 1963: 95), so that each participant 
can see the other’s face, but also what the other might be looking at and doing. All these 
aspects will be further discussed later.  
4
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A second thing to note in Example 1.1 is that A and B do not follow simple gaze 
patterns. It is not the case that every time A or B starts speaking they look down or away nor 
that they tend to look toward the addressee only when they approach the end of their turns of 
talk (see Kendon, 1967 for a claim that might suggest the opposite). Instead, they direct their 
eyes in many directions. Mostly they look at each other, sometimes they look away, but when 
they look away, it is often to look at objects that will be picked up later in the interaction. 
Sometimes they look up toward one side, displaying a thinking face (M. H. Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 1986). It also often happens that one looks at the other while the other is not 
looking back, yet this seems to be often a transitory phase, frequently followed by 
engagement of mutual gaze. In other words, gaze directions can be tracked and possibly 
explained, but the patterns they follow are not obvious. On the other hand, one thing that 
remains remarkable is how “ordinary” (Sacks, 1984b) their gaze behavior appears to be for 
the other participant and for anybody observing them. The two participants here are focused 
on the content of the conversation and the social actions performed in it (in this specific case, 
the main project is figuring out whether the two participants can go out together that evening 
or not), while the way each one uses her eyes is probably less central to their concerns. They 
certainly do not mention it at any point during the 45 minutes of conversation that follows. 
And this is what we would expect, because presenting our gaze behavior as ordinary is 
indeed what we wish to achieve during our daily interactions: we do not want participants to 
find our gaze behavior marked or deviant. There might be occasions in which this is not the 
case (e.g., when we are trying to flirt with someone or threaten someone), however, most of 
the time we attempt to avoid a “non-ordinary” use of our eyes.  
Like gestures, gaze is difficult to describe and yet appears to have a prominent role in 
our daily interactions. As Sapir (1963 [1927]: 556) wrote with respect to gestures, which we 
can easily extend to gaze: 
 
Gestures are hard to classify and it is difficult to make a conscious 
separation between that in gesture which is of merely individual origin 
and that which is referable to the habits of the group as a whole. In 
spite of these difficulties of conscious analysis, we respond to gestures 
with an extreme alertness and, one might almost say, in accordance 
with an elaborate and secret code that is written nowhere, known by 
none, and understood by all. 
 
 
 7
Cracking the gaze code, however, is not an easy task. The task of this dissertation is to 
make explicit how we come to produce “ordinary”, not marked gaze behavior in 
conversation. This means that by reaching the end of this work, it should be easier to detect 
and explain the regularities present in example 1.1. The findings of the next 3 chapters will 
provide a detailed account of what is going on in terms of gaze behavior and courses of 
action in example 1.1 (this example will be presented again as 3.3 in chapter 3 and 4.13 in 
chapter 4, to show how the different gaze practices under examination get implemented in the 
production of this extract).  
In perfect agreement with what Birdwhistell (1970: xi) claimed 40 years ago, this 
dissertation posits that “body motion is a learned form of communication, which is patterned 
within a culture and which can be broken down into an ordered system of isolable elements.” 
Yet, as it will be explained later, any body motion has to deal with the physiological limits of 
our bodies, which have evolved in a specific way for clear adaptive purposes and are 
common to all human beings (e.g., we have approximately 200° and not 360° visual range). 
Keeping in mind that our gaze behavior is partly affected by our biology and partly “a 
learned form of communication patterned within a culture”, it is important to specify some of 
the specific assumptions—grounded in previous empirical observations—that this 
dissertation is based on.  
The first assumption is that human beings did not evolve eyes to be able to 
communicate better. We have eyes to perceive the world around us, facilitate our movements 
and the detection of prey and more generally to coordinate body movements within the 
environment. As Gould and Lewontin (1979) explained with the metaphor of “the spandrels 
of San Marco”, one could think of the decorations in the spandrels (see Figure 1.4)—the 
approximately triangular spaces between two arches and a horizontal molding or cornice 
above them—as the main goal of the architect and the arches that create the spandrels as a 
consequence of that initial artistic goal. Alternatively, and more reasonably, one could 
assume that the architect wanted to create some arches, particularly functional and 
aesthetically pleasing in the architecture of the building. But once the arches had been built, 
the spandrels were there and allowed for further decorative opportunities. Similarly, humans, 
as primates, evolved eyes mainly for perceptual purposes. But once we had eyes, evolution 
facilitated the possibility of also deploying them for other purposes, such as communicative 
ones. The fact, for example, that our sclera (the white of our eyes) is not pigmented—being 
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white rather than dark, as in every other primate species—appears to be an adaptation to 
facilitate the detection of our eye movements by conspecifics (see § 1.2.2 for more details). 
 
Figure 1.4. Schematic representation of a three-dimensional and a two-dimensional spandrel.2 
 
The second assumption is that looking at somebody’s face is usually more 
interactionally relevant than looking anywhere else during a conversation (at least in Western 
cultures). Studies based mainly on American English and European languages (e.g. Argyle & 
Cook, 1976; Argyle & Dean, 1965; Argyle & Graham, 1976; Exline, 1963; Goodwin, 1981; 
Gullberg & Holmqvist, 2006; Kendon, 1967; Nielsen, 1962) show that participants spend a 
significant amount of time looking at each other’s faces when they interact. Argyle and 
Graham (1976: 6) emphasized that “in our thinking about the processes underlying social 
interaction we have come to believe that gaze at other persons is of central importance”. 
However, in dyadic interactions in laboratory settings they also showed that while 
background stimuli had an unreliable effect on gaze, objects relevant for the subject’s task 
attracted gaze for large amounts of time and therefore reduced gaze at the other person. 
Moreover, Goodwin (e.g., 1981, 1984) has claimed that looking at objects in the nearby 
environment used for accomplishing activities competing with the talk (e.g., drinking, 
smoking, eating) is less problematic than looking away in general, as long as it remains a 
brief disengagement from looking at the other participant. Nonetheless, the claim that, in 
general, looking at each other’s face during a conversation should be more relevant than 
looking at any other element in the environment not directly relevant to the task-at-hand has 
been challenged cross-culturally. For example, the work of Rossano et al. (2009) shows how 
members of a Mayan community living in Mexico and speaking Tzeltal tend not to look at 
                                                
2 Image from Gould (1997: 10751). 
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speakers while listening to them, so that not looking at anything in particular while listening 
to somebody speaking is the default home position for the eyes, and looking at some object in 
particular might be considered a sign of disattending the conversation.  
The third assumption is that participants’ gaze behavior in interaction is related to the 
fact that the participants are talking to each other. In particular, the claim is that looking at 
each other is part of and contributes to the development of interactants’ conversation. There 
is no doubt that individuals monitor the environment around them regularly; however, when 
two people are co-present mutual gaze creates an opportunity for them to initiate 
conversation. In general, individuals tend to avoid looking at each other during silences 
unless the silence constitutes just a pause or a gap (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974: 715) 
in the conversation, rather than a full disengagement. This assumption of a correlation 
between talk and gaze behavior is the basis of Kendon (1967) and Goodwin’s (e.g., 1979, 
1980, 1981) work on the organization of gaze in interaction.  
Finally, the fourth underlying assumption of this work, again shared by Kendon and 
Goodwin and previously emphasized at the beginning of this introduction, is that gazing at 
someone is also a social act and not merely a perceptual tool to better understand speech. 
Nonetheless, if we do not understand how our eyes can also be used as a perceptual organ, we 
are bound to lose a powerful tool to understand what might be going on during a social 
interaction. 
The general claim of this dissertation, then, is that gaze (in Italian conversations, at 
least) can be understood in terms of action formation and a sequential analysis of actions in 
interaction (see, e.g., Schegloff, 2007b), and not simply in terms of turn-taking or displays of 
engagement and attentiveness as has been proposed (e.g., Goodwin, 1981). This work will 
show that gaze is used, for example, to coordinate the development and closure of sequences 
and courses of action, to pressure for responses and pursue them and to indicate special states 
of recipiency. Moreover, it will show that each individual deploys specific gaze behaviors 
according to her/his role as speaker or recipient but also in relation to what s/he is trying to 
achieve during a conversation. Mutual gaze, in this sense, will be interpreted as an 
interactional achievement that results from the behavior of each participant performing 
specific gaze patterns, rather than as a goal toward which participants are normatively driven. 
So speaker gaze toward the recipient might have very different motivations than recipient 
gaze toward speaker. And yet if both perform such behaviors, they will end up looking at 
each other’s eyes and thus engaging in mutual gaze.  
8
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2 Image from Gould (1997: 10751). 
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speakers while listening to them, so that not looking at anything in particular while listening 
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achieve during a conversation. Mutual gaze, in this sense, will be interpreted as an 
interactional achievement that results from the behavior of each participant performing 
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The news here is not simply that to understand gaze in interaction one needs to take 
into account what the social situation is and what people are trying to do, in terms of physical 
and social actions, at a micro level. The news consists in suggesting that there are multiple 
levels of order that play out at the same time and that can be comprehended through a careful 
and detailed analysis of people’s use of their eyes during conversations. Gaze, indeed, is used 
to perceive the world, to control the accuracy of our body movements and other people’s 
movements in the environment, to display attentiveness and engagement, but also for 
structural communicative purposes as well. Too often two different functions of gaze 
behavior are emphasized in scientific investigations: gaze behavior as responsive to 
environmental demands (e.g., attention) vs. gaze behavior as shaping the interactional 
environment and the actions accomplishable (e.g., projecting next action). To simplify the 
dichotomy, one could say that gaze is usually either studied as “a measure of” something or 
“as a means for” something. Yet it is clear that in a single stretch of interaction, the same 
individual will be confronted with the need to pay attention to the environment and still use 
her/his eyes for her/his communicative needs. A more fruitful analysis of gaze behavior in 
social interaction, then, should be aware of the importance of each component, informed of 
their limits and biases and somehow make sense of both functions by extracting some basic 
rules concerning gaze deployment in social interaction. Therefore, the logic followed in this 
work requires trying to unravel the gaze machinery, the system of norms, biases and habits 
that guide people’s eyes and actions during a conversation. Once the system is known, we 
may be able to focus on what the specific participants in a specific interaction are trying to 
do. As Sacks (1987: 67) said: 
 
You cannot find what [people] are trying to do until you find the kind 
of things they work with. If the system had a built-in bias for 
agreement, and you did not know about it, then you’d be counting a 
whole bunch of things as agreements that might well be accounted for 
in other ways. […] Now, what they wanted to do is another question, 
and it is only, I think when we begin to have some considerable idea 
about the sort of things they are operating with (like a preference for 
agreement), and the sorts of ways they operate with those things, that 
we have much of an idea about such matters as ‘what they’re trying to 
do’.  
 
In other words, an investigation cannot start from trying to interpret what people are trying to 
do with their eyes, but rather in documenting the patterns and regularities of their behavior, 
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including whether and to what extent their behavior is associated with what we know 
participants are doing through their talk and bodies.  
As Lorenz (1966: 273) suggests, while proposing the use of a biological approach to 
the study of behavior: 
 
Biological approach and method can successfully be applied in the 
study of behaviour, exactly as Darwin had done in his book, The 
expression of the emotions in man and animals. What, then, are these 
good old Darwinian procedures?  
I would name the most obvious one first, as being most important. It is 
the unbiased observation of the organic system and the inventorizing 
of its component parts. In all natural sciences description has to 
precede systematization, and both together are the prerequisite for 
abstracting the natural laws prevailing in the operations of the whole.  
 
Observation and description always have to precede systematization. As will be 
shown in every chapter, any initial description of a possible practice will then be followed by 
a systematic search for more instances of the practice and an attempt to provide falsifiable 
hypotheses about its functions, to be tested via quantification. Finally, and not in every 
instance, a question can be raised concerning how participants can detect the current 
unfolding of a specific practice or how that practice can come to be; that is, how that practice 
might evolve.  
An example of how the latter point could be approached, and of the importance of 
taking into account more than one level of organization, comes, for example, from ethology, 
in the words of Lorenz (1966: 276): 
 
A phylogenetically adapted motor pattern which originally served the 
species in dealing with some environmental necessities, acquires a new 
function, that of communication. The primary function may persist 
[…]. In many cases, however, the primary function recedes into the 
background or disappears altogether so that a complete change of 
function is achieved. Out of communication, two new, equally 
important functions may arise […] the first of these functions is the 
canalization of aggression in a manner permitting its discharge 
without damaging fellow members of the species […] the second is the 
formation of a bond which keeps together two or more individuals. 
This is achieved by most so-called greeting ceremonies which an 
animal can perform only with a certain, individually known partner, 
whose presence, for this reason, becomes an indispensable need in the 
animal’s life. It is quite erroneous to say that such ceremonies are “the 
expression of” a bond; indeed they themselves constitute it. 
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The second characteristic of ritualized motor patterns is a change of 
form which the unritualized prototype underwent in the service of its 
new communicative function and which quite obviously was brought 
about by the selection pressure exerted by the survival value of 
communication.  
 
This quote suggests that there are multiple elements to take into account to understand the 
communicative system we use, how it came about and how it works. From an evolutionary 
perspective, the emergence of a communicative pattern presumably requires some level of 
ritualization of a behavior that originally had some specific function other than 
communication becomes a communicative signal by getting reinforced and modified in its 
meaning via repeated interactions with conspecifics. Lorenz suggests that among the new 
functions of a communicative act, the canalization of aggression and the development of a 
bond may occur through the occurrence of this ritualized act. Additionally, the act is not 
(just) “an expression of” the relationship between individuals, but rather it “constitutes it”. 
We do not act in a certain way simply because we are friends, for example, but rather, by 
acting in a certain way we reinforce our friendship and display to one another the kind of 
relationship we think we have or want to have. That is, we are “expressing” and 
“constituting” friendship in every act we perform toward a potential or current friend. The 
two additional functions mentioned above are particularly relevant for a work on gaze in 
interaction because looking at someone in the eyes is a highly arousing act, e.g., skin 
conductance increases when gaze is directed toward the observer (Hietanen, Leppanen, 
Peltola, Linna-Aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008; Nichols & Champness, 1971) and people often look at 
each other’s eyes to threaten each other (aggression) and to flirt (create intimacy) (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1989). Many authors have claimed a relationship between gaze and emotional 
arousal in humans, in particular claiming that gaze aversion is a way to reduce emotional 
arousal, both in adults (e.g., Ellsworth & Ludwig, 1972; Kendon, 1967) and in young infants 
(e.g., Brazelton, Koslowski, & Main, 1974; Field, 1979; Stern, 1974), and showing, for 
example, that in 4 month olds, gaze aversion is usually preceded by a heart rate increase and 
their heart rate decreases while the gaze is averted from the adult’s face (Field, 1981). Yet, 
aside from using our eyes for threatening or creating intimacy, we also tend to look at each 
other when we talk, and this is not just to better parse the sounds we produce, but also to 
display attentiveness or commitment, to pressure for response, to select next speaker, to 
monitor each other and so on and so forth. Mutual gaze, then, may indeed be one of the motor 
patterns originally deployed with a specific function that then obtained new functions, by 
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canalizing aggression, helping in establishing a bond and more generally allowing human 
beings to do other things with it, making their interactions more effective. 
It was suggested earlier that the study of gaze in interaction needs to take into account 
multiple levels of organization, multiple systems that affect the final deployment of people’s 
eyes, and ought to develop a more fine grained model of when and how people move their 
eyes, with the hope of understanding why as well. Considering some of the current theories, 
as far as levels of organization needed to understand human behavior in social interaction is 
concerned, three different positions stand out.  One insists that there is mainly one core level 
of organization, the interactional level that shapes every other level (see, e.g., Schegloff, 
2006). A second one suggests the existence of three different systems that interact at the same 
time, the socio-cultural system, the interactional system and the language system (see, e.g., 
Levinson, 2005). Finally, a third one also focuses on three levels of organization, cognition, 
interaction and culture, which are usually investigated by three different disciplines, but are 
necessarily intertwined, and, as such, require a more complex kind of investigation (see, e.g., 
Enfield & Levinson, 2006b; Sperber, 2006). In line with the above ethological concerns, I 
propose an approach that requires a basic understanding of four different levels of 
organization: 
 
1. Individual 
2. Micro-social (dialogical/conversational) 
3. Macro-social/Cultural 
4. Species 
 
To understand what happens in any single interaction, one should take into account 
the culture a participants belongs to, his/her socio-economic status and relationships, the rules 
of conversation or of politeness, idiosyncratic behaviors, cognitive abilities and competences 
of the single individual, as well as her or his own desires and beliefs. That said, one should 
also realize that we are biological creatures, that we have bodies with limits and specific 
capacities that necessarily affect what we can and cannot do when faced with a problem or a 
specific situation. For example, we are endowed with a specific visual system that allows us 
to perceive the world, act in it and move through it. We are endowed with two eyes 
positioned frontally, rather than laterally. The limits of our bodies are the limits of our natural 
repertoire of possible movements. All of these biological developments came about through 
evolution, in adaptation to the contingencies of a constantly changing environment. If we 
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neglect these aspects of human biology and physiology, we may provide accurate 
descriptions of what we can see people doing, without necessarily knowing why it is so, how 
it came about and most importantly, what the other possibilities may be, whether other 
movements or other actions could easily emerge. In addition, we might interpret acts that 
occur only because of the limits of our bodies as intentionally communicative. For example, 
having the capacity to only see 15-30° of the visual range with proper visual acuity, out of a 
200° range (see, e.g., Bruce, Green, & Georgeson, 2003), means that we need to move our 
eyes often if we want to ensure we accurately perceive what is happening in front of us, or 
even just for reading this written page. But these eye movements obviously do not occur in 
order to intentionally communicate to other participants which part of this page we are 
reading. Rather, it is a necessary requirement for our eyes to be able to perform this task. It 
can be informative for a recipient, but it is not designed for the recipient, as will be briefly 
outlined in what follows.  
What is proposed here, though, is not an embodied theory of social interaction. What I 
am suggesting is an approach that recognizes that the machinery, the repertoire that has 
emerged and has been reinforced through individual ritualization and social imitation —
making a specific behavior a cultural praxis through historical sedimentation — has a 
biological foundation that continues to exert pressure on what the limits of those movements 
are and what the limits of our interpretation of those movements should be. Moreover, if we 
find that some practice is shared by all cultures and all human communities, it may be 
because this practice might have some strong adaptive function and be evolutionarily the best 
adaptation for our species, and not just for our specific community. To summarize, if we 
want to be able to better understand what humans do when they interact with each other, we 
need to keep in mind the following four points: 
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1. We have individual cognition and individual memories of our previous  
    interactions.  
2. We use the interactional machinery we believe we share with other interactants and 
we recipient-design our communications and actions, because of what we know about 
others. 
3. Our actions are informed by what we deem to be socially and culturally 
appropriate. 
4. We are biological organisms with specific limits and capacities, and our bodies  
have evolved for specific adaptive purposes. 
 
To achieve an analysis that keeps these four points in mind, a broad literature has to 
be introduced and discussed.3 This will constitute the background against which the empirical 
chapters will be built. It will also provide a glimpse of the theoretical underpinnings of this 
investigation. To understand how a plane can fly, it is not enough to look at it, and yet 
without looking at it, we would not be able to explain how that specific plane can fly while 
another might not. In the same way, in order to understand how we use our eyes when we 
interact with each other, aside from describing the orientation of the gaze of the participants, 
it is useful to know something about the hardware (i.e., our eyes), about vision and about 
human sociality to make sense of how and when we direct our eyes during a conversation. To 
begin, then, a first question is: what difference does it make that human beings have eyes? 
1.2 To See: An Evolutionary Perspective on Sight 
 
In 1859 while outlining his evolutionary theory about the origin of species by means 
of natural selection, Darwin raised a distinct and serious issue for his own theory: the 
existence of the eye. In a section specifically dedicated to the eye called, “organs of extreme 
perfection and complication,” he wrote: 
 
To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for 
adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different 
amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic 
aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I 
freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree. […] If it could be 
                                                
3 I follow here the model outlined in the volume Roots of Human Sociality (Enfield & Levinson, 2006a) where 
contributors and contributions from a range of disciplines were combined to address a single, broad question: 
what are the roots of human sociality? 
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demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not 
possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight 
modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. (1859: 186-
189) 
 
He also suggested, however, what kind of evidence would support his theory, even if it was 
difficult to envision rationally at the time:  
 
Yet reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from a perfect and 
complex eye to one very imperfect and simple, each grade being useful 
to its possessor, can be shown to exist; if further, the eye does vary 
ever so slightly, and the variations be inherited, which is certainly the 
case; and if any variation or modification in the organ be ever useful 
to an animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of 
believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural 
selection, though insuperable by our imagination, can hardly be 
considered real. (1859: 186) 
 
What Darwin was looking for was a range of organs less sophisticated than the human 
eye that could still be used for vision and of any use for the animal possessing it, maintaining 
that the modifications could be inherited. Recent evidence seems to have solved this 
Darwinian puzzle.  
The first eyes that appeared on Earth belonged to the trilobite, a voracious predator 
already known at the time of Darwin’s writing. It can be dated to about 543 million years 
ago. This is not to say that this is the first mechanism ever developed to perceive light, as 
there were already single-celled organisms like amoebae that could detect sunlight and were 
using this information to distinguish up from down in the water. Moreover, there were also 
multi-celled animals that had light sensitive organs, called ocelli, which were similarly used 
to detect light direction. The difference, however, is that those organs were not capable of 
forming images; they could only detect light direction (like plants). Vision is certainly the 
most sophisticated mechanism to detect light direction, but in addition to it, it allows us to 
detect images through the retina. The retina is a multilayered tissue made of nerve cells that 
convert light signals into neural signals and through the optic nerve communicate directly 
with the brain. With the help of some apparatus such as a lens, it is possible to detect with 
some precision any image that is projected onto the retina. This allows the perception of 
shapes and therefore helps in the detection of other animals moving around the environment.  
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It has been claimed (Parker, 2003) that the development of an organ such as the eye 
changed the face of the planet by allowing some animals to perceive others much better and 
allowing them to move better and faster through the environment. In this sense, it becomes 
easier for the predator to hunt and the prey must develop other means to defend itself. 
Noticeably, apart from the presence of outer defensive hard parts such as shells and 
skeletons, animals also developed another outstanding resource: color.4 Indeed, once light 
and images can be perceived with some acuity, color perception becomes possible for 
animals, and nature evolved in accordance with this new capacity. This is of great interest if 
we think about the amazing variety of colors present in nature and the fact that developing 
and changing colors is costly for any organism. What would be the point of, for example, the 
mimetic behavior of the chameleon or the colorful plumage of so many birds or even the 
amazing variety of colors of so many fruits and flowers, if these colors could not be 
perceived? The existence of all of the above shows how a great deal of the external 
appearance of animals and plants on our planet has developed as a result of the driving force 
of the sense of sight and the presence of sunlight. 
Sight might help, but how advantageous is it? Only 6 phyla of animals have eyes out 
of the extant 33 phyla, so it might look like there was not much need for their evolution. On 
the other hand, about one-third of those 33 phyla have specialized organs for detecting light 
(Fernald, 2006; Land & Nilsson, 2002) and the 6 phyla that have eyes constitute about 96% 
of the existing animal species on Earth (Land and Nilsson, 2002). In other words, they have 
been by far the most successful ones in terms of natural selection and differentiation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Notice that color is a perceptual byproduct of light constructed by the brain and not a property of objects. It is 
the wavelength that the eye can perceive once light is reflected by a specific material surface (that partly absorbs 
and partly reflects the different wavelengths that compose light). So a blue object appears as such because it 
absorbs all of the wavelengths of light apart from the ones that our brain categorizes as blue. Different animals 
can perceive very different colors depending on the color receptors they have. So many mammals have 
monochromatic or dichromatic vision, whereas most primates, including humans, have trichromatic vision, and 
many other animals (e.g. many birds, see Bowmaker, 1991) can also perceive wavelengths in the ultraviolet 
spectrum, which human beings cannot perceive at all.  
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1.2.1 The Evolution of the Eye  
 
How did the eye evolve? As mentioned previously, the capacity of detecting light 
direction is not sufficient to consider an organ an eye. There must be some photoreceptors 
that transform light into some sort of neural signal that allows the brain to perceive the image 
projected on the retina usually through the help of a lens. There are, however, functional eyes 
that lack a lens (nautilus) but allow the animal to form an image on the retina (and therefore 
“see”), by using the principle deployed by the ancient Chinese and described by Leonardo da 
Vinci as the “camera obscura”.5 The nautilus is indeed provided with pinhole eyes. 
Moreover, there are eyes lacking a pupil or lacking the cornea, but every eye must have, by 
definition, “specialized phototransducing cells” (Fernald, 2000). All vertebrates (e.g. 
mammals) have a single type of eye called “camera eye”6 (because it works a bit like a 
camera), and human eyes consist of lenses, iris, cornea and pupils.  
Nilsson and Pelger (1994) made a “pessimistic estimate” of how long it would take 
for a light sensitive spot to evolve all the way to a fully developed lens eye by focusing on the 
development of spatial resolution (i.e. visual acuity). They modeled a sequence of 
evolutionary stages of the eye that can be found among animals existing today and they found 
that the whole evolution would require approximately half a million years. This is 
particularly important for Parker’s model, as outlined above, as it confirms that the 
development of the organ “eye” could indeed have happened rather quickly, at the beginning 
of the Cambrian and since then have tremendously affected animal evolution.  
Out of the Cambrian emerged eight different types of functional eyes (Fernald, 2000; 
Land & Fernald, 1992; Land & Nilsson, 2002); that is, eight optically distinct ways of 
forming an image on the retina which results in seeing something. This variety has been even 
larger in terms of different types of eye organizations, according to others (e.g., Salvini-
Plawen & Mayr, 1977).  
 
 
                                                
5 Light penetrates a dark environment through a tiny hole and forms an image on the dark surface opposite to the 
hole. 
6 Interestingly also octopuses have camera eyes but they developed independently from the vertebrate ones and 
are actually functionally better because they do not have a blind spot which is present in the vertebrate eye. This 
is often used as an example of “convergent evolution” because the ancestors they had in common did not have a 
camera eye. 
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The development of different mechanisms for processing light is particularly relevant 
for this investigation. Indeed, what vision does is extract information about the environment 
by using light and two of its properties, in particular: intensity and different wavelengths 
(frequency). Different animals have developed different solutions to the problem of 
processing light information and the solutions emerged through natural selection and 
therefore adaptation to environmental conditions. What matters here is the awareness that 
behaviors and practices are not the sole product of social negotiations or historical 
sedimentation, but rather the adaptive point of equilibrium for many needs and constraints in 
terms of coping with the world the individuals inhabit. This relationship between problems, 
evolution and development of specific behaviors can be easily understood by focusing for a 
moment on the fact that human beings have both eyes on the same (frontal) side of our head. 
What difference does it make that we have both eyes at the front of our head rather 
than on the sides, like rabbits? According to some scholars (e.g., Cartmill, 1974; Parker, 
2003), the position of the eyes on the head tells us something about the position of the animal 
in the food chain. Specifically, Parker (2003) claims that animals with eyes on the sides of 
the head are mainly prey, while animals with frontal eyes are mainly predators. Clearly, the 
generality of this claim is problematic because not all predators have eyes that point in the 
same direction (see Cartmill, 1992 on this), and therefore other factors must come into play. 
However, some of the reasons given for this distinction warrant consideration. For example, 
having lateral eyes means having a wider angle of vision, which allows for improved 
detection of movements, although the perception of depth and distance becomes more 
difficult. In this sense, seeing more and being more sensitive to movement might allow prey 
to react faster, and the depth of vision becomes less crucial for survival. On the other hand, 
having eyes on the front of our head, in particular having the angles of vision crossing each 
other, enables stereopsis (i.e. the perception of binocular depth). This is particularly 
important in terms of determining distance, for example, in pinpointing where an object or 
prey might be. According to some (e.g., Le Gros Clark, 1959; Smith, 1924), primates, 
together with other arboreal animals, developed binocular stereoscopic vision because it 
helped them in determining distances between branches of the trees. However, other 
explanations for the frontal position of the eyes exist. Noticing that the closeness of the eyes 
in the middle of the face reduces parallax and therefore the distance at which stereoscopic 
vision can work (i.e., one can perceive depth and distances well only at close range), Cartmill 
(1974) suggested that the convergence of the eyes must have evolved to allow better vision at 
close range, just like cats and other predators. The development of good sight, the loss of 
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claws and the development of grasping extremities would point toward insect eating and 
predation with the important aid of vision. Allman (1977) confirmed that the frontal position 
of eyes with a spherical lens favors visual acuity even more than stereopsis (animals with 
eyes on the side have more blurred vision), and this is particularly important at night, in low 
light. In other words, the predators that favored frontal eyes are mainly nocturnal predators, 
because for diurnal ones the lateral position of the eyes is less of a problem. 
Alternatively, Sussman (1991) suggests that what would have favored certain 
evolutionary adaptation in primates is fruit foraging (better perception of edges, shapes and 
distance would help seeing them). Moreover, contrary to most other mammals, primates have 
trichromatic vision and this appears to have developed in relation to fruit foraging because it 
helped recognizing mature fruits through leaves and vegetation (see, e.g., Jacobs, 1995; 
Regan et al., 2001). 
If binocular vision and stereopsis contribute to 3-dimensional vision and allow a 
better perception of shapes and distances, then it is no surprise to find out that human beings 
look at objects anticipatorily, before reaching for them.  They do so in order to calibrate their 
movements (see, e.g., Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Johansson, Westling, Backstrom, & 
Flanagan, 2001; Land, 2006), and also to guide their movements while approaching an object 
to grab it (see, e.g., Jeannerod, 1986 on how finger posturing anticipates the real grasp, 
occurs during the transportation of the hand and partly relies on visual feedback). Looking at 
objects helps establishing distances and therefore facilitates the motor control of our hands 
and arms when we reach for things. Whenever we are involved in a task such as preparing a 
cup of tea (Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999) or a sandwich (Hayhoe, 2000), our eyes mainly 
perform four monitoring functions: i) locating objects used later in the process; ii) directing 
the hand or object in the hand to a new location; iii) guiding the approach of one object to 
another; and, iv) checking the state of some variable relevant for the task. Usually the eyes 
reach the object that we reach for slightly less than a second before manipulating it, and 
usually our eyes only visit objects that are relevant for the task-at-hand, independently of how 
conspicuous other objects in the environment might be. The eyes, then, help us to plan our 
movements and provide feedback on our motor performance; feedback that becomes less 
salient the more routinized the action becomes.  
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All of the above implies that when we observe individuals in interaction looking at 
their glass or a cookie before they reach for it, we are simply observing a behavior that has 
evolved because of the specificity of primate eyes and the advantages and limits of their 
frontal position. We will see how this phenomenon plays a role in everyday interactions in 
the empirical chapters that follow. 
1.2.2  Eye Morphology in Primates and Eye Movements 
 
Human gaze behavior is a highly evolved system: unique amongst primate species, 
the human orbit has evolved to display the sclera, in humans also referred to as “the white of 
the eye”, and our eye outline is extraordinarily elongated in the horizontal direction. Human 
beings are the only primate species with a sclera without pigmentation (see Figure 1.5). The 
function of these physiological differences seems to be to make gaze direction discernable to 
others at a distance, as we have lost the “gaze-camouflaging” function common to other 
primate eyes and have enhanced the “gaze signaling” function (Kobayashi, 1997, 2001; 
Kobayashi & Hashiya, 2011; Morris, 1985). Some empirical evidence supporting this claim 
comes from an experiment run by Tomasello et al. (2007) in which human infants and other 
great apes were compared in terms of their tendency to rely on eyes or head direction in 
following the gaze of a human experimenter. They found that while human infants rely only 
on eyes, great apes rely mainly on head direction.  This suggests that the presence of a white 
sclera co-evolved with human cooperative interaction, making it easier for others to perceive 
what we are looking at (also at some distance), contrary to other great apes who mainly 
interact on a competitive basis.7 
 
 
 
                                                
7 In the seminal paper “On the human interaction engine”, Levinson (2006) claims that human beings have a 
unique propensity to interact and their interactions have a distinctive structure, when compared to other species. 
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Figure 1.5. Human eyes vs. chimpanzee eyes. 
Moreover, it has long been established that humans can judge the direction of other 
humans’ gaze to within a few degrees of arc (Gibson & Pick, 1963).  This capacity has been 
claimed to be crucial for the development of joint attention and human social cognition (see, 
e.g., Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Scaife & Bruner, 1975; Tomasello, 1995, 1999), and for 
language acquisition (see, e.g., Bruner, 1983; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Tomasello & Todd, 
1983). The capacity to follow gaze, which human infants already develop as early 3 months 
of age (D'Entremont, Hains, & Muir, 1997) and enables the possibility of establishing joint 
attention with another individual, is particularly important from a developmental point of 
view because it helps in understanding what others are thinking or intending to do (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2001). Moreover, correct gaze following at 10 months 
predicts language comprehension and gesture production at 18 months, therefore suggesting a 
strong positive correlation between gaze following and language acquisition (Brooks & 
Meltzoff, 2005). Individuals with autism appear to have a different way of engaging in gaze 
following and also an impairment of joint attention (Carpenter & Tomasello, 2000; Charman, 
2004; Dawson et al., 2004; Loveland & Landry, 1986; Mundy, 1995; Mundy & Newell, 
2007). By the end of the first month of life, human infants show the emergence of “effortful” 
concentration on the mother’s face (Lavelli & Fogel, 2005) and at 6 months of age, infants 
are sensitive to the social communicative value of gaze, as they follow gaze only if the gaze 
shift is preceded by an ostensive signal, such as gaze contact (Senju & Csibra, 2008). Further 
evidence of human infants’ predisposition to detect gaze behavior as a socially relevant cue 
comes from the work of Farroni and colleagues (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; 
Farroni, Menon, & Johnson, 2006; Farroni, Pividori, Simion, Massaccesi, & Johnson, 2004). 
This research shows that newborns have a preferential attention toward faces with direct gaze 
toward the observer, even when these faces are only schematic ones. Interestingly, even 
newborn chimpanzees have a preference for human faces with gaze directed toward them 
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(Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka, & Matsuzawa, 2003). Thus, all of these findings 
demonstrate that there is an important relation between being able to detect where somebody 
else’s eyes are directed and becoming social beings.  
Focusing on the interaction between eyes and development, one of the most notable 
features of a human infant face is the size of her/his eyes: they are particularly large 
compared to the rest of their body. At birth, a human eye has a diameter that is approximately 
70% of the size of an adult eye: 17 mm at birth vs. 24 mm as an adult (Gordon & Donzis, 
1985). In this respect, the eye is probably the human organ that grows the least during 
development. Two kinds of vertebrate tend to have large eyes compared to their body size: 
nocturnal predators and herbivore mammals such as cows and rabbits (see, e.g., Howland, 
Merola, & Basarab, 2004 on vertebrate eye sizes). In the first case, big eyes facilitate the 
detection of prey at a distance; in the latter they help the detection of predators. Clearly, a 
newborn human is anything but a great predator and has little capacity to escape if attacked. 
Moreover, if one of the advantages of having big eyes is that they improve visual acuity (and 
therefore facilitate the detection of prey at a distance), this cannot apply to human newborns 
because they can only see at a distance of about 8-15 inches in the first few weeks. This 
distance is important because it is approximately the distance between the faces of a baby and 
its caregiver when the latter holds the baby in her/his arms. So, we are not born with highly 
developed eyes that can easily scan the environment at a distance and detect things, but 
newborn eyes are particularly sensitive to human faces, and to black and white forms, much 
more than to colors (see, e.g., Fantz, 1963). A possible hypothesis concerning the 
evolutionary advantage of infant eye size and perceptual capacities at birth is that the range of 
visual acuity and large white sclera can facilitate mother-infant communication.  Thus, they 
may have evolved this way for social/communicative purposes (see Ross & Kirk, 2007 for a 
review on eye size in primates). 
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Figure 1.5. Human eyes vs. chimpanzee eyes. 
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1.2.3  Eyes and Vision  
 
Our retina, the light sensitive layer at the back of our eye, is made of two basic 
photosensitive cells: rods and cones. Rods are photoreceptors that work particularly well in 
conditions of low light and allow scotopic vision; that is, the monochromatic vision of the 
eye in conditions of low luminance (i.e., when it is dark). Given that cone cells cannot 
function in conditions of low luminance, only rod cells are active in those conditions and this 
means that in situations of darkness there is no color perception. Rods are particularly 
important for night vision, motion detection and peripheral vision.  
On the other hand, cones are the cells responsible for color vision,8 the ones that 
provide us with the highest visual acuity. There are no rods in the foveal pit, the center of the 
fovea, the part of the retina responsible for sharp vision, while cones are mostly concentrated 
in the fovea. This distribution of these two photoreceptors allows us to see over a wider 
range. The area rich in cones (the fovea) makes us see with high visual acuity during bright 
light, while the area rich in rods (i.e., the rest of the retina) provides high sensitivity vision in 
dim light. Such a distribution allows for a good balance between visual acuity and visual 
sensitivity. The fovea represents less than 1% of the retina and we can see sharply only 
through the fovea. This explains why we can see sharply only about 15-30 degrees of arc, 
while we have a basic perception of about 200 degrees (Bruce et al., 2003). This biological 
configuration also explains why we have to move our eyes to scan the environment and 
perceive the shapes of objects in a room with a decent level of visual acuity. It also explains 
why we move our eyes to look at a cup before we reach for it: excluding for a moment the 
role of the lens in visual acuity, if we had cones more evenly distributed throughout the entire 
retina, we would be able to perceive the position of the cup and its shape with high 
definition9 while still looking at the face of our interlocutor. However, given that our retinas 
do not have this configuration, our eyes have to be redirected toward the object and moved 
away from the other participant to properly control our hand movement. 
 
                                                
8 Most mammals are dichromats. Primates are the only mammals having trichromatic vision (Jacobs, 1993, 
1995). Visual acuity of humans is not really remarkable, in comparison to other species. Indeed, most birds that 
hunt can see better than us (e.g. the eagle) and many diurnal birds can see ultraviolet light. 
9 Note that visual acuity is not only dependent on the presence of cones in the retina, but other factors affect it 
as well, among which how we can modify the thickness of our lenses to bring nearby objects into focus, through 
a process called accommodation (see, e.g., Bruce et al., 2003). 
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In the second half of the 20th century developmental and psycholinguistic researchers 
exploited the correlation between eye movements and foveal vision with cognition and 
attention. This happened in particular as a development of the initial investigations in the 
1950s and 1960s made by Robert Fantz with infants and by Alfred L. Yarbus on scene 
perception and saccadic eye movements in adults. Fixation duration, direction of first look 
and frequency of switching between co-present objects have been interpreted as reflections of 
underlying cognitive processing. A detailed investigation of the history and findings of 
looking-time research in developmental psychology and of eye movement research in 
reading, during scene perception and language production (see, e.g., the success of the Visual 
World Paradigm in psycholinguistics) is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Some 
comprehensive reviews and methodological discussions of the above approaches can be 
found, however, in Aslin (2007); Griffin (2004); Rayner (1998), Spelke (1985) and 
Tanenhaus et al. (2000) and an extensive overview of recent works on eyes and perception 
can be found in Liversedge et al. (2011). 
Given the focus here on the use of eye-gaze during social interaction, no detailed 
review of the visual perception of humans will be provided here. However, it is worth 
reporting how different models of visual perception have strongly influenced our 
understanding of the function of our eyes and how they interact with the environment that 
surrounds us. A behaviorist approach to perception, such as the one proposed by Watson 
(1913, 1924), attempted to reduce perception to basic sensations excluding introspection. 
This was countered by the Gestalt psychology approach, which pushed for a more 
phenomenological and nativist approach to vision, with a strong focus on introspection. In 
recent years, Gregory (1972, 1980) proposed a top-down approach to vision, where 
hypotheses about the world are constantly tested against fragmented evidence based on the 
images we perceive. This was countered by Marr (1982) with an alternative computational 
bottom-up approach, emerging from artificial intelligence. Marr’s approach is fundamentally 
unconscious and computational in scope, which relies on inferences about the images 
perceived. It also provides humans with a certain level of awareness of the visual world by 
processing the information obtained via the retina at different levels by using statistical 
regularities. Finally, an influential approach to vision that developed in the last part of the 
20th century is the ecological one, which owes its initial framework to the work of J.J. Gibson 
(e.g., 1979). The core intuition of this approach is that action and perception are intimately 
intertwined and cannot be treated as separate problems. The point of departure should not be 
the stimulation of the light on the retinal image, but rather the optic array provided by the 
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environment. The way in which light extends over space and time provides information to the 
observer about shapes and guides the movements of animals through space. We do not just 
try to perceive shapes to memorize pictures in our brain; we use vision to make sense of what 
we can do in and with an environment. In particular, when we perceive an object, we do not 
just see what it looks like, but we also see its affordances, the actions that we can perform 
with it, its possible uses. Contrary to conventional theories of vision, which postulate a view 
of perception that is mediated by inferences about the world that develop by transforming 
mental representations, Gibson suggests that perception is not mediated by any psychological 
process such as memory or inferences but is rather an immediate picking up of invariants in 
the optic array.  
Recently, however, Milner and Goodale (1995) have put forward a different 
hypothesis about vision, one that differentiates a visual path for action from a visual path for 
perception. Basing their claim initially on findings from research on individuals with brain 
damage, they suggest that there are two different pathways in the brain, as far as our visual 
system is concerned: one dedicated to perception (the ventral stream) and one dedicated to 
action (the dorsal stream). The idea is that visual input affects our actions in different ways. 
The dorsal pathway controls fast movements and allows us to grasp, for example, the handle 
of a cup. On the other hand, through the ventral pathway, the visual input interacts with 
memory and allows us to construct a conscious and more accessible representation of the 
world, allowing us to plan for more complex courses of action. Many recent experiments 
conducted either on individuals with brain damage or using visual illusions seem to confirm 
the existence of these two different pathways (see Milner & Goodale, 2008 for a review). 
This model combines the insights of Marr’s computational model and Gibson’s ecological 
approach, by suggesting that both types of processing of visual information are actually 
occurring in our brain at the same time. 
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1.3 To Be Seen 
 
A recent study found that by simply placing a pair of printed eyes on an honesty box 
used to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room, people paid three times as much 
for their drinks than they did when a control image was used (Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 
2006). Just seeing a pair of eyes had apparently caused people to behave quite differently, in 
particular being more cooperative and generous, than in the control condition. One of the 
accounts for this finding is that at an unconscious level, printed open eyes facing the 
participants induced the perception of being watched (and therefore evoked an association to 
their accountability to others). Another experiment by von Grünau and Anston (1995) 
showed that people were much faster and more precise in detecting the presence of a straight 
gaze directed toward them among a large number of averted gaze, rather than the other way 
around. This special alertness to a straight gaze stimuli has a clear adaptive explanation: 
staring can be a sign of hostility or anger, but eye contact can also be a sign of liking or 
friendliness, and as the authors explain “whether maintained stare is a sign of dislike or like, 
it is certainly an indication of a potential social interaction.” (p. 1297) 
We know that humans have neurons that respond very selectively to stimuli that look 
like faces and eyes (e.g., Emery, 2000; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000), and we have 
already mentioned how human infants are sensitive to direct gaze toward them even when 
schematic faces are used, rather than photographs of real faces (Farroni et al., 2004). One 
reason why the impression of being watched might affect human behaviors could be that we 
are socially concerned with maintaining face (Goffman, 1955, 1963) and naturally concerned 
with maintaining a positive reputation (see, e.g., Alexander, 1987; Milinski, Semmann, & 
Krambeck, 2002). However, another option is possible as well: we are more cooperative 
when we think we are being watched because we are concerned about punishment. From a 
sociological point of view, for example, we know from the work of Foucault in Discipline 
and Punish (1979) that the control of a prisoner and his behavior can be institutionally 
exerted just by making the prisoner believe that he is being observed. Foucault cites in 
particular the plan for a perfect prison, originally suggested by Bentham, that he calls 
Panopticon, in which a single tower in the middle of a prison courtyard with a 360 degrees 
view of every cell’s window, would immediately make prisoners be more cooperative, as 
they would never know when they are actually observed by a guard. So the fear of being 
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perceived breaking the rules and as such risking being punished would make them cooperate 
more.  
Many writers have provided admirable descriptions of how characters in their works 
experience the look of somebody else toward them (see, e.g., Boll, 1994 [1963]; Sartre, 1956 
[1943]).10 Yet one aspect often neglected is how these glances are made possible during a 
conversation. The answer lies in the ways in which we position our bodies when we talk to 
each other. In the 50s and 60s Sommer developed a series of studies concerning how 
participants position themselves in space depending on the kind of interaction they want to 
have (Sommer, 1959, 1962, 1967), observations later confirmed and developed, among 
others, by Scheflen (1964, 1975a), Ekman and Friesen (1974) and Kendon (1977). The main 
aspect of Sommer’s work that matters for us is the idea that participants would position 
themselves so that they could monitor one another and make eye-contact comfortable, if they 
were planning to have a conversation. This idea of positioning our bodies so that mutual 
monitoring becomes easier has been further developed by Goffman (1963, 1964, 1981b) and 
Marjorie Goodwin (e.g., 1980), who claimed it to be a crucial component of a social situation 
and showed us how it plays out in real time. Kendon (1977) even coined a specific new term 
to describe the configuration which participants assume when they have a social interaction: 
F-formation. 
 
An F-formation arises whenever two or more people sustain a spatial 
and orientational relationship in which the space between them is one 
to which they have equal, direct, and exclusive access. Such a pattern 
can be seen in the circle of the free-standing conversational group. 
[…] The F-formation system serves as an important means of 
maintaining the separate identity and integrity of an interactional 
situation. It provides a means by which the participants can maintain 
differential access to one another and it facilitates the maintenance of 
a common focus of attention. It is thus an important part of the means 
by which behaviour is organized in occasions of face-to-face 
interaction such as conversations. (p. 209) 
 
The effect of being watched on people’s behavior suggests that eye-gaze has a strong 
regulatory power, which enables participants to affect the way others behave in their 
presence. We’ll see later how this has been investigated with respect to social interaction and 
conversation. 
                                                
10 See Tomkins (1963) for a historical review concerning how writers have written about the use of eyes in 
relationships. 
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We have already mentioned that two of the most typical situations, in the absence of 
talk, in which two individuals would find each other sustaining mutual eye contact are 
situations of threatening and flirting. Even though they seem to represent the two ends of an 
emotional spectrum, one having to do with menace and aggression and the other one with 
intimacy and desire for closeness, they have something in common: they are both actions that 
provoke high arousal (see Eibl-Eiblesfeldt, 1989 for a detailed account of how these arousing 
situations are managed and how universal and possibly innate they appear to be). Again, if 
we move from the behavioral level to its biological motivation, we can note how the very 
perception of two open eyes looking at us, when perceived, provokes a systematic increase in 
galvanic skin response (GSR) (see e.g., Nichols & Champness, 1971; Hietanen et al. 2008), 
which is to say we get aroused. Yet, the fact that people look at each other’s face during a 
conversation regularly would suggest that we have found a way of canalizing these arousing 
emotions into a communicative practice, as Lorenz (1966) suggested. It should be noted here 
that other primates, while monitoring each other’s behavior in a manner similar to the one 
used by human beings, tend to engage in eye contact mainly in agonistic situations, such as 
threatening, or to solicit sexual favors (see, e.g., Goodenough, McGuire, & Wallace, 1993; 
Hinde & Rowell, 1962; Kaplan & Rogers, 2002; Redican, 1975). There are, however, reports 
of the engagement of mutual gaze to initiate reconciliations (de Waal, 2001), and in non-
aggressive and non-sexual social interactions (Yamagiwa, 1992), mainly deployed by 
juveniles. Mutual gaze, even in chimpanzees, occurs quite regularly in mother-infant 
interactions (Bard et al., 2005; Ehardt & Blount, 1984), while it rarely occurs during 
adulthood and there appear to be differences in the amount of eye contact that usually occurs 
not just across species (see, e.g., Kaplan & Rogers, 2002), but also across groups within the 
same species (Bard et al., 2005). Nonetheless, the length of mutual gaze that occurs during a 
natural conversation between two human beings clearly far exceeds what is usually observed 
in other non-human primates. It therefore appears that some special evolutionary adaptation 
occurred in the human line that allows us to sustain mutual gaze in friendly and yet not 
arousing situations, even beyond childhood. If we combine this with what was previously 
reported concerning the different color of human sclera (white vs. dark one for other 
primates), it should be clear that we are biologically evolved and adapted to rely on gaze 
direction and mutual gaze during social interaction and communication. 
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10 See Tomkins (1963) for a historical review concerning how writers have written about the use of eyes in 
relationships. 
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We have already mentioned that two of the most typical situations, in the absence of 
talk, in which two individuals would find each other sustaining mutual eye contact are 
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emotional spectrum, one having to do with menace and aggression and the other one with 
intimacy and desire for closeness, they have something in common: they are both actions that 
provoke high arousal (see Eibl-Eiblesfeldt, 1989 for a detailed account of how these arousing 
situations are managed and how universal and possibly innate they appear to be). Again, if 
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same species (Bard et al., 2005). Nonetheless, the length of mutual gaze that occurs during a 
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occurred in the human line that allows us to sustain mutual gaze in friendly and yet not 
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primates), it should be clear that we are biologically evolved and adapted to rely on gaze 
direction and mutual gaze during social interaction and communication. 
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However, it is important to note here that when we talk to each other we tend to fixate 
not each other’s eyes,11 but rather the upper part of the nose, which sort of represents the 
center of our face, to be able to fully perceive facial expressions (see, e.g., Gullberg & 
Holmqvist, 2006). Nonetheless, the very possibility of looking at each other and the tendency 
to often engage in mutual gaze, at least in Western cultures, have been noted by Simmel as 
the “uniquely sociological function” of the eye and the “union and interaction of individuals 
[being] based upon mutual glances” (Simmel, 1969: 358). In particular he claimed that “the 
totality of social relations of human beings, their self-assertions and self-abnegation, their 
intimacies and estrangements, would be changed in unpredictable ways if there occurred no 
glance of eye to eye” (1969: 358). Seeing others and being seen, engaging in mutual gaze, 
appear to have a special significance in human interactions, which might go beyond the mere 
perceptual or communicative functions of the eyes.  
The old saying that the eyes are the mirror of the soul, modified by Cicero who 
claimed that “the face is a picture of the mind as the eyes are its interpreter”, reflects a belief 
about the relationship between eyes and emotions that has been investigated intensively in the 
last two centuries. In his work On the expression of emotions in man and animals (1872), for 
example, Darwin claimed that feelings such as pride, humility, guilt, conceit, slyness, 
suspicion and others could be detected not just by the facial expression of an individual but 
more simply by their eyes. Most recent research on facial expressions, in particular the ones 
by Ekman and colleagues (Ekman, 1992, 1993; Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman & Oster, 
1979) but also recent conversation analytic work (Ruusuvuori & Peräkylä, 2009), has looked 
at the role that eyes are said to play in the compositionality of facial expressions and has 
considered not only the movements of the eyes but also all the muscle movements going on 
around them, including the brows, to accomplish, for example, frowns. Despite the 
importance of the eyes in displays of emotions and in the composition of facial expressions, 
this dissertation will not focus on these aspects, but rather on the orientation of gaze during 
social interaction and its communicative and regulatory functions. In what follows I will 
provide some reasons for this focus. 
 
 
                                                
11 When we actually look at each other’s eyes and not just each other’s face we usually fixate one of the two 
eyes, as fixation must converge on a single point of focus. 
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1.3.1  Eyes, Faces and Brain 
 
Recent research in neuroscience has focused on what has been called the social brain 
(e.g., Adolphs, 2009; Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998; Grossmann & Johnson, 2007; Johnson et 
al., 2005), which is to say the neural networks involved in human social interaction and 
communication. Among the areas identified as part of the social brain, there are the prefrontal 
cortex, the superior temporal gyrus, the fusiform gyrus, the cingulate gyrus, the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) and the amygdala. These areas are specialized in processing 
information such as face, gaze, biological motion, human action, goal directedness, theory of 
mind and empathy.  
Before focusing on the brain regions involved in the processing of eye gaze, consider 
two recent findings concerning the differential processing of face and eyes. Haxby et al. 
(2000) found that while changeable, dynamic aspects of faces such as expressions and gaze 
tend to activate the STS (area involved in the detection of biological motion, Allison, Puce, & 
McCarthy, 2000), the static aspects of faces that enable recognition and identification activate 
the fusiform gyrus. More recently, Calder et al. (2007) provided an even more fine-grained 
finding concerning the compositional nature of face processing and the separation of gaze 
direction detection and facial identity: left and right gaze direction of the other are coded in 
the right anterior STS and in the inferior parietal lobule (involved in the orienting of 
attention), while facial identity is coded in the posterior fusiform gyrus. Moreover, we know 
that while the anterior STS is involved in the coding of different gaze directions, the posterior 
STS is actually sensitive to the intentionality of gaze and other biological signals (Pelphrey, 
Morris, & McCarthy, 2004), suggesting that a further distinction can be made between 
processing the movement of somebody’s eyes and detecting whether they are meant to 
communicate something or whether they are doing more than simply scanning the 
environment.  
Besides the right regions of the STS, there are other brain areas involved in the 
processing of gaze (see Grossmann & Farroni, 2009; Senju & Johnson, 2009 for more 
detailed overviews): the amygdala (activated in the processing of emotions or by arousing 
stimuli), the medial prefrontal cortex (involved in mentalizing12 and detecting and decoding 
communicative intentions toward self) and the orbitofrontal cortex (involved in decision 
                                                
12 With the term mentalizing I am here referring to the capacity to attribute intentions to self and others, a 
mechanism considered to be an automatic cognitive process (Leslie, 1987). 
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making). Moreover, a study by Kampe et al. (2003) has shown that hearing somebody calling 
our name and seeing somebody’s eyes directed toward us for a prolonged amount of time, 
while differing in modality and sensory channel, tend to activate similar brain areas, usually 
involved in mentalizing, namely the paracingulate cortex and the temporal lobes. The 
meaning of this finding is that both calling somebody’s name and directing the eyes toward 
that person, while acting like a summoning, signal the intention of initiating a communication 
by the other participant and our brain registers it. This explains the common experience of 
being in a public place, registering that somebody is looking at us and by the time we look up 
toward them, the person who was staring at us swiftly lowers the gaze or looks away. When 
this does not happen, the alternative is usually the initiation of a conversational exchange. 
Prolonged gaze toward our face works fundamentally like a verbal summoning, at least as far 
as our brain is concerned. 
All the findings reported above show that when we observe somebody’s eyes 
(directed toward us or even averted) a series of reactions occur in our brain, that might have 
to do with arousal and emotional responses if the context suggests so, but more generally that 
involve detecting communicative intentions directed toward us (i.e. somebody wants to 
communicate with us) and deciding what to do next, how to respond. 
The fact that gaze directed toward us indicates not only that we are the focus of 
somebody’s attention but also an intention to communicate with us is further confirmed by 
recent experimental work with infants developed by Csibra and Gergely and their model of 
natural pedagogy (see Csibra & Gergely, 2009 for a recent summary of their model). In their 
model of infant social learning, gaze toward infants is one of the ostensive cues that infants 
use to recognize that they are the ones being addressed, to expect the occurrence of some 
referential act in an ostensive context and to interpret the content of the communication as 
kind-relevant and generalizable. We will see in the following chapters how these neurological 
and psychological findings contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms at play during 
social interaction, in particular with respect to the use and perception of eye-gaze. 
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1.4 Gaze and Social Interaction 
 
Most of the detailed work on gaze in interaction has been conducted by social 
psychologists or kinesic researchers working on interaction in English or other European 
languages. The main focus of social psychologists has been to determine how specific factors 
would correlate with the amount of looking toward each other’s faces during a dyadic 
interaction, using such variables as personality, gender, age, social status, asymmetric 
relationships, seating arrangements and similar (see Kleinke, 1986 for a review of research in 
this area). Researchers such as Ralph Exline, Michael Argyle and Phoebe Ellsworth 
pioneered research in this area in the 60s and 70s. Alongside the social psychological 
approach, there was a move from linguists and anthropologists, together with those interested 
in cybernetics and psychotherapy, toward including nonverbal features of the interaction in 
their analysis and descriptions. I have already mentioned Edward Sapir, but there were many 
others as well including Elliot Chapple, Edward T. Hall, Gregory Bateson, Albert Scheflen 
and Ray Birdwhistell. The work of Birdwhistell, founder of the kinesic approach, has been 
particularly inspiring for many generations of researchers (e.g., Adam Kendon among 
others). Birdwhistell (see, e.g., 1970) tried to provide the field with a method and theoretical 
tools to produce an accurate and detailed description of body movements during an 
interaction, assuming their compositionality, communicative import and cultural variability 
(see, e.g., Leach, 1972). He assumed that there was nothing in peoples’ behavior that should 
be disregarded a priori as meaningless. This assumption has later been pushed even further 
by Conversation Analysts as summarized in Harvey Sacks’ phrase “order at all points” 
(Sacks, 1992 [1964-72]: 483). On the other hand, the obsession with wanting to provide a 
fully accurate description of any body movement, the focus on single case analysis and the 
attempt to divide body movement in pseudo-linguistic elements, similar to morphemes, led to 
the development of extremely long descriptions of body behavior that could not be used in 
any systematic comparison or corpus study. The fact that Birdwhistell never fully completed 
a description of any stretch of interaction he investigated confirmed the problem of having a 
too fine-grained tool to analyze something that might be interpreted and understood using 
different, broader, categories. There are, however, a series of insights from that approach, as 
reported by Albert Scheflen (1975b), a close collaborator of Birdwhistell: 
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1) The dichotomy according to which language is communicative, while every 
other visible behavior simply works as a cue for who is speaking or what is 
supposed to happen next is wrong; 
2) A participant does not speak, gesture, smile, hold a posture simultaneously 
to form a single message with redundant parts. Each modality is employed 
for specific purposes, some of which could be purely communicational, 
others might be regulatory and others again might be used to induce or 
sustain specific relationships between the participants in the interaction. 
 
The program was pushed for an understanding of visible behavior as a core part of the 
communicative process and not simply as a mainly redundant side thing, just used to cue who 
has to start or who has to stop doing something. Their main insights are as follows:  
 
1. Regulatory functions are not the only functions of visible behavior.  
2. Visible behavior is organized sequentially (an insight outlined by conversation 
analysts, e.g., Sacks, 1992 [1964-72]; Schegloff, 1968).  
3. What is managed during a conversation is not just the exchange of information 
and not just direct communication, but a more complex set of things, including 
relationships and projects that might not be part of the content of the 
conversational exchange.  
 
All these concerns have informed the work contained in this dissertation and will be 
emphasized in the analysis of specific stretches of interaction. These insights have permeated 
most of the work on gaze in social interaction, in particular the work of Adam Kendon and 
Charles Goodwin, whose studies will be described in more detail below. 
From a conversation analytic point of view, research on gaze in social interaction has 
focused mainly on three different dimensions: first, its relationship to participation in the 
conversation; second, its regulatory functions and its role in turn-taking; and third, its role in 
action formation. These areas, however, have received different amounts of attention, as will 
be clear from the following report of the main findings in each one of them. 
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1.4.1 Participation Roles and Participation Frameworks, Engagement and 
Disengagement 
 
A great deal of work has been dedicated to the relationship between gaze, participant 
roles in conversation and the participation framework in place. The idea that gaze is closely 
related to participant role (speaking, or being addressed, in particular) is persistent across the 
literature. In particular, it has long been claimed that in dyadic interaction, people tend to 
look at the other participant more when they are listening than when they are speaking 
(Argyle & Cook, 1976; Argyle & Dean, 1965; Argyle & Graham, 1976; Bavelas, Coates, & 
Johnson, 2002; Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Exline, 1963; Goodwin, 1981; Kendon, 1967, 1973, 
1990; Kleinke, 1986; Nielsen, 1962; Rutter, 1984). The first person to note this difference 
was Gerhard Nielsen in his seminal work on self-confrontation (1962). Interested in the 
timing of visual behavior in face-to-face interaction, he found that not only is there a 
“tendency to look more at the alter while listening to him than during one’s own speaking 
periods” but that most of the dyads “show a striking regularity: looking at alter decreased 
when speaking increased and looking at alter increased while listening increased” (Nielsen, 
1962: 141). Kendon (1967) provided a more precise description of the different patterns of 
speaker and hearer gaze.  He claimed that hearers give speakers long looks interrupted by 
brief glances away, while speakers alternate looks toward and looks away from the recipient 
of approximately equal length.  
These studies implicitly suggest that such gaze behaviors are independent of attributes 
such as race, culture and gender, for instance. There are, however, studies that claim racial 
differences with respect to the use of gaze to display engagement.  Specifically, Black 
Americans have been shown to look at the recipient more while speaking than while 
listening, while White Americans follow the opposite pattern (Erickson, 1979; LaFrance, 
1974; LaFrance & Mayo, 1976). Moreover, recent work by Rossano et al. (2009) shows that 
the amount and type of gaze interaction between speaker and recipient may vary across 
cultures and may also be strongly related to the social actions the participants are initiating 
through their talk. Indeed, they find that in the context of question-answer sequences in the 
three cultures investigated (speakers of Italian, speakers of Tzeltal, a Mayan population from 
Mexico, and speakers of Yélî Dnye, from Rossel Island, a remote island of Papua New 
Guinea), questioners are more likely to look at their recipients than vice versa, and they tend  
to do so by looking toward their recipient from the very beginning of the question without 
alternating looks toward and looks away. 
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Returning to general claims about gaze patterns in face-to-face interaction, Goodwin 
proposed two rules (1980: 275, 287; 1981: 57) that would account for gaze behavior in 
conversation, according to a case by case analysis of his data, and further supported by 
quantification in a small corpus: 
 
 1) “A speaker should obtain the gaze of [her] recipient during the course of a turn at 
talk.” 
 
 2) “A recipient should be gazing at the speaker when the speaker is gazing at the 
hearer.” 
 
If the recipient looks most of the time, then the speaker will find her/him gazing back 
any time the speaker looks toward the recipient. If the recipient is not looking at the speaker, 
the speaker has resources (phrasal breaks, pauses, restarting the turn) to solicit the recipient’s 
gaze. By proposing these as “rules”, Goodwin claims that participants’ gaze behavior is 
interrelated rather than independent and suggests a normative order to which participants are 
oriented during any turn-at-talk. In his work on gaze behavior during the course of a story 
telling, Goodwin (1984) emphasizes how participants’ visible—and, in particular, gaze—
behavior helps shape the unfolding of the telling.  Moreover, he proposes that a way to 
understand why gazing away from the speaker during a telling is rarely sanctioned or treated 
as problematic is that there is a relaxation of the gaze rule due to the co-occurrence of 
competing activities. However, the very suggestion of a rule that can be ‘relaxed’ 
immediately calls into question the normative strength of the rule suggested and whether it 
would not be more appropriate to come up with a rule that would account for this behavior, 
rather than requiring its relaxation. This dissertation will show that gaze is mainly organized 
at a different level than the one proposed by Goodwin. 
In addition to his seminal paper on how gaze deployment affects the construction of 
an utterance in progress (Goodwin, 1979), the most important work on gaze in social 
interaction from a conversation analytic perspective is Goodwin’s (1981) Conversational 
Organization: interaction between speakers and hearers. In this book, he describes gaze 
behavior as a display of attention and (dis)engagement in the conversation, or more precisely, 
a display of the type of participation framework the participants are engaged in. From this 
perspective, looking away is noticeable and potentially sanctionable because it displays 
diminished engagement in the conversation. On the other hand, engagement in some 
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competing activity (e.g. eating) provides a ready account for looking away rather than at the 
interlocutor’s face and thus makes it less sanctionable. However, this claim also implicitly 
suggests that participants are relatively free to remove their gaze from co-participants, 
provided that they direct it toward another activity in which they are engaged. This appears to 
be problematic from a closer look at a larger number of interactions. Indeed, as it will be later 
shown (chapter 2), some activities require more sustained gaze by the recipient toward the 
speaker (e.g., tellings) or by the speaker toward the recipient (e.g., questions) than others, 
suggesting that this relative freedom actually depends on the gaze expectations associated 
with the ongoing course of action. Moreover, participants appear to calibrate their looking 
toward competing activities so that they do not disrupt the progressivity of the talk; that is, 
for example, they might look toward a glass and pick it up to drink when they expect they 
won’t have to produce the next turn at talk (see chapter 4), so that drinking will not create a 
silence when talk would be otherwise expected.   
Further work on the relationship between gaze and participation has been developed 
by Heath (1984), who showed how a gaze and postural shift directed toward a co-participant 
can be used to “display recipiency”. As such, it “is sequentially implicative for an action by a 
co-participant; it breaks the environment of continuous opportunity, and declares an interest 
in having some particular action occur in immediate juxtaposition with the display” (1984: 
253). In this sense, a body movement can elicit speech by the other participant or it can elicit 
a gaze re-orientation. In this way, the person who produced the body movement in first 
position can obtain recipient gaze and begin to speak, making the beginning or the 
continuation of a conversation possible. Focusing on gaze and body posture as a way of 
displaying (dis)engagement in a course of action has been used in a fruitful way in the 
analysis of doctor-patient interactions (see, e.g., Heath, 1986; Robinson, 1998), and in 
broadcast interactions (Ekström, 2011). 
The work reported above shows that participant roles (i.e. speaker vs. recipient) affect 
participant gaze behavior. It also indicates that there may be normative expectations of gaze 
by recipients toward speakers, at least when they are not involved in competing activities and 
are listening to an extended telling. Looking toward or looking away from the other 
participant is often a good clue in terms of participants’ (dis)engagement in the conversation. 
However, as this dissertation will show, research on gaze and participation frameworks may 
have not adequately addressed differences related to social action. 
 
36
 36 
Returning to general claims about gaze patterns in face-to-face interaction, Goodwin 
proposed two rules (1980: 275, 287; 1981: 57) that would account for gaze behavior in 
conversation, according to a case by case analysis of his data, and further supported by 
quantification in a small corpus: 
 
 1) “A speaker should obtain the gaze of [her] recipient during the course of a turn at 
talk.” 
 
 2) “A recipient should be gazing at the speaker when the speaker is gazing at the 
hearer.” 
 
If the recipient looks most of the time, then the speaker will find her/him gazing back 
any time the speaker looks toward the recipient. If the recipient is not looking at the speaker, 
the speaker has resources (phrasal breaks, pauses, restarting the turn) to solicit the recipient’s 
gaze. By proposing these as “rules”, Goodwin claims that participants’ gaze behavior is 
interrelated rather than independent and suggests a normative order to which participants are 
oriented during any turn-at-talk. In his work on gaze behavior during the course of a story 
telling, Goodwin (1984) emphasizes how participants’ visible—and, in particular, gaze—
behavior helps shape the unfolding of the telling.  Moreover, he proposes that a way to 
understand why gazing away from the speaker during a telling is rarely sanctioned or treated 
as problematic is that there is a relaxation of the gaze rule due to the co-occurrence of 
competing activities. However, the very suggestion of a rule that can be ‘relaxed’ 
immediately calls into question the normative strength of the rule suggested and whether it 
would not be more appropriate to come up with a rule that would account for this behavior, 
rather than requiring its relaxation. This dissertation will show that gaze is mainly organized 
at a different level than the one proposed by Goodwin. 
In addition to his seminal paper on how gaze deployment affects the construction of 
an utterance in progress (Goodwin, 1979), the most important work on gaze in social 
interaction from a conversation analytic perspective is Goodwin’s (1981) Conversational 
Organization: interaction between speakers and hearers. In this book, he describes gaze 
behavior as a display of attention and (dis)engagement in the conversation, or more precisely, 
a display of the type of participation framework the participants are engaged in. From this 
perspective, looking away is noticeable and potentially sanctionable because it displays 
diminished engagement in the conversation. On the other hand, engagement in some 
 37
competing activity (e.g. eating) provides a ready account for looking away rather than at the 
interlocutor’s face and thus makes it less sanctionable. However, this claim also implicitly 
suggests that participants are relatively free to remove their gaze from co-participants, 
provided that they direct it toward another activity in which they are engaged. This appears to 
be problematic from a closer look at a larger number of interactions. Indeed, as it will be later 
shown (chapter 2), some activities require more sustained gaze by the recipient toward the 
speaker (e.g., tellings) or by the speaker toward the recipient (e.g., questions) than others, 
suggesting that this relative freedom actually depends on the gaze expectations associated 
with the ongoing course of action. Moreover, participants appear to calibrate their looking 
toward competing activities so that they do not disrupt the progressivity of the talk; that is, 
for example, they might look toward a glass and pick it up to drink when they expect they 
won’t have to produce the next turn at talk (see chapter 4), so that drinking will not create a 
silence when talk would be otherwise expected.   
Further work on the relationship between gaze and participation has been developed 
by Heath (1984), who showed how a gaze and postural shift directed toward a co-participant 
can be used to “display recipiency”. As such, it “is sequentially implicative for an action by a 
co-participant; it breaks the environment of continuous opportunity, and declares an interest 
in having some particular action occur in immediate juxtaposition with the display” (1984: 
253). In this sense, a body movement can elicit speech by the other participant or it can elicit 
a gaze re-orientation. In this way, the person who produced the body movement in first 
position can obtain recipient gaze and begin to speak, making the beginning or the 
continuation of a conversation possible. Focusing on gaze and body posture as a way of 
displaying (dis)engagement in a course of action has been used in a fruitful way in the 
analysis of doctor-patient interactions (see, e.g., Heath, 1986; Robinson, 1998), and in 
broadcast interactions (Ekström, 2011). 
The work reported above shows that participant roles (i.e. speaker vs. recipient) affect 
participant gaze behavior. It also indicates that there may be normative expectations of gaze 
by recipients toward speakers, at least when they are not involved in competing activities and 
are listening to an extended telling. Looking toward or looking away from the other 
participant is often a good clue in terms of participants’ (dis)engagement in the conversation. 
However, as this dissertation will show, research on gaze and participation frameworks may 
have not adequately addressed differences related to social action. 
 
37
 38 
1.4.2 Regulatory Functions of Gaze 
 
Much research on gaze in social interaction has focused on its regulatory functions. In 
what follows I outline what we know about gaze in turn taking, turn allocation, mobilizing 
response and sequence organization. 
Early studies of the regulating functions of gaze in turn taking argued that gaze works 
to show that speaker A is finished talking and thus is used to signal the handing over of the 
floor. Some researchers have focused on the importance of gaze in monitoring each other’s 
behavior and facial expressions (e.g., M. H. Goodwin, 1980; Kendon, 1967). Kendon (1967) 
and Duncan and colleagues (Duncan, 1975; Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Duncan & Niederehe, 
1974) have argued that speaker gaze has a ‘floor apportionment’ function in conversation and 
can function as a turn-yielding cue.13 In particular, they claim that speakers tend to gaze away 
at the beginning of turns and tend to look up toward the recipient when approaching turn 
completion in order to signal that they are ready to turn the floor over to the other participant. 
In his seminal work, Kendon (1967) not only claims that speaker gaze displays the relevance 
of response but also affects its timing. However, Kendon deals only with the general 
dynamics of turn taking. He makes no distinction between sentence types (such as 
interrogatives or imperatives) nor between action types performed through those turns at talk 
(e.g. announcements, challenges, complaints), but rather writes only in terms of “long” or 
“short” utterances. 
Beyond these early studies, subsequent work found no evidence that speakers use 
gaze as a turn-yielding cue. Beattie (1978, 1979) suggests that a speaker’s looking away 
during early utterance production, and reengagement during final production, are occasioned 
purely by the need to reduce cognitive load and that they do not have any regulating function 
in terms of turn taking.14 In trying to verify previous claims about the occurrence of looking 
toward a recipient approaching the end of the turn, Torres, et al. (1997) found that, of all turn 
endings in their data, only 16% included a look toward the recipient by the speaker and these 
‘look-toward’ only accounted for 15% of all the speaker ‘look-toward’. Most recently, De 
Ruiter (2005), examining task-based dialogues, confirmed the lack of a systematic 
                                                
13 Duncan and colleagues (Duncan, 1975; Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Duncan & Niederehe, 1974) actually refer to a 
shift in head direction as a turn-yielding cue, but specify that this should be taken as a proxy for ‘eye direction’ 
(1977: 211). 
14 In a direct response to Beattie’s paper, Kendon (1978) argues that Beattie’s data (conversations between a 
student and her/his supervisor) were not comparable to his (ordinary conversation between Oxford 
undergraduates), indicating that the kind of interactional situation participants are dealing with may well affect 
the deployment of gaze. 
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relationship between gaze and turn-taking in general, thereby reminding us of the need for a 
better description of gaze functions in face-to-face interaction. 
Another related line of research has focused on turn allocation or speaker selection in 
the context of multi-party conversations, rather than on turn transition. First, Goodwin (1979: 
99) claimed that, while uttering a sentence, “the gaze of a speaker should locate the party 
being gazed at as an addressee of his utterance,” and showed that the very construction of a 
sentence can be affected by whether recipients return the gaze of the speaker during the 
uttering of the sentence, thereby allowing for the establishment of eye contact between the 
participants. More recently, developing Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson’s (1974) work on turn 
allocation, Lerner (2003) compared gaze and address terms as ways of addressing a 
participant and showed that a speaker’s look toward a participant is an explicit form of 
addressing a participant, but its success is contingent on the gaze practices enacted by the 
other participants, in particular on whether both the addressed individual and the non-
addressed ones perceive the speaker’s gaze.  
A third, larger stream of research regarding the regulatory functions of gaze has 
adopted a somewhat different tack in suggesting that gaze works to solicit response. In their 
work on the social organization of word searches, Goodwin & Goodwin (1986) refer to the 
occurrence of speaker gaze toward a recipient in two examples of word searches, and they 
describe its function as a way of soliciting aid from the other participant. However, no 
systematic evidence for this claim is presented and, in both examples, this apparent 
solicitation through gaze is, in fact, unsuccessful.  
More recently, in an experimental setting, Bavelas, et al. (2002: 576-577) find that 
“the listener tended to respond when the speaker looked at her, and the speaker tended to look 
away soon after the listener responded. Together, speakers and listeners created and used the 
gaze window [mutual gaze] to coordinate their actions”. Their notion of the gaze window 
describes a mutual gaze situation in which it is not just that the speaker’s gaze elicits a 
response, but rather the listener’s response seems to terminate the speaker’s gaze. By ‘listener 
responses’ they refer mainly to mm hm, uh huh and nods, which have been labeled back 
channels in the literature (Yngve, 1970) or, within CA, continuers (Goodwin, 1986b; 
Schegloff, 1982). Bavelas et al. assert that one of the main features that distinguishes the gaze 
window from the pattern previously described in turn exchange (i.e. looking toward the 
recipient indicates that the current speaker is approaching completion of his/her turn and is 
ready to leave the floor to the other participant) is that there is no exchange of roles between 
speaker and listener.  
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One of the main conclusions that Bavelas, et al. (2002) draw is that the speaker does 
not look at the listener to monitor him/her for action but rather to solicit a response. A second 
conclusion is that listeners display their recognition and understanding of the action 
performed through gaze by responding “immediately and appropriately”. At the same time, it 
is unclear in which way the occurrence of a response before the withholding of gaze becomes 
evidence that listeners are responding specifically because of the gaze. Indeed, because of the 
coding system adopted for this study, a participant could have been looking for 10 seconds 
and if s/he looks away after a response, then the response would be considered related to the 
sustaining of the gaze, while the actual talk is not taken into account. A further problem 
associated with this study is that other communicative behaviors to solicit a response were 
not taken into account, and, as such, the specific actions performed through talk ignored. This 
suggests that the claim of a relationship between speaker gaze and listener’s response needs 
further specification, which has been provided, at least to some extent, by other researchers in 
more recent studies, to which I now turn.  
In a paper focusing on the resources that participants deploy to mobilize a response by 
a recipient, Stivers and Rossano (2010) identify speaker gaze as one such resource. They 
show that in face-to-face interactions, when the speaker is gazing at the recipient during an 
assessment or other non-canonical actions, the recipient usually responds to the initial 
assessment, while assessments that are not responded to are usually produced without speaker 
gaze or other response mobilizing features. The claim is that speaker gaze plays a role in 
mobilizing recipient response. Additional evidence for this claim comes from my work on 
question-answer sequences in Italian dyadic conversations (Rossano, 2010). I focus on the 
resources that speakers deploy to indicate to recipients that they are producing a question 
(and, therefore, that they are pressuring recipients for some response). I find that when 
speakers produce polar (yes/no) questions that do not have a prototypical interrogative 
intonational contour (i.e. a rising intonation), they are significantly more likely to look 
toward their recipient than when they are producing questions with prototypical interrogative 
contours. Given that polar questions in Italian can be marked intonationally but not morpho-
syntactically, the occurrence of speaker gaze toward the recipient appears to work as an 
additional cue that the turn should be responded to. Additionally, in work focusing on the 
timing of responses to yes-no questions in multiple languages, Stivers, et al. (2009) show that 
the occurrence of speaker gaze correlates with faster responses to participant questions. 
Although they do not take into account recipient gaze, and the number of participants 
involved in the interactions varies, the finding is nevertheless supported in nine out of the ten 
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typologically diverse languages investigated. Another recent cross-linguistic study that takes 
the sequential environment of talk and gaze into account provides additional evidence for the 
existence of a relationship between the occurrence of speaker gaze and the expectation and 
timing of a response. In their work comparing gaze behavior during questions in three 
unrelated languages and cultures mentioned earlier, Rossano, et al. (2009) show that, on 
average, speakers look at recipients during questions in 73% of cases. They also show that 
speaker gaze behavior during questions is similar across the three cultures, while recipient 
gaze behavior differs. Moreover, they find that questions are usually responded to and the 
ones that do not elicit response are typically produced with the recipient not looking at the 
speaker. Chapter 3 of this dissertation investigates further how gaze can be used to mobilize 
and pursue a response when the latter is missing. 
Chapter 4 instead will investigate how participants orient to the relevance of gaze 
withdrawal at sequence completion, particularly when this coincides with the completion of a 
course of action (for other means to project possible completion of a sequence see, e.g., 
Mondada, 2006). In prior work, gaze withdrawal was described as a function of reduced 
engagement with a conversation (e.g. Goodwin, 1981, 1984), yet the suggestion here is that 
the level at which gaze works is more fine-grained than previously described. In their work 
on assessments, for example, Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) argue that gaze withdrawal is a 
way of displaying diminished participation in the activity, and discuss assessments as a 
resource for closing topics and mutual orientation. Interestingly, though, in all examples 
shown in that paper, gaze withdrawal is not followed by immediate topic closure but rather 
by further talk (at least an additional TCU) either by the participant who withdraws gaze (if 
s/he was the speaker) or by the current speaker (if the person withdrawing gaze is the 
recipient). As will be shown in chapter 4, gaze withdrawal is indeed a resource for making a 
bid for closure, or for displaying a specific understanding of the ongoing development of the 
course of action. By bidding for closure, participants display diminished participation in the 
activity. 
In this section we have seen the claims about the regulatory functions of gaze being 
organized with respect to turn-taking, yet this dissertation will challenge those claims by 
suggesting that gaze behavior is organized with respect to the sequential organization of 
courses of action. Moreover, claims about the role of gaze in soliciting a response will be 
partly confirmed and partly refined, suggesting that this is the case in specific sequential 
environments, and not just at any point in a conversation. 
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1.4.3 Gaze in Action Formation and as a Social Act 
 
A third line of research, largely developed within the last few years, and for the most 
part undertaken by Kidwell, has addressed the role of gaze in implementing social actions, 
depending on its context and delivery. Kidwell’s work focuses, for example, on the 
recognizability of participants’ looking practices in interaction, particularly in a childcare 
setting and in interactions with young infants. Kidwell (2005) investigates how very young 
children can differentiate two practices of looking by caregivers, termed a mere look and the 
look. While a mere look tends to be of short duration, alights briefly on a target and is usually 
produced concurrently with other activities that the caregiver is involved in, the look is 
relatively longer, is fixated on a target and is produced as a discrete activity. Kidwell finds 
that young children treat these two practices of looking differently: whereas they continue to 
engage in whatever they were doing when a caregiver directs a mere look at them, those same 
children treat the look as prefiguring sanctioning. As such, after a caregiver’s ‘look’, children 
tend to inspect their own actions for its source (i.e. sanctionable behavior or activity such as 
harassing other children), and this often leads to a disruption of that behavior.  
In a related study, Kidwell (2009) shows how, in the context of children harassing 
other children, a gaze shift by the harassed child may be interpreted alternatively as “looking 
to” the caregiver as an appeal for her assistance, as “noticing” that the caregiver is 
approaching or as “searching” her out. The looking to gaze shift is “one in which the peer, 
when he or she shifts her gaze, continues her concurrent activities, readily alights and holds 
on a target, and directs action to the target” (2009: 150). The “noticing” gaze shift is “one in 
which the peer halts concurrent activities, readily alights and holds on a target, but does not 
produce action for the target” (2009: 153). Finally, the “search” gaze shift is one in which 
“the peer may stop or continue a concurrent activity, does not readily alight and hold on a 
target and makes appeals for assistance” (2009: 156). Thus, each type of gaze implicates a 
distinct social action that makes different responses relevant next. 
Focusing this time on gaze withdrawal, Kidwell (2006) shows how it can be 
differentially interpreted depending on whether it occurs during a conversation or when it is 
responsive to an imperative to comply with a directive action (e.g. an order) such as the ones 
a police officer might produce during his line of duty. Gaze withdrawal in this case can be 
taken as an act of resistance, and is thus dispreferred. Evidence is provided in that mutual 
gaze is pursued via both embedded methods (e.g. speech cut offs, gaze-tracking and 
embodied summonses) or via exposed methods (e.g. verbal commands to Listen and Look). 
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Finally, Haddington’s work (2006) focuses on how gaze can be used, in relation to the 
production of assessments, to display stances toward what has been assessed. He presents 
three types of gaze behavior (looking together at an assessable, mutual gaze during an 
agreeing second stance and cut-off gaze during actions that display divergent stances) and 
describes how they achieve stance-taking by interacting with what the participants are saying 
and doing during the interaction. 
While this work on gaze and its relationship to social action is relatively new, 
research has sometimes touched on the importance of mutual gaze or eye contact in 
conversation in ad hoc situations, while focusing on other interactional practices. For 
example, Egbert (1996) suggests that in German, the use of the repair initiator Bitte? is highly 
context sensitive. Germans tend to use Bitte? when there is no mutual gaze between the 
participants (including situations in which eye contact is impossible, such as phone 
conversations), while they tend to use other repair initiators such as Was? when they are co-
present and have mutual visual access. Sidnell (2006) also touches on the relevance of gaze 
in his investigation of how recipients identify and distinguish re-enactments from the main 
reporting of facts during a telling. In particular, he shows that during re-enactments speakers 
tend to look away from the addressee and keep their eyes away from the audience during the 
re-enactment. By doing this, the speaker shows that s/he is doing something different than 
addressing the other participant (cf. Goodwin, 1979), and indeed s/he is doing a re-enactment. 
Finally, in an examination of interviewee laughter in broadcast news interviews, Romaniuk 
(2009) suggests that interviewers withdraw their gaze when interviewees are laughing in such 
a way as to systematically terminate the relevance of responsive laughter. 
This section has described some recent studies that focus on how gaze and other 
embodied displays can be used by themselves to accomplish social actions, and also 
presented research that shows how gaze behaviors are constitutive of social actions, even 
ones performed mainly through talk. More generally, in agreement with Goodwin’s statement 
(1981: 30) that gaze “is not simply a means of obtaining information, the receiving end of a 
communication system, but is itself a social act”, this dissertation will focus on the systematic 
organization and deployment of eye gaze in social interaction. However, contrary to previous 
work, this work will show that gaze in interaction is not organized primarily by reference to 
turns-at-talk. Gaze behavior is mainly organized in relation to sequences of talk and the 
development of courses of action, to be subsumed under the general umbrella of “ongoing 
projects”, so that most of the variation in gaze direction should be observed at the beginning 
or at possible completion points of courses of action accomplished through one or more 
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1.4.3 Gaze in Action Formation and as a Social Act 
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sequences of talk. Note here that with the terms “courses of action accomplished through one 
or more sequences of talk” I refer to the fact that, for the interactional project to be 
considered completed, most actions require at least the occurrence of some sort of response 
or reaction by the other participant, and therefore an initiating action usually starts the 
development of a course of action produced by more than one participant. For the project to 
be complete and considered accomplished, more things have to happen. For example, a 
request for information, the action accomplished for example by a turn at talk, can be 
considered accomplished only if the other participant provides the information, and an offer 
is completed only if it is accepted or rejected and the thing offered is provided to the person 
to whom it had been offered. This means that the occurrence of an utterance and the action(s) 
that it implements opens the possibility of (and sometimes it normatively expects) the 
occurrence of another set of utterances or actions that would allow the initiating action to 
reach socially appropriate completion. This can be achieved in two turns or may require 
larger structures and therefore more than one sequence, though the participants’ orientation 
toward completing the gist of the initial action remains the same.  
More details concerning previous claims about gaze behavior in social interaction and 
how my position differs or aligns with those claims will be further outlined in the 
introduction of each following chapter. 
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1.5 Data and Method 
 
In order to analyze and comprehend how participants approach the boundaries of 
sequences of talk and actions, I recorded a series of videos of naturally occurring interactions, 
interactions in which people are having dinner together, playing cards, preparing food, having 
coffee or traveling together in a car, without providing them with any kind of script or 
instructions for the interactions that later occurred and without asking them to get together 
just for the recording. The recordings, then, were of interactions that would have naturally 
occurred independently of the presence of my camcorders and of my request to tape them and 
therefore their occurrence was more spontaneous and less likely to be staged.  Most of these 
interactions were dyadic, though some triadic interactions have been used as well to develop 
basic observations about the organization of gaze behavior. Details about the participants, the 
situation, the location and the main activity performed during each interaction recorded are 
presented in Appendix A. Table 1.1 shows the amount of data collected, transcribed, 
annotated and analyzed for the work reported in this dissertation. 
 
Table 1.1. Amount of data collected, transcribed, annotated and analyzed. 
What How Many 
Data collected Approx. 18 hours 
Data transcribed Approx. 5 hours and 30 minutes 
Data fully annotated15 Approx. 3 hours and 30 minutes 
Data analyzed qualitatively Approx. 12 hours and 30 minutes 
Data analyzed quantitatively Approx. 1 hour and 40 minutes 
Total number of participants in data analyzed 28 
 
Using this kind of data is crucial for the kind of investigation that I wanted to develop. 
Only by looking at what people really do in interaction was it possible to observe some 
recurrent practices for doing things with gaze. The need for this qualitative analysis, already 
emphasized in the quote by Lorenz reported above, is strongly related to something often 
observed by conversation analysts and remarked 40 years ago by Harvey Sacks (1992: 240, 
                                                
15 A large part of the data has been annotated for any shift in eye direction, for any shift in head direction and 
any postural shift and any nod by each participant. Multiple other annotations have been added with respect to 
the organization of the talk and social actions in those conversations, in relation to the specific practices under 
investigation, as it will be outlined in the following chapters.  
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Vol. II): “a base for using close looking at the world for theorizing about it is that from close 
looking at the world you can find things that we couldn’t, by imagination, assert were there.”  
Given the focus on the systematic organization of gaze behavior in relation to social 
action, mainly performed through talk-in-interaction, I needed a methodology that would 
allow me to dissect and identify the conversational structures independently of what my 
working hypotheses concerning gaze were. Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) provided 
this framework. This methodology focuses on action and interaction rather than on language 
and linguistic categories. CA allows a researcher to enter the granularity of interactions and 
to analyze details without losing touch with such macro structures as “sequence organization” 
and the “overall structural organization” of the whole event. Moreover, the focus on 
participants’ orientations and displays of understanding of the actions of the other co-present 
participants, prevents an ad hoc use of categorical labels and analysis that cannot be 
supported by what can be tracked back in the data.  The “proof procedure” of participants’ 
uptake, central to the entire conversation analytic enterprise, has been fully adopted in this 
work: I will not simply describe when people move their eyes, but try to document what kind 
of interactional consequences a shift in gaze orientation can reliably produce. I will be using 
Conversation Analysis because it aims to investigate empirically how talk becomes action, 
how action is structurally organized through talk and how participants understand the sense 
of what they are doing while they interact.  
However, the data reported here have not been analyzed only qualitatively. Insights 
from other disciplines will also be used in the general analysis of the data. As previously 
stated, I started from a qualitative analysis of single stretches of interactions, comparing ones 
in which some specific practice appeared to be deployed. After outlining the basic 
interactional features of each practice, I went back to the data, coded systematically what was 
happening in a specific amount of minutes (usually 10 minutes, as is indicated in each 
chapter) randomly picked from each interaction. The coding was done on the variables that 
had been previously identified as crucial for the practice investigated. I then ran statistical 
analysis of the coded data (mainly logistic regressions)16 to identify significant correlations 
between variables, most prominent predictors of specific outcomes, and more generally to 
                                                
16 Logistic regression is a statistical model used to predict outcome variables that are categorical (e.g. yes or 
no). In this case, if a participation role (e.g. being a speaker) predicts significantly better than the other (being a 
recipient) whether an individual will be looking at the other participant, then we can say that being a speaker 
rather than a recipient significantly affects the likelihood of the occurrence of gaze toward the other participant. 
In other words, participants look at each other differently depending on which participation role they have 
during the social action under investigation.  
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identify and quantify the systematicity of a practice by trying to falsify the empirical 
hypothesis concerning the function that a specific gaze practice might have, hypothesis 
developed while qualitatively analyzing the participants’ gaze in my corpus (Popper, 1959 
[1934]). In other words, I tried to put to practice the method indicated by Darwin (1872) and 
further summarized by Lorenz (1966) as “a biological approach to behaviour” in the quote 
reported above. 
The use of a statistical approach fully informed by CA findings is not alien to recent 
CA research. As Heritage and Maynard (2006a) put it: 
 
To extract robust outcome-based conclusions about how physicians (or 
patients) should conduct themselves in specific moments in the flow of the 
medical encounter, it is important to find a meeting point between the two 
methodologies of coding and microanalysis […] In other words, beyond the 
intrinsic worth of an analytical framework responsive to very granular, 
individual moments in the physician-patient encounter, we need one that 
simultaneously supports coding at a broader level of granularity sufficient to 
reach beyond individual cases to generate findings at a statistical evidential 
standard.” (Heritage & Maynard, 2006a: 8) 
 
In recent years, several CA works usually in institutional settings, have looked at an 
interactional phenomenon and used quantitative methods to assess the association between 
that phenomenon and some exogenous variable whether that be time (e.g. in Clayman, 
Heritage, Elliott, & McDonald, 2007), prescribing outcomes/provider perception (e.g. in 
Mangione-Smith, Stivers, Elliott, McDonald, & Heritage, 2003) or race and class (e.g. in 
Stivers & Majid, 2007).  
One reason for adopting a statistical approach was to understand whether gaze 
practices could be systematically identified across situations and individuals and to see 
whether the predictions about their generality, using qualitative methods, would survive an 
attempt to put them to test, in particular once applied to a larger number of instances, across 
different speakers and recipients, where the actions and context are in some sense 
comparable. Further details about how comparable actions and contexts have been identified 
for quantification purposes will be reported in each chapter. 
To annotate the details of talk and visible behavior from each interaction, I used the 
software ELAN (http://www.lat-mpi.eu/tools/elan/), developed at the Max Planck Institute 
for Psycholinguistics to allow researchers to view and simultaneously annotate multiple 
recordings (video and audio) of the same interaction (see Fig. 1.6 below).  
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Fig. 1.6 Screenshot of recordings of an interaction annotated with ELAN 
 
The playback and search functions proved extremely functional both for qualitative 
analysis and for the analysis of a large database. The layout of the software, that shows the 
annotations on a time scale, facilitates the identification of silences and overlaps. When this 
is combined with annotations in multiple layers, it allows the researcher to immediately 
identify whether specific visible behaviors were deployed, e.g., before or during the 
occurrence of a silence. Using the playback functions then the researcher can control for the 
correctness of the observation, as it is then possible to play just the specific bit of interaction 
under examination and verify in more than one video what happened exactly there. This 
software allows independent coding for any category we might be interested in, but at the 
same time it shows its role in context, as other annotations and layers can be visible at the 
same time. 
For the statistical analysis I used the software SPSS and the software STATA. 
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1.5.1 Transcription System 
 
The transcript of example 1.1 contains features that I will now explain. Talk is 
transcribed using the Jeffersonian system (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 2004a) 
usually adopted by Conversation Analysis. Given the use of Italian data, I adopted a 3 lines 
type of transcript, in which the first line is the text in Italian (the language in which the 
interactions occurred), the second line is a word by word translation from Italian to English 
and the third line is an English ‘free translation’, meant to convey the main gist of the 
utterance, both semantically and style wise.  
In addition to the content and style of the talk, additional symbols are present in those 
transcripts and they represent a new transcription system for eye-gaze in face-to-face 
interaction that I developed and that can be found in Appendix B. A published example of it 
can be found in Rossano et al. (2009). It differs from the previous transcription system used 
within Conversation Analysis and invented by Goodwin (e.g., 1979, 1980, 1981). In what 
follows I outline some of the basic features of my system and some of the differences 
between Goodwin’s and mine. 
 
1. It is ideal for dyadic interaction, though it could be used for multi-party 
conversations as well. 
2. It is more iconic, through the use of ovals representing faces and arrows 
representing gaze direction, than any other system currently used. 
3. It is combinatorial. Each participant’s gaze behavior can vary independently 
from the gaze behavior of the other. The number of possible symbols 
depends on the number of individual gaze orientation we deem worth 
distinguishing. In other words, the system can easily be increased if more 
features are considered worth reporting in a transcript. 
4. It does not simply report whether a participant is looking at the other’s face 
or not and whether there is a gaze shift. It adds many additional gaze 
configurations (e.g., looking at an object, closing eyes, looking away, 
looking up or down, etc.) that are interactionally relevant and meaningfully 
different from each other. 
5. By using the directionality of arrows, it partly communicates not just the 
direction of the eyes but also head movements (for example in the symbols 
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between Goodwin’s and mine. 
 
1. It is ideal for dyadic interaction, though it could be used for multi-party 
conversations as well. 
2. It is more iconic, through the use of ovals representing faces and arrows 
representing gaze direction, than any other system currently used. 
3. It is combinatorial. Each participant’s gaze behavior can vary independently 
from the gaze behavior of the other. The number of possible symbols 
depends on the number of individual gaze orientation we deem worth 
distinguishing. In other words, the system can easily be increased if more 
features are considered worth reporting in a transcript. 
4. It does not simply report whether a participant is looking at the other’s face 
or not and whether there is a gaze shift. It adds many additional gaze 
configurations (e.g., looking at an object, closing eyes, looking away, 
looking up or down, etc.) that are interactionally relevant and meaningfully 
different from each other. 
5. By using the directionality of arrows, it partly communicates not just the 
direction of the eyes but also head movements (for example in the symbols 
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indicating gaze shifts, like turning or raising eyes up, or in symbols such as 
looking away or looking down). 
6. It does not represent individuals’ gaze behavior as separate from the gaze of 
the other participant. By having both participants’ gaze behavior 
represented in the same symbol, the system claims that the combination of 
both participants’ gaze orientation is an interactionally significantly 
different configuration from any other. So if the speaker looks at the 
recipient but the latter has her eyes closed, this configuration has very 
different interactional consequences than a configuration in which they are 
both looking at each other. Facial expressions, or more simply a direct stare 
toward the recipient will not be perceivable by the latter and as such will 
affect what the speaker might expect from the other participants in terms of 
uptake. This also means, for example, that if the gaze configurations change 
during a silence, then that silence could be decomposed into different 
phases, to take into account the different potential moves that could occur at 
each point and to record the occurrence of specific interactional moves 
performed through gaze (chapter 3 will show examples of gaze pursuits 
during silence, gaze movements that perform social actions). 
7. By being located on top of brackets that have a beginning and end point 
(either on top of talk, or on symbols indicating the length of silence), each 
symbol indicates the stable gaze configuration in place during that stretch of 
talk or silence. The claim is that the length of a specific configuration might 
have interactional consequences (e.g., looking at each other during silence 
for an extended amount of time). As far as gaze is concerned, what matters 
is not just position and composition of the signal (Schegloff, 2007b) but 
also duration. This observation matches the “typical intensity” of a 
communicative signal as outlined in Morris (1957). Moreover, by indicating 
when it starts and when it ends, we can have a better grasp of the possible 
impact it might have on what gets said or done before or after that shift, 
knowing for example that the shift occurs on top of a specific word or after 
a specific amount of silence (see chapter 3 for a reflection on the length of 
silence and occurrence of pursuits). 
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8. The transcription system takes its metric from the talk, given that the focus 
of this work is to see the systematicity of gaze behavior with respect to 
social actions in conversation. 
 
The meaning of each gaze symbol is described in Appendix B. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation investigates how participants use their eyes at the beginning, in the 
middle and at the end of sequences of talk in interaction. Each empirical chapter specifically 
investigates one of these three contexts. Chapter 2 investigates how gaze behavior is 
deployed at the beginning of specific conversational units such as extended tellings and 
adjacency pair based sequences. I show how recipients use gaze to systematically 
differentiate between the two conversational environments. The chapter introduces the 
relevance of investigating the structure of social actions performed through talk to better 
understand how gaze behavior is deployed during a conversation. Moreover, it investigates 
how recipients manage to enact the practice reported here so quickly and so reliably. 
Chapter 3 investigates how speakers behave in the middle of a sequence of talk and 
how they can use gaze to pressure for responses. I focus on situations in which speakers who 
have produced a sequence initiating action that did not obtain a response pursue a response 
not simply verbally but also through using gaze toward the recipient. I first show how 
speaker and recipient gaze is deployed during sequence-initiating actions and how it affects 
the occurrence and the timing of a response. Then I move to instances in which a response 
appears to be missing and it is pursued through gaze. Finally I show how the practice of 
soliciting response/uptake via gaze can be deployed in contexts other than a transition 
relevance place. 
Chapter 4 investigates how people close conversational units such as courses of action 
and sequences of talk. In particular, it shows how withdrawing gaze from the other 
participant approaching sequence possible completion can work as a bid for closure and if 
aligned by the other participant can lead to the actual closure of a sequence. Sustaining gaze 
toward the other person when a possible completion of the sequence is reached, indicates the 
intention to expand or the understanding that the sequence is not complete as such and would 
need to be expanded. 
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Finally, chapter 5 provides the conclusions of the dissertation. It summarizes the main 
findings placing them in the broader framing partly introduced in chapter 1. Finally, it 
discusses a model that describes how gaze behavior in interaction is deployed, what are the 
driving forces in place and which kind of factors might constitute exceptions to its otherwise 
predictable and systematic deployment. 
This dissertation also provides a methodological framework that can be used to 
extend the findings reported here to related conversational environments or interactions 
occurring in other cultures or among other species. The findings should provide a useful 
improvement of our current knowledge about eye movement and gaze behavior during social 
interaction and may be of particular use for researchers interested in implementations for 
artificial intelligence or the study of cross-cultural interactions. 
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2   The Organization of Gaze Behavior in Two Different        
Sequential Environments 
 
 
How we depict any segment of the sequence is related to our conception of the whole. 
Edward M. Bruner Ethnography as Narrative (1986) 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
When do people look at others and when do they look away? What are they doing by 
looking at another person and by looking away? How do people decide when to look at and 
when to look away? In this chapter I present work that contributes to answering these 
questions. I show that gaze behavior in face-to-face interaction is orderly, specifically in its 
relationship to the sequential environment of the talk and the activities that the participants 
are implementing through their turns. In particular, I contrast recipient gaze patterns in two 
sequential environments: during the first turn constructional unit1 (henceforth TCU) of an 
extended-telling sequence (e.g., a story telling, a report) and during the first TCU of an 
adjacency-pair-based sequence (e.g., requests or offers).  
I first demonstrate that there is a systematic difference between the gaze behavior of a 
participant listening to the first TCU of an extended-telling sequence (henceforth ETS) and 
the behavior of the same participant listening to the first TCU of an adjacency-pair-based 
sequence (henceforth APBS). Whereas recipients regularly look toward speakers as soon as 
an ETS is projectably underway and sustain gaze toward speakers throughout the telling, they 
usually do not do so while listening to a first pair part2 turn. This suggests that being the 
recipient of a telling requires a different type of behavioral participation when compared to 
listening to a simple question. As such the findings presented here will provide a more fine-
                                                
1  Turn constructional units (TCU) are the building blocks of turns at talk. A TCU is the most minimal utterance 
produced by one participant that, in context, can be considered a comprehensible contribution to the interaction 
and a complete one. They “can by themselves constitute possibly complete turns and on their possible 
completion, transition to a next speaker becomes relevant (although not necessarily accomplished) (Schegloff, 
1996c: 55). See also § 2.2.4 for further clarification of this concept. 
2 A first pair part turn is a turn that makes conditionally relevant the occurrence of a second turn and its absence 
a noticeable absence. For example, an invitation makes relevant an acceptance or a rejection, a greeting makes 
relevant the return of the greeting by the other participant (see Schegloff, 2007b for a systematic description of 
the types of first pair parts deployed in conversation). 
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grained deconstruction of the hearer role than the one outlined by Goffman in Footing 
(1981a). I then examine the mechanisms that allow recipients to project which type of 
sequence a particular TCU is in the service of. To do that, I introduce the turn design features 
that tend to occur at the beginning of these different sequential environments and I propose 
that these features are crucial for the orderly occurrence of recipient’s orientation toward the 
speaker. Finally, I suggest some implications of the findings for our understanding of how 
human cognition works in interaction, and I address the issue of the proper structure of 
heuristics for human interaction. 
 
2.2 Speaker and Recipient Gaze  
 
In this section I first review what existing studies have shown about the difference 
between speaker and recipient gaze in interactions. I then challenge the general claim about 
their differences on the basis of a qualitative analysis of dyadic interactions. In order to 
determine an appropriate way of investigating the level of order of the new patterns 
identified, I propose further refining the domain of investigation. Finally, I provide an 
overview of what is known about ETSs in conversation as a way into the comparison of gaze 
behavior in different sequential environments. 
 
2.2.1 Background 
 
It has long been claimed that in dyadic interaction people tend to look at the other 
participant more when they are listening than when they are speaking (Argyle & Cook, 1976; 
Argyle & Dean, 1965; Argyle & Graham, 1976; Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2002; Duncan 
& Fiske, 1977; Exline, 1963; C. Goodwin, 1980, 1981; Kendon, 1967, 1973, 1990; Kleinke, 
1986; Nielsen, 1962; Rutter, 1984).  
As said in chapter 1, the first person to note this difference was Gerhard Nielsen in his 
work on self-confrontation (1962). It was, however, Adam Kendon (1967: 27) who provided 
a more precise description of the different patterns of speaker and hearer gaze:  
 
during listening, p [the speaker] looks at q [the hearer] with fairly 
long gazes, broken by very brief gazes away, whereas during speaking 
he alternates between gazes to the recipient and gazes away of more 
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equal length, the gazes away being longer than those that occur during 
listening. (1967: 27) 
 
Charles Goodwin suggested that quantitative measures of overall frequencies of gaze 
“may not be an appropriate way to study the organization of gaze as an activity in its own 
right” (1981: 94) and relying on a case by case analysis of the data he proposed two rules 
(1980: 275, 287; 1981: 57; 1984: 230) to account for participants’ gaze behavior: 
 
1. “A speaker should obtain the gaze of his recipient during the course of a turn at  
    talk” 
2. “A recipient should be gazing at the speaker when the speaker is gazing at the    
                hearer” 
 
According to Goodwin, if the recipient looks most of the time, then the speaker will 
find her/him gazing back any time the speaker looks toward the recipient. On the other hand, 
if s/he is not looking at the speaker, the latter has resources (phrasal breaks, pauses, restarting 
the turn) to solicit and obtain the recipient’s gaze. By proposing these as rules3 Goodwin 
claims that participants’ gaze behavior is interrelated rather than independent and suggests 
normative measures to maintain that level of order possibly for every turn of talk, giving 
Kendon’s observations a normative force. Indeed, if the recipient looks all the time and the 
speaker glances back and forth then there should be no need to deploy procedures to obtain 
recipient’s gaze orientation toward the speaker. Therefore Kendon’s gaze patterns should be 
the default for every turn of talk.4  
Kendon’s remarks suggest something intriguing from both an interactional and a 
semiotic point of view: a careful observation of just the eyes of two participants in interaction 
would allow us to distinguish who is speaking from who is listening and when they exchange 
these roles. “Kendon’s gaze patterns” have been apparently replicated and re-stated in all the 
subsequent studies mentioned above. 
                                                
3 In a footnote Goodwin (1981: 57) admits that even though he proposes these as rules applying to turns in 
general, this pattern is not found in every turn of talk.  
4 Kendon (1967) does actually indicate that this is a generalization and not every single turn of talk necessarily 
follows the pattern he is suggesting. The goal here is to take seriously the pattern proposed and at the same time 
the possibility of deviating from this pattern, only to suggest a different level of organization for gaze behavior 
that does not treat deviation from the pattern as “deviant behavior”, but rather normative gaze behavior, only 
limited to a specific sequential environment. 
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The literature suggests that there are few doubts about the causality of this 
phenomenon. Indeed, the general idea is that the different gaze patterns of the participants are 
due to the fact that somebody is speaking and somebody else is listening and the social roles 
of speaker and listener associated with them. The claim usually is that the occurrence of talk 
in a face-to-face interaction leads to the occurrence of these gaze patterns because of a 
conventionalized way5 of looking associated with a specific interactional role. The evidence 
for this claim comes from the fact that the participant role (of speaker and listener) is usually 
taken as the only independent variable and the occurrence of gaze as the dependent one. In 
other words, a participant would look at the other in a certain way and for a certain amount of 
time because s/he is speaking or because s/he is listening to the other participant, 
independently of the actions performed through the talk. 
Regulatory functions, in particular in relation to turn taking, have been claimed for the 
deployment of gaze (see chapters 1 and 3 for a review). For example looking toward a 
recipient or looking away could be used as a cue that a speaker is or is not going to select that 
person to speak next (see, e.g., Lerner, 2003). This would suggest that gaze also affects the 
exchange of speaker/hearer roles. As such, a straightforward causal chain that links how gaze 
is deployed to the simple occurrence of talk should be questioned. This leads to an empirical 
question: is the order of gaze behavior simply due to the participation role of speaker and 
listener, or does it depend on the details of what participants in those roles do and have to do 
in terms of social actions?  
If gaze is organized in relation to the participation role of speaker and listener, then 
speakership and recipiency would matter. There should be no difference if any distinction is 
made within the stretches of talk, in particular in terms of the sequential environment in 
which they are uttered and the social actions that are performed through their talk. If gaze is 
organized in relation to social action and what speakers and recipients do in each specific 
social action, then it should be possible to observe some systematic difference in people’s 
gaze patterns in relation to what they are doing with their talk. In what follows I test these 
hypotheses through a systematic analysis of empirical data. 
 
 
                                                
5 Some evidence that specific gaze behavior might be conventionalized comes from recent work (Rossano, 
Brown, & Levinson, 2009) comparing speaker and recipient gaze behavior during questions in three different 
cultures that displays that there is some cultural variability, in particular in terms of how recipiency is enacted 
and sustained. However this work does not distinguish speaker and recipient in general, but only during 
question turns and therefore focuses on more specific action types than Kendon’s work. 
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2.2.2 Contrastive Evidence for Kendon’s Pattern 
A qualitative analysis of twelve hours of recordings of naturally occurring dyadic 
Italian data suggests caution in embracing Kendon’s gaze patterns as they stand. Although it 
is true that on average listeners look at speakers more than speakers look at listeners, they do 
not do so invariably. A systematic analysis of video data shows that the length and the 
patterns of gaze toward the other participant vary widely during a single conversation. At 
times a recipient does not look at all at the speaker, and a speaker sometimes holds her/his 
gaze toward a recipient even when the latter is not looking back or during gaps.6 This means 
that there could be a substantial amount of time in which Kendon’s patterns would not 
accurately describe the data and thus undermine prior claims (e.g. by Goodwin) that the 
recipient looking toward the speaker is a norm-governed phenomenon. In order to show some 
of the differences between these situations, I will present four extracts taken from two 
different interactions (two supporting Kendon’s patterns and two that contrast with his 
claim). I then suggest that what distinguishes them and what matters for the participants’ 
organization of gaze behavior is not only who is speaking and who is listening but also the 
sequential organization of talk. 
 
2.2.2.1 Supportive Evidence 
The two following examples represent supportive evidence for the gaze patterns 
described by Kendon. They are both dyadic interactions in which the participants are female 
undergraduate students and long time friends.  
In example 2.1, A and B are two women in their 20s. They are sitting on two couches 
drinking a cup of tea and chatting about their babysitting jobs. Before this extract, B told A 
that she does not know how to ask to be paid more by the family she is babysitting for 
because they are also friends of hers. A says that she is a friend of the main family she works 
for too but on the other hand it is also fair to be paid given that it is a job (see line 1). The 
gaze behavior of both participants strongly resembles the one proposed in Kendon’s pattern, 
in which the speaker alternates looking toward and looking away from the other participant 
while the recipient tends to look toward the speaker. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 See chapters 3 and 4 and Rossano et al. (2009) for further evidence supporting this claim. 
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question turns and therefore focuses on more specific action types than Kendon’s work. 
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2.2.2 Contrastive Evidence for Kendon’s Pattern 
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In example 2.1, A and B are two women in their 20s. They are sitting on two couches 
drinking a cup of tea and chatting about their babysitting jobs. Before this extract, B told A 
that she does not know how to ask to be paid more by the family she is babysitting for 
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6 See chapters 3 and 4 and Rossano et al. (2009) for further evidence supporting this claim. 
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(2.1) 2GSOFA_aumentato 23:32 
                             
01 A:  .hh  e’   giusto anche che  me li  diano  .hh 
            be.3s right  also that me cl. give 
       .hh it is also fair that they give them to me .hh 
                         
02     pero’ in effetti non saprei  neanch’io co-<↑una volta  
       but   in effect  not know.1s neither I wh- one time 
      but actually I would not even know wh-<↑once 
                
03     io ho   aumentato 
       I  have raised 
      I have raised ((the price)) 
          
04      (0.5)    (0.2) 
            (0.7) 
                                    
05 A:  mi ricordo  che:  .hh ho      aumentato e  >ho      detto tipo< 
       me remember that      have.1s raised    and have.1s said like 
       I remember tha:t .hh I raised ((the price)) and >I said like< 
                       
06     hh c(h)ioe’ non mi r(h)icordo bene le mod(h)alita’ 
          that is  not me remember   well the modalities 
      hh I m(h)ean I don’t r(h)emember well the det(h)ails 
                                               
07     pero’ .h  tipo uhm:: (0.6) era stato magari .h dopo  l'estate
       but       like uhm         was.3s    maybe     after the summer 
       but  .h  like uhm:: (0.6)  it was maybe .h after summer 
                                 
08     (0.4) quindi ero    tornata (0.3) e  >tipo ho      detto< 
             so     was.1s come back     and like have.1s said 
      (0.4) so I had come back ((from holidays)) (0.3) and >like I said< 
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09     beh  dai     da  quest’anno faccio otto   euro<una cosa cosi’ 
       well give.2s from this year make.1s eight euros a  thing so 
       well come on from this year it is eight euros<something like that 
10     (0.8) 
11 B:  Ah con loro? 
       Oh with them 
       Oh with them? 
12     (.) 
13 A:  ((Annuendo)) Si’ 
                   Yes 
      ((Nodding)) Yes 
When this extract starts, participant A is holding a cup of tea in her hands and puts it down 
while producing lines 2 and 3 (the cup reaches the table in front of her while she is producing 
the first person pronoun “io” at line 3). A then reaches for a biscuit on the table and holds it 
in her hands until the completion of line 9, when she brings it to her lips and starts eating it. 
Participant B, on the other hand, is just sitting on the couch oriented toward A and neither 
eats nor drinks during this stretch of interaction. A produces most of the talk during this 
example, and she is the only speaker between line 1 and 9, where the direction of both 
participants’ gaze is transcribed. 
If we look at the speaker’s gaze (A’s gaze) we can see that it alternates between 
looking at objects (lines 2-5 when she looks down toward the table and the biscuits, and line 
9, when she glances at the biscuit before putting it into her mouth),7 looking into the middle 
distance (lines 6, 7 and 9), looking at the other participant (lines 5, 7, 8 and 9) and simply 
closing her eyes (lines 5-6). If we look at the recipient’s gaze (B’s gaze) we see that she looks 
at the speaker’s face most of the time (lines 1-9) (with only a couple of exceptions when she 
is looking at the table where A is looking [lines 2-3 and lines 4-5]).  
Example 2.2 shows a similar pattern. Here the two participants are friends who attend 
the same courses at the university. B is visiting A for the holidays, and they alternate 
                                               
7 Notice here how the relationship between vision and the motor control of parts of our body, in particular the 
hand, outlined in chapter 1 and claimed to be an evolutionary adaptation of primate vision, can be observed in 
any instance of human interaction. A looks at the biscuit before reaching for it on the table and then looks at it 
when she has it on her hand before putting it into her mouth to calibrate the distance, the precision of the 
grasping, the directionality of the movement and the physical effort to be applied to accomplish this apparently 
trivial task.  
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studying and chatting. A and B are sitting facing each other, A on a bed and B on a chair with 
a table on her right side. A few minutes before the beginning of this extract, B has made a 
phone call to her mother to let her know when she will return home. Line 1 completes a 
comment by A in which she says that she is glad that even engineers sometimes do not feel 
like working. The implicit reference here is to some friends of hers that the two women 
visited the night before. In what follows B reports the exchange with her mother on the 
phone. Mark is B’s boyfriend who is, at that moment, in another country and did not join her 
for the holidays. The two friends are clearly playing with the fact that while her boyfriend is 
away she can still go out and meet nice young men. Later in the interaction B will stress that 
she was just joking about this and this is also clear from the smiles during this exchange. 
(2.2) 2GSTUDYING_mamma 29:36 
01 A:  anche gli ingegneri 
       also  the engineers 
      the engineers too 
02     (0.3) 
03 B:  °Infatti° 
        Indeed 
       °Indeed° 
        
04     (1.4) 
                                 
05 B:  Mi fa   mia mamma  hai     conosciuto dei  bei      ragazzi? Si’ 
       Me does my  mum    have.2s known      some handsome boys    Yes 
      My mum says to me “have you met some handsome boys?” “Yes” 
        
06     (0.7) 
          (0.7) 
         
07 A:  A:[::h                          
       Oh 
      O:[::h 
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08 B:     [E    Mark?  
           And  Mark 
         [And  Mark? 
           
09       (0.7)
             
10 B:  Ehee Mark, 
       Ehee Mark 
       Ehee Mark, 
                 
11 A:  E   Mark sta  la’   eh [he] 
       And Mark stay there eh he 
      And Mark is there eh [he] 
                                
12 B:                           [eh]  
                                 eh 
                               [eh] 
         
13      (0.8) 
14 B:  °Quando poteva   star qui  no?° 
        When   could.3s stay here no 
       °When he could have been here no?° 
If we look at the turns in which B is the speaker we see that most of the time she is looking 
down, but she looks at the recipient twice (at lines 8 and 12). In contrast, A as a recipient 
looks at B most of the time (lines 5-13). We can also note that A looks at B while speaking 
(lines 7 and 11), while B looks at A only briefly (line 11) while being a recipient. This 
example shows a bit more variety than the previous one in terms of speaker-recipient gaze 
behavior, but we can still say that if we consider B as speaker and A as recipient their 
behavior supports Kendon’s patterns. 
What we have seen in these two examples suggests that speaker and recipient indeed 
display different patterns in terms of their gaze behavior and these patterns strongly resemble 
what Kendon suggested more than 40 years ago. On the other hand, example 2.2 has already 
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shown two turns of talk in which the pattern seems to be reversed, with the speaker looking 
all the time and the recipient looking up only briefly. This is not an isolated case, as will be 
shown in the following section. 
2.2.2.2 Counter Evidence 
Although the pattern described by Kendon is common, there are numerous instances 
in a conversation in which the gaze behavior of the participants does not follow this pattern. 
The following two examples illustrate this. They are taken from the same two conversations, 
so the participants, the reason for meeting, the general ongoing activity and all the other 
contextual features remain the same. If we can still see a difference and this seems to be 
systematic, then a different hypothesis should be provided for the organization of their gaze 
behavior. 
Example 2.3 is taken from the same interaction as 2.1. Before the beginning of this 
extract the two women were commenting about the drink they had and whether it was tea or 
something else. A then suggested that the smell of it resembled henna, a product used to paint 
one’s body with a short lasting tattoo (see line 1). In line 3 she begins a completely new 
topic. Also in this fragment, A is holding a cup in her right hand, which she puts down on the 
table during the turn at line 7. B is not holding anything in her hands until the completion of 
line 5, when she moves closer to the table and during the silence at line 6 picks up a biscuit 
which she puts into her mouth after completing the turn at line 7.  The ongoing competing 
activities are therefore the same as seen during example 2.1. 
(2.3) 2GSOFA_come   25:16 
01 A:  Questa e' henne p(h)ura [hh 
       This   is henne pure 
      This is p(h)ure henna [hh 
02 B:                         [hhu h[h 
            
03 A:                                [Ieri      ho      visto il  Milan  
Yesterday have.1s seen  the Milan
                  [Yesterday I saw Milan ((playing)) 
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04     cioe'  abbiam giocato di merda 
       I mean have.1p played of shit 
      I mean we played very bad 
               
05 B:  Non l'  ho      visto 
       Not it have.1s seen 
      I didn’t see it 
       
06     (1.2) 
                 
07 B:  Come t'  e' venuto in mente 
       How  you is come   in mind 
      How come you thought about it 
        
08     (0.3)
                               
09 A:  Ma  non lo so.     Stavo   pensando a  Sheva8 stranamente. 
       But not it know.1s stay.1s thinking of Sheva oddly 
       Well I don’t know. I was thinking about Sheva oddly. 
Let’s look at gaze behavior from a speaker-recipient perspective. When A is the speaker, she 
alternates looking at the recipient (lines 3-4 and 9) and looking down toward either her cup 
(lines 3-4) or the table (line 9).  B, as a speaker, does not look at A but rather orients toward 
the table and the activity of picking up a biscuit from the table (lines 5 and 7). On the other 
hand, she does not look much at A even while acting as a recipient. Indeed she looks only 
very briefly during line 4 and for about half of her turn at line 9.  While acting as a recipient 
A looks at B during line 5 but not during line 7. The speaker pattern is quite similar to what 
we saw in the previous examples while the recipient’s gaze pattern is quite different. There is 
no systematic sustained gaze at the speaker at any point. The generalization proposed by 
Kendon cannot account for this piece of data. It could be claimed that the difference is due 
only to the timing of the competing activities (picking up a cookie and putting down a cup). 
                                               
8 Sheva is the nickname of a soccer player who was playing for the Italian football club Milan at the time of the  
recording. 
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recording. 
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The competing visual involvement of the participants could be taken as a reasonable account 
for their not looking toward the other participant (see C. Goodwin, 1981). However, as will 
be shown later in the chapter, participants can and often do disengage from looking at other 
objects or being involved in competing activities because of what is happening in the ongoing 
conversation and what the latter requires in terms of visual engagement and display of 
participation. It is always a choice and at least a possible alternative. The question is rather 
whether in some cases abandoning the competing visual engagement has priority over its 
continuation.
In order to show that example 2.3 is not an isolated case, let’s look at another example 
(2.4) taken from the same interaction as example 2.2. A and B are preparing for an exam and 
A just said that she was trying to show B on the piece of paper she is holding what B had to 
say, like a TV anchorman who reads the news. They laugh about it (see lines 1 to 6). 
(2.4) 2GSTUDYING_testa    29:07  
01 B:  hh [ha ha] 
02 A:     [Q(h)uello che  devi    leg]gere  
           That      that must.2s read 
         [W(h)hat you have to re]ad  
03     (0.4) 
04 A:  hh hu 
05     (0.9) 
06 B:  .hhh 
07     (0.7) 
           
08 B:  Okay quindi   (0.3) 
       Okay therefore 
      Okay therefore (0.3) 
                                                
09 A:  .h No io veramente son scarburatissima ho      un mal di testa  
          No I  really    am  out of steam    have.1s a  bad of head    
      .h No I am really out of steam I have a headache    
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10     anch'io 
       also I 
      as well 
           
11      (0.1)    (0.1) 
             (0.2) 
                      
12 B:  Anch'io c' ho      mal di testa   ((annuendo)) 
       Also I  cl have.1s bad of head 
       I have a headache too ((nodding)) 
              
13         (1.1)       (0.3   
                  (1.4) 
                                                
14 A:  Poi  ho      detto sara'   il raffreddore sara': il-  
       Then have.1s said  will be the cold       will   the 
      Then I said it will be the cold it will be: th-  
            
15     i   postumi dell'influenza, (0.5)  
       the effects of   flu               
      the side effects of the flu, (0.5) 
B turns toward some sheets on the table on her right while producing line 8 and continues 
looking at them during lines 9-10, while A alternates looking toward the desk and looking 
down during those turns. If we focus on the speaker’s gaze behavior we see that B does not 
look at the recipient during line 8 while she does at line 11. A does not look at B at all during 
lines 9-10 and for part of lines 13-15, but during the turn at lines 14-15 she looks up toward 
B’s face. This speaker behavior again resembles that seen in the previous examples. On the 
other hand, if we look at the recipient’s gaze behavior we can observe that A does not look at 
B during line 8, while she does at line 11. And B does not look at the speaker during lines 9-
10 and at the beginning of line 13, while she turns toward A mid turn and keeps looking 
64
64
The competing visual involvement of the participants could be taken as a reasonable account 
for their not looking toward the other participant (see C. Goodwin, 1981). However, as will 
be shown later in the chapter, participants can and often do disengage from looking at other 
objects or being involved in competing activities because of what is happening in the ongoing 
conversation and what the latter requires in terms of visual engagement and display of 
participation. It is always a choice and at least a possible alternative. The question is rather 
whether in some cases abandoning the competing visual engagement has priority over its 
continuation.
In order to show that example 2.3 is not an isolated case, let’s look at another example 
(2.4) taken from the same interaction as example 2.2. A and B are preparing for an exam and 
A just said that she was trying to show B on the piece of paper she is holding what B had to 
say, like a TV anchorman who reads the news. They laugh about it (see lines 1 to 6). 
(2.4) 2GSTUDYING_testa    29:07  
01 B:  hh [ha ha] 
02 A:     [Q(h)uello che  devi    leg]gere  
           That      that must.2s read 
         [W(h)hat you have to re]ad  
03     (0.4) 
04 A:  hh hu 
05     (0.9) 
06 B:  .hhh 
07     (0.7) 
           
08 B:  Okay quindi   (0.3) 
       Okay therefore 
      Okay therefore (0.3) 
                                                
09 A:  .h No io veramente son scarburatissima ho      un mal di testa  
          No I  really    am  out of steam    have.1s a  bad of head    
      .h No I am really out of steam I have a headache    
65
       
10     anch'io 
       also I 
      as well 
           
11      (0.1)    (0.1) 
             (0.2) 
                      
12 B:  Anch'io c' ho      mal di testa   ((annuendo)) 
       Also I  cl have.1s bad of head 
       I have a headache too ((nodding)) 
              
13         (1.1)       (0.3   
                  (1.4) 
                                                
14 A:  Poi  ho      detto sara'   il raffreddore sara': il-  
       Then have.1s said  will be the cold       will   the 
      Then I said it will be the cold it will be: th-  
            
15     i   postumi dell'influenza, (0.5)  
       the effects of   flu               
      the side effects of the flu, (0.5) 
B turns toward some sheets on the table on her right while producing line 8 and continues 
looking at them during lines 9-10, while A alternates looking toward the desk and looking 
down during those turns. If we focus on the speaker’s gaze behavior we see that B does not 
look at the recipient during line 8 while she does at line 11. A does not look at B at all during 
lines 9-10 and for part of lines 13-15, but during the turn at lines 14-15 she looks up toward 
B’s face. This speaker behavior again resembles that seen in the previous examples. On the 
other hand, if we look at the recipient’s gaze behavior we can observe that A does not look at 
B during line 8, while she does at line 11. And B does not look at the speaker during lines 9-
10 and at the beginning of line 13, while she turns toward A mid turn and keeps looking 
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during line 14. Thus the recipient’s gaze behavior more closely resembles the speaker’s gaze 
behavior than the behavior described by Kendon.  
These latter examples show an interesting diverging pattern in terms of gaze behavior 
when compared to the first two examples. This difference does not apply to both roles but 
rather to the recipient’s. The speaker’s gaze behavior is similar to that observed in the first 
two examples. However the recipient gaze behavior is radically different. If Kendon's 
patterns were correct, and if they were normatively governed, the behavior observed in the 
latter example should be unusual or treated as deviant, but it actually occurs quite often in 
these data. If we aim for a model that accounts for every instance of gaze behavior, then an 
alternative hypothesis in terms of the organization of recipient’s gaze is needed - one that can 
embrace and at the same time explicate the different observable patterns and one that can 
suggest how participants know where to direct their eyes during conversation. 
 
2.2.3 Two Sequential Environments 
 
What accounts for the two patterns? Examples 2.1 and 2.3 are from the same 
interaction, just like 2.2 and 2.4. Therefore, the differences observed between the first batch 
of examples (2.1 and 2.2) and the second batch of examples (2.3 and 2.4) cannot be due to 
gender, general context of the interaction or whether the participants know each other. I 
propose that the differences are due to what participants are doing in the interaction at a 
micro level. In particular, I propose that the decisive factor affecting recipient gaze behavior 
is the sequential environment of the talk, e.g. whether the recipient is listening to the first 
TCU of an extended telling or of a first pair part action, such as a request for information or a 
complaint. In fact, the sequential environment of the talk is different in the two pairs of 
fragments. If we look back at the previous examples and we look at the sequential 
organization of the talk, we see that while the first two are extended reports, the last two 
examples are adjacency pairs.9  
In examples 2.1 and 2.2 the recipient looks up when the production of a telling is 
projectable (lines 3-5 in example 2.1 and line 5 in example 2.2) and sustains her gaze 
throughout the telling (which incidentally is a report). These cases support the argument that 
gaze is organized also with respect to sequential environment rather than just participation 
                                                
9 It could be said that another difference is the length of participant’s turns of talk, but this is an outcome of the 
kinds of actions the participants are performing. Moreover, if we look at examples 2.1 and 2.2 we can see that 
even among tellings the length can vary widely. 
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role. In both examples we see that recipients’ gaze orients toward the speaker at the 
beginning of a projectable ETS and is sustained throughout it. The telling may start abruptly 
(as in ex. 2.1) or after some silence following a turn that could constitute sequence 
completion (as in ex. 2.2). In both cases the recipient is not looking at the speaker before the 
first TCU of the projectable extended telling but looks at the speaker before the completion of 
that TCU. 
In examples 2.3 and 2.4 the sequential environment differs from the first two 
examples and so does the recipient’s gaze behavior. In both cases the recipient does not look 
at the speaker during the sequence initiating turn (lines 3-4 in example 2.3 and lines 9-10 in 
example 2.4) while she does during the responsive turn. Note that in examples 2.3 and 2.4 the 
recipient of the initiating turn and the recipient of the responsive one are two different 
individuals, but the pattern observed in example 2.4 is the same as the one described for 
example 2.3: the speaker of the first TCU of an APBS keeps looking through the responsive 
turn, while the recipient of the first TCU of an APBS does not look up (or she does so only 
minimally during the second TCU as in example 2.3) even though two TCUs are produced.  
These data extracts therefore suggest that participation status is not sufficient to 
explain the organization of gaze behavior. These data further suggest that the sequential 
organization of talk-in-interaction serves an important organizing function. The gaze 
behavior observable in extended tellings seems to correspond to Kendon’s pattern, while in 
APBSs the pattern is different and the recipient often does not look at the speaker. In what 
follows I explain what the term ETS entails and what is already known about the organization 
of extended tellings and in particular of their beginnings.  
 
2.2.4 Extended Tellings and Their Beginnings 
 
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) defined as turn constructional unit (TCU) the 
smallest conversational unit that can constitute a turn of talk. Turns may be made up of only 
one TCU or of many TCUs. In outlining the organization of turn taking Sacks et al. show 
that: 
In starting the construction of a turn’s talk, the speaker is initially 
entitled […] to one such unit. The first possible completion of a first 
such unit constitutes an initial transition-relevance place. Transfer of 
speakership is coordinated by reference to such transition relevance 
places, which any unit-type instance will reach. (1974: 703)  
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Critical here is that when speakers get the floor, they are not guaranteed more than 
one TCU. Thus, producing more than one TCU is contingent and may require the deployment 
of some specific interactional practice. Schegloff (1982) describes some of the practices 
speakers use when attempting to produce a multi-unit turn: 
a) The potential speaker may indicate, from the beginning of the turn, an interest in 
producing a more than one unit turn (for example projecting the production of a 
list by using a list-initiating marker such as ‘first of all’) 
b) There can be a turn devoted to projecting the production of a multi-unit turn (see 
e.g. Sacks, 1974 on story prefaces)10 
c) In positions different from turn beginning speakers may deploy other devices such 
as a ‘rush through’ to achieve a turn extension by speeding up the pace of talk 
approaching a possible completion of a turn constructional unit (see also Local & 
Walker, 2004) 
d) After the possible completion of a one unit turn, it may be that no other co-
participant starts a next turn so that if the prior speaker starts talking again, s/he 
may add a new turn constructional unit to the first one and thereby make it a 
multi-unit turn (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 1982) 
 
The first two are ways in which the speaker projects from the beginning that her/his 
turn will be a multi-unit one. By contrast, the last two facilitate the occurrence of a multi-unit 
turn during the course of the turn, in a way that is much less predictable for the recipient.  
In this chapter I have already identified a specific interest in recipient gaze behavior 
in ETSs (extended-telling sequences) and APBSs (adjacency-pair-based sequences). 
Extended tellings might occur either as a multi-unit turn or as a sequence that starts with an 
adjacency pair projecting that an extended telling will follow and in general both can be 
interrupted by repair sequences. While example 2.1 represents an example of a telling 
achieved through a multi-unit turn, example 2.2 represents an example of a telling sequence, 
where the recipient repeatedly intervenes and facilitates the production of the telling. In both 
cases, however, recipients11 usually not only sustain the gaze throughout the entire telling, but 
they also tend to look up toward the speaker very early, before the completion of the first 
                                                
10 See Sidnell (2011: 174-196) for a recent summary of the main ways in which storytellings are launched in 
conversation. 
11 In example 2.2 I am labeling as “recipient” the person who has not initiated the telling, even though in two 
moments of the telling sequence she is actually speaking. 
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TCU that projects the occurrence of the telling. The hypothesis here is the existence of a 
strategy that could be described in these terms:  
 
“To signal recognition and acceptance of an ETS, look at the Speaker” 
 
To provide evidence supporting this hypothesis, the focus of the remainder of this 
chapter will be on projectable extended tellings. Indeed, the recipients have to parse every bit 
of talk and body behavior online to figure out what action will be relevant for them to make 
next. If a specific gaze pattern is regularly produced, then it is reasonable to assume that this 
behavior (looking up toward the speaker) is one of the relevant next actions that a recipient 
produces when an extended telling is recognizably in progress. To be able to do that, there 
must at least be a point in which the recipient is able to project that a telling is under way. 
Indeed, if it were otherwise, there would be no regular recipient gaze pattern so early in the 
extended telling sequence.  
For this coordination to be successful, the collaboration of the co-participant is not 
only important but necessary, as s/he could block the production of an extended telling by 
simply taking the floor at the first transition relevance place. This implies that the co-
participant must be able to recognize that, at least approaching the transition relevance place, 
the current TCU is not going to be the last one of the telling but rather there will be further 
ones. It is, indeed, at that place that the recipient is asked to withhold a full turn of talk or to 
produce minimal feedback (see e.g. Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000; Schegloff, 1982; 
Yngve, 1970). The latter usually occurs around the possible completion of most of the TCUs 
that constitute a multi-unit turn; this shows that each completion of a TCU represents an 
opportunity for the recipient to confirm her/his recipiency or to initiate actions that can be 
easily integrated within a multi-unit turn (such as initiating repair sequences) or to derail it 
[such as starting oblique sequences by asking questions (Koenig, 2007)]. Nods, head shakes 
and assessments can be appropriate responses to the development of a multi-unit turn and 
display an understanding of the ongoing talk (C. Goodwin, 1986b; C. Goodwin & Goodwin, 
1987, 1992; Kendon, 2002) and can be used to convey affiliation with the teller’s stance 
toward the events (Stivers, 2008). 
The transition relevance place of each TCU is therefore a point where speakers can 
see if the other is playing their role as a recipient. For these reasons, this work could focus on 
what happens to gaze during the transition relevance place that follows each TCU of a multi-
unit turn. However, in examples 2.1 and 2.2, the recipient is already gazing and continues 
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gazing to the speaker if what is ongoing is a telling, and this is confirmed in many other 
examples in the corpus.  If the recipient is already gazing at the speaker and nothing really 
changes, it is difficult to make the case that it is at that moment that the recipient understands 
that the other participant is producing a telling. Moreover, there is interactional evidence that 
the recipient must arrive at this analysis much earlier. If this were not the case we would 
often observe overlapping talk after the first TCU of a multi-unit turn, as the recipient would 
start a turn and take the floor only to realize that an extended telling was in progress. We 
rarely observe this sort of interactional collision. Rather, the timing of continuers, 
assessments and nods suggests that recipients understand early in a TCU whether it is 
projecting the beginning of a multi-unit turn, and behave as recipients, at least by not taking 
the floor. 
All this points to the TCU that projects the extended telling, rather than the first 
transition relevance place, as a locus of order for further investigation. Moreover, we have 
already noted that it is very early in extended tellings that the recipients look up in examples 
2.1 and 2.2. Therefore the focus should be on gaze behavior at the beginning of extended 
tellings to see whether the regularities in gaze behavior can be accounted for. 
In sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 I provisionally identified, through qualitative analysis, 
different recipient gaze behavior projectable extended tellings vs. adjacency-pair-based 
sequences. I have then further refined the domain of investigation suggesting that the focus 
for ETS should be on their beginnings, and in particular in the first TCU. This seems to be 
the place in which recipients start looking up at the speaker (if they were not already looking) 
and when they start to sustain gaze toward her/him.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.1 and 2.2, the completion of the TCU that projects an 
extended telling vs. the completion of a first pair part of an adjacency-pair based sequence 
have different interactional implications. At the completion of the first TCU of a multi-unit 
turn (to pick one of the ways in which an extended telling can be produced), other 
participants withhold taking the floor, orienting toward the bid by the speaker to produce 
further talk. By contrast, the completion of the TCU that initiates an adjacency pair sequence 
constitutes a transition relevance place at which talk by another participant is not only 
allowed but typically due. 
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Extended telling 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Allocation of TCUs after a TCU projecting an ETS 
 
Adjacency-pair-based sequence  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Allocation of TCUs after the first pair part of an APBS 
 
In the following section, I provide further qualitative evidence of how participants 
distinguish these interactional places through their gaze and body behavior. While further 
illustrating the empirical evidence of the claim here presented, the following examples also 
provide some initial clues in terms of which features participants rely on to be able to 
produce these behaviors systematically.  
 
2.2.5 Further Qualitative Evidence 
 
This section uses two extended examples to illustrate how recipients’ gaze behavior 
functions as a display of their understanding of what kind of talk will follow (ETS or APBS). 
The recipient is the same in both instances and in both cases the interactants are looking at 
pictures together. The goal is to further demonstrate that gaze behavior differs when 
everything else but the sequential context remains the same. 
Example 2.5 shows the beginning of an extended telling (a story, in this case) in 
which the recipient looks up toward the speaker and shifts his posture from a prior orientation 
to a competing activity to being oriented toward the teller. This example is from an 
interaction between two male friends who are looking at pictures together. B (blue and white 
shirt) is visiting A (white shirt) to help A fix some problems on his computer. A has just 
returned from his summer holidays and he is showing B some of his pictures. Before the 
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beginning of this extract B told a short story triggered by a picture. He described his shock 
and concern when he woke up and heard an alarm coming from a big chemical factory. Line 
1 represents the end of that telling and line 3 A’s reaction to line 1.  
(2.5) 2PCOMP_rosso 10:59  
01 B:  Si' pero' era un falso allarme 
       Yes but   was a  false alarm 
       Yes but it was a false alarm 
02     (0.5) 
03 A:  A:h 
       Oh 
       O:h 
              *    
04 B:  .h E   quel giorno   che: (0.3)       
          And that day      that 
       .h And the day in whi:ch (0.3) 
   *= B raises head from pictures toward A but looks mid distance  
and not to A
                               
05 B:  [c'era  tutto rosso quando mi son svegliato la mattina  
        cl.was all   red   when   me woke.1s up    the morning 
      [It was all red when I woke up in the morning 
06      [  
                           
07 B:  ci siam presi paura perche' pensavamo  che  
       cl.    got.1p fear  because thought.1p that 
      we got scared because we thought that 
73
                                                     
08 B:  fosse successo qualcosa=nube  [tossica  
       was   happened something cloud toxic  
      something had happened=[toxic cloud 
                                            
09 A:                                [atomica  
                                                                           atomic   
[atomic  
After the completion of the previous telling and the receipt of the last bit by A (line 1-3), B 
starts another telling. He does it with a short inbreath, the use of the conjunctive “e” (and) 
and a temporal reference “quel giorno che” (the day in which). After a short pause at line 4 he 
adds a description “c’era tutto rosso” (it was all red) and a more specific time in which this 
event occurred “quando mi sono svegliato la mattina” (when I woke up in the morning) 
which becomes the beginning of a telling. The telling continues beyond line 9. Here I 
represent only the very beginning.12 The focus is what happens in terms of gaze at line 4. At 
line 3 both participants are oriented toward the pictures in front of them. However, at line 4, 
B starts a turn of talk and after the word “quel” (that) re-orients his head up more toward A, 
although his gaze is in the middle distance and not on A. Soon after the beginning of B’s 
head movement, on the last syllable of the word “giorno” (day) A moves his head and gaze 
up toward B and then sustains his gaze toward B throughout the telling. Thus, B appears to be 
orienting to A’s turn as initiating a new multi-unit turn. Additional evidence that he is 
oriented not just to the fact that B is talking but to what B is doing with his talk comes from 
the shift in posture performed by A during the silence at the end of line 4 and at the beginning 
of line 5. He goes from being oriented toward the pictures to being completely oriented 
toward B: he leans his head toward his right hand, while his right elbow is on the table (see 
picture at line 6). This shift in posture occurs at the same moment that B shifts his gaze 
toward A but also at a point in which A’s recipiency has only been displayed through gaze 
and not through any nodding or verbal continuers. As Schegloff (1998), has shown, the 
orientation of our head and torso is usually related to the direction of our attention and in 
particular it becomes a display of our willingness to engage in other activities. A’s shift in 
body posture at that point becomes an index of his disengagement from the activity of 
looking at pictures and his engagement in recipiency of B’s ETS. Not only that, by shifting 
                                               
12 In all the following examples of extended tellings, only the beginning part will be shown. 
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beginning of this extract B told a short story triggered by a picture. He described his shock 
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(2.5) 2PCOMP_rosso 10:59  
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       O:h 
              *    
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[atomic  
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his posture entirely rather than torquing his body, A displays his understanding that this new 
activity (listening to B’s talk) will not be short and therefore requires a rearrangement of his 
body in relation to the projected action. My claim is that the recipient of the telling (A) finds 
sufficient evidence in “.h e quel giorno” in line 4 to project that another telling will be 
produced, in a sequential context in which a telling from B had just occurred. A indeed shifts 
his gaze first and then his posture accordingly and acts as a recipient. It might seem quite 
bold to claim that “.h e quel giorno” would be enough to project a telling, but the previous 
telling by B (shown below as example 2.6), produced few seconds earlier, started with a 
similar phrase: “Pensavo a Porto Marghera. Quella volta che mi sono svegliato e si 
sentiva…” (I was thinking about Porto Marghera. The time in which I woke up and you could 
hear…).  
 
(2.6) 2PCOMP_Porto 10:49 
 
01     (1.0) 
02 B:  No pensavo  a     Porto Marghera 
       No think 1S about Porto Marghera 
       No I was thinking about Porto Marghera 
03      (.) 
04 B:  hm quella volta che mi son svegliato e   si sentiva iu:: iu::  
       hm that   time that me  woke up      and cl. hear   iu   iu 
       hm the time in which I woke up and you could hear iu:: iu:: 
05     ini[ziai ((S fa gesto tipo “avere paura” see Fig. 2.1)) 
       started 1s 
 I sta[rted ((B makes emblematic gesture of “being scared” Fig. 2.3)) 
06 A:       [Ah si’? 
             Oh yes 
            [Oh really? 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Emblematic gesture meaning “being scared” 
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Note the similarities between “quella volta che” and “e quel giorno che” (which is the 
expression he uses in example 2.5). A can be expected to use this resource to recognize this 
as a telling. A has just heard B using the former as a way of starting a telling. Moreover the 
turn initial “e” (and),13 produced at a place in which the previous telling is over, suggests 
either an expansion of the previous telling or another similar situation of waking up scared: 
what the two stories have in common. Finally, tellings frequently contain a time reference in 
their beginnings and this often provides a claim about the “tellability” and “news” of what 
will follow (Sacks, 1986). By offering a time reference a speaker not only specifies when 
something happened, but also accentuates, on one hand, that the events narrated happened in 
a recognizable moment in time and the access the speaker had to the events narrated (imagine 
saying “last Monday” versus “thousands of years ago”) and, on the other hand, it projects that 
what is going to be told is not something about the present, but it is located in some other 
time when the recipient was likely not with the speaker.  
There are therefore potentially multiple features in the beginning of this TCU that 
help the recipient to project that an ETS is likely to be forthcoming. Moreover, there is a 
double display of orientation toward the beginning of the telling, first through gaze and then 
through a shift in posture. Both occur in the context of a competing activity that heavily relies 
on the participants’ gaze: looking at pictures. This shows that even in the context of an 
ongoing engagement in a competing activity, the competing activity is abandoned and the 
recipient orients toward the extended telling as an activity having priority over the other 
activity. In my data set, participants are fast and effective in orienting their gaze toward the 
teller as soon as they can project a telling, even if this requires momentarily abandoning a 
competing activity. This suggests that a further analysis of the situations in which competing 
activities get prioritized over displaying recipiency to the telling is needed. It could emerge 
that sustaining an orientation toward a competing activity is a marked type of action and a 
way of displaying what kind of recipiency a participant is going to provide.  
Let’s see now what recipients’ gaze behavior looks like in the alternative sequential 
environment: the initiating turn of an APBS. In the following example the participants are the 
same as the ones in example 2.5. They are looking at pictures, and B, the person producing 
the initiating action (a request for information), is the same individual who started the telling 
in example 2.5. Thus, everything seems to be the same, apart from the content and action 
                                                
13 For similar claims in terms of the function of turn-initial “and” see Van Dijk (1979) on the pragmatic aspects 
of the use of connectives and Heritage and Sorjonen (1994) on and-prefaced questions and their claim that 
“and” invokes not simply a relationship between facts, but rather a relationship between the current turn and its 
interactional setting. 
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performed through the first TCU of B’s talk. Our focus is the recipient’s gaze behavior at line 
9.
(2.7) 2PCOMP_pagato 9:33 
     
        
08     (1.0) 
                                
09 B:  Soccia quanto   hai  pagato per entrar qua.  
       Wow   how much have.2s paid for enter  here 
       Wow how much did you pay to enter here.  
        
10     (0.2)     
     
11 B:  Die[ci  
       Ten 
       Te[n 
                          
12 A:      [Poco.  °Un euro. Due euro neanche 
            Little. One euro two euro neither 
          [Little.° One euro. Not even two euros 
At the beginning of this extract both participants are oriented toward the pictures on the table 
(see line 8). At line 9 B first produces an assessment that sounds like an outloud (Goffman, 
1981c) “soccia” (wow), most likely about what he is seeing in the picture (the dome of St. 
Peter’s church in Rome). Then he asks a question about the cost of a visit to the dome. That 
request for information is our focus. The recipient does not look at the speaker at all during 
the turn’s production. The speaker shifts his head orientation and gaze from the pictures to A 
while producing the beginning of line 9. This head movement is formally identical to the one 
described in example 2.5 during the beginning of the ETS. The only difference is that this 
time B looks at A when he ends the head movement while in the previous example he had a 
middle-distance gaze before looking at A. In example 2.5 the timing of B’s head movement 
and A’s shift in gaze orientation may have pushed for an understanding of the shift as a 
reaction to the head movement. This could mean that in example 2.5 A looked at B at that 
77
moment not because of what was happening in the talk, but rather because of what was 
visible in B’s shift in head orientation. Example 2.7 shows that B’s head movement is not, 
per se, prompting A to look up. At line 9 B turns his head and looks at A while A keeps 
looking at the picture. Moreover, A continues looking down through the following silence 
and looks at B only when he starts to answer at line 12. It could be said that A continues 
looking at the picture during the gap because of the indexical “qua” (here) at the end of B’s 
turn and because B’s index finger is on the picture. On the other hand, the index finger has 
been there since the beginning of line 9. A has been looking at that picture since before the 
beginning of line 9 and the speaker is staring at A during that turn. Finally, the absence of 
speech disfluencies in B’s turn notwithstanding (e.g., silences or phrasal breaks), B’s gaze 
toward the recipient and the absence of recipient’s gaze suggests that the recipient’s gaze is 
not normatively required or that Goodwin’s rule (1980, 1981) can be relaxed here because of 
the competing activity of looking at pictures.  
A comparison of example 2.5 and example 2.7 shows a clear difference between the 
recipient orientation toward the speaker during the first TCU of a telling vs. the first TCU of 
a sequence initiating action. In these examples the participants are the same, the competing 
activities they are involved in are the same and so is the environment where this interaction 
occurs. Moreover, in both examples the participants are looking down before the focus TCU 
and in both cases the speaker turns toward the recipient in the beginning of the TCU. The 
different behavior observed in these two examples, however, could be accounted for in terms 
of different understandings and orientations toward what is happening in the talk and what 
activities those TCUs begin. Recipients treat the beginning of a projected extended telling as 
a position where their gaze should properly be directed at the speaker whereas they treat 
beginnings of APBSs as not making gaze at speaker relevant.  
The two alternative hypotheses explaining recipients’ gaze toward the speaker 
presented throughout this chapter can be alternatively summed up as follows: recipients look 
toward speakers at the beginning of an ETS because 
 
a) someone is talking and the participant role of recipient requires looking toward 
the speaker most of the time 
b) the speaker’s TCU is in a particular sequential environment and is therefore 
initiating a particular activity (i.e. s/he will make particular social demands for the 
recipient, including producing appropriate responses at the right time)  
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Hypothesis a) has been proposed by prior literature on the topic, while hypothesis b) 
has been advanced during the course of this chapter (initially in section § 2.2.3) and then 
supported by qualitative evidence. The examples observed in this section point toward two 
additional issues that need to be addressed in the remainder of this chapter: 
1. Is this behavior affected by whether the participants are involved in competing  
   activities (e.g. cooking, eating, beading)?  
2. How do we account for those ETSs in the data set in which the recipient does not 
look toward the speaker before completion of the first TCU? 
 
In what follows I provide a negative answer to the first question and will deal with the 
second in section 2.3.4.  
 
2.2.6 Competing Activities and Their Relation to the Distribution of Gaze  
 
In the previous examples we saw that sometimes people are involved in competing 
activities while participating in a conversation. This work does not assume that the 
participants’ gaze orientation toward other objects is a sufficient explanation for their not 
gazing at speakers while being recipients. If people only looked at the speaker during the 
beginning of a telling when they were not involved in any other competing activity, this 
would suggest that recipients only sometimes look up and keep looking, namely when they 
have nothing else to look at. This is clearly not the case. Participants are constantly involved 
in other activities throughout the data set analyzed here and yet they systematically react to 
the beginnings of extended tellings in the same ways. In examples 2.5 and 2.7 I have shown 
that if a participant is involved in the same competing activity but the sequential environment 
of the conversation changes, that participant shows a different orientation toward the talk and 
as such her/his gaze behavior is systematically different. To stress this point and to deal with 
the alternative account that uses orientation toward other objects or activities as a reasonable, 
equally valid, option for the participants during a conversation, I show two additional 
examples in which the gaze behavior changes while the competing activity and the 
participants remain the same.  
In the following example two male friends are chatting facing each other. B has asked 
A to tell him how to prepare some recipes, as he will have to cook for 60 people for several 
days and he is worried about it. Our focus here is line 20, where B begins a telling. 
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(2.8) 2PPLAN_il problema 06:28 
16     (0.2) 
 
17 B:  Cosa¿ 
       What 
       What¿  
 
18     (0.6) 
  
19 A:  F(h)ate   tr(h)anquillamente    voglio dire non e' che (tu) 
       Make2p    relax                 want   say  not is that you 
       You can d(h)o it ea(h)sily       I mean it is not that (you) 
               
20 B:  Ho capito. Pero' il problema e' che  (0.1)   (0.4) 
       Have.1s understood but the problem is that  
       I understood. But the problem is that (0.1)  (0.4) 
   
21     uno   da   quel che   ho     capito che e' quello che   arriva  
       one   from that which have.1s understood which is that which arrives 
       one   from what I understood that is the one that arrives  
         
22     lunedi' (0.2) se ne intende abbast- somma  m'ha chiamato  lui e  
 Monday           it know.3s enough  well  me have.3s called he and  
 Monday (0.2) knows about it enou-well he called me and  
After B’s open class repair initiation (Drew, 1997) at line 17 and A’s repair at line 19, B 
starts his turn at line 20 claiming he understood A’s insistence on not worrying about the 
amount of cooking. Then he starts another TCU in which he counters B’s minimization of the 
difficulties of the event, by explaining what the issues are (fundamentally there are only two 
people cooking for the first day, including himself, and he is not much of a cook). A, during 
lines 16-20, is looking down, first at a piece of paper with the menu and then at some keys he 
has picked up from the table. After the words “il problema e’ che” (the problem is that) the 
recipient looks up toward the speaker and sustains his gaze through the beginning of the 
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has picked up from the table. After the words “il problema e’ che” (the problem is that) the 
recipient looks up toward the speaker and sustains his gaze through the beginning of the 
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telling, as seen also in example 2.5. What we see then is that A does not look at B while 
listening to the repair initiation (line 17) or doing the repair (line 19), nor during the first 
TCU of B’s turn at line 20, when the latter stresses that he understood A’s point. Rather, A 
looks up when B has projected that some explanation or details about why B is still worried 
will be delivered. In other words at the beginning of a projectable extended telling. 
Similarly, see example 2.9, which is taken from the same interaction and where A is 
again the recipient. They are still talking about recipes and A has started going through the 
menu in front of him to see how he can help B. The menu he is looking at is from the year 
before and this is why he is using the future tense throughout this extract. The target in this 
extract is the turn at line 5-6 where B suggests what he is going to do.  
(2.9) 2PPLAN-prendo 08:45 
 
01  A:  Allora gli spaghetti alla carbonara sicuramente ci saranno  
        Okay   the spaghetti      carbonara certainly   cl. will be 
        Okay spaghetti carbonara definitely will be there 
 
02       per[che' li   mettono] s[empre] 
         because  them put      always 
        beca[use they put them in] eve[ry time] 
    
03  B:      [Che schifo]       [Mangiano lo]ro 
             How disgusting   Eat.3p   they 
            [How disgusting] [They eat it] 
    
04        (0.6) 
 
05  B:   .hhh Allora facciamo cosi' io prendo fuori della  
              Okay   do.1p so   I  take.1s out   some 
         .hhh Okay let’s do this I’ll get some 
 
06        carta [eh¿ intanto 
          paper  eh  in the meanwhile 
         paper [eh¿ in the meanwhile 
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07  A:           [Il condimento al tonno e' sempre quello:::  
                  the dressing  at tuna  is always that 
                 [The tuna dressing is always the same::: 
08     [quindi     lo faranno] sicuramente 
          therefore  it do.3p   certainly 
         [so they will make it] for sure 
09  B:   [Prendo   la  penna]   
          Take.1s the pen 
        [I’ll get the pen] 
A is looking at the menu and speculating about the probability of having the same food this 
year as the year before at lines 1-2. B says how much he dislikes spaghetti carbonara and then 
suggests what the two of them could do starting from what he is going to do: pick up a piece 
of paper to annotate A’s cooking advice.  While producing lines 5-6, B reaches for the papers 
underneath the menu, therefore entering A’s visual space. At line 9, B says that he is going to 
take the pen and the pen is again beside the menu, within A’s visual space. But A neither 
reacts nor looks at B. His entrance into A’s visual space and touching objects close to his 
focus of attention do not lead him to look up toward B. 
If we then look more closely at the action at lines 5-6 we see that it is a proposal and 
at the same time B says that he will be reaching for the paper (under the menu A is looking 
at) and therefore will be intruding into A’s space. The use of the tag “eh” with slightly rising 
intonation displays that B is looking for a go ahead by A (Sacks, 1986), which he does not 
get, and yet B nonetheless proceeds in picking up the paper. The turn at lines 5-6 is also 
proposing, indirectly, that A interrupts what he is doing and that they start looking at each 
item in the menu in a more detailed way, so that B can make some notes. So it proposes a re-
start of the advice about the cooking. Finally, by detailing what he is going to do after having 
started his turn with a plural “facciamo cosi’” (let’s do this), B is inviting A to infer the part 
concerning what A should do if B gets some paper and, as such, to recognize what “I’ll get 
some paper in the meanwhile” means for him. What matters for us is that the TCUs in lines 
5-6 constitute sequence-initiating actions and A does not look toward B. Lines 7-8, similar to 
lines 1-2, are outlouds and A stops talking immediately after the end of this stretch of talk, 
letting B start the advice seeking activity with “allora partiamo” (Okay, let’s start) just one 
second after line 9. 
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In the prior example (2.8), we see that while the recipient is looking at objects on the 
table and therefore is clearly engaged in competing activities, he nevertheless looks up during 
the first TCU of a projectable extended telling. By contrast, he continues looking down 
during the sequence initiating action in example 2.9. Therefore, it is not simply that the 
recipient does not gaze toward the addressee because he is looking at something else. Rather, 
depending on what is going on through the talk, the relevance and appropriateness of a visual 
orientation toward the speaker is more likely to make the participant disengage from the 
competing activity or not. We saw this in examples 2.5 and 2.7 as well. This evidence 
supports the claim that gaze behavior in interaction displays priorities and recognition of 
relevance to specific sequential types of talk.  
Goodwin (1984) proposes that a way to understand why gazing away from the 
speaker during a telling is often not sanctioned or problematic is that there is a relaxation of 
the gaze rule. However, the notion of “relaxation of a rule” that would otherwise require the 
recipient to gaze at a looking speaker, does not sufficiently explain the interactional 
negotiation of local priorities and accountability of contingent choices, but rather takes for 
granted that competing activities at times get prioritized over visual engagement in a 
conversation. For recipients, looking at the speaker may not always be relevant, but 
sometimes may be. We should see an orientation by the participants toward the relevance for 
the recipient to look toward the speaker at the beginning of an ETS, no matter what other 
activities are going on. My claim that recipients tend to look at speakers during tellings does 
not mean that the recipient never looks away or glances at other objects in the environment. 
This actually happens quite often. For example, before grasping an object, or putting food on 
a spoon, or moving a cup toward their lips, participants normally look at the objects they are 
going to move. As said in chapter 1, this is related to visual control of actions (e.g. hand 
movement) and to a perceptual function of gaze. In studies that examine where people fixate 
when they perform routine activities on their own (see Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005 for a detailed 
review), it has been found that participants do not focus on the most visually salient object, 
but on what is more important for the spatio-temporal demands of the job they are doing.  
They do not look at irrelevant objects, but do look at the relevant objects for the ongoing 
activity (e.g., a glass if they are going to drink) before reaching for them. Thus, fixations are 
linked in time to the progression of the task s/he wants to accomplish. This simply means that 
in order to grab a cup from the table I look at it before reaching for it (and I can monitor my 
hand grip while I am going to grab it). This is not necessarily to display to the other 
participants that I want to grab the cup but because the accomplishment of the task requires 
83
coordination of my muscles in relation to spatial and temporal information. These glances 
will be brief and indeed related to the accomplishment of the task. If I am making a cup of 
tea, I have to look at the cup, at the tea bag and at the water boiler at certain points 
throughout the process. However, if I am simultaneously a recipient of an extended telling, I 
will display through gaze and body orientation that I understand and recognize that I should 
be looking at the speaker, by alternating glances toward the relevant objects and glances 
toward the speaker. Just continuing to look at the tea bags or at the cup should be an 
accountable action and not simply a reasonable alternative. 
Example 2.10 shows how a recipient of a telling (A) manages handling a competing 
activity (stirring the pasta in a pot) and attending to a report about B’s vacations. The 
participants here are two male roommates in their 20s and they are preparing lunch together. 
Notice in the three pictures how A (person on the left) first looks toward the pot with the 
pasta in Figure 2.4, but then keeps his body and gaze orientation toward the teller while using 
his stretched right arm to stir the pasta in the pot (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). They are already in 
the midst of a telling when this extract begins. 
 
(2.10) 2PRON1-mare 16:50 
 
01      (2.0) 
 
           
     Figure 2.4 
02 B:  No era bello perche’ dalla catena di sopra e’ come(Fig.2.4) se fos-  
       No was nice  because from  chain  of above is like          if was 
       No it was nice because from the chain on top it is as (Fig.2.4) if-  
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     Figure 2.5 
03     quasi  come (Fig.2.5) la Liguria vedi   direttamente il  mare_ 
       almost like              Liguria see.2s directly     the sea 
       almost like (Fig. 2.5) Liguria you (can) see directly the sea_ 
04      (0.2) 
05 A: mm hm 
      mm hm 
      mm hm 
06      (0.4) 
 
           
     Figure 2.6 
07 B: (Fig.2.6) Quando sei    li’   sopra…  
                When   are.2s there above 
      (Fig.2.6) When you are up there… 
 
The telling continues after line 7. This example shows how a participant might go out of his 
way to display sustained attention toward the telling even when a competing activity might 
require his attention as well. First he looks toward the object he has to reach for, to control 
distances and his reach, then, when found, he re-orients toward the teller and displays 
attentiveness with his whole body posture and gaze. 
85
 This section has shown that participants in interaction discriminate their involvement 
in competing activities in relation to what the sequential environment of the talk is.  
 
2.3 Generalizing The Claim 
 
It has been noted above that recipients’ gaze behavior during sequences of talk can 
differ between a first turn and a second turn and that recipients who were not already looking 
at the speaker often do not look up during the TCU that initiates an adjacency pair sequence. 
Nonetheless, it has not been established yet how generalizable these observations are and to 
what extent the pattern described at the beginning of ETSs holds. For this reason, a 
quantitative comparison of the following domains was developed: recipients’ gaze behavior 
during the first TCU of an ETS vs. recipients’ gaze during the first TCU of an APBS.  
Before proceeding with a quantitative comparison, I will show how my work takes 
into account a couple of general problems that emerge from prior literature on the topic.  
 
2.3.1 How These Observations Fit (or not) with Prior Literature 
 
In the preceding sections I have provided qualitative evidence that participants’ gaze 
behavior is influenced by the sequential organization of the talk and that the pattern described 
by Kendon and many others since only applies to participants involved in a multi-unit turn 
(as far as recipient’s behavior is concerned). This points to two general problems with prior 
work in this area outside of the conversation analytic tradition: 
 
1. Insufficient analyzed data, both in terms of the amount of minutes and  
   in terms of the number of different participants and their diversity 
2. Insufficient control of the sequential environment of the talk and  
   of the actions performed through talk.  
 
Most research in this domain is based on the analyses of 3 to 5 minutes of video 
recordings from each interaction. In my corpus, a single telling can take that length of time. 
Therefore some behaviors may not have been observed because of the limited amount of data 
analyzed. 
84
84
           
     Figure 2.5 
03     quasi  come (Fig.2.5) la Liguria vedi   direttamente il  mare_ 
       almost like              Liguria see.2s directly     the sea 
       almost like (Fig. 2.5) Liguria you (can) see directly the sea_ 
04      (0.2) 
05 A: mm hm 
      mm hm 
      mm hm 
06      (0.4) 
 
           
     Figure 2.6 
07 B: (Fig.2.6) Quando sei    li’   sopra…  
                When   are.2s there above 
      (Fig.2.6) When you are up there… 
 
The telling continues after line 7. This example shows how a participant might go out of his 
way to display sustained attention toward the telling even when a competing activity might 
require his attention as well. First he looks toward the object he has to reach for, to control 
distances and his reach, then, when found, he re-orients toward the teller and displays 
attentiveness with his whole body posture and gaze. 
85
 This section has shown that participants in interaction discriminate their involvement 
in competing activities in relation to what the sequential environment of the talk is.  
 
2.3 Generalizing The Claim 
 
It has been noted above that recipients’ gaze behavior during sequences of talk can 
differ between a first turn and a second turn and that recipients who were not already looking 
at the speaker often do not look up during the TCU that initiates an adjacency pair sequence. 
Nonetheless, it has not been established yet how generalizable these observations are and to 
what extent the pattern described at the beginning of ETSs holds. For this reason, a 
quantitative comparison of the following domains was developed: recipients’ gaze behavior 
during the first TCU of an ETS vs. recipients’ gaze during the first TCU of an APBS.  
Before proceeding with a quantitative comparison, I will show how my work takes 
into account a couple of general problems that emerge from prior literature on the topic.  
 
2.3.1 How These Observations Fit (or not) with Prior Literature 
 
In the preceding sections I have provided qualitative evidence that participants’ gaze 
behavior is influenced by the sequential organization of the talk and that the pattern described 
by Kendon and many others since only applies to participants involved in a multi-unit turn 
(as far as recipient’s behavior is concerned). This points to two general problems with prior 
work in this area outside of the conversation analytic tradition: 
 
1. Insufficient analyzed data, both in terms of the amount of minutes and  
   in terms of the number of different participants and their diversity 
2. Insufficient control of the sequential environment of the talk and  
   of the actions performed through talk.  
 
Most research in this domain is based on the analyses of 3 to 5 minutes of video 
recordings from each interaction. In my corpus, a single telling can take that length of time. 
Therefore some behaviors may not have been observed because of the limited amount of data 
analyzed. 
85
86
An additional complication is that we do not know the specific actions performed 
through the talk occurring in most of the previous research. In several studies the 
experimental task the participants were performing is described merely as “having a 
conversation” (e.g., Argyle & Graham, 1976; Kendon, 1967). In others the task for the 
participants is explicitly to tell (and listen to) a story (Bavelas et al., 2002) or to listen, 
wearing an eye-tracker, to somebody telling a story in order to be able to retell it to the 
experimenter (e.g., Gullberg & Holmqvist, 2006). In the latter two studies, the tasks and the 
pattern found (recipient looking at speaker’s face most of the time) confirm the initial 
observations made in this chapter that when somebody produces a projectable multi-unit turn 
of talk (such as a storytelling) the recipient will start looking at the speaker very early and 
will sustain the gaze throughout it. For the other studies it is impossible to dismiss the 
possible presence of reasonably long tellings that would explain the misleading 
generalization that what matters in terms of participants’ gaze behavior is only (or at least 
mainly) their participation status. 
This chapter combines a qualitative and a quantitative approach to the analysis of 
gaze behavior. The analysis relies on data from 10 dyadic interactions (10 minutes from each) 
and 20 different participants (see Appendix A for further details about these interactions and 
their participants). These analyses demonstrate that the sequential environment of the talk is a 
critical organizational feature of gaze behavior. The following sections outline some of the 
findings about extended tellings in the conversation analytic literature. 
 
2.3.2 Conversation Analytic Literature on Extended Tellings 
 
There has been a significant amount of work in Conversation Analysis on the 
beginning of extended tellings and how opportunities for their delivery emerge throughout a 
conversation. Sacks (1974; 1992 [1964-72]: 222-228) showed that stories are sequential  
objects that articulate with the conversational context in which they occur. Stories can begin 
with story preface sequences, minimally composed of two turns. Prefaces usually project the 
launching of a telling and usually involve a characterization of it that will help the recipient 
recognize when the telling is over and how to react to it. Jefferson (1978) studied how stories 
can either be elicited or solicited, how they are locally occasioned by being either triggered in 
the course of turn-by-turn talk or can be methodically introduced into turn-by-turn talk and 
how these tellings can be sequentially implicative for the talk that follows their completion. 
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Marjorie Goodwin (1982) described how “instigating stories” begin (i.e. stories meant to 
create conflict by reporting what a non-present person said about the current recipient). 
Among their common features, the principal character of the story is a non-present person 
and the story reports actions performed by this party that can be perceived as offensive for 
the recipient. Charles Goodwin (1986a) showed how diversity in the audience to a story, in 
particular with respect to the different experiences and relationship that recipients might have 
with the events being talked about, can affect the way a story is told. Lerner (1992) described 
how the production of a telling can be “assisted” by other participants. He showed that there 
are three main ways of assisting the initiation of a story: by prompting it, by provoking it or 
by producing a reminiscence recognition sequence (solicit + recognition). Moreover who will 
deliver the story is usually interactionally arranged in the course of the preface.  
C. Goodwin (1984) focused also on the relationship between gaze behavior and the 
production of a telling, though he did not analyze specifically what recipients of the telling do 
with their eyes at the very beginning of the telling. He argues that apart from displaying 
engagement and attention, recipient gaze fundamentally follows the rule described in some of 
his previous works (C. Goodwin, 1980, 1981) according to which if the speaker is looking at 
the recipient then the recipient should be looking back. He also suggests that in some 
sequential positions the rule can be ‘relaxed’ though not ignored so that the participant can 
attend to competing activities. In particular, he says that a non-gazing recipient may nod in 
different sequential positions compared to when the recipient is gazing, to display an 
orientation toward the possibility that looking away is a dispreferred activity. Goodwin also 
suggests that the body behavior of the storyteller, in particular assuming particular postures 
and looking toward the recipient, can be considered signals toward the recipient that a telling 
is about to start. However, apart from Sacks’ work on the verbal beginning of tellings and 
Goodwin’s single example of a “storytelling posture” by the incipient teller, none of these 
works explain in detail which features make clearly recognizable or projectable, from the 
very beginning of these extended tellings, that an extended telling will be delivered, and 
whether recipients display in any way their understanding of it before reaching the first TRP.  
Later in this chapter I will attempt to fill this gap. 
In what follows I provide a quantitative comparison of the participants’ gaze behavior 
in the two sequential environments above mentioned. 
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with the events being talked about, can affect the way a story is told. Lerner (1992) described 
how the production of a telling can be “assisted” by other participants. He showed that there 
are three main ways of assisting the initiation of a story: by prompting it, by provoking it or 
by producing a reminiscence recognition sequence (solicit + recognition). Moreover who will 
deliver the story is usually interactionally arranged in the course of the preface.  
C. Goodwin (1984) focused also on the relationship between gaze behavior and the 
production of a telling, though he did not analyze specifically what recipients of the telling do 
with their eyes at the very beginning of the telling. He argues that apart from displaying 
engagement and attention, recipient gaze fundamentally follows the rule described in some of 
his previous works (C. Goodwin, 1980, 1981) according to which if the speaker is looking at 
the recipient then the recipient should be looking back. He also suggests that in some 
sequential positions the rule can be ‘relaxed’ though not ignored so that the participant can 
attend to competing activities. In particular, he says that a non-gazing recipient may nod in 
different sequential positions compared to when the recipient is gazing, to display an 
orientation toward the possibility that looking away is a dispreferred activity. Goodwin also 
suggests that the body behavior of the storyteller, in particular assuming particular postures 
and looking toward the recipient, can be considered signals toward the recipient that a telling 
is about to start. However, apart from Sacks’ work on the verbal beginning of tellings and 
Goodwin’s single example of a “storytelling posture” by the incipient teller, none of these 
works explain in detail which features make clearly recognizable or projectable, from the 
very beginning of these extended tellings, that an extended telling will be delivered, and 
whether recipients display in any way their understanding of it before reaching the first TRP.  
Later in this chapter I will attempt to fill this gap. 
In what follows I provide a quantitative comparison of the participants’ gaze behavior 
in the two sequential environments above mentioned. 
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2.3.3 Looking Up during First TCU 
 
Prior sections illustrated a difference in the organization of gaze in two sequential 
environments. In this section I show that recipients systematically look toward the speaker at 
the beginning of an ETS, whereas they do not systematically do so at the beginning of an 
APBS.  
 
2.3.3.1 Beginning of Tellings vs. Beginning of Adjacency-Pair-Based Sequences 
Two types of evidence show that recipients look toward speakers in response to 
beginnings of ETS.  
First, recipients not only look up toward speakers, they also sustain their gaze through 
the transition relevance place and well into the following TCUs. In the 35 instances analyzed 
here it is not just that recipients look up quickly and then look away or toward something else 
before the completion of the TCU. Rather, they engage in the pattern previously described of 
sustained gaze toward the speaker. In this way they display that the looking up represents the 
beginning of that pattern, and therefore a display of recognition and understanding that they 
are/will be the recipient of a multi-unit turn.  
Second, recipients behave differently in adjacency pairs from the way they behave in 
extended tellings. If recipients look up simply because they hear someone speaking then there 
should be no difference. If there is a systematic difference, then it likely lies in the sequential 
structure of the talk. This would also confirm the observation made in connection with 
examples 2.1 and 2.2 and what distinguished them from examples 2.3 and 2.4. 
Let us look closer at the second type of evidence and focus on what recipients do with 
their gaze during the first recognizable TCU of an extended telling. The data analyzed here 
consist of 100 minutes of interaction involving a total of 20 different participants. I randomly 
selected 10 minutes from 10 different dyadic interactions and then coded for their content. As 
previously described, these interactions were not experimentally controlled and the 
participants were free to say and do anything they wanted, including producing extended 
tellings. I collected all the instances of extended tellings in the corpus without paying any 
attention to gaze behavior. These data yielded 68 instances of extended tellings. I then further 
reduced the collection to the extended tellings that started with the recipient not already 
looking at the speaker in order to assess whether something was happening to recipient’s 
gaze direction during the first TCU of the telling. The instances were therefore reduced to 
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38.14 Which TCU would count as the first one was determined post hoc, once the entire 
extended telling had been selected for the collection of 68 previously mentioned. The 
empirical question is whether there is a change in the recipient gaze direction during that 
TCU and whether the recipient starts looking toward the face of the speaker.  
I then went back to the same corpus and collected all the TCUs that initiate an APBS 
(i.e. all the actions that could initiate a new sequence, and not ones that would constitute 
expansions of an ongoing one).  This time the collection yielded 135 cases. These TCUs 
implement many different actions including requests for information, noticings, directives 
and announcements. Again, in order to observe differences in the gaze behavior of the 
recipient of that TCU, I reduced the collection to only instances in which the recipient was 
not already looking at the speaker before the beginning of the TCU. There were 103 
remaining instances. The question then is: do recipients look up toward the speaker as they 
did during the first TCU of ETSs? 
Table 2.1 shows the contrast between the two sequential environments and Figure 2.7 
depicts this contrast graphically. 
 
Table 2.1 Recipient gaze behavior during the first TCU of ETS and first TCU of APBS 
 Extended-Telling 
Sequences (ETS) 
Adjacency-Pair-Based 
Sequences (APBS) 
Recipient gazes at 
Speaker 
35 (92%) 43 (42%) 
Recipient does not gaze 
at Speaker 
3 (8%) 60 (58%) 
Totals 38 (100%) 103 (100%) 
 
 
                                                
14 The fact that in 30 of the 68 instances the recipient was already looking at the speaker does not constitute a 
problem for the claim here. Most of the tellings that began with the recipient already looking at the speaker were 
produced in second position, either as second stories or in response to questions by the other participant, or even 
as explanations of something they had just mentioned. This means that the other participant was likely oriented 
toward the speaker because the course of action was not possibly complete at that point, even if a telling was not 
necessarily projectable. This supports the findings described in chapter 4 about the withdrawal of gaze being 
related to an analysis of possible completion of the sequence of actions. 
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Figure 2.7 Percentage of first TCUs by sequence in which the recipient turns gaze toward speaker. 
 
In 92% of all cases recipients bring their gaze to the speakers once they hear that an 
ETS is projectably beginning. This distribution clearly contrasts with the one displayed in 
Table 2.1 for APBS. Here the recipient looks at the speaker in the minority of the cases (only 
in 42% of them), suggesting that participants can systematically differentiate their gaze 
between a TCU that constitutes the beginning of an ETS and a TCU that constitutes the 
beginning of an APBS before that TCU reaches completion.  
In order to establish whether the observed difference was statistically significant, the 
relationship between gazing at speaker and the sequential environment of the TCU was tested 
using a logistic regression. This further allowed for a correction of the standard error for the 
clustering of sequences in the 10 interactions.  
 
Table 2.2 Results of Logistic Regression predicting Recipient Gaze at Sequential environment.15 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Extended Telling 16.28*** 5.05, 52.45 
 
The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 2.2 as an odds ratio with the 
95% confidence interval. They show that if the TCU is the first one of a projectable ETS then 
                                                
15 *** denotes p<.001 
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the odds that the recipient will gaze at the speaker during that TCU go up 16.28 times in 
contrast with TCUs representing the beginning of an APBS. The results were adjusted for 
interactions to monitor whether what happens in one particular interaction would mainly 
drive this result in the direction just presented, but this is not the case. Thus, the difference in 
gaze behavior is generalizable and systematic with respect to sequential environment. These 
results contrast with the general claim of what I called Kendon’s gaze patterns and instead 
confirm the initial observation discussed with respect to examples 2.1 and 2.2 vs. examples 
2.3 and 2.4: recipient gaze behavior in projectable ETS is different from recipient gaze during 
the first TCU of an APBS. These results also show that recipients usually engage in sustained 
gaze toward the speaker within the first TCU of the ETS. They do not have to wait until a 
transition relevance place.  
There is, then, a systematic practice implemented by recipients of extended tellings, 
namely looking toward the speaker as soon as they detect the beginning of a telling and 
sustaining this orientation throughout the telling. This appears to be due to affordances and 
requirements of extended turns of talk and not simply to their being recipients of any turn of 
talk.  
The distributional evidence provided here shows that it is a replicable pattern. It 
shows that recipients treat gaze to speakers as something that they should do in ETSs but not 
necessarily in APBSs. The next section addresses the issue of the normativity of recipient’s 
gaze behavior in extended tellings by presenting a deviant case. 
 
2.3.4 A Deviant Case 
 
In documenting the interactional practice of recipients looking toward speakers’ faces 
during the first TCU of a telling there were 3 cases (out of 38) where this did not occur. In 
what follows I discuss how we can account for one of these cases16 and how these three cases 
add to our understanding of this practice.  Example 2.11 is one of the three cases. As will be 
shown, the recipient does not look at the addressee during what I initially labeled as the first 
TCU of the extended telling. Upon closer analysis though that TCU is equivocal as to 
whether it is closing the prior telling or initiating a new telling. The fact that the TCU is 
                                                
16 Of the two remaining examples, in one case the extended telling occurs without being projected, simply by 
having the speaker adding TCUs that end up constituting a telling while the recipient neither responds nor looks 
at the speaker. In the last case the recipient is trying to assemble a plastic rose and looks intently toward the 
objects in front of her saying outloud “Okay wait I need,” while the speaker starts the telling (i.e., she was not 
paying attention to the speaker of the ETS and considered the competing activity priority).  
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pivotal could explain the gaze behavior of the recipient. The participants in this example are 
the same as in examples 2.1 and 2.3. Here they are talking about a friend of theirs who is 
considered to be very insensitive. The focus is the recipient’s gaze at lines 6 and 10. 
(2.11) 2GSTUDYING_trattore 37:47 
01 A:  Proprio u- un trattore 
       Exactly a- a  tractor 
       Really a- a tractor 
02     (0.7) 
03 A:  mm- mm- va   dritta   per la sua strada .hh
       mm- mm- goes straight for    her way 
       mm- mm- She does not deviate from her way .hh 
                                      
04     Poi  non ha  piu' parlato assolutamente 
       Then not has more talked  at all 
       Then she did not talk anymore at all 
            
05     (0.2)    (0.5) 
      (0.7) 
                             
06 A:  Idem  [quando la Lea] si e' lasciata   con  M(h)atteh 
       Ditto  when      Lea  cl.had broken up with Matte 
       Ditto [when Lea] broke up with M(h)atteh 
                 
07 B:        [(A cioe')] 
              I mean 
             [(I mean)] 
        
08     (0.5) 
                                     
09 A:  .hhh  che  se- c'ero  anch'io pero'    quella sera 
       .hhh  that if- cl.was also I  but      that   evening 
       .hhh  that if- I was there too however that evening 
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10     siamo usciti tutti   insieme (0.8) e   la Lea 
       are   exit   all     together      and the Lea 
       we went out all together (0.8) and Lea 
                           
11     gliel’    ha  detto mi sono lasciata con  Matte .h
       her that has said  me am   left     with Matte  
                told her I broke up with Matte .h 
Line 4 is the last part of the previous telling, where A was talking about the day in which 
their friend C had behaved “like a tractor”, being extremely cold and unfriendly when she 
heard that A had broken up with her boyfriend. The talk at line 4 refers to the silence 
following C’s cold reply to A’s bad news. Whereas the recipient keeps looking at the speaker 
into the following silence, the speaker has already lowered her gaze before the completion of 
the TCU. During the silence the recipient lowers her gaze as well and both participants seem 
oriented toward the possible completion of the telling. Then, at line 6, A produces the 
possible pivot turn.  On the one hand, it could be heard as a story preface in which the 
speaker announces that the main point of the story will be describing how C did the same 
thing to Lea. On the other hand, the use of the term “idem” (ditto) suggests the possibility 
that the turn is a re-completion of the telling, stressing that what happened to A was not 
simply a unique case but rather something common, as it already happened with another 
friend of theirs. In this sense, line 6 could be further supporting evidence for the choice of the 
extreme characterization of C as a “tractor”. B is drinking some iced tea from a glass and she 
is not looking at A while doing it. The additional evidence that B has not projected the 
production of an extended telling at that point comes from her behavior during line 9 and the 
beginning of 10, when she puts the glass down on the table on her right and she looks at it 
while A is talking. At this point, indeed, line 9 could be understood as another pivot TCU. 
The TCU to be taken as one unit (because of its prosodic contour) is “c’ero anch’io pero’ 
quella sera” (however I was there too that evening). On the one hand it provides additional 
evidence concerning the reliability of the information at line 6 (A was there when this 
happened). On the other hand, it provides additional epistemic evidence of her knowledge of 
what she is reporting. So line 9 could be either looking backwards at what had just been said 
or looking forward to what has not been said yet. At line 10, after the first two syllables of the 
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word “usciti” (went out) B starts turning her head and her gaze toward A and from then on 
looks at A throughout the telling, including the 0.8 seconds of silence following “tutti 
insieme” (all together) at line 10. 
Once A has said that something similar happened to another person they both know 
(and that A was there and witnessed it) the clause “we went out” becomes hearable as part of 
a telling. The fact that the event is located in the past, the choice of words such as “sera” 
(evening), and the fact that A was also present all create a semantic compound that makes 
plausible an understanding of “we went out” as an event that is related to what has been 
mentioned in the previous two TCUs. Moreover, the absence of any specification of the 
subject in Italian (there is no “we” but first person plural is specified in the conjugation of the 
verb and it is not clear who could be the “we”, apart from A, C and Lea) adds to the                   
relevance of linking the initiating utterance with what preceded. Even just focusing on the 
choice of the verb “to go out”, we see that it projects a description of other things that 
happened during that evening, as “going out” represents only the first step in the possible 
schema of what normally happens when people meet in the evening. It is also a piece of 
information that contributes no crucial additional evidence to the negative characterization of 
C, so it cannot be perceived as a third piece of the re-completion of the telling. All these 
features allow B to recognize what is going on at that point and to look up and sustain her 
gaze toward the speaker, as happens in all the previous examples of multi-unit tellings. 
A closer look at this deviant case has therefore shown that the recipient is not really 
deviating from the otherwise common gaze pattern, but rather she is analyzing the 
conversation on-line and interpreting a pivot turn as a possible end of the previous telling, 
until she has reason to interpret the next piece as actually a piece of a new telling. At that 
point the recipient gaze pattern observed in previous examples is immediately engaged, 
therefore confirming the systematicity of the practice. 
This shows that deviant cases of the gaze practice described in this chapter can be 
reconciled with the normativity of the practice because participants’ behavior is explainable 
in terms of interactional contingencies. In what follows I show how this orderly gaze 
behavior is practically implemented and I show that the findings that emerge can tell us 
something about human cognition and behavior parsing. 
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2.4 On Projectability 
 
In the sections above I have shown that recipients look at speakers early in an 
extended telling. In this section I show how recipients can detect an extended telling in 
advance. In particular I show how recipients’ gaze becomes a possible key to access their 
understanding of what is going on in the interaction. A list of features will be presented that 
should account for how participants can project which kind of action will be performed and 
whether something is going to be an extended telling or not.17 Finally, some implications for 
research on decision-making, social cognition and heuristics will be discussed. 
 
2.4.1 Projecting an ETS 
 
The participants in these data look up toward the speakers of extended tellings 
systematically at the very beginning of the telling. How can a recipient recognize an extended 
telling right at the beginning, i.e. in the first TCU? I want to propose and test four18 candidate 
features: 
  
1. The speaker is gazing at recipient 
2. The sentence type of the TCU 
3. The action performed by the TCU 
4. Lexical choice in the TCUs 
 
These four features are not mutually exclusive and participants very likely rely on 
more than one of them, or even all of them at the same time in order to recognize ETSs. This 
analysis will suggest that some of these features seem to matter more than others, without 
                                                
17 Projection in social interaction is crucial not only for the fast unfolding of turn-taking, but also for the 
capacity of producing a sequentially appropriate next action while the first is still underway (i.e., in overlap). A 
few scholars have investigated this mechanism not from a psychological point of view but from an interactional 
one. As Mondada (2006: 118) summarized: “projections can be observed within prosodical, syntactic (Auer, 
2005), turn constructional (Schegloff, 1996c; Selting, 2000; Ford, 2004), sequential (Drew, 1995), and gestural 
(Streeck, 1995) organizational practices.” 
18 It has been suggested that a fifth feature should be the posture the speaker of an ETS assumes before 
launching into a telling, as suggested by Goodwin (1984). However, examples 2.5 and 2.7 show that often there 
is absolutely no difference between the posture a speaker assumes before launching a telling and the posture a 
speaker assumes before initiating an APBS. A further look at the instances of ETS and APBS this dataset show 
that speakers do not reliably assume one or more specific posture for ETS, clearly systematically distinguishable 
from the ones they assume for APBS. Moreover, often there is no shift in posture by the speaker at all before the 
beginning of an ETS. 
94
94
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completely rejecting some additional influence of the others. In presenting the analysis 
performed on each of the four features above mentioned, I will present fragments from 
examples previously shown in this chapter (or new ones, in case no example previously 
shown contained the dimension of interest). As such, the numeration of the examples refers 
to the number that the example had when it was first presented within this chapter.19 
Let us begin by returning to our current knowledge of the database of ETSs and 
APBSs previously examined. Table 2.3 shows that there are 38 instances of beginnings of 
ETSs and 103 instances of first pair parts of APBSs that start with the recipient not already 
looking at the speaker. In 92% of the first TCUs of ETSs the recipient starts looking toward 
the speaker, while this happens in only 42% of the first TCUs of first pair parts of APBSs. 
Table 2.3 Current knowledge about the data set  
Sequential Environment Number of instances Recipient starts to look at 
Speaker 
ETS 38 92% 
APBS 103 42% 
The first feature –speaker gaze toward recipient during the TCU– is proposed as a 
candidate given Goodwin’s claim (1980, 1981, 2000b, 2006) that speaker and recipient gaze 
could be considered as two parts of an adjacency pair where the presence of the first 
(speaker’s gaze toward recipient) makes conditionally relevant the occurrence of the second 
(recipient’s gaze toward speaker). It is possible that recipients look up more often during the 
beginning of extended tellings because the speaker tends to look at them in those situations. 
Example 2.8 could be supporting evidence for this claim. 
(2.8) 2PPLAN_il problema 06:28 
               
20 B:  Ho capito. Pero' il problema e' che  (0.1)  (0.4) 
       Understood but   the problem is that  
I understood. But the problem is that (0.1)  (0.4)
                                               
19 Some of the extracts presented in chapter 2 will be presented again in the following chapters, to show that 
multiple practices can be deployed one after the other on the same conversational fragment. This will also show 
that potentially any extract from a dyadic conversation might show evidence of the various practices described 
in this work. 
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In this example the speaker looks toward the recipient before the latter looks up. 
However, there are many cases (e.g. 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.11) in which this is not the case. Let’s 
look for example at the beginning of the extended telling shown earlier in example 2.2. 
(2.2) 2GSTUDYING_mamma 29:36 
                                 
05 B:   Mi fa   mia mamma hai     conosciuto dei  bei      ragazzi? Si’ 
        Me does my  mum   have.2s known      some handsome boys    Yes 
       My mum says to me have you met some handsome boys? Yes 
In this example the speaker never looks at the recipient while the recipient looks toward the 
speaker early in the TCU. The qualitative analysis shows that it is unlikely that speakers’ 
gaze is systematically making relevant recipients gaze toward them, but a more quantitative 
approach is needed here. I therefore looked at participant’s gaze behavior across the database. 
Tables 2.4 to 2.7 show that it is unlikely that speaker’s gaze toward the recipient is the 
driving force of recipient’s gaze behavior. Although speakers tend to look up toward the 
recipient a bit more during the first TCU of an extended telling (60.5%) than during the first 
TCU of an APBS (43.7%), the number of instances in which the speaker is not gazing and the 
recipient nonetheless looks up toward the speaker are too high to support such an analysis as 
a primary account (see Tables 2.5 and 2.7). Indeed, in 34.2% of the cases of extended tellings 
and in 14.5% of the cases of sequence initiating actions the recipient looks toward the 
speaker even if the speaker is not looking.20 The percentage of TCUs in which there is no 
gaze by any participant in APBS is also remarkable. As shown in Table 2.7, 41.7% of 
sequence initiating turns (APBS) are produced without any gaze toward each other by any of 
the participants and even more remarkable is the percentage of TCUs in which there is no 
mutual gaze during the course of the entire first TCU (72.8% for APBS and 42.1% for ETS). 
These percentages counter the claim by Goodwin that mutual gaze is the default during face-
to-face interactions and that not engaging in mutual gaze during a turn would be accountable 
or problematic.  
                                               
20 Additional evidence against a Goodwinian account is that in my data speakers who do not have recipient’s 
gaze do not usually produce cut off, phrasal break or pause to secure the recipient’s gaze before the completion 
of the turn. Specific evidence for this point is provided in Rossano et al. (2009) and in the following chapters of 
this dissertation. 
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Table 2.4 Gaze behavior during first TCU of ETS. 
Participant Gaze at other participant Gaze away from other 
participant
Speaker 23 (60.5%) 15 (39.5%) 
Recipient 35 (92.1%) 3 (7.9%) 
Table 2.5 Instances of no mutual gaze in first TCU of ETS, divided by gaze configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total no Mutual 
Gaze 
2 (5.3%) 1 (2.6%) 13 (34.2%) 16 (42.1%) 
Table 2.6 Gaze behavior during first TCU of APBS. 
Participant Gaze at other participant Gaze away from other 
participant 
Speaker 45 (43.7%) 58 (56.3%) 
Recipient 43 (41.7%) 60 (58.3%) 
Table 2.7 Instances of no mutual gaze in first TCU of APBS, divided by gaze configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total no Mutual 
Gaze 
43 (41.7%) 17 (16.5%) 15 (14.5%) 75 (72.8%) 
The second feature I proposed was sentence type. Relying on sentence types for 
determining whether the recipient should be looking at the speaker means relying 
fundamentally on specific morpho-syntactic features of the TCU. I considered the 
distribution of three sentence types: interrogative, declarative, imperative. We might expect 
that, for instance, declaratives would be more likely to be associated with the recipient’s gaze 
because tellings often start with turns in a declarative format, while interrogatives would be 
more likely associated with first pair parts in APBSs and therefore less likely to get the 
recipient’s gaze. 
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Example 2.7 shows a TCU with interrogative morpho-syntax (it is a wh-question): 
(2.7) 2PCOMP_pagato 9:33  
                                
09 B:  Soccia quanto   hai pagato per entrar qua.  
       Wow    how much have paid  for enter  here 
       Wow how much did you pay to enter here.  
In this example the speaker produces a first pair part by asking how much the recipient paid 
to enter the dome of Saint Peter’s church. 
Example 2.4 is another example of sequence initiating turn but this time the TCU has 
declarative morpho-syntax. 
(2.4) 2GSTUDYING_testa    29:07  
                                      
09 A:  .h No io veramente son scarburatissima ho      un mal di testa  
          No I  really    am  out of steam    have.1s a  bad of head    
       .h No I am really out of steam I have a headache    
Our target here is the TCU “io veramente sono scarburatissima” (I am really out of 
steam) and it is in a declarative form. Example 2.12 is instead an example of imperative 
morpho-syntax. The participants are two girls sitting opposite each other eating a piece of 
cake. 
(2.12) 2GC-pezzo 28:00 
                           
01 B:     [Dai     prendi  un  altro pezzo 
           Come on take.2s one other piece 
         [Come on Take another piece 
02 A:  N:o io davvero 
       No I   really 
      N:o I really 
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At line 1 B tells A to take another piece of the cake that is on the table in front of them, but A 
refuses. Line 1 is another example of a sequence initiating turn but this time with imperative 
morpho-syntax.  
If a specific sentence type is more strongly associated with the beginning of extended 
tellings rather than with sequence initiating turns we could consider the sentence type the 
driving force of this specific gaze behavior. Table 2.8 shows the distribution of sentence 
types by sequential environment. 
 
Table 2.8 Distribution of instances of sequence-initial TCUs belonging to a specific sentence type 
Sentence Type Extended Telling Sequence Adjacency Pair Based 
Sequence 
Interrogatives 2 (5.3%) 44 (42.7%) 
Declaratives 36 (94.7%) 46 (44.7%) 
Imperatives 0 13 (12.6%) 
Total 38 (100%) 103 (100%) 
 
There are two things to note about the distribution of sentence types by sequential 
environment: first, in this corpus imperatives are only used to initiate a sequence of talk and 
not to initiate tellings.21 Second, in this corpus declaratives are the main way in which 
participants start a telling while they are used a bit less than half of the time to initiate a 
sequence. 
Table 2.8 also shows that there is a striking similarity between the percentage of 
declarative sentences at the beginning of extended tellings (94.7%) and in first pair parts of 
adjacency-pair-based sequences (44.7%) and the percentage of instances in which a recipient 
looks up at the beginning of an ETS (92.1%) and at the beginning of an APBS (41.7%). 
Could sentence type be the feature that affects gaze behavior during a conversation? We can 
check this by examining whether recipients tend to look up only (or mainly) during 
declaratives when they are in APBS.  This is shown in Table 2.9: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 In theory it is possible to project a story telling by producing an imperative: “listen to this!” 
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Table 2.9 Instances of gaze toward speaker by recipient divided by sentence type 
Sentence type Extended Telling Sequence Adjacency Pair Based 
Sequence 
Interrogatives 2/2 (100%) 20/44 (45.5%) 
Declaratives 33/36 (91.7%) 20/46 (43.5%) 
Imperatives 0 3/13 (23%) 
 
Table 2.9 shows that the sentence type of the TCU is not (at least alone) driving the 
recipient looking up toward the addressee. Indeed, the three instances in which the recipient 
does not look up at the beginning of a telling all occur with a declarative TCU, but more 
importantly, of the 43 total instances in which a recipient looks up during a sequence 
initiating turn only 43.5% are in declarative forms. In APBSs the looking up by the recipient 
is quite evenly split between interrogatives and declaratives, though the percentages are only 
half of what we see for the same sentence types when deployed at the beginning of an 
extended telling. In other words, one might assume the rule to be “if declarative, suspect the 
occurrence of an extended telling”, but if this were the case, then we should see that at least 
90% of the time the TCU under examination is in a declarative format the recipient looks at 
the speaker. What we see, instead, is that when the declarative starts a telling, recipients look 
toward the speaker almost always, while when the declarative represents the beginning of an 
adjacency-pair-based sequence, then the recipient looks up toward the speaker only 43% of 
the time. This means that participants must use some other cue to distinguish among 
declaratives and what they actually project. Therefore, recipients do not seem to treat the 
sentence type of the first TCU as critical to whether they should look toward the speaker or 
not.  
The third feature under examination is action type. The actions that will be considered 
here are not the actions or course of actions that the entire telling is performing, such as 
storytelling or doing a report, but rather what kind of action the first TCU of the telling is 
implementing, for example announcing or assessing. The following examples represent some 
of the action types that can be found in the data. Example 2.1 “una volta io ho aumentato” 
(once I have raised the price) illustrates an announcement. 
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(2.1) 2GSOFA_aumentato 23:32 
                         
02 A:  pero’ in effetti non saprei  neanch’io co-<↑una volta  
       but   in effect  not know.1s neither I wh- one time 
      but actually I would not even know wh-<↑once 
                
03     io ho   aumentato 
       I  have raised 
      I have raised ((the price)) 
Before line 2, B had mentioned that she finds it difficult to ask for more money for her 
babysitter job and A had said that B has to ask for more anyway, although A does not know 
either how to ask for more money. Then, A cuts off her turn and says that she actually did it 
once. By reporting what she has done in first position (so not having been asked if she had 
ever done it) she frames this TCU as an announcement for B: here is something she has done 
that she has not told B about yet. 
Example 2.3 is a request for information.
(2.3) 2GSOFA_come    25:16 
              
07 B:  Come t'  e' venuto in mente 
       How  you is come   in mind 
      How come you thought about it 
Example 2.8 is the beginning of an explanation. 
(2.8) 2PPLAN_il problema 06:28 
               
20 B:  Ho capito. Pero' il problema e' che  (0.1)   (0.4) 
       Understood but   the problem is that  
       I understood. But the problem is that (0.1)  (0.4) 
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21     uno    da quel che ho capito che e' quello che   arriva  
       one    from that which understood which is that which arrives 
       one    from what I understood that is the one that arrives  
Example 2.13 is an assessment (a negative one) about a girl who is said to behave like 
a “bulldozer” when interacting with her friends.
(2.11) 2GSTUDYING_trattore 37:47 
        
07      (1.5)
08  A:  HUUU A volte  e' un c a t e r p i l l a r 
        huuu at times is a  bulldozer 
        HUUU Sometimes (she) is a bulldozer 
For recipients, to rely on the feature of action means that the recipient should look at 
the speaker once a certain action is recognizable. If we find that recipients looking up toward 
speakers strongly correlates with specific types of actions and that those specific types of 
actions are mainly occurring in one sequential environment rather than the other, we can 
account for the different gaze patterns with the actions a speaker is implementing through a 
TCU. 
Table 2.10 and 2.11 show the distribution of action types22 among the first TCUs of 
ETSs and APBSs, respectively, and show how often the recipient looks at the speaker divided 
by action type. 
                                               
22 I have consolidated the action types around general categories of action such as reporting, assessing, 
announcing, etc. I kept track of whether the recipient’s gaze seems to behave similarly among the actions of one 
cluster. By this I mean that if the recipients look at speakers half of the time in one small group and the same 
happens in another one that I have labeled as two types of reports I clustered them as reports. 
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Table 2.10 Action types and gaze behavior in first TCU of ETS 
Action Type Number of Instances Recipient Gaze toward 
Speaker 
Announcement 19 17 (89.5%) 
Assessment 2 2 (100%) 
Report 8 7 (87.5%) 
Explanations 7 7 (100%) 
Other 2 2 (100%) 
 
Table 2.11 Action types and gaze behavior in first TCU of APBS 
Action Type Number of Instances Recipient Gaze toward 
Speaker 
Announcement 11 6 (54.5%) 
Assessment 21 11 (52.3%) 
Report 11 4 (36.4%) 
Directive 11 2 (18.2%) 
Offer 8 3 (37.5%) 
Request 36 14 (38.9%) 
Explanation 3 1 (33.3%) 
Other 2 1 (50%) 
 
Table 2.10 shows that the main way in which the extended tellings in my dataset get 
started is through ‘announcements’, which represent 50% of the entire instances. Table 2.11 
shows that the most represented type for sequence initiating turns is the action type ‘request’. 
On the other hand, while in extended tellings the recipient looks toward the speaker 
independently of the action performed, in the case of adjacency-pair-based sequences only 
announcements and assessments get the recipient to look at the speaker for slightly more than 
50% of the cases. This is especially relevant for those actions such as announcements, 
assessments, reports and explanations that we also find in extended tellings and that in that 
environment are usually associated with the recipient looking toward the speaker. None of 
the action types found in the sequence initiating turns have a correlation with the occurrence 
of recipient gaze that goes above chance. It therefore seems reasonable to state that action 
types are not (by themselves) a driving force guiding the recipient gaze behavior. 
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Before proceeding to the next and last feature, I would like to sum up what we have 
seen in this section. The occurrence of the speaker’s gaze, the sentence type and the action 
type of the TCU have been shown not sufficient alone to predict the recipient’s gaze toward 
the speaker. This does not mean, though, that they are irrelevant. Indeed, from each analysis 
and numerical description we can pick one or two elements worth considering for further 
analyses in this domain. For instance, that the speaker seems to be looking at the recipient 
more at the beginning of an ETS than at the beginning of an APBS could be displaying a 
different orientation by speakers toward these sequential environments and the actions 
performed there. It is not the main cue, but it could be relevant and certainly worth exploring 
with a larger data set. 
The fact that most of the ETSs start with declaratives and at the same time only half 
of the APBSs start with declaratives could be worth exploring further as well. Moreover, the 
fact that ETSs do not usually start with imperatives could be an additional hint for the 
recipient who is trying to project what the speaker is going to say and do. 
Finally, the fact that certain action types tend not to occur in both sequential 
environments could be another important negative cue for recipients. If a recipient hears a 
request, it is unlikely that this is going to be the beginning of an extended telling and as such 
it could be less relevant for her/him to look at the speaker. Announcements, then, represent 
the kind of action that most frequently attracts recipients’ gaze in the beginning of APBS and 
announcements are also the main action type through which ETSs tend to begin. Moreover, 
directives (and therefore imperative sentence types) less frequently attract a recipient’s gaze. 
The specific action that the first TCU of a sequence is performing may not be the sole cue, 
but it may account for part of the observed pattern. There is, however, an issue that we need 
to consider to make sense of the next step in this analysis: how are turns of talk constructed 
and designed? 
This is not the place to initiate an appropriate analysis of turn design23 and action 
formation24 but it seems clear that there are many features that are recurrent and maybe 
                                                
23 It is clear that a turn is designed in a certain way to implement specific actions, therefore the two are related. 
24 For a recent summary of what is known about action formation and recognition, see Levinson (in press). 
Though mainly limited to the investigations performed by few individuals, conversation analysts have produced 
extensive work on the formation and recognition of a few social actions, such as compliments (e.g., Golato, 
2005; Pomerantz, 1978), complaints (e.g., Drew, 1998; Drew & Holt, 1988; Drew & Walker, 2009; Monzoni, 
2008), assessments (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987, 1992; Pomerantz, 1984a), requests (Curl & Drew, 2008; Drew 
& Walker, 2010), invitations (Davidson, 1984, 1990; Drew, 1984). 
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unique to specific types of actions or specific clusters of actions.25 There is empirical 
evidence that suggests that not just the verb but other word types or practices (e.g., pitch 
resets) or semantic domains could help to project the occurrence of an ETS rather than an 
APBS: sometimes the recipient looks toward the speaker just 1 or 2 words into the TCU and 
sustains the gaze afterwards. How can recipients project the beginning of an extended telling 
with such a limited amount of information? 
To answer this question, Gerd Gigerenzer and his collaborators’ approach to the 
notion of heuristics is relevant. With the term heuristics they refer to mechanisms by which 
humans make decisions. Rather than considering these mechanisms to be imperfect versions 
of optimal statistical procedures, they treat them as adaptive strategies deployed by humans 
and animals to make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In a 
recent article, Hutchinson and Gigerenzer (2005) propose a closer collaboration with 
biologists to develop better models of heuristic algorithms based on the descriptive findings 
of biologists. In particular they stress that two of their most famous heuristics, the Take the 
Best heuristic and the Recognition heuristic could be valuably used to understand animal and 
human behavior.26 The Take the Best heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) proposes that 
having to make a decision given different cues, a participant takes the cue that discriminates 
better between two alternatives and has a positive cue value and should ignore the remaining 
cue(s). However, if the cue examined does not discriminate, then the algorithm goes back to 
the cue values and searches for another one that discriminates better between the options. The 
Recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) proposes that given two or more 
options, if we cannot recognize a specific option, it is very likely to be a less important one 
(e.g., which is the biggest city: Chemnitz or Berlin?). People would normally opt for the one 
they can recognize (in this case, Berlin).  
This focus on recognizability resonates with a famous quote by Harvey Sacks in 
which he defined culture as “an apparatus for generating recognizable actions” (Sacks 1992 
[1964-72]: 226, Vol. I). Gigerenzer’s attention toward simple mechanisms that can explain 
how people decide one way or another resonates with the concerns of this chapter and so 
does his stance toward heuristics as adaptive strategies, as answers to the problem of not 
having unlimited time and computational power. Do any of the above-mentioned heuristics 
                                                
25 See Austin’s (e.g., 1962) or Searle’s (e.g., 1970) work on speech acts and their suggestion to use the verb type 
to determine which action is an utterance performing.  
26 See Enfield (2009a) for a recent attempt to utilize heuristics to describe human behavior in social interaction. 
107
work once applied to recipient’s gaze behavior in ETSs? In what follows I address this 
question first by presenting the possible cues at play. 
The following distributional evidence shows that certain turn design features are 
relevant for helping recipients project that an extended telling is in progress. The fact that 
participants often look toward the speaker of an extended telling very early in a TCU 
suggests they could use the presence of particular words, and their semantic domains, as 
possible cues to project what will come next and what sort of uptake will be relevant – 
recipiency or answering/acting etc. If this is the case, we should see different turn design 
features at the beginning of a telling than in a question or other sequence initial actions. This 
would imply that just hearing one or more specific words in the first TCU would be enough 
to determine whether it is relevant to direct my gaze toward the speaker. For instance, if a 
speaker uses a deictic and a point close to the place where her/his recipient’s eyes are already 
oriented, the latter will typically not look up at the speaker’s face but rather look in the 
direction indicated by the pointing finger. 
In these data there are various turn design features occurring immediately before the 
recipient looks toward the speaker. I identified six features27 of turn design that were 
recurrently present in first TCUs of ETSs and four features commonly present in the design 
of the first TCU of APBS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 The features here listed are only six because only six features could be found in more than 10% of the first 
TCUs of ETSs in my data. It seems plausible that more than six could be found and described. For example, 
something such as “pitch resets” might attract recipient’s gaze and might be used to initiate extended tellings, to 
distinguish them from previous turn-by-turn talk. A larger database and work developed in other languages 
might shed more light in this direction and provide further features to add to the list. 
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Table 2.12 Possible heuristics in initial TCUs. 
ETS APBS 
1) First person pronoun or first person 
inflected in the verb 
 
a)  Second person pronoun or second person  
     inflected in the verb 
2) Time references (usually about past or 
future but not about the present) 
 
b)  Deictics (verbal and/or visible) 
 
3) Initial mentioning of third persons  c) “Ma” (resumption marker) 
4) Verbs that display epistemic access to a 
certain fact or event 
 
d) Modals (want, should, could, etc.) 
5) Mentioning of actions’ first step in a 
schema of a larger event or activity 
 
 
6) Extreme characterizations of individuals, 
places or facts 
 
 
 
Before discussing how recurrent these features are in the data and therefore their 
significance as cues, let us examine some examples of the items that usually appear at the 
beginning of extended tellings. The first design feature listed for extended tellings in Table 
2.12 is the use of the first person pronoun “I” or “we”. The beginnings of extended tellings 
often contain references to the first person singular pronoun “I”, while first pair parts of 
APBSs are more likely to contain references to the second person singular pronoun “you”. In 
a pro-drop language such as Italian the first and second person are often only inflected in the 
verb, but in the sequential environments we are comparing it often happens that the pronoun 
is explicitly produced. Apart from the presence of the pronoun, it is clear that in many 
beginnings of ETSs the speaker says something about herself/himself, while in many 
beginnings of APBSs the speaker says something about the addressee, or at least puts her/him 
as subject of the main verb. Most storytellings and reports are about the speaker, or 
something that the speaker has experienced, seen, heard, etc. On the other hand, when one 
asks someone something, it is likely that the second person pronoun will be relevant. 
Example 2.1 shows an instance of a first TCU where the recipient looks up toward the 
speaker and it contains a first person pronoun  
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(2.1) 2GSOFA_aumentato 23:32 
                         
02 A:  pero’ in effetti non saprei  neanch’io co-<↑una volta  
       but   in effect  not know.1s neither I wh- one time 
 but actually I would not even know wh-<↑once 
                
03     io ho   aumentato 
       I  have raised 
      I have raised ((the price)) 
In this example the recipient starts looking up after the production of the first pronoun 
“io” (I) and during the production of the verb “aumentare” (to raise). 
Example 2.3 contains an example of second person pronoun in a TCU in which there 
is no gaze up by the recipient. In this example neither of the participants looks at the other.  
(2.3) 2GSOFA_come    25:16 
              
07 B:  Come t'  e' venuto in mente 
       How  you is come   in mind 
      How come you thought about it 
Another recurrent design feature at the beginning of extended tellings is the use of 
temporal expressions that locate the events at a time different from the present, and as such 
potentially in a time when the recipient was not present. These can range from “the day” to 
“the first time she entered my house”, for example. It should be noted that not just any time 
reference seems to occur at the beginnings of extended tellings but rather ones that refer to 
recurrent times (often, sometimes, etc) or to the past or to the future but not to the current 
situation at the time in which the conversation unfolds. People do not usually start a telling by 
saying “adesso” (now) though they can say ‘today’ in the sense that it refers either to a time 
prior to the moment of speaking or to a time that follows the completion of the current 
conversation.  
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Example 2.5 contains an initial time reference to which the recipient reacts by raising 
his gaze. 
(2.5) 2PCOMP_rosso 10:59  
              *    
04 B:  .h E   quel giorno   che: (0.3)       
          And that day      that 
         And the day in whi:ch (0.3) 
   *= B raises head from pictures toward A but looks mid distance  
and not to A 
Here the recipient looks up after the words “quel giorno” (that day), which refer to a specific 
day that will be identified only by what happened to the speaker. It is a non-recognitional 
time reference for the recipient. 
A third turn design feature is the initial mentioning of third persons. This sensitivity 
to new characters resonates with an observation made a-propos of Chekhov’s plays. In a 
Chekhov play, if the opening curtain reveals a gun hanging over the fireplace, you can be 
sure it will be shot before the final curtain falls. In the same way, if all of a sudden a new 
individual is introduced into the conversation, very likely something important will be said 
about this individual or about something this individual has experienced or done. Example 
2.2 is a case in point. 
(2.2) 2GSTUDYING_mamma 29:36 
                                 
05 B: Mi fa   mia mamma hai     conosciuto dei  bei      ragazzi? Si’
       Me does my  mum   have.2s known      some handsome boys    Yes 
      My mum says to me have you met some handsome boys? Yes 
In this example the recipient starts moving her eyes toward the speaker immediately after the 
production of the person reference “mia mamma” (my mum). Clearly related to it is a fourth 
feature of turn design: the use of verbs that provide information about the epistemic access 
the characters had to some event or news like ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’, ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, etc. 
In the following example the two participants are talking about preparation for an exam and 
participant A has asked B whether B has notes that he can borrow. B says that he does not 
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have notes and after 1.1 second of silence (line 1) he starts an ETS by saying “ho visto che” 
(I have seen that). He will then continue explaining how he knows about where other notes 
are and what happened to him when he went looking for them. 
(2.13) 2PEXAM-visto 47:28 
01    (1.1) 
                                          
02 B:  Ho     visto che  ce ne   sono in giro.  Al Dobbi anche 
       Have.1s seen  that cl them are  in around at Dobbi also 
      I have seen that there are ((notes)) around. At Dobbi also 
In example 2.13 we can see that the recipient shifts his gaze toward the speaker after 
the latter has produced a verb of seeing that displays his epistemic access to what he is going 
to say next. The speaker produces line 2 while looking toward a computer screen and does 
not shift his head orientation during the first TCU. 
Fifth, the choice of verbs such as “going out” projects a telling about what happened 
once the people were out because of its being a first item in a schema of what happens when 
people go out together, as in the following example. The two participants are talking about a 
mutual friend who seems to be particularly insensitive in terms of love matters. Example 2.11 
shows the lines that exemplify the first action in a schema. 
(2.11) 2GSTUDYING_trattore 37:47  
                                     
09 A:  .hhh  che  se- c'ero  anch'io pero'   quella sera 
       .hhh  that if- cl.was also I  but     that   evening 
       .hhh  that if- I was there too however that evening 
                                   
10     siamo usciti tutti   insieme (0.8) e  la Lea 
       are  exit   all     together      and the Lea 
       we went out all together (0.8) and Tea 
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Example 2.5 contains an initial time reference to which the recipient reacts by raising 
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              *    
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The target here is line 10 and the TCU that starts with “siamo usciti” (we went out). 
On the last syllable of “usciti” (went out) the recipient start shifting her head orientation 
toward the speaker. 
Finally, extreme characterizations or formulations (see Edwards, 2000; Pomerantz, 
1986; Sidnell, 2004) can be used “to counter challenges to the legitimacy of complaints, 
accusations, justifications and defenses; to propose a phenomenon is ‘in object’ or objective 
rather than a product of the interaction or the circumstances; to propose that some behavior is 
not wrong, or is right, by virtue of its status as frequently occurring or commonly done” 
(Pomerantz, 1986: 219-220). They can also be used to project the upcoming explanation of 
why something or somebody is characterized in first position as “unbelievable”, “terrible”, “a 
mess”, “a bulldozer”. Example 2.13 shows an extreme characterization in which a girl is said 
to behave like a “bulldozer”. 
(2.11) 2GSTUDYING_trattore 37:47 
        
07      (1.5) 
                                 
08 A:   HUUU A volte  e' un c a t e r p i l l a r
       huuu at times is a  bulldozer 
        HUUU Sometimes (she) is a bulldozer 
In this example we see that after the second syllable of the extreme characterization- 
the word “caterpillar” (bulldozer)- the recipient starts turning toward the speaker and they 
engage in mutual gaze. 
I have shown that each of these turn design features can appear before the recipient 
starts looking toward the speaker, but to establish whether these features are actually 
associated with or attract recipient gaze requires an analysis of their distribution with respect 
to the sequential environments. I show this in Table 2.13. 
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Table 2.13 Frequencies of turn design features in first TCU of an ETS or an APBS 
Features ETS APBS 
1) I, me 19/38 (50%) 21/103 (20.4%) 
2) Time reference 16/38 (42.1%) 9/103 (8.7%) 
3) Third person 16/38 (42.1%) 13/103 (12.6%) 
4) Epistemic access 13/38 (34.2%) 5/103 (4.9%) 
5) First action in schema 7/38 (18.4%) 1/103 (1%) 
6) Extreme characterizations 4/38 (10.5%) 10/103 (9.7%) 
   
a) You 3/38 (7.8%) 47/103 (45.6%) 
b) Deictics (verbal or visual) 1/38 (2.6%) 40/103 (38.8%) 
c) But 3/38 (7.8%) 23/103 (22.3%) 
d) Modals 2/38 (5.3%) 12/103 (11.6%) 
 
Table 2.13 reports the instances and percentages of the occurrence of an item in the 
first TCU of an ETS or an APBS. The first six occur at the beginning of ETSs at least 10% of 
the time (up to a maximum of 50%), while their occurrences in first pair parts of APBS is 
minimal and much less likely (from 20% for the use of I to 1% for actions that are first steps 
in a schema). On the other hand, if we look at the last four items we can see the opposite 
effect: they all occur much more often in sequence initiating turns (from a minimum of 
11.6% of times up to 45.6% of times).  
This shows that their distribution is systematically different and that the likelihood of 
having one of these items present at the beginning of a TCU could help recipients project 
which kind of turn the speaker is going to produce.  
I have previously stressed that recipients look at speakers only 42% of the time during 
sequence initiating turns and I suggest here that, for example, if we hear a time reference we 
are more likely to look toward the speaker because we can project that a telling will be 
produced. If this claim is correct then we should see that in the first TCUs of APBSs in which 
the recipient looks up, a time reference should be more frequent than in the TCUs in which 
the recipient does not look toward the speaker. This is indeed the case. A time reference is 
present in 16.3% of the first TCUs of APBS in which the recipient looks at the speaker, while 
it is present in only 3.3% of the first TCUS of APBS in which the recipient does not look at 
the speaker. The recipient is therefore 5 times more likely to look up toward the speaker 
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when there is a time reference. This difference is statistically significant.28 The same holds, 
for example, for the presence of third person references. In this case a third person is present 
in 23.3% of first TCUs in which the recipient looks at the speaker while it is present only in 
5% of the first TCUs of APBS in which the recipient does not look at the speaker. Even in 
this case, the difference is statistically significant.29  
This suggests that recipients are more likely to look at the speaker during the first 
TCU of an APBS that includes one of the features mentioned above. Participants therefore 
appear to orient to the occurrence of one or more of these items during the course of a TCU 
to project whether the turn is going to be the beginning of an ETS or an APBS.  
The final piece of evidence comes again from what we may consider deviant cases. In 
a bottom up inferential probabilistic model it should be possible that participants hear a 
feature more often associated with an ETS, they look toward the speaker and they keep 
looking until they realize that in that particular instance the speaker was not starting a telling 
but just producing a single utterance. At that point we should see something happening in the 
gaze behavior of the recipients that displays that the heuristic procedure they followed failed 
in that specific case. Example 2.15 is a case in point. 
Example 2.14 is taken from an interaction in which two friends are chatting sitting on 
a sofa (same participants as in Examples 2.1 and 2.3). A has just mentioned that she had been 
dreaming about a political figure of the 20th century from Saudi Arabia and that she was 
shocked about that dream because the exam about history of Arabic countries will be in one 
month.  Then they laugh about the dream and they are silent for a couple of seconds before 
the beginning of this extract. Our focus is what happens during lines 1 to 4. 
(2.14) 2GSOFA_faccio 25:47  
                                
01 A:  Me    e' un casino Chia e' un casino tutta quella storia  
       Shit  is a  mess   Chia is a  mess   all   that   story 
       Shit it is a mess Chia it is a mess all that story 
                 
02     li'   non ce  la   faccio  
       there not cl. that make.1s 
       there I cannot make it 
                                               
28 Fisher Exact Test p = 0.03
29 Fisher Exact Test p= 0.01 
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03 B:  Hu hu hu [hu 
       Hu hu hu [hu 
                        
04 A:           [Non ce  la   faccio 
not cl. that make.1s
                [I cannot make it 
            
05     (0.4)    (0.4) 
           (0.8) 
                      
06 A:  E   Guros "Ma  si'   dai (0.2) 
       and Guros  But yes   give 
       And Guros “But yes   come on (0.2) 
07 A:  te  lo   leggi cosi' per cultura  generale. 
       you that read  so    for culture  general 
       you read it just for general knowledge. 
A’s turn starts at line 1 with an outloud (shit) and then an extreme characterization of 
her situation (feature 6 of ETS) “e’ un casino” (it is a mess) and a vocative (Chia, B’s 
nickname). At this point B, who was looking at a biscuit she had in her hand, looks up toward 
A and sustains the gaze. While an address term can attract the gaze of the recipient, an 
extreme formulation in first position could be projecting a telling that accounts for the use of 
that characterization. But what follows in A’s turn is a repetition of the assessment with the 
specification of the object of the predication of the assessment and finally A states her 
concern about her possible success in that exam (lines 2 and 4). B laughs and keeps looking 
at A, apparently oriented toward the possibility of the occurrence of an ETS, but the next 
piece by A does not further the progressivity of the talk (Schegloff, 1979, 2007b; Stivers & 
Robinson, 2006), and it is rather a repetition of the last TCU of line 2. Line 4 is produced 
with the speaker looking down, rather than toward the recipient as before. This could show 
that something else is going on, and that potentially there will be no telling. B keeps looking 
toward A for 0.4 seconds into the transition relevance place and then she re-orients toward 
the biscuit she was holding in her hand. At this point, given the orientation of both 
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participants, the re-engagement into eating a biscuit by B and the silence, it looks like 
participants are treating the complaint by A as possibly complete and no further talk on the 
topic seems to be on the way. B’s sustained orientation toward A has indeed been abandoned 
and she is re-engaging into the activity she had momentarily interrupted (eating a biscuit). 
But at line 6 A starts a telling by using the conjunction “e” (and), the mentioning of a third 
person non present and not mentioned in the immediately preceding talk, and starts quoting 
what this person said about the preparation for the exam. After “e Guros ma” the recipient re-
orients toward the speaker, who is looking mid distance in a sort of empty space, and again 
sustains gaze toward the speaker. The telling then follows.  
This example shows that participants can orient toward features of the talk as 
potential projections of an ETS and sustain their gaze until it seems that the telling will not be 
produced. On the other hand, if the telling is then started, the recipient will orient toward the 
speaker and sustain the gaze as in all the previous examples. This confirms, then, that there 
are specific features of talk in specific sequential positions that can evoke the possibility of an 
upcoming telling. Participants display an orientation toward them exactly like in the cases in 
which the telling actually occurs immediately after them, as at the moment in which these 
features occur the actual occurrence of an ETS is only a possibility, not a certainty. 
 
I have shown that recipients can start turning and looking toward speakers after each 
of the six design features I have listed for ETSs.30 I have then shown that these features tend 
to occur more in an ETS than in an APBS and that at least the first four of them tend to occur 
more in the first TCU of APBSs in which the recipient looks toward the speaker than in the 
ones in which the recipient does not look at the speaker. Finally I have provided evidence that 
participants can use these features occasionally incorrectly to project an upcoming ETS that 
is not actually going to occur. At that point a participant may look away and abandon the 
orientation toward the other participant. All this provides evidence of the deployment of 
bottom-up heuristics by recipients to project the occurrence of a telling versus, for example, a 
request. 
                                                
30 During a discussion of these results, a commentator claimed that the 6 features that get the recipient to look 
toward the speaker simply indicate interactional displacement. In other words that the topic of the conversation 
is changing, and as such that what will be said is different from the previous activity. This is a plausible 
hypothesis and would certainly apply to the time reference feature, yet some features do not appear to have this 
function, but rather are specific of telling environments. For example, in what way does using the first person 
pronoun indicate displacement? And in what ways does an extreme characterization constitute a displacement? 
Moreover, if they are the first thing that gets said after a lapse (a long silence), as is often the case, then anything 
that gets said would constitute a displacement.  
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I have also stressed that often the recipient looks toward the speaker after very few 
words and suggested that it is impossible, at that point, to project the exact action that the 
TCU will implement. However, it is possible to infer to which ‘ball park’ the turn will 
belong, especially in terms of activity and sequential environment. This means that if the 
speaker starts a turn of talk with ‘yesterday’ I can guess there could be a telling or a report 
but, as we will see, for instance, in the following example, it is impossible to determine 
whether the action performed through the TCU will be an announcement or an assessment. 
On the other hand, a proper description of the patterns observed should say whether 
recipients always react after one of those design features or whether it happens more often 
that they need to listen to more than one of those features before they orient toward the 
speaker. Before showing the distribution of features that occur before the looking up of the 
recipient, I show two examples where it is clear that more than one feature is present. 
Example 2.15 shows a first TCU of an ETS in which there are two design features before the 
recipient turns toward the speaker. In this example the speaker starts a telling by assessing 
how her favorite soccer player played the day before. The previous topic of the conversation 
was an Arabic politician and the preparation for an exam on the history of the Middle East. 
(2.15) 2GSOFA-giocato 26:46 
01   (0.4) 
                                         
02 A:  Niente  ieri      Sheva ha giocato  di  merda 
       Nothing yesterday Sheva has played  of  shit 
      Well yesterday Sheva played “like shit” 
The recipient starts turning on the word “giocato” (played), after the speaker has 
produced a time reference (yesterday) and introduced a new character in the conversation 
(Sheva). The following example, Example 2.6, has been previously presented in this chapter 
without a transcript of gaze behavior. If we look at what happens during the first TCU of the 
ETS we can see that the recipient reacts after three design features have been produced. 
(2.6) 2PCOMP_Porto 10:49 
03      (.) 
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pronoun indicate displacement? And in what ways does an extreme characterization constitute a displacement? 
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I have also stressed that often the recipient looks toward the speaker after very few 
words and suggested that it is impossible, at that point, to project the exact action that the 
TCU will implement. However, it is possible to infer to which ‘ball park’ the turn will 
belong, especially in terms of activity and sequential environment. This means that if the 
speaker starts a turn of talk with ‘yesterday’ I can guess there could be a telling or a report 
but, as we will see, for instance, in the following example, it is impossible to determine 
whether the action performed through the TCU will be an announcement or an assessment. 
On the other hand, a proper description of the patterns observed should say whether 
recipients always react after one of those design features or whether it happens more often 
that they need to listen to more than one of those features before they orient toward the 
speaker. Before showing the distribution of features that occur before the looking up of the 
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(2.15) 2GSOFA-giocato 26:46 
01   (0.4) 
                                         
02 A:  Niente  ieri      Sheva ha giocato  di  merda 
       Nothing yesterday Sheva has played  of  shit 
      Well yesterday Sheva played “like shit” 
The recipient starts turning on the word “giocato” (played), after the speaker has 
produced a time reference (yesterday) and introduced a new character in the conversation 
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(2.6) 2PCOMP_Porto 10:49 
03      (.) 
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04 B:  hm quella volta che mi son svegliato e   si sentiva iu:: iu::  
       hm that   time that me  woke up      and cl. hear   iu   iu 
hm the time in which I woke up and you could hear iu:: iu::
The recipient, A, starts turning on the word “sentiva” (hear). Before that, the speaker had 
used a time reference (the time), a first action in schema (to wake up) and the first person (I), 
although inflected in the verb.  
It is possible, then, to have more than one feature occurring before the recipient 
reacts, moreover, as we can see, the speaker does not display any sign of trouble for not 
having the recipient gaze after the first design feature. The question is, rather, whether it is 
common for participants to react only after more than one feature. Table 2.14 shows that this 
is not the case and that only in a minority of cases the recipient looks up after multiple cues.
Table 2.14 Distribution of features before recipient looks toward speaker in first TCU of ETS 
Number of design features before R looks at S Instances 
1 25/35 (71.4%) 
2 5/35 (14.3%) 
3 5/35 (14.3%) 
If we consider only the 35 cases of ETSs in which the recipient looks toward the 
speaker, in 71.4% of the cases the recipient reacts after just one cue. There are, nonetheless, 
quite a few cases in which the recipients rely on more cues before looking toward the 
speakers. How can this be reconciled with the idea that participants rely on turn design 
features to project what the sequential environment of the talk will be? 
Here is a simple way of conceptualizing it: imagine a semantic domain, such as time 
reference, and let’s say that it corresponds to building block X (see Figure 2.8). When a 
recipient hears X s/he looks toward the speaker. On the other hand, given that a human being 
does not always react like Pavlov’s dog, it is possible that the participant will consider X just 
a little cue and will wait for another cue to react, let’s say Y. As we can see from table 2.13, a 
time reference is 5 times more likely to occur in the first TCU of an ETS than in the first 
TCU of a sequence initiating turn, but it still occurs 9% of the times in sequence initiating 
turns. So it is not the case that if the participant hears a time reference then s/he can be sure 
that s/he is listening to the beginning of an ETS. This is why it is not unreasonable to wait for 
more evidence, especially if the same participant is potentially involved in some other 
competing activity. Sometimes Z will have to occur too, other times, Y and Z by themselves 
will be enough and A actually occurs after the recipient has already started looking at the 
speaker, simply because it is part of how a certain turn is designed. Every building block 
would have a different force in terms of cuing for a certain type of action or the occurrence of 
an ETS or an APBS. This force would come from the likelihood of being the discriminator 
between the two options, or at least from the likelihood of seeing it associated with a specific 
type of action. This force would not have to be constant, as there could be other contextual 
factors that could push the recipient to react to just one cue or to wait for more.  
        1)                    R↑  TCU continues 
                                       
        2)                                       R↑ TCU continues 
        3)                                       R↑                      TCU continues 
Figure 2.8. Scheme of features configurations that allow for probabilistic inference of sequential 
environment.  
Neither the Take the Best nor the Recognition Heuristic correspond to the mechanism 
used by recipients to decide when to look toward the speaker and whether to sustain the gaze 
or not. Rather the occurrence of more cues one after the other, even if the second and third 
are less discriminating than the first one, increases the discriminating power of the whole. 
There is no neglecting or ignoring of the previous cues but rather a summative effect. If, for 
example, a time reference is 5 times more likely to occur at the beginning of an ETS than at 
the beginning of an APBS but the probability of being listening to an ETS is only 2.5 times 
higher if I hear a first person pronoun, once I hear “Yesterday evening I” the odds that this 
will be an ETS become higher. If both features per se would suggest it is more likely that the 
current TCU is the beginning of an ETS, once you see both of them one after the other the 
odds that this is not an ETS become lower and lower. It is a matter of joint probability of the 
occurrence of these features one after the other in the same utterance that explains why they 
are very powerful cues. It appears then that participants operate at a simpler computational 
                                               
 R↑ means recipient looks up towards the speaker 
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level: they apply the elementary probability rule for independent events: P(A & B)= P(A) * 
P(B). So if P(A)= 0.5 and P(B)= 0.5 then P(A & B)= 0.25. It is highly unlikely they would 
occur one after the other by chance and so they become powerful identifiers of extended 
telling sequences. 
We could say that if one knows that something is a telling, the latter is very likely to 
have some specific turn features in it. If one does not know what something is but s/he finds 
some of these features, it is plausible to infer that it is a telling. To recognize and appreciate 
the meaning of a part, we need to have an idea of what the whole might be.  
Studying the timing of recipients looking up toward the speaker in ETSs opens a sort 
of window into their cognition. It provides us with clues concerning the online 
comprehension process of the recipient. Once we know that recipients regularly look up 
toward speakers and sustain their gaze during a projected telling, we can try to trace back not 
only which action performed through a TCU allowed them to recognize the possible 
beginning of a telling, but also which words within the same TCU were potentially enough to 
cue the possibility of an extended telling. And in the future we can possibly establish which 
feature seems to matter the most in projecting that a telling is going to begin, knowing that 
they are likely correlated.  
In this section I discussed four features that participants may rely on and tested them 
as plausible hypotheses. I have provided the distributions of different features that could be 
used by recipients to determine whether looking toward the speaker is particularly relevant or 
appropriate. I have shown that while it is impossible to reject any influence on recipient’s 
decisions, the first three (speaker’s gaze, sentence type and action type of the TCU) do not 
account in a major way for the orderly recipient gaze behavior and in particular for its timing. 
I then proposed that participants are using the occurrence of words belonging to specific 
semantic domains to abductively infer whether an ETS or an APBS will be produced. I have 
listed some that clearly emerge from this data set. I have provided illustrations of them and I 
have provided their comparative frequencies. I have shown that most of the time just one of 
them is sufficient for the recipient to turn her/his gaze toward the speaker and I have 
explained how to account for the situations in which more than one cue is present before the 
recipient reacts. By doing this I have shown that turn design features are likely used as cues 
for determining whether a TCU is part of an ETS or of an APBS. Finally, I have proposed 
that participants in a conversation would apply the elementary probability rule for 
independent events to discriminate between sequential environments, rather than using more 
complex heuristics.        
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2.5 Discussion 
 
This chapter shows that Kendon’s distinction between speaker’s and listener’s gaze 
patterns is not sufficiently accurate to describe what happens during a dyadic conversation. A 
more fine-grained analysis demonstrates that those gaze patterns apply only to ETSs. In other 
words, Kendon's rule works if you replace the general words 'speaker' and 'listener' with 
'teller of an ETS' and 'recipient of an ETS'. In a different sequential environment, such as in 
an APBS, the recipient’s gaze behavior is much more variable. The evidence comes not only 
from a sampling of ETSs and APBSs such as question-answer sequences but also from a 
comparison of recipient’s gaze behavior during the first TCU of an ETS and the first TCU of 
an APBS. The data show that when a recipient is not looking at the speaker before the onset 
of those TCUs, if something in the TCU projects (and retroactively the TCU actually 
constitutes) the beginning of an ETS, then the recipient almost always (92% of the time) 
looks up toward the speaker at that point. By contrast, if the TCU constitutes the first move in 
an APBS, only around half of the time do recipients look up toward speakers. This also 
demonstrates that participants in interaction do not look toward the speaker as soon as they 
hear some sounds produced by the speaker. Rather, recipients look at speakers once this 
orientation becomes socially relevant. The looking toward an addressee is therefore not 
merely an instinctive response to an auditory stimulus but it can be a constitutive component 
of a social action, with its own implications. 
Recipient gaze and body orientation can be seen as a systematic way of displaying a 
fine grained online parsing of the ongoing conversation The recipient projects in which 
activity he is going to be involved next before the TCU is complete and his gaze orientation 
does or does not change accordingly. This displays that participants treat listening to the 
beginning of a story telling or of an explanation as a different type of interactional 
engagement when compared to listening to a question, a noticing or a directive.  
In a paper on the invariants of human behavior, Herbert Simon (1990) suggested that 
even though “the fundamental goal of science is to find invariants, such as conservation of 
mass and energy and the speed of light in physics” (p. 1) “some of the most important 
invariants in science are not quantitative at all” (p. 2) but have rather a qualitative structure. 
Talking about psychology and distinguishing it from classical mechanics he claimed that  
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its laws are, and will be, limited in range and generality and will be 
mainly qualitative. Its invariants are and will be of the kinds that are 
appropriate to adaptive systems. Its success must be measured not by 
how closely it resembles physics but by how well it describes and 
explains human behavior (p. 2)  
 
He added that “human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are 
the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (p.7). 
Finally, he proposed that “because of the limits on their computing speeds and power, 
intelligent systems must use approximate methods to handle most tasks. Their rationality is 
bounded” (p.6). 
If what we are looking for are invariants of human behavior and we are aware that 
they must be qualitative and cannot be only quantitative, we should embrace an explanation 
of how people manage to project what the speaker will be saying that is interactionally and 
cognitively plausible. We need to consider the possibility that there are simple heuristics that 
participants use which do not require overly costly computations nor the calculation of too 
many levels of theory of mind or implicatures. I suggest that one way that participants project 
whether a TCU is the beginning of an ETS or not is by relying on a probabilistic association 
between turn design features and the sequential environments in which they tend to occur. To 
succeed, however, one must know what the whole (an ETS or an APBS) might look like. I 
propose a simple mechanism of abductive inference that could be carried out under the 
limited amount of time and knowledge that participants have. This does not deny that the turn 
design features mentioned above can be combined compositionally to form the actions that 
participants in interaction consistently orient to. Nonetheless, I suggest that for recipients to 
decide whether they should orient their gaze toward the speaker or whether they can continue 
looking down, a proper analysis of the sentence type or of the exact action type of a TCU is 
not necessary and is practically impossible anyway if all they have heard is “the other day” or 
“ My mum says”. The fact that participants look toward speakers at those points works as 
additional evidence of the plausibility of my claim.  
Perhaps this gaze behavior is systematic because the participants know each other 
well. It is a general claim in social psychology that closeness, intimacy and level of 
acquaintance between participants affect the amount of gaze between participants (see e.g. 
Argyle & Dean, 1965; Bente, Donaghy, & Suwelack, 1998; Cordell & McGahan, 2004; 
Exline, 1963). Usually in experimental work this variable is taken care of by using 
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unacquainted subjects. It remains an empirical question whether friendship affects the 
principles here outlined. 
 
The findings of this chapter display that participants treat listening to the beginning of 
a story telling or of an explanation as a different type of interactional engagement when 
compared to listening to a question, a noticing or a directive. This finding is particularly 
important when compared to Goffman’s analysis (1981a) of the different types of hearers that 
might occur in a social situation. He distinguished between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
participants. Within official participants he distinguished between ‘addressed’ and 
‘unaddressed recipients’ and among the unofficial participants between ‘eavesdropper’, 
‘overhearer’, ‘bystander’ and ‘audience’. What matters for us is that within addressed 
recipients, one must further distinguish between a recipient of an extended telling vs. a 
recipient of the first pair part of an adjacency pair sequence. In this way, we can further refine 
our understanding of participation in a social situation and recognize the specific behavior 
that an individual is expected to implement in order to act like an attentive and proper 
recipient. 
The implications and relevance of the findings presented in this chapter can be seen 
from two different perspectives. On one hand, from a participant point of view, the looking 
up and then sustaining of the gaze toward the speaker could be used by the speaker as a 
recipient signal of her/his potential involvement as an extended telling recipient. This occurs 
much earlier than the traditional place in which the recipient signals recognition of her/his 
being a listener of an extended turn of talk: the first transition relevance place at TCU 
completion. The findings of this chapter suggest that even before producing a continuer, 
nodding or withholding talk in the first transition relevance place, the looking toward the 
speaker at specific places and sustaining of the gaze into the TRP can work as a cue for the 
speaker. The importance of this can be fully understood once the high vulnerability to 
derailment of the beginning of extended tellings is taken into account. 
On the other hand, from an analytic point of view, this confirms that a participant in 
interaction not only auditorily monitors what is going on, but systematically analyzes and 
projects what kind of behavior is going to be relevant next from her/him. Looking toward the 
speaker while s/he is producing a multi-unit telling is evidently one of the behaviors that are 
relevant as soon as the telling is projectable, given the systematicity of the pattern observed. 
Indeed, the recipient’s sustaining of the gaze toward the speaker throughout the telling seems 
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to indicate that the preferred gaze pattern for the recipient in a multi-unit telling requires a 
sustained look toward the speaker.  
A final comment is on the possible reason for such a difference in gaze behavior 
between ETSs and APBSs. Two answers, not necessarily mutually exclusive, could be 
provided. The first answer to this question lies in the phenomenological notion of ‘aboutness’ 
and in the way in which gaze, also through its indexicality, can be used to display 
‘aboutness’. Talking about story telling, Harvey Sacks asked (1992 [1964-72]: 768, Vol. I): 
“what is a story about, by virtue of the fact that it’s between those two? Stories are ‘about’ – 
have to do with – the people who are telling them and hearing them”. If a multi-unit telling is 
about the participants, their relationship, etc. then in the same way in which we look at 
pictures to do “looking at pictures” or we orient toward the dishes to do “washing the dishes”, 
then looking at the speaker during a telling becomes a simple acknowledgment of what a 
story is about: it tells something about the teller, his dreams, issues, what he finds funny or 
scary, annoying or entertaining. As such it tells something about the relationship with the 
recipient by doing basic socialization. In the same way in which I have to look at the pictures 
if I understand that what we are doing together is “about” the pictures and requires “looking 
at pictures” then looking at the teller of a story is not simply a matter of attention or lip 
reading but rather something fundamentally social. It becomes a way of displaying an 
understanding of what we are doing together and what a telling is (also) about: not just 
human beings, but the specific human being who is producing it and the one who is listening 
to it.  
The second answer to the question of why recipients look at speakers during tellings 
deals with the notion of tellability and what it takes to produce an ETS. Among the things 
that matter, in order to produce an extended turn of talk, there is the existence of an audience 
to which the story can be told in so many utterances. As I said earlier in this chapter, once a 
participant starts talking s/he is entitled to produce one TCU (Sacks et al., 1974). To be able 
to produce more than that, a speaker will have to either project that a longer turn will be 
produced or make sure that possible transition relevance places are passed while the same 
participant keeps speaking (e.g. speeding up the talk, latching the end of a TCU to the 
beginning of another one). One important consequence of trying to produce an ETS consists 
of the necessity of having other participants to collaborate in this endeavor by withholding 
producing turns at talk. If the speaker needs to know whether s/he will have an audience to 
the telling that will align with the fact that this could require multiple TCUs and their 
collaboration, having a visible cue like sustained gaze toward speaker as soon as the telling is 
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recognizable as such becomes a useful resource. The idea is that by looking at the speaker 
very early in the first TCU of an ETS, the recipient displays that s/he recognizes that a 
possible telling is in progress and will act as a recipient. Additionally, by looking toward the 
speaker a recipient can heighten the input of information facilitating a proper calibration of 
appropriate uptake. It should be noted that in this case the issue is not just whether the 
recipient is paying attention to the speaker and therefore whether s/he is listening at all. The 
issue is the general accomplishment of a course of action that requires the collaboration of at 
least another individual. By sustaining gaze toward the speaker a recipient displays an 
understanding of what the course of action will be and the potential willingness to act as a 
recipient where it would otherwise be possible to take the floor and become the speaker.  
While the first answer deals with a possible intrinsic understanding of what the things 
we do or say are “about”, the second one takes a more “action” oriented perspective and sees 
recipient’s gaze as an active cue for the speaker, rather than a mere display of attentiveness. It 
shows action recognition and shared intentionality: “I can see what you are trying to do and I 
am going to align with it to make it possible”. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, one line of thought about gaze behavior tends to 
conceptualize it as something fundamentally responsive to the environment and potentially 
redundant from a communicative point of view: I orient my eyes and my attention where it is 
more needed, usually in order to accomplish specific tasks. Another way of thinking about it 
considers gaze behavior as something that can shape the environment and the actions 
accomplishable in it. It can work as a way of projecting involvement and attention, it can 
work as a pledge of commitment, it can be actively directed toward the world to initiate 
engagement into an activity that had not been pressing and it can display ‘aboutness’. The 
direction of my eyes and my head displays not just what I am currently attending but 
potentially what I am going to do next. The findings described in Hayhoe and Ballard (2005) 
(we look at the object that we are going to use or reach for before we actually reach for it) 
confirm the consistency of this view. The rest of this dissertation will focus on the latter way 
of thinking about gaze and will present different practices through which gaze can be used to 
do things in the world rather than being simply the gateway between the perceptual world and 
our brain. 
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3 Gaze as a Method of Pursuing Responses 
 
No endeavor is in vain; 
Its reward is in the doing, 
And the rapture of pursuing 
Is the prize the vanquished gain. 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow The Wind Over the Chimney 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 showed how recipients of a turn of talk use different patterns of gaze 
behavior depending on which course of action (an extended telling or an adjacency-pair-
based sequence) the first TCU projects. In that chapter the focus was on recipient gaze 
behavior during the first TCU of a turn. This chapter focuses on speaker gaze behavior and 
on a different interactional environment: the transition relevance place after possible turn 
completion. More specifically, this chapter examines the first turns in APBSs and shows what 
happens after the occurrence of a first pair part when the latter is not responded to promptly. 
It will show that speakers can use gaze to mobilize a response by the recipient when a 
response is not forthcoming. 
The literature on gaze in social interaction has long emphasized its regulatory 
functions. They were first mentioned in relation to turn taking in conversation (Duncan, 
1975; Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Duncan & Niederehe, 1974; Kendon, 1967), in particular in 
terms of signaling when somebody is going to start or stop producing a turn of talk and pass 
the floor to another participant. More recently, further work on gaze behavior in interaction 
has highlighted how gaze contributes to turn allocation and next speaker selection when there 
are more than two participants involved in a conversation (Lerner, 2003) and how children 
can distinguish a monitoring look from a sanctioning one by the caregiver and react 
accordingly (Kidwell, 2005). Another regulatory function that has been described is how 
gaze elicits a response from another participant (Kendon, 1967, Bavelas et al., 2002), which 
has been described as a symbolic function of speaker gaze during an interaction (Bavelas et 
al., 2002).  
In general, the regulatory functions of an interactional practice can be more or less 
sensitive to both contextual features and participants’ identities. Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson (1974) distinguished interactional organizations (e.g., turn-taking) that can be 
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“context-sensitive” and “context-free”. The organization of several related practices might be 
“context-free” if the specific context and participants do not affect the relevance or operation 
of an interactional organization (e.g., the turn-taking system). This means that every time 
some condition occurs (e.g., at the completion of a turn at talk), one of the practices that 
constitute that system can be implemented (e.g., turn allocation mechanism). On the other 
hand, a specific practice might be “context-sensitive” if the context might affect the actual 
implementation of that practice (as other variables might be at play and so the practice might 
have a differential effect).1 “Context-free” and “context-sensitive” are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, however, as some aspects of specific interactional practices might be 
“context-sensitive” while the system of practices might remain generally “context-free”.  
Within a larger “context-free” system of practices aimed at mobilizing responses 
(Stivers & Rossano, 2010), this chapter documents a practice that has a “context-free” 
dimension in that it can be deployed in any interactional situation, both institutional and 
ordinary, and the identities of the participants do not affect the implementation of this 
practice. However, this practice is also “context-sensitive”.2 In specific sequential 
environments, participants in conversation use gaze to both solicit a response and to display 
their understandings of where they are in a course of action. Specifically, by bringing their 
gaze to recipients during silence following a first action, speakers orient towards the 
relevance of a response by the recipient (i.e., they treat the responsive action as missing). 
And, recipients typically respond to this gaze practice by producing a relevant second pair 
part (SPP) to the initial first pair part (FPP).  By looking toward the addressee in that 
sequential environment speakers employ gaze to pursue a response to a FPP, thereby treating 
the responsive action as missing.  
So, rather than simply focusing on gaze as a regulatory turn-taking mechanism, I will 
focus on its indexicality. That is, gaze as a pursuit asks the recipient to consider what has 
been done before its occurrence and to perform an appropriate responsive action. By the time 
the speaker’s gaze shifts towards the recipient, the recipient must “look backward” at what 
has just been said or done and, at the same time, “look forward” to produce an appropriate 
next action. In this sense, gaze provides a partial solution to the key interactional issue of 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Heritage’s investigation (2011) of the practice of prefacing a turn with “oh”, in terms of “the limits 
of the context-free meaning of [the] practice and its context-sensitive uses” (p. 233). See also Lerner’s work 
(2003) on the context sensitive operations through which forms of addressing can be used by participants to 
select next speakers in multi-party conversations. 
2 “Context” here refers to a different level of granularity than the one outlined in “context-free”, as this time it 
refers specifically to the conversational context, the sequential context of the talk, and not the social situation or 
social identity of the participants. 
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obtaining a response to a specific action. How can interactants get others to cooperate in an 
appropriate way in the development of a specific course of action? And how do recipients 
know when and how to do that if they fail or actively withhold reacting to the initiating action 
of another? By describing the organization of the practice of pursuing a response via gaze this 
chapter will offer a glimpse of some of the systematic resources people can rely on to deal 
with this interactional problem. In what follows, I first outline prior claims in the literature 
about the role of gaze in soliciting a response. 
 
3.2 Speaker Looking Toward Addressee 
 
The sustaining of gaze by the speaker towards another participant has previously been 
described as a way of signaling the relevance of some response. Kendon (1967) describes 
how gaze can be used by interactants in dyadic conversations to regulate each other’s 
behavior:  
 
In looking up, which we have seen that [the speaker] does briefly at 
phrase endings, and for a longer time at the ends of his utterances, he 
can at once check on how his interlocutor is responding to what he is 
saying, and signal to him that he is looking for some response from 
him. And for his interlocutor, these intermittent glances serve as 
signals to him, as to when [the current speaker] wants a response from 
him. (Kendon, 1967: 42) 
 
Kendon also provides quantitative evidence to support the claim that the speaker looking up 
towards the recipient at the end of a long utterance3 functions as a signal to the recipient that 
a response is expected. The long utterances that ended with extended looks got no response 
or a delayed one in only 29% of the cases, while the ones that ended without speaker’s gaze 
got no response or a delayed one in 71% of the cases (Kendon, 1967: 36-37). In this way 
Kendon not only claims that speaker gaze displays the relevance of a response but also that it 
affects the timing of a response. In his seminal work, however, Kendon only deals with the 
general dynamics of turn taking. He does not make a distinction between sentence types 
                                                
3 Kendon calls “long utterances” any utterance longer than 5 seconds. He is therefore likely referring to what 
was labeled as multi-unit turns in chapter 2; that is, turns that often constitute extended-telling sequences (e.g., 
storytellings or reports). 
128
128
“context-sensitive” and “context-free”. The organization of several related practices might be 
“context-free” if the specific context and participants do not affect the relevance or operation 
of an interactional organization (e.g., the turn-taking system). This means that every time 
some condition occurs (e.g., at the completion of a turn at talk), one of the practices that 
constitute that system can be implemented (e.g., turn allocation mechanism). On the other 
hand, a specific practice might be “context-sensitive” if the context might affect the actual 
implementation of that practice (as other variables might be at play and so the practice might 
have a differential effect).1 “Context-free” and “context-sensitive” are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, however, as some aspects of specific interactional practices might be 
“context-sensitive” while the system of practices might remain generally “context-free”.  
Within a larger “context-free” system of practices aimed at mobilizing responses 
(Stivers & Rossano, 2010), this chapter documents a practice that has a “context-free” 
dimension in that it can be deployed in any interactional situation, both institutional and 
ordinary, and the identities of the participants do not affect the implementation of this 
practice. However, this practice is also “context-sensitive”.2 In specific sequential 
environments, participants in conversation use gaze to both solicit a response and to display 
their understandings of where they are in a course of action. Specifically, by bringing their 
gaze to recipients during silence following a first action, speakers orient towards the 
relevance of a response by the recipient (i.e., they treat the responsive action as missing). 
And, recipients typically respond to this gaze practice by producing a relevant second pair 
part (SPP) to the initial first pair part (FPP).  By looking toward the addressee in that 
sequential environment speakers employ gaze to pursue a response to a FPP, thereby treating 
the responsive action as missing.  
So, rather than simply focusing on gaze as a regulatory turn-taking mechanism, I will 
focus on its indexicality. That is, gaze as a pursuit asks the recipient to consider what has 
been done before its occurrence and to perform an appropriate responsive action. By the time 
the speaker’s gaze shifts towards the recipient, the recipient must “look backward” at what 
has just been said or done and, at the same time, “look forward” to produce an appropriate 
next action. In this sense, gaze provides a partial solution to the key interactional issue of 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Heritage’s investigation (2011) of the practice of prefacing a turn with “oh”, in terms of “the limits 
of the context-free meaning of [the] practice and its context-sensitive uses” (p. 233). See also Lerner’s work 
(2003) on the context sensitive operations through which forms of addressing can be used by participants to 
select next speakers in multi-party conversations. 
2 “Context” here refers to a different level of granularity than the one outlined in “context-free”, as this time it 
refers specifically to the conversational context, the sequential context of the talk, and not the social situation or 
social identity of the participants. 
129
obtaining a response to a specific action. How can interactants get others to cooperate in an 
appropriate way in the development of a specific course of action? And how do recipients 
know when and how to do that if they fail or actively withhold reacting to the initiating action 
of another? By describing the organization of the practice of pursuing a response via gaze this 
chapter will offer a glimpse of some of the systematic resources people can rely on to deal 
with this interactional problem. In what follows, I first outline prior claims in the literature 
about the role of gaze in soliciting a response. 
 
3.2 Speaker Looking Toward Addressee 
 
The sustaining of gaze by the speaker towards another participant has previously been 
described as a way of signaling the relevance of some response. Kendon (1967) describes 
how gaze can be used by interactants in dyadic conversations to regulate each other’s 
behavior:  
 
In looking up, which we have seen that [the speaker] does briefly at 
phrase endings, and for a longer time at the ends of his utterances, he 
can at once check on how his interlocutor is responding to what he is 
saying, and signal to him that he is looking for some response from 
him. And for his interlocutor, these intermittent glances serve as 
signals to him, as to when [the current speaker] wants a response from 
him. (Kendon, 1967: 42) 
 
Kendon also provides quantitative evidence to support the claim that the speaker looking up 
towards the recipient at the end of a long utterance3 functions as a signal to the recipient that 
a response is expected. The long utterances that ended with extended looks got no response 
or a delayed one in only 29% of the cases, while the ones that ended without speaker’s gaze 
got no response or a delayed one in 71% of the cases (Kendon, 1967: 36-37). In this way 
Kendon not only claims that speaker gaze displays the relevance of a response but also that it 
affects the timing of a response. In his seminal work, however, Kendon only deals with the 
general dynamics of turn taking. He does not make a distinction between sentence types 
                                                
3 Kendon calls “long utterances” any utterance longer than 5 seconds. He is therefore likely referring to what 
was labeled as multi-unit turns in chapter 2; that is, turns that often constitute extended-telling sequences (e.g., 
storytellings or reports). 
129
130
(such as interrogatives, imperatives, etc) or between action types performed through those 
turns at talk. Instead, he only talks in terms of long or short utterances.4 
Duncan and colleagues (Duncan, 1975; Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Duncan & Niederehe, 
1974) shares with Kendon his observations about the function of signalling the handing over 
the turn  for the speaker practice of looking up towards the recipient as the former approaches 
the end of her/his turn. Indeed, Duncan et al. list this as one of the basic cues deployed by 
participants in interaction to regulate turn taking. In trying to verify previous claims about the 
occurrence of looking towards a recipient approaching the end of the turn, Torres et al. 
(1997) find that of all turn endings in their data, only 16% include a look towards the 
recipient by the speaker. Moreover, these “look-towards” represent only 15% of all the 
speaker “look-towards” in their data.  Relying on information structure, and, in particular on 
Halliday’s (1967) notions of theme and rheme, they find that “co-temporaneous rheme and 
end of turn always elicits a look-toward” (Torres et al. 1997: 8) but also that “45% of all the 
look-towards [other participant] were not associated with either the end of the turn or the 
beginning of rhematic material”. This leads them to assert: “we still cannot account for the 
majority of gaze behavior (look-towards in particular) with the association of information 
structure and turn-taking” (Torres et al. 1997: 8). De Ruiter (2005), looking at task based 
dialogues, confirms the lack of a systematic relationship between gaze and turn-taking in 
general, therefore re-affirming the need for a better description of gaze functions in face-to-
face interaction. 
Starting from Kendon’s claim and looking at a storytelling environment, Goodwin 
(1981: 103) observes that “nods are not only seen by the speaker, but seem to be organized 
precisely so as to be seen. They begin just after the speaker, who has turned her head away, 
returns her head to the recipient.” Similarly, in storytelling environments produced in an 
experimental setting, Bavelas et al. (2002) find that “the listener tended to respond when the 
speaker looked at him or her, and the speaker tended to look away soon after the listener 
responded. Together, speakers and listeners created and used the gaze window [mutual gaze] 
to coordinate their actions” (2002: 576-577). Their notion of gaze window describes a mutual 
gaze situation in which it is not just that the speaker’s gaze elicits a response but rather the 
listener’s response seems to terminate the speaker’s gaze. By “listener responses” they refer 
                                                
4 Kendon actually talks about “short questions” as a type of utterance in which the speaker will look steadily at 
the recipient because the speaker “expects” an answer. Then he shows that this is the case in 75% of the 
questions in his corpus and accounts for the remaining questions in terms of utterances in which a lot of hesitant 
speech occurs and there is a high level of emotionality by the speaker. This, in his opinion, explains the looking 
away. 
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mainly to “mm hm”, “uh huh” and “nods”, which have been labeled in the literature as back 
channels (Yngve, 1970) or continuers (C. Goodwin, 1986b; Schegloff, 1982). They assert 
that one of the main features that distinguishes the gaze window from the pattern previously 
described in turn exchange is the fact that there is no exchange of roles between speaker and 
listener.  
One of the main conclusions that Bavelas et al. draw is that gaze has a symbolic 
function, meaning that the speaker is not looking at the listener to monitor her/him for action 
but rather to solicit a response. A second conclusion is that “the listeners understood the 
meaning of the act because they responded immediately and appropriately” (Bavelas et al., 
2002). Nonetheless, it remains unclear in which way the occurrence of a response before the 
withholding of gaze becomes evidence that listeners are responding specifically because of 
the gaze. Indeed, because of the coding system adopted by Bavelas et al., somebody could 
have been looking for 10 seconds and if s/he looks away after a response then the response 
would be considered related to the sustaining of the gaze, while the actual talk is not taken 
into account. Other signals to solicit a response are simply not taken into account, and, as 
such, the specific actions performed through talk are ignored. This suggests that the claim of 
a relationship between speaker gaze and listener’s response needs further specification. What 
is particularly needed is stronger evidence that listeners are actually responding to speaker 
gaze. 
In their work on the social organization of word searches, Goodwin & Goodwin 
(1986) refer to the occurrence of speaker gaze towards recipient in two examples of word 
searches and they describe its function as a way of soliciting aid from the other participant. 
No systematic evidence for this claim is presented and in both examples this apparent 
solicitation through gaze is unsuccessful. However, later in the chapter it will be shown in 
which way their observation resonates with a wider and more systematic understanding of the 
occurrence and function of speaker gaze in specific sequential environments. The analysis 
presented here reinforces the evidence of a connection between the organization of gaze and 
different levels of organization of human action and talk in interaction. Moreover, it 
reinforces previous observations by providing empirical evidence for the necessity of 
including at least one other level of analysis: the sequential level. Indeed, one of the limits of 
Kendon’s characterization of gaze patterns in dyadic conversation, is that if focuses mainly 
on the notion of utterance (turn) and the idea that participants have to take the floor from each 
other and keep talking, rather than focusing on the social actions the participants are 
implementing with their talk. In a similar fashion, Bavelas et al. do not explain why the 
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4 Kendon actually talks about “short questions” as a type of utterance in which the speaker will look steadily at 
the recipient because the speaker “expects” an answer. Then he shows that this is the case in 75% of the 
questions in his corpus and accounts for the remaining questions in terms of utterances in which a lot of hesitant 
speech occurs and there is a high level of emotionality by the speaker. This, in his opinion, explains the looking 
away. 
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mainly to “mm hm”, “uh huh” and “nods”, which have been labeled in the literature as back 
channels (Yngve, 1970) or continuers (C. Goodwin, 1986b; Schegloff, 1982). They assert 
that one of the main features that distinguishes the gaze window from the pattern previously 
described in turn exchange is the fact that there is no exchange of roles between speaker and 
listener.  
One of the main conclusions that Bavelas et al. draw is that gaze has a symbolic 
function, meaning that the speaker is not looking at the listener to monitor her/him for action 
but rather to solicit a response. A second conclusion is that “the listeners understood the 
meaning of the act because they responded immediately and appropriately” (Bavelas et al., 
2002). Nonetheless, it remains unclear in which way the occurrence of a response before the 
withholding of gaze becomes evidence that listeners are responding specifically because of 
the gaze. Indeed, because of the coding system adopted by Bavelas et al., somebody could 
have been looking for 10 seconds and if s/he looks away after a response then the response 
would be considered related to the sustaining of the gaze, while the actual talk is not taken 
into account. Other signals to solicit a response are simply not taken into account, and, as 
such, the specific actions performed through talk are ignored. This suggests that the claim of 
a relationship between speaker gaze and listener’s response needs further specification. What 
is particularly needed is stronger evidence that listeners are actually responding to speaker 
gaze. 
In their work on the social organization of word searches, Goodwin & Goodwin 
(1986) refer to the occurrence of speaker gaze towards recipient in two examples of word 
searches and they describe its function as a way of soliciting aid from the other participant. 
No systematic evidence for this claim is presented and in both examples this apparent 
solicitation through gaze is unsuccessful. However, later in the chapter it will be shown in 
which way their observation resonates with a wider and more systematic understanding of the 
occurrence and function of speaker gaze in specific sequential environments. The analysis 
presented here reinforces the evidence of a connection between the organization of gaze and 
different levels of organization of human action and talk in interaction. Moreover, it 
reinforces previous observations by providing empirical evidence for the necessity of 
including at least one other level of analysis: the sequential level. Indeed, one of the limits of 
Kendon’s characterization of gaze patterns in dyadic conversation, is that if focuses mainly 
on the notion of utterance (turn) and the idea that participants have to take the floor from each 
other and keep talking, rather than focusing on the social actions the participants are 
implementing with their talk. In a similar fashion, Bavelas et al. do not explain why the 
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speaker is soliciting uptake at those specific moments and in which ways the timing of this 
practice is organized. Specifically, they do not analyze what the participants are doing each 
moment with their talk, which limits the understanding of the orderliness of the practice they 
describe. This chapter shows why not considering the social actions that participants are 
implementing through their talk might be a problem. 
Recent cross-linguistic work that takes the sequential environment into account, in 
particular whether a turn constitutes a first pair part of an adjacency pair or a first action of a 
possible sequence, provides additional evidence for the existence of a relationship between 
the occurrence of speaker gaze and the expectancy and timing of a response. In particular, in 
a study that compares gaze behavior during questions in three unrelated languages and 
cultures, Rossano et al. (2009) show that, on average, speakers look at recipients during 
questions in 73% of cases.5 They also show that speaker gaze behavior during questions is 
similar across the three cultures while recipient gaze behavior differs. Questions are 
overwhelmingly responded to and the ones that do not get responded to are produced mainly 
with the recipient not looking at the speaker (there is a significant correlation between lack of 
mutual gaze and lack of responses to questions in two of the three languages). Moreover, they 
find that when the speaker or the recipient look towards the other participant during a 
question, they tend to do so from the beginning to the end of the question. Delayed looking 
towards the addressee tends to occur at particular sequential boundaries (usually at the 
beginning of courses of action or following their possible completion). 
Similarly, in a paper focusing on the resources that participants can deploy to 
mobilize a response by a recipient, Stivers and Rossano (2010) list speaker gaze as an 
important resource to deploy in actions such as assessments (and potentially other first-pair-
part actions as well) to pressure the recipient for a response.6 They show that in face-to-face 
interactions, when the speaker is gazing at the recipient during an assessment, the recipient 
usually responds to the initial assessment, while the assessments that do not get responded to 
are usually produced without speaker gaze. Therefore the claim is that speaker gaze plays a 
role in mobilizing recipient response. Additional evidence for this claim comes from my own 
work on question-answer sequences in Italian dyadic conversations (Rossano, 2010). In this 
work I focus on resources that speakers deploy to signal to addressees that they are producing 
a question and therefore that they are pressuring for a response. I show that when speakers 
                                                
5 Notice that this percentage is perfectly compatible with the one presented by Kendon (1967: 45, 47) for “short 
questions” produced with speaker’s gaze in dyadic interactions in English (75%) and by Beattie (1978: 13) for 
questions in general produced with speaker’s gaze in dyadic interactions in English (76.9%). 
6 This finding in fact first emerged from the dissertation research here reported. 
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produce polar questions that do not have a prototypical interrogative intonational contour 
(e.g. if rather than ending with rising intonation, they end with a flat one, or they even have a 
declarative contour) they are significantly more likely to look towards their addressee than 
when they are producing questions with prototypical interrogative contours. Given that polar 
questions in Italian can only be marked intonationally and not morpho-syntactically, the 
occurrence of speaker gaze towards the recipient during a question appears to work as an 
additional cue that her/his turn is something that should be responded to. 
Finally, in a work focusing on the timing of responses to yes-no questions in multiple 
languages, Stivers and colleagues (including the present author) (2009) show that the 
occurrence of speaker gaze accelerates the speed of responses to participants’ questions. 
However, in this study, recipient gaze is not taken into account, the number of participants 
involved in the interactions varies (i.e. they are not all dyadic or tryadic interactions) and the 
domain of investigation is specifically limited to yes-no questions. Still, the finding is 
supported in 9 out of 10 of the diverse languages investigated.  
These four recent works have in common the focus on a very specific domain of 
investigation (questions or assessments) and the focus on the occurrence of gaze (or not) 
towards the other participants during the action examined. The first part of this chapter will 
provide three further developments to those claims. The first one consists of generalizing the 
original observations made on questions or assessments to all FPPs. This means that the 
current domain of investigation is expanded to include not only questions and assessments 
but also announcements, sanctionings, complaints, accusations etc. These actions have been 
suggested to make relevant a response once they are produced (e.g., in Schegloff, 2007b). 
Thus, these actions potentially provide us with a broader claim about the role of gaze in 
pressuring addressees for a response. The second development consists of analyzing not only 
speaker gaze but also recipient gaze behavior during FPPs to see whether the picture changes 
once recipient gaze is included, and thus when mutual gaze analyses become possible. In 
particular, it is possible that speaker and recipient gaze affect the occurrence of a response 
and its timing in different ways, which will be illustrated below. In addition to analyzing gaze 
behavior during a turn, this chapter also analyzes gaze behavior during the transition 
relevance place that follows possible turn completion. At turn completion the other 
participant can start talking. If the first turn was a FPP, the other participant actually has an 
obligation to produce a response. What happens if the response does not occur in a timely 
fashion? How long do participants wait for a response before pursuing it? And if gaze has a 
role in pressing for a response, can a speaker use gaze to actually pursue a missing response?  
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These questions will be addressed in the second part of this chapter. The final part of this 
chapter will show how the findings provided in §3.3 and §3.4 can provide a framework for 
understanding similar speaker gaze practices (i.e., pursuing a response, or at least pressing for 
one) occurring in interactional environments in which the relevance of a response or uptake 
by the recipient is less straightforward. 
 
3.3 Gaze and Sequence Organization 
 
The first thing to establish before proceeding with a more detailed description of 
when in a sequence of actions gaze can be used to push for a response is that just engaging 
mutual gaze during talk does not mean that the speaker is pressing for some sort of response 
by the other participant.  The following example shows this clear problem for the notion of 
mutual gaze as a “gaze window” (i.e., when the speaker engages mutual gaze with the 
addressee, the addressee responds) (Bavelas et al., 2002). In example 3.1 two young women 
are chatting sitting at a table face to face. B is telling A about her grandmother and how weird 
she has become as she has grown old. At the beginning of this extract they are talking about 
the grandmother’s age (she is eighty-four years old) and the beginning of line 4 is a display of 
astonishment at this information. The focus is the participant’s gaze during the turn at lines 4-
5. 
 
(3.1) 2GC-dottoressa  24:00 
 
01 A:  [Ottantacinque_ 
        Eighty-five   
       [Eighty-five_ 
 
02 B:  Ottantaquattro 
       Eighty-four 
       Eighty-four 
 
03     (3.0) 
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04 A:   Me::. Io ho avuto un nonno (.) di mio papa’ (0.2) 
        Wow   I  had.1s   a granfather of my  dad  
        Wow:: I had a grandfather (.) from my dad’s side (0.2)  
                                      
05      ho      il singhiozzo (.) che e’ morto a ottantasette 
        have.1s the hiccup       that is dead  at eighty-seven 
I   have  hiccups   (.) who died at eighty-seven years old
         
06 B:  .hhh    
      .hhh 
              
07     (0.4)     (0.9)     (0.2)    ((B turns her head away from A)) 
                 (1.5) 
                                         
08 B:  hhh hhhu Si’ hh Speriamo di no   e(h)ccoh 
                Yes    hope.1p  of not I mean 
        hhh hhhu Yes hh Let’s hope not I m(h)eanh 
At line 4 A starts producing a turn that is interrupted by a side description (I have 
hiccups) that accounts for the intra-turn silences, which she then goes on to complete (line 5). 
If we look at the participants’ gaze behavior we see that B, the recipient, is looking all the 
time, while A looks at her 4 times during the course of that turn and still B reacts only at line 
6, with a sigh and turning her head away during the silence. B makes explicit what she meant 
with that reaction by producing line 8. We can also observe that A keeps looking at B until 
the end of line 8, when she withdraws her gaze and looks at the table. This example shows 
that mutual gaze during a turn at talk does not invariably entail that the recipient will produce 
some responsive action or feedback. That is, the engagement of mutual gaze, by itself, does 
not make a response relevant; however, sometimes a response occurs after the engagement of 
mutual gaze. This suggests the need for a more fine-grained analysis that can assess when the 
engagement of mutual gaze might lead to a responsive action to what has just been done by 
the speaker.  
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Any account of speaker looking towards recipient and of mutual gaze needs to take 
into account what happens in examples like this and it should be able to explain when 
speakers who are looking at addressees secure responses and when they do not. This might 
provide us with some information concerning whether speakers looking at addressees exert 
pressure for a response from the co-participant in the interaction. In what follows, I will show 
that it is necessary to include the sequential organization of action in an analytic framework 
of gaze and how the visible modality of gaze direction maps onto this level of order in 
interaction. 
 
3.3.1 Sequential Patterns in Conversation 
 
The first step towards understanding the relationship between speaker gaze and 
sequence organization consists in seeing how the first maps onto the second. In a dyadic 
interaction, when a participant A produces a sequence initiating action, B’s responsive action 
can occur in the following 5 possible combinations: 
 
 
Table 3.1 Possible sequential configurations following the production of a First Pair Part 
Configuration Features 
1 A first pair part (FPP) action is followed, without delay, by a second 
pair part (SPP) action produced by the other participant (e.g., a request 
for information is followed by an answer that provides that 
information) 
 
2 A SPP occurs, but it is produced partly in overlap with the FPP 
 
3 A SPP occurs, but it is delayed 
 
4 A FPP does not get responded to promptly and after some silence the 
same speaker pursues a response 
 
5 A FPP does not get responded to but the speaker of the FPP does not 
pursue it and what follows is a sequence of actions unrelated to the 
initial FPP 
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Here is a graphic representation of the configurations in Table 3.1:  
 
1.     A: FPP           
       Time   B: SPP 
 
         A: FPP 
 
           2. 
        Time 
 
        B: SPP 
 
 3.                      A: FPP       Silence 
        Time                                              B: SPP 
 
            
 4.                      A: FPPb     Silence      A: FPPp 
                 Time            B: SPP 
 
5.                     A: FPP1     Silence                   A: SPP2 
      Time                                               B: FPP2 
 
Configuration 4 can be further refined by distinguishing 4 possible types of pursuits:  
 
a) the pursuit is done by repeating the FPP; 
b) the pursuit is done by adding a delayed tag (e.g. it’s a beautiful day (1.5) isn’t it?); 
c) the pursuit is done by further specifying the FPP (e.g. how much does it cost? (1.0) 
How much does a helmet cost?);  
d)  the pursuing turn modifies the polarity of the preferred response.  
 
In pursuits a, b and c the polarity of the preferred response is not modified. Pursuit type a 
assumes that the lack of response might be due to a problem in hearing the FPP. Pursuit type 
b assumes that the recipient has heard the FPP and that some pressure to respond should be 
sufficient to elicit a response. Pursuit type c assumes that the lack of response is due to a 
possible problem in understanding. In pursuit type d, however, the speaker of the FPP, 
prefiguring a dispreferred answer because of the silence, facilitates the likelihood of 
obtaining a preferred response by backing down or upgrading the FPP or providing an 
alternative preferred answer (e.g. did you take these notes? (1.0) did somebody give them to 
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you?). The five configurations presented in Table 3.1 represent who speaks next and whether 
the FPP gets responded to or not and when. In this sense, configuration 4 can represent all 
fours situations (a-d) even though the way in which a response is pursued, and, as such, the 
response that will be provided, might vary substantially, as it will be illustrated below. 
How are these patterns distributed in dyadic interactions? Answering this question 
required returning to the same dataset used in chapter 27 and characterizing all of the FPPs in 
terms of the five configurations outlined above. This first pass at the data did not consider the 
gaze behavior of the participants but instead only considered verbal pursuits. As in patterns 3-
5, a SPP was considered delayed when more than 0.2 seconds8 of silence occurs between the 
end of the FPP and the beginning of the SPP. Results are indicated in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Distribution of verbal responsive patterns to First Pair Parts 
Possible Patterns Number of instances 
1) FPP  SPP 
 
125 (29.9%) 
2) FPP  Overlapping SPP 53 (12.7%) 
3) FPP  (Silence)  SPP 
 
174 (41.6%) 
4) FPP  (Silence)  Pursuit 
 
44 (10.5%) 
5) FPP  (Silence)  ∅ 
 
22 (5.3%) 
Total 418 (100%) 
 
Table 3.2 shows that almost 95% of the FPPs in my dataset get a responsive SPP, although 
10.5% do so only after a verbal pursuit. However, the information in this table also suggests 
that more often than not the responses to first actions are produced with some delay rather 
than immediately after the FPP in dyadic face-to-face interactions. 
We now turn to how gaze behavior maps onto these patterns. In the first sequential 
pattern, where the FPP is immediately followed by a SPP, the FPP is frequently produced 
with speaker gaze towards the recipient (in 77% of the cases). On the other hand, it is also the 
                                                
7 Ten minutes of dyadic face-to-face interaction from 10 different interactions for a total of 100 minutes and 20 
different participants. For further details see Appendix A. 
8 Based on the data collected for the Stivers et al. (2009) comparison of question-answer sequences in 10 
languages, it emerged that the average “on time” response for Italian conversation occurs 92 ms after the 
completion of the question. As such, 200 ms (0.2 s) corresponds to nearly 2 standard deviations above this 
average value. Moreover, of the 107 responses that occur after 200ms or more, only 6% are judged “on time” by 
a native speaker of Italian. All the others are judged to be late. 
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case that the recipient is often looking back at the speaker (in 74% of the cases). Participants 
engage in mutual gaze during those FPPs in 63% of the cases. Examples 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate 
these gaze configurations. In example 3.2 two friends are sitting on two couches talking 
about exams and how they usually study.  A has just complained about how difficult it is for 
her to memorize what she reads and B has asked whether she underlines parts of the text 
while she reads. The focus is the speaker gaze behavior during the questions at lines 3 and 7 
and the timing of the responses. 
(3.2) 2GSOFA-colori 34:27 
01 A:  e   mentre leggo   sottolineo   le  cose   che  secondo me 
       and while  read.1s underline.1s the things that according to me 
and while I read I underline th things that in my opinion
                    
02     sono piu’ importanti [(che   s-) 
       are  more important    which a- 
      are more important [(which a-) 
                                    
03 B:                      [Con  colori diversi? 
                            With colors different 
    [With different colors? 
                             
04 A:  Con  colori diversi. ((+ nod)) Il risultato pero’   e’  
       With colors different          The result   however is 
      With different colors. ((+nod)) The result however is 
                     
05    che  alla   fine sottolineo   tutto. 
      that at the end  underline.1s everything 
     that in the end I underline everything. 
138
138
you?). The five configurations presented in Table 3.1 represent who speaks next and whether 
the FPP gets responded to or not and when. In this sense, configuration 4 can represent all 
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with speaker gaze towards the recipient (in 77% of the cases). On the other hand, it is also the 
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06     (0.2) 
                       
07 B:   Cosa sottolinei   te=[che   colori] usi? 
        What underline.2s you which colors  use.2s 
       What do you underline=[which colors] do you use? 
                              
08 A:                      [T u t t o] 
                            Everything 
                          [Everything] 
                                
09 B:  Il  rosso e   il  blu  e   il  verde per i   t(h)itoli hhh .hh 
       The red   and the blue and the green for the titles  
      Red and blue and green for the t(h)itles hhh .hh 
Here B asks A to further specify how she underlines the text while reading and A responds 
promptly to the three questions at lines 3 and 7. Although the answers are preferred in type, it 
should be noted that the one at line 4 (‘with different colors’) is not a type conforming answer 
(Raymond, 2003), it does confirming an allusion (Schegloff, 1996a), and the first one in line 
8 (‘everything’) is a partial repetition of what A had just said at line 5, which was treated as 
not really informative by B. The main noticing here is that the questions are produced in 
mutual gaze and the answers are provided without delay.  
Example 3.3 shows a similar pattern, only this time participants are not constantly 
looking at each other and the recipient tends to look away during the question and before the 
production of her timely answers (in 2 out of 3 questions). In this example two friends are 
sitting at a table (at a 90 degree angle) and the conversation has just started. We focus on the 
gaze behavior during lines 1, 3, 7-8. 
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(3.3) 2GGOSS-stasera 00:15 
                               
01 B:  .hh A(h)l l o r a stas(h)era cos’ e’ che  fate 
           S(h)o         tonight    what is that do.2s 
       .hh S(h)o t(h)onight what are you doing 
                   
02 A:  Eh    andiamo a  Villa Chiara= 
       Eh    go.1p   to Villa Chiara 
       Eh    we go to Villa Chiara= 
                               
03 B:  =Ma  a  che   ora  vi  incontrate 
        But at which hour you meet.2p 
       =But at what time do you meet 
                                
04 A:  Vado  alle nove e   mezza dalla Gloria. 
       Go.1s at   nine and half  to    Gloria 
       I go to Gloria’s (house) at nine thirty. 
          
05    ((B annuisce)) 
((B nods))
06   ((some turns with side sequence omitted)) 
                                                                                    
07 B:             [Nove e   mezza ma]  andate subito      a  Villa  
                   Nine and half  but go.2p  immediately to Villa  
                  [Nine thirty but] do you go immediately to Villa  
                
08     Chiara alle nove e   mezza?= 
       Chiara at   nine and half 
       Chiara at nine thirty?= 
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09 A:  =Con- le   dieci con  gli altri. 
        With the ten   with the others 
       =With- at ten with the others. 
        
10     (0.4) 
At line 1 the recipient starts looking at the speaker before the speaker turns towards her. By 
the time the question at line 3 starts, the participants are looking at each other and only the 
recipient withdraws gaze before the completion of the question. The same happens during the 
question at lines 7-8. Each of these questions are requests for information about A’s plans for 
the night, probably meant to get an invitation by A. Participants engage in mutual gaze during 
each question and even though the recipient looks away before the completion of the last two 
questions, the answers are delivered without delay.9 
Sometimes the speaker of a FPP looks at the addressee while the addressee does not 
look back. In my corpus, where the participants sit less than one meter away from each other, 
if the speaker has her/his head oriented towards the recipient, the recipient can be assumed to 
perceive this.10 In situations in which the speaker looks at the addressee during the FPP but 
the latter is not looking back, often the responses are delayed. Example 3.4 illustrates this 
pattern. In this example, two friends are sitting side-by-side at a table looking at A’s holidays 
pictures. At the beginning of this extract they are looking at a picture of the inside of a 
building in Rome. Our focus is the participants’ gaze behavior during the FPP at line 2. 
                                               
9 Pragmatically, the gist of the question is already clear when the recipient looks away during the questions at 
line 3 and 7-8, even though the speaker continues. It is possible that the recipient is looking away to think about 
the answer (see Kendon 1967 and Beattie 1979 on speakers looking away before speaking to help planning their 
own speech), nonetheless the answers to the requests for information are not delayed.  
10 As mentioned in chapter 1, the human eye receives information from a field of about 200 degrees, although 
proper visual acuity provided by foveal vision is only about 15-30 degrees. In other words, our peripheral vision 
is very powerful even though the acuity of what we can perceive is quite poor. 
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(3.4) 2PCOMP-pagato 9:33 
         01      (1.0) 
                                
02 B:  Soccia quanto   hai pagato per entrar qua.  
       Wow    how much have paid  for enter  here 
       Wow how much did you pay to enter here.  
03     (0.2)     
        
04 B:   Die[ci  
        Ten 
        Te[n 
                          
05 A:      [Poco.  °Un euro. Due euro neanche 
            Little. One euro two euro neither 
          [Little.° One euro. Not even two euros 
       
06     (.) 
       
07 B:  Ah    beh 
       Oh    well 
      Oh    well 
       
08    (1.9) 
At line 2, B asks about the cost of entering the building represented in the picture. The 
speaker (B) turns towards the recipient (A) at the beginning of the question while the 
recipient keeps looking at the picture. After a delay in responding, B offers a candidate 
answer, but following this A looks towards B and begins a delayed answer.  
On the rare occasions in which a FPP is not responded to, the participants are not 
usually looking at each other during the production of the FPP. Examples 3.5 and 3.6 
exemplify this pattern. In example 3.5 two friends are sitting in front of each other talking 
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about exams and sometimes checking for information on the Internet. At the beginning of this 
example B is looking at his computer screen and continues looking at it, while A asks B to 
start asking him possible questions for the exam he has to take the next day. Our focus is the 
participants’ gaze behavior during the request at lines 3-4. 
(3.5) 2PEXAM-chiedi 48:42 
01 B:  E   qui  ti: ti apre ((guardando lo schermo del computer)) 
       And here you you open.3s 
       And here it opens ((for you)) ((looking at the pc monitor)) 
02    (4.4)  ((B sneezes)) 
                                  
03 A:   .hhh Scolta    mi chiedi un paio   di cose   della  
             Listen.2s me ask.2s a  couple of things of the  
       .hhh Listen ((can you))ask me a couple of things about the  
                     
04      rabbia e   della  brucellosis poi:[::: 
        rabies and of the brucellosis then 
       rabies and the brucellosis then:[::: 
                                               
05 B:                         [Ma  qui  c’e’     un sacco 
                               But here there is a  bag 
                             [But here there is a lot  
          
06     di roba  eh anche_ 
       of stuff eh also 
      of stuff eh also 
07    (0.9) 
08 A:  Eh lo so 
       Eh it know.1s 
      Eh I know 
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Here we see that A’s request is completely ignored by B, and, rather than responding, B 
instead produces a noticing at line 5 while looking at the computer screen. At line 8 A 
responds to the announcement/noticing. In this example both speaker and recipient are not 
looking at each other, but while the recipient (B) is clearly involved in another activity, the 
speaker (A) is simply looking away from the other participant, only to turn towards him and 
the screen during the production of line 5. The FPP does not get a response and both 
participants were not looking at the one another during the FPP. 
Example 3.6 shows a similar case, only this time the FPP is produced in overlap and 
is not responded to by the other participant, who instead keeps talking and completes his own 
turn failing to deal with the FPP entirely. In this example two friends are sitting in front of 
each other and B has just asked A for some advice in terms of recipes he could prepare for a 
boy-scout camp. During lines 46-47 B is looking down towards the table in front of them, 
mainly at a piece of paper and at a TV remote control that he moves slightly to the left. Our 
focus is the gaze behavior during the question at line 47. 
(3.6) 2PPLAN-scrivere 7:20 
41 A:  Come [sgua]ttero ce l'hai l' e(h)sp(h)erienza [hu hu hu] 
       As scullery boy  cl. have the experience 
       As  [scul]lery-boy you have e(h)xp(h)erience [hu hu hu] 
42 B:       [(so)]                                   [Si' ins(h)omma] 
             know.1s                                  Yes I mean 
            [(I know)]                               [Yes I m(h)ean] 
43     (0.6) 
44 B:  M'aiuta.     Da solo no- non:: 
       Me help.3s   Alone no- not 
       It helps me. On my own (I) don- I do::n’t 
45     (0.8) 
                               
46 B:  L[ui  fa  ah  vabbe'  vabbe' va]bbe'  poi  non ho capi- = 
       He do.3s ah    alright alright alright then not have.1s und-    
       H[e goes “ah  alright alright al]right then I did not und- = 
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47 A:   [Cosa ti devo    scrivere scusa]  
         What you must.1s write  sorry 
        [What should I write for you excuse me] 
                            
48 B:  =di fatto    uno che   ci aiuti non so   se ci sia e (0.3) 
       practically one which cl. help not know if cl. Is and 
       =practically one who help us I do not know if there is and (0.3) 
B does not respond to the request for clarification at line 47, and instead continues his turn-at-
talk (beyond line 48; not shown). However, there is evidence that B has heard the question. In 
particular, we can see that immediately after A produces the question at line 47 (produced in 
overlap with the beginning of line 46), B looks briefly at A while saying “then not”. This 
look towards A suggests that B heard A speaking and monitors what A is doing. However, B 
sees A looking down towards a piece of paper rather than looking back at him and so B 
immediately lowers his gaze and continues his turn. 
Examples 3.5 and 3.6 show two situations in which a FPP is not responded to nor 
pursued:  
1. when the other participant is involved in a competing activity and produces  
    another unrelated FPP immediately after the first; 
2. when the FPP is produced in overlap and the recipient continues producing his  
    turn. 
Concerning gaze behavior, we can see that in both cases the participants are not looking 
at each other during the production of the FPP. This is particularly interesting if compared to 
what we observed in examples 3.2 and 3.3, when both participants are looking at each other 
and the responses are produced on time. It is also important to notice the difference between 
example 3.4, where the speaker looks towards the addressee and holds his gaze towards the 
recipient, and examples 3.5 and 3.6. In example 3.4, the response is produced, although it is 
delayed, while in the latter two examples no response is produced at all. The speakers in 
examples 3.2-3.4 look towards the recipient whereas the speakers in examples 3.5 and 3.6 do 
not. A first qualitative observation then suggests that given the relationship between gaze and 
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direction of attention, if a participant, in particular a recipient, does not look towards the 
speaker during a FPP, this might lead to a delayed response to the FPP or no response at all. 
And yet, the occurrence of speaker gaze towards the addressee appears to play a role as well. 
To summarize, these extracts exemplify the following three patterns: 
 
1. When participants engage in mutual gaze during FPP, the SPP is produced without 
delay. 
2. When the speaker of the FPP looks at the addressee, who is in close proximity, the SPP 
is produced but it is delayed. 
3. When both participants do not look towards the other during the FPP, the FPP is not 
responded to. 
 
These three patterns deserve further investigation, particularly with respect to their robustness 
in a larger corpus and in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, and timing, of responses. 
The following section shows how speaker and recipient gaze differently influence the 
occurrence of a response and its timing. 
 
3.3.2 Gaze During FPP, Response and Its Timing 
 
In this section I intend to address two aspects of the relationship between gaze behavior 
and the occurrence of responses to FPPs: 
 
 
1) whether gaze affects the provision of a response 
2) whether gaze affects the timing of responses 
 
 
To address these two questions I returned to the database of 100 minutes of naturally occurring 
dyadic interactions quantitatively analyzed in chapter 2. This database had already been coded 
for sequential patterns as shown in Table 3.2; however, I also coded for the following features: 
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    another unrelated FPP immediately after the first; 
2. when the FPP is produced in overlap and the recipient continues producing his  
    turn. 
Concerning gaze behavior, we can see that in both cases the participants are not looking 
at each other during the production of the FPP. This is particularly interesting if compared to 
what we observed in examples 3.2 and 3.3, when both participants are looking at each other 
and the responses are produced on time. It is also important to notice the difference between 
example 3.4, where the speaker looks towards the addressee and holds his gaze towards the 
recipient, and examples 3.5 and 3.6. In example 3.4, the response is produced, although it is 
delayed, while in the latter two examples no response is produced at all. The speakers in 
examples 3.2-3.4 look towards the recipient whereas the speakers in examples 3.5 and 3.6 do 
not. A first qualitative observation then suggests that given the relationship between gaze and 
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direction of attention, if a participant, in particular a recipient, does not look towards the 
speaker during a FPP, this might lead to a delayed response to the FPP or no response at all. 
And yet, the occurrence of speaker gaze towards the addressee appears to play a role as well. 
To summarize, these extracts exemplify the following three patterns: 
 
1. When participants engage in mutual gaze during FPP, the SPP is produced without 
delay. 
2. When the speaker of the FPP looks at the addressee, who is in close proximity, the SPP 
is produced but it is delayed. 
3. When both participants do not look towards the other during the FPP, the FPP is not 
responded to. 
 
These three patterns deserve further investigation, particularly with respect to their robustness 
in a larger corpus and in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, and timing, of responses. 
The following section shows how speaker and recipient gaze differently influence the 
occurrence of a response and its timing. 
 
3.3.2 Gaze During FPP, Response and Its Timing 
 
In this section I intend to address two aspects of the relationship between gaze behavior 
and the occurrence of responses to FPPs: 
 
 
1) whether gaze affects the provision of a response 
2) whether gaze affects the timing of responses 
 
 
To address these two questions I returned to the database of 100 minutes of naturally occurring 
dyadic interactions quantitatively analyzed in chapter 2. This database had already been coded 
for sequential patterns as shown in Table 3.2; however, I also coded for the following features: 
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1. speaker gaze during the FPP 
2. recipient gaze during the FPP 
3. mutual gaze during the FPP  
4. face-threatening FPP 
5. whether the FPP is a question 
6. whether the FPP is an other-initiation of repair 
7. preference compatibility of the SPP 
8. type conformity of the SPP (if a yes/no question) 
 
In what follows I account for my interest in each of the 8 factors. The first three factors 
concern the possible effect of gaze on the provision of a response to a FPP. In the previous 
section we observed a possible relation between the occurrence of mutual gaze and the 
occurrence of a response to the FPP. Looking at examples 3.5 and 3.6, in both cases neither 
party is looking at the other during the FPPs and the FPPs are not responded to, while in 
examples 3.2 and 3.3 both participants are looking at each other during the FPPs and the FPPs 
are systematically responded to. This immediately suggests that in a dyadic face-to-face 
conversation the occurrence of mutual gaze during a FPP could predict that a response will be 
produced, while lack of mutual gaze could be associated with lack of response.  
Among the additional factors that might affect whether a recipient responds to a FPP is 
whether the FPP is what Brown and Levinson (1987) call a “face-threatening act”. This term is 
used to refer to the kind of actions that could be socially perceived as challenging or negative 
because they attack the recipient’s “face” (see also Goffman, 1955, 1959, 1967), such as 
challenges, accusations, criticisms, sanctionings etc. So the face-threatening status of a FPP 
should be included in a model that tries to understand systematic predictors of the occurrence 
of response or not. The fifth factor to take into account is whether the FPP has a question 
format, given that an interrogative formatting might add pressure for a response (see, e.g., 
Stivers and Rossano, 2010). The sixth factor that could affect the likelihood for a FPP to obtain 
a response is whether the FPP initiates repair (see, e.g., Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). 
The hypothesis is that if a FPP is initiating repair, it is more likely that the recipient responds to 
it in order to repair her/his own talk.11 Regarding the seventh factor, extensive research on the 
preference of SPPs (e.g., whether an invitation is accepted rather than rejected) has shown that 
                                                
11 Another reason for responding might be that the repair initiation, in some cases, could be understood as 
prefiguring a disalignment or doing challenging (see, e.g., Schegloff, 2000b). However, a bivariate analysis of 
the effect of the FPP doing other initiation of repair suggests that there is no specific effect of this feature on the 
occurrence of a response. 
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preferred responses are produced faster and with no delay, while dispreferred ones are usually 
delayed (see, e.g., Pomerantz, 1984a; Sacks, 1987; Stivers et al., 2009). Finally, recent work by 
Raymond (2003) has shown that with respect to polar questions, type conformity of the SPP 
(i.e., whether the recipient responds with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ rather than with some other form) 
affects delay in the production of SPPs. In particular, type conforming responses are produced 
faster than non-type-conforming ones. 
To address the question of whether gaze affects the provision of a response, a logistic 
regression analysis was conducted on the predictors of response after a FPP, where a FPP is 
considered responded to if it receives a response without a pursuit by the speaker of the FPP, 
regardless of its exact timing. 
 
Table 3.3 Predictors of response including mutual gaze. Results of logistic regression with data 
clustered by interaction. 12 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Mutual Gaze 3.95*** 2.25, 6.92 
Face threatening FPP 1.51 0.66, 3.42 
Repair 1.26 0.42, 3.80 
Question 0.93  0.59, 1.45 
 
Table 3.3 shows that the status of a FPP as face-threatening, a repair initiation or a 
question does not predict whether the FPP will be responded to or not in any significant way, 
while the occurrence of mutual gaze makes it almost 4 times more likely that the first action 
will be responded to than if it did not occur. This shows that mutual gaze by the participants 
during the FPP is a good predictor of the occurrence of a response after its completion. 
The second question to be addressed in this section concerns the effect of gaze on the 
timing of the response. The relevant timing here is not the exact length of silence after which 
the response occurs, but rather the timing of a response conceptualized according to turn-taking 
rules and the details of sequence organization (see, e.g., Schegloff, 2007b). In this sense, if we 
exclude the turns that do not get responded to (and those which must be pursued), only three 
scenarios are possible: 
                                                
12 *** denotes p<.001 
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1. The FPP gets responded to promptly, without an audible delay (i.e., within 0.2 s) 
2. The FPP gets responded to but in overlap 
3. The FPP gets responded to but after some silence 
 
Given the complexity of the accounts for an early response (i.e., in overlap), I decided 
to exclude cases of overlap (#2) from this quantitative analysis, together with the FPPs that did 
not receive a response. The reason these were excluded is that often an overlapping SPP shows 
affiliation and optimal mutual understanding, strong disagreement or to prevent further talk on 
a specific topic. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that if participants engage in mutual 
gaze than the response would actually occur before the completion of the FPP, which is an 
interactionally marked action anyway. For all of these reasons, the investigation was reduced to 
turns that get a timely response and those that are responded to after a delay. As mentioned 
above, a response was coded as delayed if it occurred more than 0.2 s after the completion of 
the FPP. 
We saw in examples 3.2 and 3.3 that FPPs during which participants engage in mutual 
gaze get a timely response. This suggests that the occurrence of mutual gaze during the FPP is 
probably a good predictor of the occurrence of a timely response. Among other factors that can 
independently influence the timing of a response there is its preference, intended as an 
interactional preference13 (e.g., an invitation should be accepted, a request should be granted) 
and not a subjective or psychological notion of preference.  
Another factor that could play a role in the timing of a response is its type conformity, 
as shown in the case of yes-no interrogatives by Raymond (2003). The results of the logistic 
regression analysis presented in Table 3.4 are obtained by considering as predictors of a timely 
response (versus a delayed response) only the occurrence of mutual gaze, whether the response 
is preferred or not and whether it is type conforming. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Pomerantz (1984a) or Sacks (1987) for a definition of preference in social interaction. 
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Table 3.4 Predictors of timing of response, including mutual gaze. Results of logistic regression with 
data clustered by interaction.14 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Mutual Gaze 2.16** 1.27, 3.66 
Preference 2.53*** 1.71, 3.76 
Type Conformity 0.89*** 0.85, 0.93 
 
Table 3.4 shows, as predicted, that preferred responses to a FPP, type conformity of the 
response and mutual gaze are all good predictors of whether the response will occur without a 
noticeable delay. In particular, the likelihood of getting a timely response goes up 2.16 times 
if participants engage in mutual gaze during the FPP and it increases to 2.53 times if the SPP 
is preferred. 
The results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide quantitative evidence that 
confirms the qualitative observations outlined with examples 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6, namely, 
that the occurrence of mutual gaze is a good predictor of whether the FPP will be responded 
to or not and whether this response will be timely. It is not the only predictor but it is 
certainly a relevant one even when evaluated in combination with other variables. However, 
just knowing that mutual gaze is a significant predictor does not tell us much about the 
different possible roles that speaker and recipient gaze can play in predicting a response and 
its timely delivery. In example 3.4, for example, we saw that sometimes only one participant 
looks toward the addressee (in that case the speaker looks at the addressee) and we saw that 
the response was delayed. It could be that mutual gaze is a significant predictor because 
either the occurrence of speaker gaze or of recipient gaze is mainly driving the results and 
that each participant’s gaze might be contributing something very different to the interaction. 
If this were the case, mutual gaze would be a byproduct of behavior independently enacted 
by each participant, rather than something that participants strive to achieve during 
conversation. To address this issue, two further logistic regression analyses were run, this 
time substituting mutual gaze with speaker gaze and recipient gaze during the FPP. Table 3.5 
corresponds to the same dataset used for the analysis presented in Table 3.3 and shows the 
role of speaker and recipient gaze as predictors of the occurrence of a response.  
 
                                                
14 ** denotes p<.01 *** denotes p<.001. 
150
150
 
1. The FPP gets responded to promptly, without an audible delay (i.e., within 0.2 s) 
2. The FPP gets responded to but in overlap 
3. The FPP gets responded to but after some silence 
 
Given the complexity of the accounts for an early response (i.e., in overlap), I decided 
to exclude cases of overlap (#2) from this quantitative analysis, together with the FPPs that did 
not receive a response. The reason these were excluded is that often an overlapping SPP shows 
affiliation and optimal mutual understanding, strong disagreement or to prevent further talk on 
a specific topic. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that if participants engage in mutual 
gaze than the response would actually occur before the completion of the FPP, which is an 
interactionally marked action anyway. For all of these reasons, the investigation was reduced to 
turns that get a timely response and those that are responded to after a delay. As mentioned 
above, a response was coded as delayed if it occurred more than 0.2 s after the completion of 
the FPP. 
We saw in examples 3.2 and 3.3 that FPPs during which participants engage in mutual 
gaze get a timely response. This suggests that the occurrence of mutual gaze during the FPP is 
probably a good predictor of the occurrence of a timely response. Among other factors that can 
independently influence the timing of a response there is its preference, intended as an 
interactional preference13 (e.g., an invitation should be accepted, a request should be granted) 
and not a subjective or psychological notion of preference.  
Another factor that could play a role in the timing of a response is its type conformity, 
as shown in the case of yes-no interrogatives by Raymond (2003). The results of the logistic 
regression analysis presented in Table 3.4 are obtained by considering as predictors of a timely 
response (versus a delayed response) only the occurrence of mutual gaze, whether the response 
is preferred or not and whether it is type conforming. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Pomerantz (1984a) or Sacks (1987) for a definition of preference in social interaction. 
151
Table 3.4 Predictors of timing of response, including mutual gaze. Results of logistic regression with 
data clustered by interaction.14 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Mutual Gaze 2.16** 1.27, 3.66 
Preference 2.53*** 1.71, 3.76 
Type Conformity 0.89*** 0.85, 0.93 
 
Table 3.4 shows, as predicted, that preferred responses to a FPP, type conformity of the 
response and mutual gaze are all good predictors of whether the response will occur without a 
noticeable delay. In particular, the likelihood of getting a timely response goes up 2.16 times 
if participants engage in mutual gaze during the FPP and it increases to 2.53 times if the SPP 
is preferred. 
The results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide quantitative evidence that 
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to or not and whether this response will be timely. It is not the only predictor but it is 
certainly a relevant one even when evaluated in combination with other variables. However, 
just knowing that mutual gaze is a significant predictor does not tell us much about the 
different possible roles that speaker and recipient gaze can play in predicting a response and 
its timely delivery. In example 3.4, for example, we saw that sometimes only one participant 
looks toward the addressee (in that case the speaker looks at the addressee) and we saw that 
the response was delayed. It could be that mutual gaze is a significant predictor because 
either the occurrence of speaker gaze or of recipient gaze is mainly driving the results and 
that each participant’s gaze might be contributing something very different to the interaction. 
If this were the case, mutual gaze would be a byproduct of behavior independently enacted 
by each participant, rather than something that participants strive to achieve during 
conversation. To address this issue, two further logistic regression analyses were run, this 
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corresponds to the same dataset used for the analysis presented in Table 3.3 and shows the 
role of speaker and recipient gaze as predictors of the occurrence of a response.  
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Table 3.5 Predictors of response including speaker and recipient gaze. Results of logistic regression 
with data clustered by interaction.15 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Speaker Gaze 3.05*** 1.85, 5.05 
Recipient Gaze 1.40 0.98, 2.02 
Face threatening FPP 1.55 0.64, 3.73 
Repair 1.24 0.47, 3.28 
Question 0.92 0.60, 1.41 
 
Table 3.5 shows that speaker gaze is the factor that best predicts whether a response 
will occur or not after the FPP, while recipient gaze does not quite reach significance. This 
suggests that while recipient gaze plays a crucial role for the occurrence of mutual gaze 
(shown to be a significant predictor of the occurrence of a response in Table 3.3), the most 
important predictor of response is speaker gaze during the FPP. If the speaker looks towards 
the recipient during a FPP it is 3 times more likely that the FPP will be responded to. If we 
combine these results with the ones in Table 3.3, we see that once the recipient looks back at 
the speaker and they engage in mutual gaze, the likelihood of getting a response increases 
and becomes 3.9 times higher than if mutual gaze was not obtained. This shows that speaker 
gaze matters more than recipient gaze for the occurrence of a response to a FPP, and the 
importance of recipient gaze is conditional on speaker’s gaze, i.e., on entering a state of 
mutual gaze. 
Turning to the factors affecting the speed of a response rather than the presence of a 
response, Table 3.6 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis of the predictors of a 
timely response to the FPP, considering the same dataset used for the analysis run for the 
predictors in Table 3.4. Speaker gaze and recipient gaze substitute for mutual gaze as 
variables here. 
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Table 3.6 Predictors of timing of response, including speaker and recipient gaze. Results of logistic 
regression with data clustered by interaction.16 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Speaker Gaze 1.43 0.81, 2.55 
Recipient Gaze 1.98*** 1.65, 2.38 
Preference 2.50*** 1.67, 3.77 
Type Conformity 0.88*** 0.84, 0.92 
 
In contrast to the findings in Table 3.5, Table 3.6 shows that speaker gaze is not a good 
predictor of a timely response to the FPP, while recipient gaze is (and so are type conformity 
and the preference of the response). In particular, if the recipient gazes at the speaker during 
the FPP it is 2 times more likely that the recipient will respond promptly than if s/he is not 
looking at the speaker. If we compare these results with the ones presented in Table 3.4 we 
can see that the likelihood of getting a timely response becomes slightly higher when the 
participants engage in mutual gaze (2.16, rather than 1.98), and therefore speaker gaze 
matters once it is engaged in mutual gaze with the recipient.  
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 showed that the occurrence of mutual gaze during a FPP is an 
important predictor both of the occurrence of a response and of its occurring promptly, 
although other variables can play an important role as well. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 have further 
refined the finding by showing that for the occurrence of any response at all, what matters the 
most is actually the occurrence of speaker gaze, while when a response occurs, its timing 
depends mostly on recipient gaze. In other words, if the speaker is looking at the recipient, 
the recipient is more likely to respond to a FPP, but if the recipient is looking at the speaker, 
the recipient is more likely to respond promptly, without delays. The latter finding seems 
perfectly reasonable given that a gaze orientation towards the speaker during the FPP is not a 
default (see chapter 2) and that because of the biological limits of our foveal vision, looking 
at the speaker entails not paying attention to competing activities that could become a 
distractor. If the recipient is treating the speaker’s talk as the main activity to attend to, then it 
                                                
16 *** denotes p<.001 
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is plausible that this would make it easier for the recipient to process the information, detect 
the action(s) delivered in the FPP and react promptly.  
The role of speaker gaze in the occurrence of a response to a FPP is consistent with 
and expands the claims made by Stivers and Rossano (2010) about the use of speaker gaze to 
pressure for a response to assessments and confirms the claim that this could be a mechanism 
at play in designing the action that can work as a first action in a sequence. Showing that this 
mechanism is significant across different types of FPPs is important because it demonstrates 
the significance of the sequential position of an action. Indeed, as in example 3.1, recipients 
do not react every time speakers look towards them, and yet, there are specific places (the 
completion of a turn) and specific types of actions (the ones that can be used as FPPs) after 
which a response can actually occur. The claim is therefore that speaker gaze can pressure for 
responses not at any point in time but rather when it occurs in specific sequential 
environments, in this case during a sequence initiating action. Later in the chapter I will show 
that this function of pressuring for responses works also during the transition relevance place 
following a FPP.  
The importance of the sequential environment for the interpretation of speaker’s gaze 
is important for the “gaze window” hypothesis by Bavelas et al. (2002). It is true, indeed, that 
the engagement of mutual gaze affects the likelihood of a response and its timely delivery, 
but this does not mean that a response could occur at any time after the occurrence of mutual 
gaze. The claim of this chapter is that there are, indeed, interactional moments, based on the 
organization of talk and action in interaction, on top of which gaze can place an additional 
pressure for response, without it being, by itself, a symbol of anything. It should be specified 
here that the sequential environment in which mutual gaze has been investigated in this 
chapter is different from the one studied by Bavelas and colleagues. Here, gaze behavior has 
been investigated during sequences of talk, in particular during FPPs, and the effect gaze has 
on recipient production of a response has been examined. Bavelas et al. (2002) studied what 
happens during storytellings, here labeled as extended-telling sequences in chapter 2. That 
chapter showed that different sequential environments (i.e., extended telling sequences and 
adjacency pair based sequences) require different gaze behavior by the participants.  
Two more points need to be emphasized before proceeding to the next part of the 
chapter. First, consider the finding that the engagement of mutual gaze is an important 
predictor of the occurrence and timing of a response following a FPP. Mutual gaze is clearly 
an emergent property of natural conversation that occurs in relation to the specific gaze 
behavior deployed by each participant in a conversation. Yet, if one thinks about it simply in 
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terms of attention, it is clear that if recipients are fully attending speakers’ turns at talk, 
recipients are more likely to respond without delay than not (as they might be distracted). Yet 
what is the speaker doing by looking at the addressee in a dyadic interaction? If it were 
simply a matter of monitoring the recipient, then it is not clear why speaker gaze would better 
predict the occurrence of responses than recipient gaze itself. The speaker must have a 
different reason for looking toward the recipient and I propose that this has to do with the 
capacity of adding pressure towards the occurrence of a response.  
If speaker gaze matters more for the occurrence of responses and recipient gaze more 
for their timely delivery, the two participants in a dyadic interaction could be looking at each 
other for very different reasons. And yet, the occurrence of both participants’ gaze could still 
help to secure the occurrence of a response and its prompt delivery. This matters because it 
reminds us that we cannot study gaze behavior without taking into account all of the 
participants in the interaction. Focusing only on speaker gaze in analyzing the occurrence of a 
response or focusing only on recipient gaze in analyzing its timely delivery could lead to 
forgetting that these two factors are related to each other and that both participants contribute 
to the final outcome.  
Secondly, consider that each participant plays a different role in the development of a 
sequence of talk. Sacks (1992 [1964-72]: 55, Vol. I) claimed that the questioner has control 
over the conversation because he has the right to talk again after the answer by the other 
participant. He later modifies this claim, noticing that this is true only in part, because the 
recipient might be avoiding answering the terms of the question and therefore might be 
uncooperative. This observation becomes particularly relevant here if we extend it to 
adjacency pairs, in general, rather than limiting it to question-answer sequences. The 
individuals who produce first actions are the ones who initiate the sequence and the ones who 
know, from the beginning, whether they are designing their action(s) to secure a response. I 
here subscribe to the model outlined in Stivers and Rossano’s work (2010), where canonical 
and non-canonical actions are distinguished and response relevance is not conceived as 
normatively on or off, but rather as something scalar, that can be publicly mobilized and 
therefore increased by stacking particular cues together while delivering a sequence initiating 
action. It is possible that initial actions are produced and thrown into the public arena to see if 
they get picked up and dealt with. This is sometimes the case, for example, for noticings, 
announcements, topic proferrings, or even assessments (see Stivers & Rossano, 2010 on non-
canonical actions). A response or reaction to the turn might be appreciated, but if it does not 
occur, the individual who launched the turn does not treat it as missing. Speakers then know 
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is plausible that this would make it easier for the recipient to process the information, detect 
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The role of speaker gaze in the occurrence of a response to a FPP is consistent with 
and expands the claims made by Stivers and Rossano (2010) about the use of speaker gaze to 
pressure for a response to assessments and confirms the claim that this could be a mechanism 
at play in designing the action that can work as a first action in a sequence. Showing that this 
mechanism is significant across different types of FPPs is important because it demonstrates 
the significance of the sequential position of an action. Indeed, as in example 3.1, recipients 
do not react every time speakers look towards them, and yet, there are specific places (the 
completion of a turn) and specific types of actions (the ones that can be used as FPPs) after 
which a response can actually occur. The claim is therefore that speaker gaze can pressure for 
responses not at any point in time but rather when it occurs in specific sequential 
environments, in this case during a sequence initiating action. Later in the chapter I will show 
that this function of pressuring for responses works also during the transition relevance place 
following a FPP.  
The importance of the sequential environment for the interpretation of speaker’s gaze 
is important for the “gaze window” hypothesis by Bavelas et al. (2002). It is true, indeed, that 
the engagement of mutual gaze affects the likelihood of a response and its timely delivery, 
but this does not mean that a response could occur at any time after the occurrence of mutual 
gaze. The claim of this chapter is that there are, indeed, interactional moments, based on the 
organization of talk and action in interaction, on top of which gaze can place an additional 
pressure for response, without it being, by itself, a symbol of anything. It should be specified 
here that the sequential environment in which mutual gaze has been investigated in this 
chapter is different from the one studied by Bavelas and colleagues. Here, gaze behavior has 
been investigated during sequences of talk, in particular during FPPs, and the effect gaze has 
on recipient production of a response has been examined. Bavelas et al. (2002) studied what 
happens during storytellings, here labeled as extended-telling sequences in chapter 2. That 
chapter showed that different sequential environments (i.e., extended telling sequences and 
adjacency pair based sequences) require different gaze behavior by the participants.  
Two more points need to be emphasized before proceeding to the next part of the 
chapter. First, consider the finding that the engagement of mutual gaze is an important 
predictor of the occurrence and timing of a response following a FPP. Mutual gaze is clearly 
an emergent property of natural conversation that occurs in relation to the specific gaze 
behavior deployed by each participant in a conversation. Yet, if one thinks about it simply in 
155
terms of attention, it is clear that if recipients are fully attending speakers’ turns at talk, 
recipients are more likely to respond without delay than not (as they might be distracted). Yet 
what is the speaker doing by looking at the addressee in a dyadic interaction? If it were 
simply a matter of monitoring the recipient, then it is not clear why speaker gaze would better 
predict the occurrence of responses than recipient gaze itself. The speaker must have a 
different reason for looking toward the recipient and I propose that this has to do with the 
capacity of adding pressure towards the occurrence of a response.  
If speaker gaze matters more for the occurrence of responses and recipient gaze more 
for their timely delivery, the two participants in a dyadic interaction could be looking at each 
other for very different reasons. And yet, the occurrence of both participants’ gaze could still 
help to secure the occurrence of a response and its prompt delivery. This matters because it 
reminds us that we cannot study gaze behavior without taking into account all of the 
participants in the interaction. Focusing only on speaker gaze in analyzing the occurrence of a 
response or focusing only on recipient gaze in analyzing its timely delivery could lead to 
forgetting that these two factors are related to each other and that both participants contribute 
to the final outcome.  
Secondly, consider that each participant plays a different role in the development of a 
sequence of talk. Sacks (1992 [1964-72]: 55, Vol. I) claimed that the questioner has control 
over the conversation because he has the right to talk again after the answer by the other 
participant. He later modifies this claim, noticing that this is true only in part, because the 
recipient might be avoiding answering the terms of the question and therefore might be 
uncooperative. This observation becomes particularly relevant here if we extend it to 
adjacency pairs, in general, rather than limiting it to question-answer sequences. The 
individuals who produce first actions are the ones who initiate the sequence and the ones who 
know, from the beginning, whether they are designing their action(s) to secure a response. I 
here subscribe to the model outlined in Stivers and Rossano’s work (2010), where canonical 
and non-canonical actions are distinguished and response relevance is not conceived as 
normatively on or off, but rather as something scalar, that can be publicly mobilized and 
therefore increased by stacking particular cues together while delivering a sequence initiating 
action. It is possible that initial actions are produced and thrown into the public arena to see if 
they get picked up and dealt with. This is sometimes the case, for example, for noticings, 
announcements, topic proferrings, or even assessments (see Stivers & Rossano, 2010 on non-
canonical actions). A response or reaction to the turn might be appreciated, but if it does not 
occur, the individual who launched the turn does not treat it as missing. Speakers then know 
155
156
that by looking at the recipient they can exert additional pressure and display that a response 
would be expected by the end of the turn. This also means that if the speaker is not looking at 
the recipient while producing a FPP, the recipient could potentially understand the utterance 
as not necessarily requiring a response. This is particularly relevant for all those actions such 
as noticings or assessments, which may end up not being responded to (Stivers & Rossano, 
2010). On the other hand, the recipient is the person who produces the response, and 
therefore the one who decides whether a response occurs and when. This means that the 
recipient has the most power in affecting what happens after the sequence initiating action. 
Even in the case in which one would rather subscribe to a conception of question-answer 
sequences as a normative system, where response is normatively required, the actual 
compliance with the possible norm (i.e., responding) is usually costly—it takes time, it 
usually requires thinking about the response and, more generally, it can provide a benefit for 
the person who asks but does not necessarily provide any immediate benefit to the answer. 
And the cost of not complying during ordinary conversation is not necessarily high. In other 
words, the fact that most times complete strangers would respond to each other’s questions 
without securing any immediate advantage remains a remarkable display of humans’ natural 
cooperativeness (see, e.g., Tomasello, 2009). Although responses are often produced, the 
possibility of not receiving one exists. This explains why looking towards the speaker, 
displaying full engagement in the conversation and a sort of preliminary commitment to it via 
gaze can be an important cue to what the recipient of the initial action will do during the 
transition relevance place: namely respond, usually promptly. Yet it remains a crucial fact 
that this asymmetry in the development of sequences of action (where the speaker of a 
sequence initating action can only pursue but the recipient ultimately decides whether or not 
to respond) is always in place and requires both participants to rely on the norms of 
conversation but also on cooperation by the other participant. Gaze, by itself, does not 
determine response. However, speaker gaze is a resource that increases pressure for a 
response in specific sequential environments (as outlined in the remainder of this chapter). 
Similarly, recipient gaze is a resource for displaying upcoming “cooperation” towards the 
completion of the course of action and priority given to the conversation over other activities. 
Therefore the occurrence of mutual gaze during a sequence initiating action can project the 
occurrence of a response and its timing, but it does not make a response obligatory. The 
question is, then, what can speakers do if their first action gets no response, and when in the 
developing silence is it tantamount to “no response”? The remainder of this chapter addresses 
these issues and describes the practices that a speaker can implement to pursue a response. 
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3.4 Pursuing 
 
In § 3.3.1 I outlined 5 different configurations that describe what happens after the 
occurrence of a FPP. Scheme 4 is of particular interest here. It shows that speakers can do 
something to favor the actual production of a SPP when it appears to be missing: namely 
produce another utterance that works as a pursuit of the missing response. 
 
 4.                      A: FPPb     Silence      A: FPPp 
                 Time            B: SPP 
 
From the literature, we know that participants can deploy different verbal practices in order to 
pursue a response. One way participants can deal with silence after FPPs such as invitations, 
offers, requests and proposals (which can signal upcoming potential rejection) is by 
producing a subsequent version that addresses a possible inadequacy or trouble in the first 
version in order to make acceptance the preferred outcome (Davidson, 1984). Different forms 
of pursuit include subsequent versions of the FPP, following actual rejections, or following 
weak agreements, or after the absence of response at possible completion points, or, finally, 
after “other monitor spaces” (Davidson, 1984: 119). Participants monitor what follows the 
first action and produce subsequent revised versions of it in order to pursue acceptance, 
which is seen as preferred. In addition, there is evidence that there is a preference for 
agreement and contiguity in response to questions, and interactants can revise the structure of 
their turns to pursue that agreement (Sacks, 1987).  
Pomerantz (1984b) has described three practices for pursuing a response after an 
assertion depending on the type of problem with the assertion: 
 
1. If the problem is understood to be an unclear reference or term, then the  
speaker offers a less opaque reference to replace the problematic one.  
2. If the problem is understood to be that some previously assumed shared  
knowledge is not actually shared, the speaker often tries to explicate the facts and 
information.  
3. If the problem is understood to be that the recipient does not support or agree  
with the speaker’s assertion then the speaker commonly reviews the assertion and 
possibly modifies it if overstated or inaccurate.  
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The basic idea is that speakers look for support or agreement to the actions they initiate and if 
they do not get it then they will try to figure out what went wrong and remedy the problem. 
The production of some assertion (Pomerantz does not use terms such as FPPs in that work) 
normally makes relevant uptake and if there isn’t any, there may be a problem that the 
speaker can solve by revising his previous turn and adding something. Most of the 
observations made in the research outlined above are based on the analysis of phone 
conversations or audio recordings. As such, the role of visible behavior has not yet been 
studied. The next step then is to look at what role gaze plays in pursuing responses in face-to-
face interactions. 
 
 
3.4.1 Gaze in the Transition Relevance Place 
 
In § 3.3, I showed that the presence or absence of speaker gaze has an influence on 
whether a FPP gets responded to or not (and partly on its timely occurrence if participants 
engage in mutual gaze). In particular, I showed that when speaker gaze occurs during the 
production of the FPP, the recipient is more likely to respond. The question then is what 
happens if the FPP is produced without speaker gaze and the FPP does not get an immediate 
response. If speaker gaze adds pressure on the recipient to produce a response, three scenarios 
should be recurrently observable in face-to-face interactions:  
 
1. A speaker can gaze towards the recipient as an ‘increment’ (Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 
2002; Lerner, 2004; Schegloff, 1996c), with less than 0.2 s between the completion of 
the FPP and the beginning of the movement of the eyes. 
2. If a speaker who does not look towards the addressee during the FPP looks towards 
the recipient during the transition relevance place (TRP), the recipient might be likely 
to respond promptly to the FPP. 
3. If the recipient does not respond promptly, the speaker may allow for some delay 
treating the delay as projecting a dispreferred response and if no response is provided, a 
response may either be further pursued verbally (while holding the gaze) or (more 
rarely) the speaker may abandon the gaze pursuit. 
 
In what follows I provide evidence of the recurrent occurrence of these scenarios in natural 
conversation. 
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3.4.2 Post-Positioned Gaze
The first piece of evidence of the importance, for speakers, to look at the addressee as 
a way of obtaining a response comes from an apparent ‘misfire’ of the looking behavior, 
more precisely described as the post-positioned deployment of gaze (henceforth, PPG).  This 
can happen in situations in which the FPP is not taken as making a response clearly 
conditionally relevant (but see example 3.8). Examples 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show this pattern. 
The first two examples show that the speaker starts moving her/his eyes towards the recipient 
before any silence occurs and the recipient responds promptly. What we are using as a 
measure is the fact that the speaker’s shift in eye direction (and often head direction) occurs 
before 0.1 second of silence has elapsed. The time it takes for the eyes to reach a focus on the 
other participant’s face depends on the speed at which the participants move their eyes and 
head. We are interested in when a shift in eye direction is projectable.  
In example 3.7 two friends have just decided to stop studying for the day. A says she 
is really tired and has a headache (she adds “as well” because B has mentioned having a 
headache earlier on). Our focus is A’s looking up towards B at line 11. 
(3.7) 2GSTUDYING-testa 29:07  
07     (0.7) 
           
08 B:  Okay quindi   (0.3) 
       Okay therefore 
      Okay therefore (0.3) 
                                                 
09 A:  .h No io veramente son scarburatissima ho      un mal di testa  
          No I  really    am  out of steam    have.1s a  bad of head    
      .h No I am really out of steam I have a headache    
       
10     anch'io 
       also I 
      as well 
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speaker can solve by revising his previous turn and adding something. Most of the 
observations made in the research outlined above are based on the analysis of phone 
conversations or audio recordings. As such, the role of visible behavior has not yet been 
studied. The next step then is to look at what role gaze plays in pursuing responses in face-to-
face interactions. 
 
 
3.4.1 Gaze in the Transition Relevance Place 
 
In § 3.3, I showed that the presence or absence of speaker gaze has an influence on 
whether a FPP gets responded to or not (and partly on its timely occurrence if participants 
engage in mutual gaze). In particular, I showed that when speaker gaze occurs during the 
production of the FPP, the recipient is more likely to respond. The question then is what 
happens if the FPP is produced without speaker gaze and the FPP does not get an immediate 
response. If speaker gaze adds pressure on the recipient to produce a response, three scenarios 
should be recurrently observable in face-to-face interactions:  
 
1. A speaker can gaze towards the recipient as an ‘increment’ (Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 
2002; Lerner, 2004; Schegloff, 1996c), with less than 0.2 s between the completion of 
the FPP and the beginning of the movement of the eyes. 
2. If a speaker who does not look towards the addressee during the FPP looks towards 
the recipient during the transition relevance place (TRP), the recipient might be likely 
to respond promptly to the FPP. 
3. If the recipient does not respond promptly, the speaker may allow for some delay 
treating the delay as projecting a dispreferred response and if no response is provided, a 
response may either be further pursued verbally (while holding the gaze) or (more 
rarely) the speaker may abandon the gaze pursuit. 
 
In what follows I provide evidence of the recurrent occurrence of these scenarios in natural 
conversation. 
159
3.4.2 Post-Positioned Gaze
The first piece of evidence of the importance, for speakers, to look at the addressee as 
a way of obtaining a response comes from an apparent ‘misfire’ of the looking behavior, 
more precisely described as the post-positioned deployment of gaze (henceforth, PPG).  This 
can happen in situations in which the FPP is not taken as making a response clearly 
conditionally relevant (but see example 3.8). Examples 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show this pattern. 
The first two examples show that the speaker starts moving her/his eyes towards the recipient 
before any silence occurs and the recipient responds promptly. What we are using as a 
measure is the fact that the speaker’s shift in eye direction (and often head direction) occurs 
before 0.1 second of silence has elapsed. The time it takes for the eyes to reach a focus on the 
other participant’s face depends on the speed at which the participants move their eyes and 
head. We are interested in when a shift in eye direction is projectable.  
In example 3.7 two friends have just decided to stop studying for the day. A says she 
is really tired and has a headache (she adds “as well” because B has mentioned having a 
headache earlier on). Our focus is A’s looking up towards B at line 11. 
(3.7) 2GSTUDYING-testa 29:07  
07     (0.7) 
           
08 B:  Okay quindi   (0.3) 
       Okay therefore 
      Okay therefore (0.3) 
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11      (0.1)    (0.1) 
             (0.2) 
                      
12 B:  Anch'io c' ho      mal di testa   ((annuendo)) 
       Also I  cl have.1s bad of head 
       I have a headache too ((nodding)) 
              
13         (1.1)       (0.3   
                  (1.4) 
                                               
14 A:  Poi  ho      detto sara'   il raffreddore sara': il-  
       Then have.1s said  will be the cold       will   the 
      Then I said it will be the cold it will be: th-  
            
15     i   postumi dell'influenza, (0.5)  
       the effects of   flu               
      the side effects of the flu, (0.5) 
In this example, after 0.1 seconds of mutual gaze, B responds to A’s “headache” statement by 
saying that she has a headache as well (she had already mentioned this few minutes earlier in 
the conversation). A starts moving her eyes towards B immediately after the completion of 
her turn at line 10, spending 0.1 seconds to reach the face of the interlocutor. In one sense, 
the TCU “ho un mal di testa anch’io” (I have a headache as well) could be taken as an 
announcement about her current physical condition.  In another, it can also be interpreted as 
an account for her previous statement “io sono veramente scarburatissima” (I am really out of 
steam). Both are produced with no speaker gaze to the recipient and yet we see A’s gaze 
move towards B immediately after the completion of line 10 (I have a headache as well). The 
recipient then promptly responds to the announcement about the headache. The 
announcement about the headache at lines 9-10 already shows that A knows that B has a 
headache as well (the words “anch’io”, me as well, indicate it), yet B repeats it and nods. The 
occurrence of nodding makes sense only in a situation in which B knows that A is looking at 
her (and indeed B can perceive A’s gaze because they engage in mutual gaze during line 11). 
Independently of whether we believe that the verbal response at line 12 was occasioned by 
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the speaker gaze towards the recipient at line 10, the occurrence of the nodding can be 
perceived as a response because the speaker is looking towards the recipient during the TRP 
at line 11. In this example we therefore see that A starts shifting her gaze towards B while 
uttering the last sound of her turn, and B responds timely. 
Example 3.8 shows a similar pattern. In this example, two friends are looking at 
pictures sitting side by side. A is showing B some pictures he took in Stockholm during a 
vacation and at line 1 he points towards a boat in one of the pictures. Our focus is B’s looking 
up towards A during the silence at line 4 and A’s immediate response at line 5.
(3.8) 2PCOMP-barca 12:15 
01 A:  hh Questo e’ l’ostello  in cui   ero ((indicando una foto)) 
          This   is the hostel in which be.1s 
      hh This is the hostel where I was ((pointing on a picture)) 
02     (2.4) 
                 
03 B:  Cosa vuol    dire=sulla  barca 
       What want.3s say  on the boat 
      What does it mean=on the boat 
            
04    (0.2)    (0.1)  
           (0.3) 
       
05 A:  Si’ 
       Yes 
      Yes 
06     (1.0)  
07 A:  E’ un ostello meta’ sulla  barca meta’ sulla  terraferma 
       Is a  hostel  half  on the boat  half  on the land 
      It is a hostel half on a boat and half on the land 
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01 A:  hh Questo e’ l’ostello  in cui   ero ((indicando una foto)) 
          This   is the hostel in which be.1s 
      hh This is the hostel where I was ((pointing on a picture)) 
02     (2.4) 
                 
03 B:  Cosa vuol    dire=sulla  barca 
       What want.3s say  on the boat 
      What does it mean=on the boat 
            
04    (0.2)    (0.1)  
           (0.3) 
       
05 A:  Si’ 
       Yes 
      Yes 
06     (1.0)  
07 A:  E’ un ostello meta’ sulla  barca meta’ sulla  terraferma 
       Is a  hostel  half  on the boat  half  on the land 
      It is a hostel half on a boat and half on the land 
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When B produces the FPP at line 3 in which he initiates repair by asking A for a clarification, 
both B and A are both looking at the picture on the desk. At the completion of B’s turn at line 
3, B turns and looks towards A, who looks up towards B and then responds (line 5).  
In the last two examples we have seen that a participant can start moving her/his eyes 
towards the recipient before any noticeable silence occurred after the completion of the FPP 
(notice that at line 4 of example 3.8, B shifts his gaze towards A immediately and 0.2 s is the 
time it takes him to get his eyes from looking at pictures to looking towards A, not the time 
he waits until shifting his gaze). When the speaker looks towards the recipient, s/he meets the 
eyes of the recipient and they engage in mutual gaze. At that point the recipient promptly 
responds to the FPP. Often these slightly delayed responses are actually preferred responses 
to the FPP (e.g., acceptance of an offer). This suggests that once a first action is produced 
without speaker gaze towards the recipient, the speaker can start looking towards the 
recipient immediately at completion of the turn, so that the looking towards the addressee 
may be perceived as a post-positioned deployment of gaze or as a kind of increment (Ford et 
al., 2002; Lerner, 2004; Schegloff, 2001). According to Lerner (2004), increment initiators 
such as “to”, “for”, “because”, etc. might occur in situations in which the turn is syntactically 
and prosodically complete, yet pragmatically there seems to be some bit of information 
missing.  This missing information is then provided by the increment. Moreover, a piece of 
talk is incremental if it displays its connection to the previous turn at talk (e.g., “we went 
straight to visit Ted (1.0) from the office”). 
The interesting feature of this incremental post-positioned gaze (PPG) is that the 
element that is added is not talk, but rather the specification that the last TCU was designed 
to be responded to. It is crucial that the speaker’s gaze to the recipient occurs before any 
audible silence because it means that its occurrence is not due to a perceived lack of response 
(i.e., there is no gap at the moment the looking up starts), but rather to pre-empt other 
possible problems (e.g., not getting a response to). In this respect, a PPG may appear to do an 
interactional job similar to increments (i.e., providing further pragmatic specification in terms 
of the action the turn is implementing). However, the impossibility of displaying a connection 
to the previous turn through gaze (apart maybe from its timely occurrence on the last sound 
of the turn) invites a more careful categorization of this practice and therefore the current 
labeling will be post-positioned gaze.  
With this established, although speakers may look towards recipients as soon as they 
enter the transition relevance place, this does not necessarily secure an immediate response. 
Example 3.9 is a case in point. In this example, two friends are having a conversation facing 
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each other sitting on two couches. B has just asked A to help him with some recipes for 
preparing food for a boy-scout camp and at line 1 A asks about the number of people B will 
have to cook for. The focus is on the participants’ gaze behavior during the silence at line 9. 
(3.9) 2PPLAN-piu 05:56 
01 A:  Quante   sono le  persone 
       How many are  the people 
How many people are there
02     (0.4) 
03 B:  Trenta 
       Thirty 
      Thirty 
04     (0.1) 
05 B:  °Cinni° 
        Kids 
      °Kids° 
06     (0.5) 
            
07 B:  Cinni, Ragazzi    ((A sta guardando un foglio con il menu’)) 
       Kids   adolescents 
      Kids, Adolescents ((A is looking at piece of paper with menu’)) 
        
08 A:  Piu’, 
       Plus 
Plus,
          
09     (0.2)   (0.6) 
           (0.8) 
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When B produces the FPP at line 3 in which he initiates repair by asking A for a clarification, 
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talk is incremental if it displays its connection to the previous turn at talk (e.g., “we went 
straight to visit Ted (1.0) from the office”). 
The interesting feature of this incremental post-positioned gaze (PPG) is that the 
element that is added is not talk, but rather the specification that the last TCU was designed 
to be responded to. It is crucial that the speaker’s gaze to the recipient occurs before any 
audible silence because it means that its occurrence is not due to a perceived lack of response 
(i.e., there is no gap at the moment the looking up starts), but rather to pre-empt other 
possible problems (e.g., not getting a response to). In this respect, a PPG may appear to do an 
interactional job similar to increments (i.e., providing further pragmatic specification in terms 
of the action the turn is implementing). However, the impossibility of displaying a connection 
to the previous turn through gaze (apart maybe from its timely occurrence on the last sound 
of the turn) invites a more careful categorization of this practice and therefore the current 
labeling will be post-positioned gaze.  
With this established, although speakers may look towards recipients as soon as they 
enter the transition relevance place, this does not necessarily secure an immediate response. 
Example 3.9 is a case in point. In this example, two friends are having a conversation facing 
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each other sitting on two couches. B has just asked A to help him with some recipes for 
preparing food for a boy-scout camp and at line 1 A asks about the number of people B will 
have to cook for. The focus is on the participants’ gaze behavior during the silence at line 9. 
(3.9) 2PPLAN-piu 05:56 
01 A:  Quante   sono le  persone 
       How many are  the people 
How many people are there
02     (0.4) 
03 B:  Trenta 
       Thirty 
      Thirty 
04     (0.1) 
05 B:  °Cinni° 
        Kids 
      °Kids° 
06     (0.5) 
            
07 B:  Cinni, Ragazzi    ((A sta guardando un foglio con il menu’)) 
       Kids   adolescents 
      Kids, Adolescents ((A is looking at piece of paper with menu’)) 
        
08 A:  Piu’, 
       Plus 
Plus,
          
09     (0.2)   (0.6) 
           (0.8) 
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10 B:  Piu’::::: tre   noi: e   loro i   capi   saranno: (0.4) 
       Plus      three us   and them the bosses be.3p 
      Plus::::: three of us: and them the bosses will be: (0.4) 
             
11     quattro o  cinque 
       four    or five 
      four or five 
        
12     (0.3) 
                   
13 B:  Quaranta persone 
       Forty    people 
      Forty people 
As in example 3.7, the speaker’s gaze provides additional evidence for the recipient that this 
is a turn that should be responded to. In this example the speaker (A) of the FPP at line 8 
looks up towards the recipient, who was already looking at him, immediately after the 
completion of the FPP. While producing line 8, A looks at the menu B has to prepare for the 
boy-scouts. Line 8 can be considered a FPP because, with it, A asks B to specify how many 
more people will be present in addition to the boy-scouts, although it does so in a very 
elliptical manner. The speed at which the speaker looks up towards the recipient makes it 
look like a natural bit of behavior belonging to the previous TCU (i.e. at line 8). Nonetheless, 
this time the response is delayed. The reason for this delay can be found in the delivery of the 
response: B does not know exactly how many more people will be present at the boy-scout 
camp. So even though they are looking at each other, the recipient starts responding only 
after 0.6 seconds of mutual gaze and while producing the answer he looks away, in the 
middle distance, displaying “ thinking” (C. Goodwin, 1987; M. H. Goodwin & Goodwin, 
1986), and he does so also in his talk with the sound stretches on the “u” of “più” (plus) and 
later on the words “noi” (we) and “saranno” (will be). A looks away briefly while B conveys 
that he is “thinking” (line 10) and resumes looking at him soon after B starts producing the 
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response. Finally, notice also that it is not self-evident that line 8 is a complete turn when it is 
delivered.  
To summarize, in example 3.9 we have seen that even though speaker gaze has been 
post-positionally added to the end of the turn and mutual gaze is engaged, the response is 
nonetheless delayed because the recipient does not immediately know the answer. At the 
same time, this does not contradict the claim that speaker gaze pressures recipients for a 
response, as the delay can be accounted for contingently. The next section shows a case that 
could be taken as a variant of the practice outlined in this section or a member of the second 
practice that will be presented in § 3.4.4. 
 
 
3.4.3 A Continuum of Pursuits? 
 
Example 3.10 shows something in between a post-positioned deployment of gaze and 
a full-blown gaze pursuit. In theory, a gaze pursuit could be described as another occurrence 
of PPG, as the gaze is post-positioned with respect to the FPP. However, the occurrence of 
speaker gaze before the occurrence of silence is interactionally different from the occurrence 
of speaker gaze after some silence has occurred. In the first case, the turn might be 
“pragmatically” incomplete, but no delay in responding has occurred yet, while in the second 
case the occurrence of speaker gaze might be dealing with the lack of response, as the 
absence of a response after a bit of silence is a noticeable phenomenon. It will be shown that 
the main feature that distinguishes these two practices is the timing of speaker’s gaze towards 
the recipient.  
In the following extract, two friends are talking about the exams for which they need 
to prepare. At lines 1-2 A asks B whether she has talked to someone about her exam and what 
to study. Our focus is the gaze behavior during the silence at line 6. 
 
(3.10) 2GSOFA-chiama 31:08 
 
01 A:  Ma  hai     sentito qualcuno? Quella tipa la’ 
       But have.2s heard   someone   that   type there 
       But did you hear from someone? That woman/girl there 
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10 B:  Piu’::::: tre   noi: e   loro i   capi   saranno: (0.4) 
       Plus      three us   and them the bosses be.3p 
      Plus::::: three of us: and them the bosses will be: (0.4) 
             
11     quattro o  cinque 
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12     (0.3) 
                   
13 B:  Quaranta persone 
       Forty    people 
      Forty people 
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boy-scouts. Line 8 can be considered a FPP because, with it, A asks B to specify how many 
more people will be present in addition to the boy-scouts, although it does so in a very 
elliptical manner. The speed at which the speaker looks up towards the recipient makes it 
look like a natural bit of behavior belonging to the previous TCU (i.e. at line 8). Nonetheless, 
this time the response is delayed. The reason for this delay can be found in the delivery of the 
response: B does not know exactly how many more people will be present at the boy-scout 
camp. So even though they are looking at each other, the recipient starts responding only 
after 0.6 seconds of mutual gaze and while producing the answer he looks away, in the 
middle distance, displaying “ thinking” (C. Goodwin, 1987; M. H. Goodwin & Goodwin, 
1986), and he does so also in his talk with the sound stretches on the “u” of “più” (plus) and 
later on the words “noi” (we) and “saranno” (will be). A looks away briefly while B conveys 
that he is “thinking” (line 10) and resumes looking at him soon after B starts producing the 
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response. Finally, notice also that it is not self-evident that line 8 is a complete turn when it is 
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To summarize, in example 3.9 we have seen that even though speaker gaze has been 
post-positionally added to the end of the turn and mutual gaze is engaged, the response is 
nonetheless delayed because the recipient does not immediately know the answer. At the 
same time, this does not contradict the claim that speaker gaze pressures recipients for a 
response, as the delay can be accounted for contingently. The next section shows a case that 
could be taken as a variant of the practice outlined in this section or a member of the second 
practice that will be presented in § 3.4.4. 
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Example 3.10 shows something in between a post-positioned deployment of gaze and 
a full-blown gaze pursuit. In theory, a gaze pursuit could be described as another occurrence 
of PPG, as the gaze is post-positioned with respect to the FPP. However, the occurrence of 
speaker gaze before the occurrence of silence is interactionally different from the occurrence 
of speaker gaze after some silence has occurred. In the first case, the turn might be 
“pragmatically” incomplete, but no delay in responding has occurred yet, while in the second 
case the occurrence of speaker gaze might be dealing with the lack of response, as the 
absence of a response after a bit of silence is a noticeable phenomenon. It will be shown that 
the main feature that distinguishes these two practices is the timing of speaker’s gaze towards 
the recipient.  
In the following extract, two friends are talking about the exams for which they need 
to prepare. At lines 1-2 A asks B whether she has talked to someone about her exam and what 
to study. Our focus is the gaze behavior during the silence at line 6. 
 
(3.10) 2GSOFA-chiama 31:08 
 
01 A:  Ma  hai     sentito qualcuno? Quella tipa la’ 
       But have.2s heard   someone   that   type there 
       But did you hear from someone? That woman/girl there 
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02     l’hai       ch- l’ [hai chiamata?] 
       her have.2s ca- her have.2s called 
did  you  ca- [did you call her?]
03 B:                     [No non l’ho]       chiamata 
                           No not her have.1s called 
   [No I did not] call her 
          
04       (1.1) 
          
05 B:  La chiamo? 
       Her call.1s 
     ((Should)) I call her? 
         
06    (0.1)  (0.2)    (0.2) 
             (0.5) 
            
07 A:  [C h i a m a l a ] 
        Call her 
      [C a l l  h e r] 
                           
08 B:  [Magari domani   la] chiamo cosi’ mi faccio  raccontare 
        Maybe  tomorrow her call   so    me make.1s tell 
      [Maybe tomorrow] I call her so she tells me ((about the exam)) 
Immediately following the first FPP at line 1, A refines the reference to the person B should 
have talked to by referring to “la tipa” (that woman/girl) in her second FPP. Producing a 
second more specific question immediately after a more general one without any audible 
silence in between is a pattern that appears to be the verbal equivalent of the gaze practice 
just described in § 3.4.1: that is, a way of facilitating the occurrence of a response to the FPP. 
Interestingly, it would not be appropriate to talk of a verbal pursuit in this case because there 
is no indication that the first FPP will not be responded when the second more specific 
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version is offered. Rather, it is clearly an attempt to clarify what the question is targeting and 
therefore an attempt to facilitate an appropriate answer. The question receives a dispreferred 
answer in overlap at line 3, and after some silence, B asks whether she should actually call 
that person. The question here seems rhetorical given that A has already implicitly suggested 
B should talk to this woman. B gazes towards A soon after the end of the FPP, but this time a 
brief silence occurs before the beginning of the movement (0.1 s). The occurrence of some 
silence before the speaker of the FPP shifts her gaze towards her addressee’s face is what 
makes 3.10 a different case than the ones presented in § 3.4.1.  
The question is: is B’s gaze movement during the silence at line 6 being prompted by 
this gap or is it a misfire of the PPG practice presented in § 3.4.1?  Although difficult to 
assess with some certainty, given that the main criteria for distinguishing the two practices is 
the noticeable absence or not of a response before the occurrence of the looking up towards 
the recipient, there are other important elements that show the link between the incremental 
use of speaker gaze and the pursuing use of speaker gaze. Specifically, the participants 
engage in mutual gaze during the silence following the FPP and the FPP is then promptly 
responded to. The relationship between the timing of speaker gaze, and the timing and 
occurrence of a response is the focus of the following section. 
 
3.4.4 Pursuing Responses With Gaze 
 
The second piece of evidence that speaker gaze is instrumental in obtaining a 
response from a recipient comes from the fact that gaze can be used to pursue a response 
when one is missing. The timing of speaker’s gaze towards the recipient is different from the 
cases of PPG shown in examples 3.7-3.9. If the gaze is used to pursue a response, the looking 
up occurs only after some silence has occurred, and therefore after a noticeable gap in the 
sequential development of the course of action. However, when a speaker does gaze towards 
a recipient, a response is generally promptly provided. Thus, the timing of the response is an 
important piece of evidence because the response was absent before the speaker’s looking up. 
Examples 3.11 and 3.12 illustrate this pattern. 
In the following example, there are two university students sitting side by side in front 
of a desk, looking at pictures together and commenting on them. When this extract starts, the 
guest (B) has just recognized a famous actor in one of A’s pictures. A had previously 
introduced the picture as “the evening of the concert” (in which A played the piano). Our 
focus is the gaze behavior during the silence at line 11. 
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did  you  ca- [did you call her?]
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                           No not her have.1s called 
   [No I did not] call her 
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06    (0.1)  (0.2)    (0.2) 
             (0.5) 
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        Maybe  tomorrow her call   so    me make.1s tell 
      [Maybe tomorrow] I call her so she tells me ((about the exam)) 
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just described in § 3.4.1: that is, a way of facilitating the occurrence of a response to the FPP. 
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is no indication that the first FPP will not be responded when the second more specific 
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therefore an attempt to facilitate an appropriate answer. The question receives a dispreferred 
answer in overlap at line 3, and after some silence, B asks whether she should actually call 
that person. The question here seems rhetorical given that A has already implicitly suggested 
B should talk to this woman. B gazes towards A soon after the end of the FPP, but this time a 
brief silence occurs before the beginning of the movement (0.1 s). The occurrence of some 
silence before the speaker of the FPP shifts her gaze towards her addressee’s face is what 
makes 3.10 a different case than the ones presented in § 3.4.1.  
The question is: is B’s gaze movement during the silence at line 6 being prompted by 
this gap or is it a misfire of the PPG practice presented in § 3.4.1?  Although difficult to 
assess with some certainty, given that the main criteria for distinguishing the two practices is 
the noticeable absence or not of a response before the occurrence of the looking up towards 
the recipient, there are other important elements that show the link between the incremental 
use of speaker gaze and the pursuing use of speaker gaze. Specifically, the participants 
engage in mutual gaze during the silence following the FPP and the FPP is then promptly 
responded to. The relationship between the timing of speaker gaze, and the timing and 
occurrence of a response is the focus of the following section. 
 
3.4.4 Pursuing Responses With Gaze 
 
The second piece of evidence that speaker gaze is instrumental in obtaining a 
response from a recipient comes from the fact that gaze can be used to pursue a response 
when one is missing. The timing of speaker’s gaze towards the recipient is different from the 
cases of PPG shown in examples 3.7-3.9. If the gaze is used to pursue a response, the looking 
up occurs only after some silence has occurred, and therefore after a noticeable gap in the 
sequential development of the course of action. However, when a speaker does gaze towards 
a recipient, a response is generally promptly provided. Thus, the timing of the response is an 
important piece of evidence because the response was absent before the speaker’s looking up. 
Examples 3.11 and 3.12 illustrate this pattern. 
In the following example, there are two university students sitting side by side in front 
of a desk, looking at pictures together and commenting on them. When this extract starts, the 
guest (B) has just recognized a famous actor in one of A’s pictures. A had previously 
introduced the picture as “the evening of the concert” (in which A played the piano). Our 
focus is the gaze behavior during the silence at line 11. 
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(3.11) 2PCOMP-mangiato 16:32 
01     (4.0)
02 A:  Tipo alla   mano poi  sai 
       Guy  at the hand then know.2s 
       Guy very easy going then you know 
03 B:  Si’ si’ 
       Yes yes 
       Yes yes 
04      (2.0)
05 B:  Ma si vede anche adesso perche’ e’: [c’era in una  
       But cl. see also now    because is  cl. was in a                              
       But you can see it even now because he is: [he was in a 
      [B starts turning picture 
06      trasmissione l’  altro giorno [.hhh 
  tv show      the other day 
tv show the other day         [.hhh
07 A:                                 [hhh 
   [hhh 
                  
08 B:  Ma  ha     mangiato li’   con  voi? 
       But has.3s eaten    there with you 
       But did he eat there with you? 
            
09         (0.4) 
10 A:  hhh h ((looking at pictures)) 
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11        (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.1) 
                  (0.7) 
                            
12 A:  E:hm n[o dopo sono andati a  far  la  cena   dopo  li   ho  
       Ehm  no  then were gone   to make the dinner after them have.1s          
E:hm n[o later they went for dinner and afterwards
              [B turns pictures back to the picture with the actor 
              
13     raggiunti anch’io 
       reached   also I 
       I joined them too 
In this excerpt, the speaker of the FPP pursues a response by looking towards the recipient 
during the silence and this gaze pursuit obtains a prompt response. Let’s take a closer look at 
how the gaze pursuit occurs. B’s question at line 8 is responded to after 1.5 seconds of silence 
(lines 12-13). After having acknowledged and conveyed independent knowledge17 of the 
“easy going” nature of the famous Italian actor (see lines 5-6), B asks whether the actor also 
had dinner with A and his friends (line 8). During the production of the turn at line 5 the 
speaker (B) continues to turn the pictures then stops to look at two new ones. He continues 
talking about the previous picture but at the same time takes a closer look at the new ones. At 
line 7, A produces a laugh token while looking at the new picture (that is later described by A 
as representing a dinner with his relatives and is not related to the one with the actor). When 
B asks the question at line 8 both of them are oriented towards this new picture. During the 
following gap (lines 9-11) A produces another laugh token (line 10) while continuing to look 
toward the new picture. This laugh token is not interpretable as a response to the question. A 
does not produce any further talk, and, as a result, after another 0.5 seconds of silence, B 
begins to turn towards A. At this point, A then provides the relevant next turn: an answer to 
                                               
17 For a more detailed account of how and why participants would claim independent epistemic rights in 
assessing someone’s personality or behavior, see Heritage & Raymond (2005) and Stivers (2005). 
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(3.11) 2PCOMP-mangiato 16:32 
01     (4.0)
02 A:  Tipo alla   mano poi  sai 
       Guy  at the hand then know.2s 
       Guy very easy going then you know 
03 B:  Si’ si’ 
       Yes yes 
       Yes yes 
04      (2.0)
05 B:  Ma si vede anche adesso perche’ e’: [c’era in una  
       But cl. see also now    because is  cl. was in a                              
       But you can see it even now because he is: [he was in a 
      [B starts turning picture 
06      trasmissione l’  altro giorno [.hhh 
  tv show      the other day 
tv show the other day         [.hhh
07 A:                                 [hhh 
   [hhh 
                  
08 B:  Ma  ha     mangiato li’   con  voi? 
       But has.3s eaten    there with you 
       But did he eat there with you? 
            
09         (0.4) 
10 A:  hhh h ((looking at pictures)) 
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11        (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.1) 
                  (0.7) 
                            
12 A:  E:hm n[o dopo sono andati a  far  la  cena   dopo  li   ho  
       Ehm  no  then were gone   to make the dinner after them have.1s          
E:hm n[o later they went for dinner and afterwards
              [B turns pictures back to the picture with the actor 
              
13     raggiunti anch’io 
       reached   also I 
       I joined them too 
In this excerpt, the speaker of the FPP pursues a response by looking towards the recipient 
during the silence and this gaze pursuit obtains a prompt response. Let’s take a closer look at 
how the gaze pursuit occurs. B’s question at line 8 is responded to after 1.5 seconds of silence 
(lines 12-13). After having acknowledged and conveyed independent knowledge17 of the 
“easy going” nature of the famous Italian actor (see lines 5-6), B asks whether the actor also 
had dinner with A and his friends (line 8). During the production of the turn at line 5 the 
speaker (B) continues to turn the pictures then stops to look at two new ones. He continues 
talking about the previous picture but at the same time takes a closer look at the new ones. At 
line 7, A produces a laugh token while looking at the new picture (that is later described by A 
as representing a dinner with his relatives and is not related to the one with the actor). When 
B asks the question at line 8 both of them are oriented towards this new picture. During the 
following gap (lines 9-11) A produces another laugh token (line 10) while continuing to look 
toward the new picture. This laugh token is not interpretable as a response to the question. A 
does not produce any further talk, and, as a result, after another 0.5 seconds of silence, B 
begins to turn towards A. At this point, A then provides the relevant next turn: an answer to 
                                               
17 For a more detailed account of how and why participants would claim independent epistemic rights in 
assessing someone’s personality or behavior, see Heritage & Raymond (2005) and Stivers (2005). 
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the question.18 A starts talking before B turns the pictures back to the previous one. B’s head 
turning and his looking towards A become an efficient way of pursuing a response that was 
missing.  
Example 3.12 shows another pursuit of a response achieved by looking up towards
the other participant. Here two young women have just finished studying together and are 
beginning to chat. A begins by noticing that B tends to scribble a lot. Our focus is A’s gaze 
during the silence at line 3.  
(3.12) 2GSTUDYING-colori 30:20 
01      (1.6) 
                 
02 A:  Tu  colori   sempre 
You color.2s always
      You color all the time 
03    (0.8) ((enacting coloring)) (0.1)   (0.1)  (0.1)    
                         (1.1) 
                                
04 B:  Io e’    vero. L’ ho      notat[o 
       I  be.3s true  It have.1s noticed 
      Me it is true.          I notic[ed it 
05 A:                               [Sempreh 
                                     Always 
                                    [Alwaysh 
A’s observation about B is what Labov & Fanshel (1977) call a ‘B-event statement’ and 
makes confirmation relevant (Heritage & Roth, 1995). However, this observation does not 
                                               
18 An alternative account might be that it is actually B’ s turning the pictures back to the previous picture that 
facilitates A’s answer and not the gaze; however, the timing of the picture turning in relation to the beginning of 
A’s answer counters this claim. 
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receive a response until A looks up towards the recipient, after having mimicked B’s 
scribbling on a piece of paper during the silence. B is not directly looking at A’s face but is 
nevertheless less than 1 meter away, 19 and so arguably, B can easily perceive A’s shift in 
head and gaze direction. B’s response at line 4, though not type-conforming (Raymond, 
2003), confirms A’s observation and therefore appears to be preferred (see, e.g., Atkinson & 
Heritage, 1984; Pomerantz, 1984a; Sacks, 1987), yet it is produced in a dispreferred manner 
being delayed and occurring only once pursued.  
In these two examples we have seen that by orienting towards the other participant 
during the gap following a FPP the speaker obtains a relevant SPP promptly. More 
specifically, in a situation in which the participants are not directly looking at each other, the 
speaker of the FPP turns towards the recipient who then answers the question. The only thing 
that changes in terms of bodily orientation and posture is the speaker’s head and eye 
orientations. Immediately following these shifts in orientation, the recipient produces a 
sequentially relevant next (the SPP) in order to advance the sequence (and the preference of 
the SPP often cannot account for the previous delay in answering). The claim is that gazing 
towards the recipient in this sequential environment is a way of pursuing uptake. Participants 
in interaction orient to gaze in this position as a recognizable practice for pursuing response 
by immediately producing the appropriate SPP. Next, I examine deviant cases in which a 
participant implements the practice of pursuing a response through gaze and yet s/he fails to 
obtain a timely response or any response at all. 
 
3.4.5 Gaze Pursuits That Fail or Get Very Delayed Responses 
 
The fact that a participant can pursue a response by looking towards the recipient 
during the transition relevance place following a FPP does not mean that this attempt is 
always successful or that the response will always be produced promptly. In what follows, I 
show a series of examples in which the speakers of a FPP perform a gaze pursuit but are 
ineffective in achieving a response.  
In 3.13, B pursues A’s response with gaze, however, A does not respond. That said, in 
this case we nonetheless see an orientation towards the occurrence of a response soon after a 
                                                
19 The distance between the faces and the bodies of the participants is always less than 1 meter. If the recipient 
is oriented towards the speaker, although looking down, s/he can perceive the change in gaze direction by the 
prior speaker because of peripheral vision. § 3.4.5 will provide examples in which the recipient cannot perceive 
the speaker’s gaze direction for various reasons (for example because turned towards a computer screen), and in 
which a gaze pursuit cannot be responsible for the timing of the response. 
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gaze pursuit as the default and a lack of a prompt response as projecting a dispreferred 
response to come or at least a problematic one. When a response is not immediately 
forthcoming, the speaker of the FPP can treat the silence as prefiguring disagreement and 
back down. In this example A is teaching B how to make a recipe, and at lines 2-3, B asks 
whether adding some ham would improve it. Our focus is the gaze behavior during the 
silence at line 4. 
(3.13) 2PPLAN-prosciutto 09:17 
                       
01 A:  Pero’ non so      la  pan[na io la metterei 
       But   not know.1s the cream  I  it put.1s 
      But I do not know [I would put the cream 
                                          
02 B:                          [Ma non ci  sta      bene  
                                But not cl. stay.3s well  
 [But doesn’t it fit well 
             
03     anche il  prosciutto 
       also  the ham 
      also the ham ((in it)) 
                    
04        (0.9)      (0.2)   (0.3) 
                   (1.4) 
                             
05 B:  Di-  Vabbe’ io [devo    fare quell che   mi dicono quindi = 
       Di-  Alright I  must.1s do   that  which me say.3p so 
      Di-  It’s alright [I must do what they tell me ((to do)) so= 
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06 A:                [si’       si’       si’      si’      ci = 
                      Yes       yes       yes      yes      cl. 
          [Yes       yes       yes      yes 
            
07 B:  =si’ tranquillo] 
yes relax
      =yes don’t worry] 
                    
08 A:  sta     be]ne anche il  prosciutto 
       stay.3s well  also  the ham 
       the ham fits we]ll as well  
When A produces the FPP at lines 2-3, he is looking down at the entire menu B has to 
prepare, while B is taking some notes about the recipe. After 0.9 seconds, B looks up towards 
A and sustains gaze towards him for 0.3 seconds before starting to back down (line 5). When 
B pursues a response with his gaze, A continues looking down. The delay in responding, 
together with the lack of recipient gaze towards him after a total of 1.4 seconds of silence, is 
interpreted by B as prefiguring A’s disagreement. In anticipation of that disagreement, B 
backs down from his suggestion of improving the recipe by adding ham and says that he has 
to do what the organizers tell him to do, implicitly indicating that his suggestion was perhaps 
not appropriate. However, A actually produces a response to B’s initial suggestion regarding 
the ham and confirms that adding ham would be a good idea. The way the answer at lines 6-8 
is produced shows that A has been thinking about the suggestion by B and is willing to 
acknowledge that this could be a good variation. Given that A is the expert and B has 
repeatedly manifested his incompetence in terms of food recipes, it is clear that this stretch of 
interaction is highly affected by the epistemic rights in play between these two individuals. In 
particular, B seeks confirmation of the appropriateness of a variation to the recipe, but this 
turns out to be something that A has never considered. By delaying his acceptance of B’s 
suggestion, A re-asserts his expertise by enacting a thoughtful consideration of the 
apprentice’s suggestion. This example shows that when a speaker pursues a response through 
gaze, s/he expects the recipient to respond promptly, and if this does not happen, the speaker 
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displays an orientation towards this delay as projecting further problems in dealing with the 
original FPP. 
A second deviant case is shown in example 3.14. Here, although a response is pursued 
via gaze, the response occurs only after a noticeable delay. However, the delay is accounted 
for by the dispreferred nature of the response. In this excerpt, a couple is sitting at a table 
eating and chatting. Before the beginning of this excerpt, A accused her boyfriend B of 
having almost entirely eaten a chocolate rabbit she had bought for dinner guests that evening. 
After some denying, he eventually admits having eaten the chocolate rabbit. She accepts his 
confession and closes the sequence with a sequence closing third “alright” (Beach, 1995; 
Schegloff, 2007b). Then they re-engage eating during the silence at line 1. Here our focus is 
the participants’ gaze during the silence at line 3. 
(3.14) 2PLUNCH1-sorpresa 9:12 
01      (2.5) 
                                        
02 A:  Io ci son rimasta male che non c’ era  la sorpresa. 
       I  cl. am left    bad that not cl. was the surprise 
       I was disappointed because there was not the surprise.  
   ((Inside the chocolate rabbit)) 
                      
03          (1.0)     (0.2)     (1.3) 
                      (2.5) 
04 ((B makes gesture + facial expression like “what a pity”, Fig. 3.1)) 
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Figure 3.1. Frame representing line 4 
                 
05      (0.2) (0.3)  (0.6)   (0.1)       (6.3) 
                       (7.5) 
06 A:  Beh insomma Angela ha vinto l’  Erasmus ad Heidelberg (0.2)  
       Well in sum Angela has won  the Erasmus at Heidelberg 
      Well Angela won the Erasmus for Heidelberg (0.2) 
A’s turn at line 2 is both a complaint (not about B’s actions) and an announcement (i.e. there 
was no surprise in the chocolate rabbit). A produces the talk at line 2 without looking at B 
and looks at him only 1 full second into the transition relevance place. They engage in mutual 
gaze and sustain it for 1.3 seconds before B produces a facial expression and a mildly 
empathetic gesture that can be glossed as “what a pity”, which seems quite ironic. They 
engage in a back and forth of looking towards each other, probably due to the ironic nature of 
B’s response, until both of them look down and then re-engage eating for some seconds. 
Contrary to other examples shown in this chapter, B’s reaction to the gaze pursuit is 
not immediate. It is actually quite delayed, as if he was resisting answering. If we consider 
the sequential environment in which it occurs we can find an appropriate account for this. B 
has just been accused of having eaten the entire chocolate rabbit without thinking about A 
and her guests and he has admitted it after having initially denied it. After 2.5 seconds, A 
seeks B’s affiliation with her complaint for the absence of a surprise inside the chocolate 
rabbit that had just been the cause of an argument.  The delay, after the sustained mutual 
gaze, and the teasing component readable in his facial expression display his unwillingness to 
easily affiliate with such a complaint. He appears to be delaying conveying his stance 
towards the other participant. In this respect A’s looking up and down again during the 
following silence is a way of monitoring what B meant through his enactment: in particular 
whether it is something she should accept or take up in a specific way. The fact that A looks 
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back and forth at him after the visible response, rather than simply withdrawing gaze and 
closing the sequence, provides further evidence for this claim.20 Example 3.14 thus provides 
some evidence that a participant orients towards a delay in the occurrence of a response after 
a gaze pursuit as a marked action and that pursuits do make relevant a timely response.  
Although most gaze pursuits are responded to, occasionally this is not the case. 
Example 3.15 shows a gaze pursuit that is abandoned after no response is provided in the 1.3 
seconds that follows the pursuit. This shows both the affordances of this visible behavior 
(i.e., gaze towards a recipient can be sustained and abandoned) and an orientation towards a 
lack of response within a certain amount of time as a probable display that no answer will be 
provided to the FPP. In this excerpt, B has just offered A the use of her helmet for the 
evening. At line 2 B warns A that she will get very upset if he loses her helmet. Our focus is 
their gaze behavior during the silence at line 3. 
(3.15) 2PLUNCH1-perdi 11:32 
                     
01        (1.1)          (0.4) 
                 (1.5) 
                 
02 B:  Se mi perdi   il  casco  vedi 
       If me lose.2s the helmet see.2s 
      If you lose my helmet you will see ((the consequences)) 
                                
03    (0.2)  (0.2)   (0.2)       (1.3)          (0.7) 
                     (2.6) 
                   
04 A:  Te  lo ripaghero’ il  casco 
You it repay.1s   the helmet
      I will repay it the helmet 
                                               
20 See chapter 4 for evidence that A’s behavior after B’s response displays that A perceives the sequence as 
incomplete at that point. 
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05    (1.2) 
 
06 B: Giallo ((il colore del casco)) 
      Yellow 
      Yellow ((the color of the helmet)) 
 
Here, the recipient of the FPP (A) looks at B during its production and briefly into the 
following silence, yet he does not react to the warning/threat that B produces at line 2. After 
some silence, B looks up towards A to pursue a response and keeps looking at him for 1.3 
seconds but he keeps looking down at his dish (line 3). After this sustained look and without 
accomplishing mutual gaze, B lowers her gaze for 0.7 seconds. At this point, however, A 
responds to the FPP by saying he will buy her a new helmet if he loses it. In this case, there is 
no reason to believe that A actually responds to the gaze pursuit, given that 2 seconds passed 
after B looked up towards him. A responds with such a delay because he perceives B’s 
comment at line 2 as a threat and also a possible accusation that he normally loses things. If 
the FPP is perceived as being face threatening, a delay in responding and the seriousness of 
the response can be a display of his stance towards that action.  
In this final example, the speaker does not abandon the gaze pursuit as in 3.15 above, 
but the recipient nevertheless does not look back but instead maintains focus on a computer 
screen. The dispreferred response that is eventually produced is delayed but is also 
occasioned by the gaze pursuit. In example 3.16 two friends are preparing an exam and B is 
talking about what A can find in a book they have to read for the exam. At line 6 A asks B 
whether B has read this book entirely. Our focus is their gaze behavior in the silence that 
follows. 
 
(3.16) 2PEXAM-letto 45:49 
 
01 B:  pero’ il  Treetti va   bene per radiografia.  
       but   the Treetti goes well for radiography 
       but Treetti is good for radiography. 
 
02     Per ecografia  non dice niente. 
       For ultrasound not says nothing 
       Concerning ultrasounds it does not say anything. 
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03    (0.3) 
       
04 A:  mm 
       mm 
      mm 
       
05    (0.2) 
                      
06 A:  Ma  l’hai      letto tutto il  Treetti¿
       But it have.2s read  all   the Treetti 
      But have you read it all the Treetti¿ 
           
07    (0.2)    (0.2)   (0.3) 
               (0.7) 
                  
08 B:  Macche’ ((scuotendo la testa)) 
       Not al all 
      Not at all ((with a headshake)) 
           
09        (1.6)           
10 B:  No   del Treetti devi fare le prime:  Cioe’  le prime pagine 
       No   of  Treetti must do   the first I mean the first pages 
      No  of Treetti you must do the firs:t I mean the first pages 
179
                                       
11     che  poi  sono (1.0)  (0.6)   (0.2) quelle che: son 
       that then are                       those  that are 
       that then are         (1.8)         those tha:t are 
                      
12     schematizzate  sugli appunti di Marini. 
       schematized    on the notes of Marini 
      schematized on Marini’s notes. 
        
13     (7.0) 
At line 6, A produces a FPP that does not receive an immediate response by B. After a bit of 
silence, A turns and looks towards him, though he is actually looking at a computer screen, 
surfing the Web. A sustains his gaze for 0.3 seconds until B produces a dispreferred response 
(line 8) and then explains what A has to study in the book (lines 10-12). In responding in this 
way, B first deals with the format of the question (line 8) and then deals with the action 
implemented by the turn at line 6: that is, the question of what A has to study from that book. 
The timing of B’s response, however, does not seem to be affected in any way by the gaze 
pursuit, which B has very likely not even perceived. Rather, the timing is more likely affected 
by the fact that the response is dispreferred and that B is involved in a competing activity. 
Notice that B turns and looks towards A during his response at line 11-12, yet he produces 
the first part of his more detailed answer while continuing looking at the computer screen. 
The main point displayed through this example is that the timing of the recipient’s response is 
not in fact due to the occurrence of a gaze pursuit, even though it might appear so. This 
example shows again that the speaker of a FPP can implement the practice of gaze pursuit but 
the contingencies of the interaction (the recipient looking at a computer screen rather than 
towards the speaker) can make it ineffective.  
In this section we have seen multiple examples of gaze pursuits that are not 
immediately successful. This invites further investigation about the actual timing of delayed 
responses, the timing of pursuits and how quickly participants tend to respond to them when 
they occur. The following section provides quantitative answers to these questions. 
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03    (0.3) 
       
04 A:  mm 
       mm 
      mm 
       
05    (0.2) 
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3.4.6 Types of Pursuits 
 
The database was re-coded considering the occurrence of gaze pursuits before a 
response occurs, in order to examine how often non-answered responses are pursued, how 
long speakers wait before pursuing a response and whether pursuing a response normally 
occasions a prompt response. This re-coding produced the results presented in Table 3.7 (an 
updated version of Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.7 Distribution of response patterns to first pair part turns including gaze pursuits. 
Possible Patterns 
 
Number of Instances 
1) FPP  SPP 
 
125 (29.9%) 
2) FPP  Overlapping SPP 53 (12.7%) 
3) FPP  (silence)  SPP 
 
157 (37.6%) 
4) FPP  PPG or verbal increment 15 (3.6%) 
5) FPP  (silence)  Pursuit 
 
48 (11.5%) 
6) FPP  (silence)  Ø 
 
20 (4.8%) 
TOTAL 418 (100%) 
 
 
The first noticeable difference from Table 3.2 is the addition of a pattern that I called the 
occurrence of a verbal increment or of a PPG after the possible completion of the FPP that 
facilitates the occurrence of a response. This corresponds to the gaze patterns displayed in § 
3.4.2 and to any similar modification done verbally, as shown in example 3.8. From now on 
both these practices will be called “incremental modifications”. This pattern is observable in 
3.6% of the cases. The number of unresponded turns without pursuits slightly decreased 
compared to Table 3.2 because in two of them the speaker had actually produced a gaze 
pursuit that did not get a response. Moreover, there is a decrease in the number of turns that 
get a delayed response without any pursuit. 15% of all FPPs (63, given by the sum of the 
ones with an incremental modification and the ones that got pursued) get modified either 
through gaze, verbally or with the occurrence of both to facilitate a response and only around 
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5% of FPPs are not pursued and are not responded to. Table 3.8 shows how the 63 FPPs are 
modified. 
 
Table 3.8 Distribution of modalities through which a FPP gets modified. 
Modality Incrementally 
Modified 
Pursued Total 
Verbal Only  4/15 (26.7%)   12/48 (25%)  16/63 (25.4%) 
Gaze Only  9/15 (60%)  16/48 (33.3%)  25/63 (39.7%) 
Gaze + Verbal  2/15 (13.3%)  20/48 (41.7%)  22/63 (34.9%) 
 
 
Table 3.8 shows that nearly 2/3 of FPPs that are incrementally modified are modified 
solely through the looking up by the speaker towards the recipient, while a response is 
pursued with gaze alone in only 1/3 of the FPPs. In general, combining the two possible ways 
of modifying a FPP, a FPP gets modified around 25% of the time using verbal resources 
only, 40% of the time using gaze only (see total in Table 3.8) and around 35% of time by 
producing another TCU while holding the gaze towards the recipient. FPPs with speaker gaze 
towards the recipient constitute approximately 75% of all cases (47/63). Thus, most of the 
time when a speaker tries to pressure a recipient for a response, s/he will do so by looking 
towards the recipient.  
If we now focus on the effectiveness of the modifications in terms of obtaining a 
response, we can see in Table 3.9 that 80% of the incrementally modified FPPs get responded 
to and 72.9% of the ones pursued get responded. 
 
Table 3.9 Effectiveness of modification on facilitating a response. 
Type Responded Not responded 
Incrementally Modified 12/15 (80%) 3/15 (20%) 
Pursued 35/48 (72.9%) 13/48 (27.1%) 
 
 
Of the 16 FPPs that were not responded to after the first modification, only 2 are not 
responded to at all (in both cases response had been pursued only with speaker gaze). In 14 
instances a response is pursued further. Table 3.10 shows how responses are pursued the first 
and the second time. 
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Table 3.10 Verbal vs. gaze modification of multiply pursued FPPs. 
Modality First Pursuit Second Pursuit 
Verbal Only 4 (28.6%) 1 (7.1%) 
Gaze Only 7 (50%) 4 (28.6%) 
Gaze + Verbal 3 (21.4%) 9 (64.3%) 
TOTAL 14 (100%) 14 (100%) 
 
 
Table 3.10 shows that of the FPPs that got modified/pursued more than once to facilitate a 
response, half of them had been initially pursued only through gaze and only a small number 
had been initially pursued both visually and verbally. If we then look at how a turn gets 
pursued a second time, we see that most of the time a speaker produces a verbal pursuit while 
looking at the recipient (64.3%), and, in general, it appears to be extremely rare (n=1/14) that 
a response is pursued a second time without speaker gaze towards the recipient. These results 
underscore the importance of gaze in pressuring for a response, although gaze alone is not 
necessarily the most effective modality to obtain a response (as shown in § 3.4.5).  
If we consider all of the possible combinations of modalities through which the 
pursuit gets done, a remarkable picture emerges. Table 3.11 shows that only 4 out of 9 
possible patterns actually occur in the corpus. 
 
Table 3.11 Patterns of pursuits in terms of modality when a response is pursued twice. 
1st PURSUIT   2nd PURSUIT NUMBER OF INSTANCES 
1. Verbal Only  Verbal Only 0 
2. Gaze Only  Gaze Only 0 
3. Verbal Only  Gaze Only 4 (28.6%) 
4. Gaze Only  Verbal Only 1 (7.1%) 
5. Verbal Only  Verbal + Gaze 0 
6. Gaze Only  Verbal + Gaze 6 (42.9%) 
7. Verbal + Gaze  Gaze Only 0 
8. Verbal + Gaze  Verbal Only 0 
9. Verbal + Gaze  Verbal + Gaze 3 (21.4%) 
TOTAL 14 (100%) 
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The results in Table 3.11 show that if a response had been first pursued using only one 
modality (e.g., only verbally or via gaze), the second time it will be either pursued using the 
other modality (e.g., pattern 3 or 4), or by using a combination of them (e.g., pattern 6 or 9). 
It is never the case that a failed pursuit using one modality is simply repeated using that same 
modality. Moreover, it is never the case that if the initial pursuit had been delivered using 
both modalities (i.e., verbally and with gaze), then the second pursuit is launched only relying 
on a single modality. This is particularly important for the claim put forward in this chapter, 
and in the work of Stivers and Rossano (2010), concerning how participants mobilize 
response and concerning a compositional view of action in interaction and pressuring for 
response. The results in Table 3.11 also show that the failure of a pursuit in one modality 
leads a participant to either attempt using the other modality (which leaves open the option of 
a potential third pursuit, as will be shown later) or using a combination of the two modalities 
in order to increase pressure on the recipient for a response. Indeed, it appears that pursuing a 
response with both modalities seems to be the most effective way of pursuing a response. 
And gaze is almost always deployed. When gaze is deployed, it is usually not abandoned in 
the second pursuit, while if gaze has not been deployed the first time, the second pursuit 
nearly always (13/14 instances) involves the speaker gaze to the recipient. These results also 
highlight the cumulative power of these modalities, because if both are initially deployed, 
they will both be deployed the second time, while if only gaze has been initially deployed, 
most of the time both will be deployed in the second pursuit.  
Further, these patterns suggest that if speakers pressure for a response with only one 
modality, they are less effective than if they deploy both. However, if they pressure with both 
modalities initially and this does not prove effective, they have no other additional resources 
to deploy beyond repetition of the action. Tables 3.8 and 3.10 suggest speakers typically 
pursue a response with one modality, with gaze being the most likely to be deployed of the 
two. This suggests that if a response can be obtained by exerting the least noticeable pressure, 
such a pursuit is preferable (an idea that will be further discussed later on in this chapter). An 
additional piece of evidence about the tendency to cumulate modalities to maximize 
effectiveness comes from the fact that of the 14 FPPs that are pursued twice, 2 are actually 
pursued three times21 and of these one is finally responded to and one is not. In both cases in 
which a response is pursued three times, the final time responses are pursued with both 
modalities. Here are the patterns of pursuit for these two cases: 
                                                
21 No response is pursued more than 3 times in my corpus. 
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21 No response is pursued more than 3 times in my corpus. 
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1)     1st Pursuit Only Verbal  2nd Pursuit Only Gaze  3rd Pursuit Both  No response 
2)     1st Pursuit Only Gaze    2nd Pursuit Both            3rd Pursuit Both  Response 
 
3.4.7 Timing of Responses and Pursuits 
 
Let’s now consider the timing of delayed responses, the timing of pursuits and the 
timing of responses after pursuits. The average delay time across the 157 responses that occur 
without any pursuit (and yet are delayed by more than 0.2 seconds) is 0.68 seconds.22 
Approximately 90% of the responses occur within 1 second of real time, confirming the 
“standard maximum silence” of 1 second described by Jefferson (1989) for conversations in 
English (see also De Ruiter, Mitterer, & Enfield, 2006; Sacks et al., 1974; Stivers et al., 
2009). If we then look at the time it takes before a speaker starts to pursue a response 
(considering the 48 cases of actual pursuits and not the ones incrementally modified before 
any silence occurred) we find that the average time is slightly longer at 0.76 seconds.23 
Although this difference is not statistically significant, it still confirms something very 
important: on average, a speaker waits to pursue a response until the delay has exceeded the 
average delay time for a delayed response. If by that time the recipient has not yet responded, 
then the speaker may begin pursuing a response.24 In my corpus, the approximate time when 
this tends to occur is about 0.6-0.7 seconds from the completion of the FPP.  
With this information in mind, if we then consider how long a participant waits to 
pursue a response if s/he pursues it repeatedly, we find that there is no significant difference 
between the waiting time before the first pursuit and the second pursuit.25 This suggests that 
each newly deployed pursuit provides a new opportunity for the recipient to respond and the 
silence tolerance does not change if one pursues a response twice or only one time. In other 
words, a speaker does not lose patience nor does s/he become more patient when faced with 
the absence of response.  
                                                
22 The median is 0.60 seconds. 
23 The median is 0.70 seconds. 
24 It is possible, and in some cases it seems likely (e.g., in the interaction 2PLUNCH1 and in 2PEXAM), that 
the time a speaker waits before pursuing a response is calibrated on the typical speaking speed of the recipient 
and on the time that that particular individual takes to produce a dispreferred response. However, this corpus is 
too limited to allow a systematic empirical investigation of this possibility. 
25 Considering responses to FPPs that are pursued at least twice, in my sample the average wait time before the 
first pursuit is 0.67, while the average wait time before the second pursuit is 0.81; however, the difference is not 
statistically significant (p=.345). 
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This finding is confirmed if we consider how often and how quickly a speaker who 
has modified or pursued a FPP obtains a response. In the database, of the 63 FPPs that are 
modified, 47 are responded to without further pursuits (75%). This result is not very different 
from the 80% of FPPs responded to (with the remaining 20% being the ones not responded to 
at all and the ones that are pursued) that we found in the general dataset for FPPs that are not 
themselves pursued. Eleven responses occur in partial overlap with the pursuit, 16 responses 
occur promptly and the remaining 20 have an average delay of 0.62 seconds (the exact same 
range as the 0.68 seconds found for the delay of responses to initial FPPs). These numbers 
suggest that pursuing does not necessarily make it more likely that a speaker will secure a 
response nor that s/he will secure one more quickly than following the original FPP. 
However, if a FPP does not get responded to within ± 1 second, it will likely remain that way. 
Pursuing responses nevertheless gives the speaker another chance at obtain a response in 
order to complete the sequence the speaker initiated with the first FPP.  
 
3.4.8 Examples of Gaze + Verbal Pursuits 
 
Examples of the pursuing patterns discussed in the previous section will be presented 
in this section. Moreover, further evidence of speaker sensitivity to a 0.6-0.7 seconds silence 
for the conversations in my dataset will be provided. The first two examples will show 
pursuits performed verbally only, without speaker gaze. The following two examples will 
show pursuits done both with gaze and verbally. Having already showed multiple examples 
of pursuits performed only through gaze, this section is meant to illustrate the patterns listed 
in Table 3.8 and show how pursuits are produced in attempting to obtain an absent response. 
The first example shows how both participants orient towards 0.6 seconds of silence 
as the maximum length of silence before a response should be provided or will be pursued. In 
example 3.17 two friends are looking at pictures together and B, the guest, asks A about the 
content of the pictures. Our focus is the silence at line 3 and what happens next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184
184
 
1)     1st Pursuit Only Verbal  2nd Pursuit Only Gaze  3rd Pursuit Both  No response 
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of pursuits performed only through gaze, this section is meant to illustrate the patterns listed 
in Table 3.8 and show how pursuits are produced in attempting to obtain an absent response. 
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(3.17) 2PCOMP-carta 10:17  
01     (1.0) 
                 
02 B:  Cos’e’ quella roba  la’  ((indicando)) 
       What is that  thing there 
      What is that thing there  ((pointing to the picture))  
        
03     (0.6) 
          
04 B:  [La carta,] 
        The paper 
      [The paper,] 
                 
05 A:  [E’ il coso   per la c]arta 
        Is the thing for the paper 
      [It is the thing for the p]aper 
        
06     (0.3)  
B points towards an object in the picture while producing the question at line 2 but A does 
not respond promptly. After a silence of 0.6 seconds, the recipient starts to respond, but 
simultaneously the speaker of the initial FPP starts pursuing a response by offering a 
candidate answer (which turns out to be the correct response). The point here is that both the 
speaker and the recipient orient to 0.6 seconds as a maximum silence. Notice also that both 
participants are looking down at the picture and not at each other and therefore the pursuit is 
done only verbally. Indeed, to adequately respond to this FPP requires both participants to 
focus on the object under examination. 
Example 3.18 illustrates another example of a verbal pursuit in which the speaker 
does not look at the recipient. In this fragment, B is teaching A how to make flowers with 
187
beads. They are both looking at the materials they are going to use for this task. Our focus is 
the gaze behavior of the participants during the pursuit at line 3-4. 
(3.18) 2PERLINE-cominciare 04:43 
                            
01 B:  Allora  co- da   dove  vuoi    cominciare, 
       Alright st- from where want.2s start 
      Alright le- How do you want to start, 
       
02    (0.6) 
                            
03 B:   .hh Vuoi    incominciare dall’    infilare perle,  
            want.2s start        from the thread   pearls 
       .hh Do you want to start from threading beads, 
                          
04    ((con pollice sinistro alzato))(.) per fare:
                                         to  make: 
     ((holding her left thumb up))(.) to make: 
              
05 A:  No. Allora (0.2) Du- 
       No  So           so- 
      No. So (0.2) le- 
            
06 B:  O  vo- o  vo- o- 
       Or wa- or wa- or- 
      Or wa- or wa- or- 
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07 A:  Dove  eravamo arriva- dunque 
       Where be.1p   arrive- so 
      Where did we sto- let’s see 
A does not respond the initial FPP by B and, after a silence of 0.6 seconds and a short 
inbreath, B pursues a response verbally (line 3), continuing to look at the objects on the table. 
She does so by listing the possible alternatives in terms of where to start (indicated in her 
gesture at line 4). A rejects the first alternative provided by B and at line 7 she asks a 
question of her own for additional contextual information to help her answer B’s question. 
Two points are particularly relevant here: as in 3.17, the pursuit starts around 0.6 seconds 
after the end of the first FPP, and it is performed without any speaker gaze towards the 
recipient. The speaker is looking at the objects that are relevant for the upcoming task 
(making flowers with beads),  and doing so facilitates B’s suggestion of where they could 
begin. Her lack of gaze towards the recipient during the pursuit is therefore accountable by 
considering the contingencies of the task at hand. 
Now let’s look at two examples in which a verbal pursuit is also accomplished with 
speaker gaze towards the recipient. Example 3.19 shows a case in which the speaker of the 
initial FPP pursues a response while gazing towards the recipient and, as a result, the 
participants engage in mutual gaze. In this example, two friends are preparing for an exam 
together and B is asking A questions to check his preparation. Our focus is the gaze behavior 
during the silence at line 2 and the pursuit at line 3. 
(3.19) 2PEXAM-classi  42:19 
                            
01 B:  Le  malattie sono divise  in cinque  classi 
       The diseases are  divided in five    classes 
      Diseases are divided in five classes 
                               
02    (0.3)         (1.3)           (0.4) 
                    (2.0) 
189
                     
03 B:  Le   sai     le  classi  di divisione 
       Them know.2s the classes of division 
      Do you know the classes in which they are divided 
                   
04     (0.6)     (0.8)       (0.4)   (0.5) 
                       (2.3) 
                
05 A:  No ((scuotendo la testa)) 
       No 
      No ((+ headshake)) 
       
06    (1.5) 
07 B: hhh (0.2) hhu hhu 
      hhh (0.2) hhu hhu 
Example 3.19 starts with B looking at some notes and stating that some animal diseases are 
divided into five classes. In the context of B asking A questions, line 1 implies “can you list 
the five classes?” There is no response and after a long silence the speaker moves his head up 
and looks towards A, with his eyes reaching A exactly at the time he starts producing the 
verbal pursuit at line 3. Notice that B withdraws his gaze from the recipient after a long delay 
in which A enacts thinking about a response. Then, following 2.3 seconds, the question 
receives a disprefered response. 
Example 3.20 shows a case in which the speaker of the FPP is already gazing at the 
recipient during its production and holds his gaze throughout the ensuing gap and well into 
the verbal pursuit. By the time the verbal pursuit occurs, the speaker is already gazing at the 
recipient so both modalities are in play here. In this excerpt two friends are looking at 
pictures together, and at line 9, B asks how much A paid to get into the place shown in one of 
the pictures. Our focus is the gaze behavior during the silence at line 10 and during the 
pursuit at line 11. 
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(3.20) 2PCOMP-pagato 9:33  
         08      (1.0) 
                                
09 B:  Soccia quanto   hai pagato per entrar qua.  
       Wow    how much have paid  for enter  here 
       Wow how much did you pay to enter here.  
10     (0.2)     
        
11 B:   Die[ci  
        Ten 
   B:   Te[n 
                         
12 A:      [Poco.  °Un euro. Due euro neanche 
            Little. One euro two euro neither 
          [Little.° One euro. Not even two euros 
In this example the response to the FPP occurs in partial overlap with the pursuit at line 11. 
The pursuit is incomplete but it clearly proceeds in the same way as the verbal pursuit in 
example 3.17: by providing a candidate answer to his own question. Here the speaker holds 
his gaze towards the recipient throughout the gap at line 10, and by the time he initiates the 
verbal pursuit he is already looking at the recipient. This is a potential variant of what was 
shown in example 3.19 in terms of how a speaker may pursue a response by both producing a 
new utterance in addition to looking at the recipient. In example 3.19, the speaker looks up 
towards the recipient at the same time as he starts the pursuit as he was not looking at the 
recipient before. By contrast, in this example, the speaker gaze is held through the gap and 
also while producing the verbal pursuit. 
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In this section I have only shown examples of verbal pursuits, which are mainly 
accountable through the contingencies of the interaction, and examples of combinations of 
verbal pursuits produced with speaker gaze towards the recipient. Together with the examples 
of gaze pursuits shown in the previous sections, these four patterns constitute the possible 
ways in which a speaker can pursue a response. In the following section, I show examples of 
the patterns observable when a response is pursued more than once.  
 
3.4.9 Multiple Pursuits 
 
As shown in Table 3.11, in my dataset only four different patterns are observed when a 
response needs to be pursued more than once: 
 
1) 1st Pursuit Verbal Only               2nd Pursuit Gaze Only 
      2) 1st Pursuit Gaze  Only               2nd Pursuit Verbal Only 
      3) 1st Pursuit Gaze  Only               2nd Pursuit Both modalities 
      4) 1st Pursuit Both modalities   2nd Pursuit Both modalities 
 
In what follows I provide examples that illustrate these patterns and discuss how they come 
to be realized by participants in interaction. 
 
3.4.9.1 Two Pursuits: 1st Pursuit Verbal Only  2nd Pursuit Gaze Only 
In example 3.21 we see that the first pursuit is done only verbally, while the second 
one is done only through gaze. Here there are two students preparing for an exam. A is 
visiting B, who is looking at his computer screen during the entire fragment produced below. 
Our focus is A’s gaze behavior at line 8 and during the silence at line 9. 
 
(3.21)  2PEXAM-appunti 47:22 
 
01 A:  Eh mi devi    dare allora il:: 
       Eh me must.2s give then   the 
       Eh you should give me then the:: 
 
02     (0.6) 
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       Eh me must.2s give then   the 
       Eh you should give me then the:: 
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03 A:  .hhh 
       .hhh 
04     (0.3) 
                                                      
05 A:  il  coso <E    hai     degli appunti?A parte il libro  
       the thing and  have.2s some  notes   apart   the book 
      the thing <And do you have notes? Apart from the book  
         
06     di Trenti 
       by Trenti 
       by Trenti 
       
07     (.) 
               
08 A:  O hai      solo quelli li’ 
       Or have.2s only those  there 
      Or do you have only those ones 
             
09     (0.6)     (0.1)   (0.8) 
                 (1.5) 
          
10 B:  Appunti non ne   ho 
       Notes   not them have.1s 
       I do not have notes 
11     (1.2) 
When A initiates a request at line 5, it is unclear what the request is for (“you should give me 
the thing”); however, he subsequently asks whether B has notes. This is a request for 
193
information but also an indirect request to obtain the notes. At the beginning of the transition 
relevance place, but before B responds, A adds an increment clarifying that he is not asking 
about a specific book. Nonetheless, B neither turns towards A nor answers the question, and 
at line 8 A reverses the preference of the question by asking whether B only has the book A 
just mentioned. This is a clear pursuit of response and it is delivered without any gaze 
towards the recipient. A’s question at line 8 suggests a reasonable inference regarding B’s 
lack of response; however, further delay by B nevertheless hints at the possibility that B does 
not have any notes. Before B’s response at line 10, however, A implements a second pursuit, 
this time with gaze only. Notice that A starts moving his eyes towards B 0.6 seconds after the 
beginning of the silence and that he holds his gaze towards B for another 0.8 seconds. The 
length of this delay already suggests that the upcoming response will be dispreferred, and 
indeed it is (i.e., B does not have any notes; line 10). Throughout this fragment, the recipient 
looks at a computer screen and does not turn towards the speaker even when he responds at 
line 10. This suggests that the timing of the response has not been affected by the gaze 
pursuit. At the same time, it is notable that after having pursued a response only verbally, a 
speaker first initiates a gaze pursuit rather than another verbal one even though the recipient 
is looking towards his computer screen. Also notable is that the gaze pursuit occurs around 
0.6-0.7 seconds from the completion of the prior turn. 
 
 
3.4.9.2 Two Pursuits: 1st Pursuit Only Gaze  2nd Pursuit Both Modalities 
In the following example (see also § 3.4.10 for two further instances of this pattern), a 
response to a FPP is first pursued only through gaze and then it is pursued verbally while 
sustaining the gaze towards the recipient. In example 3.22 two friends are having dinner 
together and B, the host, is asking about a typical schedule for A’s day. Our focus is the gaze 
behavior during lines 7-8.  
 
(3.22) 2GCOLL-lezione 18:06 
 
01 B:  Facciamo una giornata normale 
       Make.1p  a   day      normal 
       Let’s talk about a normal day 
 
 
 
192
192
03 A:  .hhh 
       .hhh 
04     (0.3) 
                                                      
05 A:  il  coso <E    hai     degli appunti?A parte il libro  
       the thing and  have.2s some  notes   apart   the book 
      the thing <And do you have notes? Apart from the book  
         
06     di Trenti 
       by Trenti 
       by Trenti 
       
07     (.) 
               
08 A:  O hai      solo quelli li’ 
       Or have.2s only those  there 
      Or do you have only those ones 
             
09     (0.6)     (0.1)   (0.8) 
                 (1.5) 
          
10 B:  Appunti non ne   ho 
       Notes   not them have.1s 
       I do not have notes 
11     (1.2) 
When A initiates a request at line 5, it is unclear what the request is for (“you should give me 
the thing”); however, he subsequently asks whether B has notes. This is a request for 
193
information but also an indirect request to obtain the notes. At the beginning of the transition 
relevance place, but before B responds, A adds an increment clarifying that he is not asking 
about a specific book. Nonetheless, B neither turns towards A nor answers the question, and 
at line 8 A reverses the preference of the question by asking whether B only has the book A 
just mentioned. This is a clear pursuit of response and it is delivered without any gaze 
towards the recipient. A’s question at line 8 suggests a reasonable inference regarding B’s 
lack of response; however, further delay by B nevertheless hints at the possibility that B does 
not have any notes. Before B’s response at line 10, however, A implements a second pursuit, 
this time with gaze only. Notice that A starts moving his eyes towards B 0.6 seconds after the 
beginning of the silence and that he holds his gaze towards B for another 0.8 seconds. The 
length of this delay already suggests that the upcoming response will be dispreferred, and 
indeed it is (i.e., B does not have any notes; line 10). Throughout this fragment, the recipient 
looks at a computer screen and does not turn towards the speaker even when he responds at 
line 10. This suggests that the timing of the response has not been affected by the gaze 
pursuit. At the same time, it is notable that after having pursued a response only verbally, a 
speaker first initiates a gaze pursuit rather than another verbal one even though the recipient 
is looking towards his computer screen. Also notable is that the gaze pursuit occurs around 
0.6-0.7 seconds from the completion of the prior turn. 
 
 
3.4.9.2 Two Pursuits: 1st Pursuit Only Gaze  2nd Pursuit Both Modalities 
In the following example (see also § 3.4.10 for two further instances of this pattern), a 
response to a FPP is first pursued only through gaze and then it is pursued verbally while 
sustaining the gaze towards the recipient. In example 3.22 two friends are having dinner 
together and B, the host, is asking about a typical schedule for A’s day. Our focus is the gaze 
behavior during lines 7-8.  
 
(3.22) 2GCOLL-lezione 18:06 
 
01 B:  Facciamo una giornata normale 
       Make.1p  a   day      normal 
       Let’s talk about a normal day 
 
 
 
193
194
02 A:  Mm  
       Mm 
Mm
03 B:  la  mattina ti  alzi, 
       the morning you get up.2s 
      in the morning you get up, 
04    (0.2) 
05 A:  Mm hm 
       Mm hm 
      Mm hm 
              
06 B:  poi   vai   a  lezione? 
       then  go.2s to lesson 
      then you go to class? 
            
07    (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.2)  
             (0.4)      
           
08 B:  questo periodo 
       this   period 
       these days 
                     
09 A:  ((gesticolando no con l’indice))  No 
                                         No 
     ((gesturing ‘no’ with index finger)) No 
10    (1.1) 
Here we see that B’s request for confirmation at line 6 does not get an immediate response 
and B pursues it by looking up towards A. At this point they are in mutual gaze but A 
supplies no immediate response. B further pursues a response by specifying that she is not 
195
asking whether she goes to class in general but whether she went to class in the morning 
during the last few days. At this point, A produces a negative response first through a gesture 
and then verbally.  
In this section, we have seen that if the speaker is not looking at the recipient when 
s/he produces the initial FPP, s/he can pursue a response via gaze. If this fails, then a verbal 
pursuit may be produced, but gaze is sustained and not withdrawn, suggesting that the 
speaker is increasing the pressure for a response. In such cases, gaze appears to be used to 
hold the recipient accountable for a relevant next action.
3.4.9.3 Two Pursuits: 1st Pursuit Both Modalities  2nd Pursuit Both Modalities 
The third pattern consists of two pursuits done with both modalities: producing a 
verbal pursuit while gazing at the recipient. In example 3.23 two friends are preparing for an 
exam and A asks B whether the professor expects students to know what B just asked A. Our 
focus is what happens at line 3 and at line 5.  
(3.23) 2PEXAM-sapere 42:49 
                                                   
01 A:   Ma  lei vuol    sapere  ste   cose   qui? 
        But she want.3s to know these things here 
        Does she want (us) to know these things here? 
        
02     (1.6) 
        
03 A:   Eh? 
        Eh 
Eh?
         
04     (1.0)   (0.2)    (0.4) 
               (1.6) 
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        Does she want (us) to know these things here? 
        
02     (1.6) 
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Eh?
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05 A:   Lei son ste   cose   qua [che  vuole   sapere?] 
        She are these things here that want.3s to know 
        Are these  the   things [that she wants (us) to know?] 
                                                  
06 B:                           [Lei  vuole      sape]re quelle  
                                 She  want.3s to know those 
   [She wants (us) to know those 
                            
07     ‘segnalazioni immediate’=si’ questo e’ importante 
        signaling    immediate  yes this   is important 
      ‘Immediately Inform’=yes this is important 
In this excerpt A’s initial request for information at line 1 is not responded to for 1.6 seconds 
and A first pursues response minimally with “eh?”(line 3). A had already started looking at 
the recipient during the first FPP and sustains his gaze towards B. B, however, is looking 
down at some notes and very likely cannot perceive A’s gaze. As a result, this first pursuit is 
not successful, and after waiting for another 1.6 seconds26 and sustaining gaze towards the 
recipient, A produces a second pursuit (line 5), which is responded to in overlap (line 6). B’s 
answer confirms that the professor does indeed want to know what B just asked A, but this 
confirmation is done first by repeating what A had just asked and then by saying “yes”. As 
this example shows, if a speaker starts looking at the recipient during the initial FPP, usually 
s/he sustains the gaze throughout the following gaps and pursuits and does not abandon it as a 
modality for pressuring the recipient to respond.  
                                               
26 The fact that A waits an identical amount of time before pursuing a response both times confirms the claim 
that speakers tend to provide recipients with the same opportunity to respond, independently of whether it is the 
first or the second time they are asking or pursuing the question. 
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3.4.9.4 Double Pursuit 1st Pursuit Only Gaze  2nd Pursuit Only Verbal  
The last pattern discussed here is a deviant case. It is the only case in which, after an 
initial gaze pursuit, the next verbal pursuit is produced without speaker gaze. In example 3.24 
a couple is having lunch and they are talking about a teaching assistant they both had. B has 
previously stated that this teaching assistant, Arnoldi, is quite bad (presumably as a teacher). 
After some silence and a topic change, A returns to B’s negative assessment of Arnoldi and 
announces that Arnoldi studied at Berkeley (line 31-32). Our focus is the gaze behavior at 
line 33 and the pursuit at line 34. 
(3.24) 2PLUNCH-Berkeley 06:32 
                                                 
31 A:  Sai     che  Arnoldi (1.0) tlk tlk e’ stato  
       Know.2s that Arnoldi       tlk tlk has been 
       You know that Arnoldi (1.0) tlk tlk also studied 
               
32 A:  a  Berkeley anche 
       at Berkeley also 
      at Berkeley   
               
33      (0.3)   (0.2)  (0.5)  (0.3)  (0.4) 
                      (1.7) 
                         
34 A:  Quindi    proprio scarso       non dev’essere 
       Therefore really  insufficient not must be 
      So he can’t be really bad 
         
35      (0.5) 
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36 B:  E’ diventato scarso 
       Has become   insufficient 
       He has become bad 
Here, A informs B that Arnoldi has studied at a very prestigious American University, and, in 
the context of assessing Arnoldi’s qualities and intelligence, this becomes a way of 
countering B’s previous negative assessment. At this point B could receive this 
announcement as news and then change her stance towards Arnoldi, but she does not respond 
to the announcement (note the silence in response at line 33). Following this silence the 
speaker pursues response with gaze and engages mutual gaze with the recipient. We know 
from previous examples that when participants engage in mutual gaze the expectation is that 
the recipient will respond promptly, but after 0.5 seconds of mutual gaze and an additional 
0.3 of only speaker gaze, the recipient does not answer. The engagement of mutual gaze and 
then its abandonment by the recipient without responding can be understood as an indication 
that the recipient is not going to respond at all. After a bit more silence, during which both 
participants are oriented towards their dishes on the table, A further pursues a response by 
making explicit what the announcement at line 1 was about: providing further evidence that 
Arnoldi is not ‘bad‘. At this point, after some more silence, B responds with a quip about 
Arnoldi, insisting on disagreeing: probably he was good and he became bad recently. 
In this example we see that the initial announcement is not just designed to be 
received as news but mainly to counter what has been negatively assessed by one party (the 
recipient). The recipient clearly withholds responding to this announcement by abandoning 
mutual gaze without responding, after having sustained it for 0.5 seconds. At this point, 
although perceivable as a further pursuit, line 5 becomes a way of making explicit A’s
evaluation of Arnoldi and his disagreement with B. Only at this point, and after further 
silence, B responds. This suggests that this pattern is occasioned by the context of 
disagreement and resistance by the recipient and by the fact that the verbal pursuit is not 
really pursuing the announcement but the stance that he was conveying through that 
announcement.  
With the above examples in mind, in what follows I show how the findings of this 
chapter modify our understanding of pursuits and pursuing possibilities. 
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3.4.10 Patterns of Pursuits 
In § 3.4.0 I outlined existing claims about how and when some utterances get pursued. 
In this chapter I showed that gaze can be used to pursue a response, just as the verbal channel 
can, and that, in fact, this visual channel is relied on even more often. I also showed how 
these two channels can be combined to be even more effective in soliciting a response. I also 
showed the robustness of gaze pursuits as a practice quantitatively. In what follows I show 
two examples of pursuits that correspond to two ways of pursuing as reported by Pomerantz 
(1984b), to show that they are often preceded by gaze pursuits. The following two examples 
show how the patterns described by Pomerantz can become, in the context of face-to-face 
interactions, a “second-best” way of pursuing once a gaze pursuit fails. The first example 
deals with the first way that Pomerantz indicated speakers pursue a response:  
-     If the problem is an unclear reference or term, then the speaker could offer a  
more understandable reference to replace the problematic one. 
Example 3.25 represents a case in which a gaze pursuit fails to obtain a response by 
the recipient (see Table 3.11). In this example A is teaching B how to make flowers with 
beads and while she produces line 1 A holds a rose made with beads in her left hand and 
points towards it. After producing a turn, the speaker looks up at the recipient and keeps 
looking until the recipient looks back. They engage in mutual gaze but silence ensues. Then, 
A self-repairs her talk (in the transition space), at which point B responds.  
(3.25) 2PERLINE-petali 29:06 
01 A:  Tu puoi farne     anche per dire (.) se^i. 
       You can make them also to say        six 
You can also make of them for example (.) six.
           
02    (0.3)   (0.2)   (0.2)   (0.5)  (0.2) 
                      (1.4) 
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(3.25) 2PERLINE-petali 29:06 
01 A:  Tu puoi farne     anche per dire (.) se^i. 
       You can make them also to say        six 
You can also make of them for example (.) six.
           
02    (0.3)   (0.2)   (0.2)   (0.5)  (0.2) 
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03 A:  Sei      p e t a l i [se vuoi 
       Six   petals       if want.2s 
Six   p e t a l s [if you want
04 B:                    [Ah  beh si’ si’ 
  Oh well yes yes 
                        [Oh well yes yes 
At line 1 A is referring to the number of petals one can use to make a rose. The word “petal” 
has been used some turns earlier and here it is indexically referred to with the suffix “ne” in 
the word “farne” (make of them). After 0.3 seconds silence, A looks up at B who looks back 
at A. They sustain mutual gaze for 0.5 seconds but there is no uptake by B. They both look at 
the rose A holds in her hand and at this point A begins revising “sei” to “sei petali” (six 
petals) and then adding “if you want”. But this second clause, “if you want”, is overlapped 
with A’s uptake introduced by “ah” that corresponds to the English “oh” and indicates a 
change of state (Heritage, 1984). B therefore produces an appropriate display of 
understanding only after A revises her initial utterance at line 1. This revision does not only 
occur after silence but after the participants have engaged, sustained and finally abandoned 
mutual gaze during the silence. B’s production of the change of state token marks that some 
piece of information was missing, and, once it is offered, B understands what A meant to 
convey in her talk at line 1 and what sort of response was sought. 
This example shows the practice described by Pomerantz (1984b). If there is no 
response speakers routinely orient towards the possibility of some trouble for the recipient in 
understanding the turn. However this example also adds further evidence for the practice
described in this chapter: before participants pursue responses verbally, they can pursue a 
response with gaze. In particular, the speaker solicits a response by gazing during the 
transition relevance place. The recipient looks up too and engages in mutual gaze, but the 
pursuit here initially fails.  
A second practice for pursuing described by Pomerantz is checking that the 
information required to respond is actually shared. Example 3.26 is a case in point. In this 
example A and B are looking at pictures together and A is describing some pictures of 
Stockholm. A attempts an indirect reference to something salient for B (a Swedish soccer 
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team that played against his favorite Italian team two days earlier). This reference initially 
fails and so does the gaze pursuit. At this point, A makes explicit what he was referring to. 
(3.26) 2PCOMP-Stoccolma 12:40 
49 A:  He hh .hh hh Questo invece  e’ il lungo canale_ (0.5) tch  
                    This   instead is the long channel 
       He hh .hh hh This instead is the long canal (0.5) tch 
                       
50     che  arrivi    al- al parco di Djugordel.  
       that arrive.2s at- at park  of Djugordel 
      that arrives at- at the Djugordel’s park 
          
51     (0.1)  (0.1)    (0.8)    
(1.0)    
                                 
52 A:   Che poi e’ di quella squadra che  ha  giocato contro  la  
        That then is of that  team    that has played  against the 
       That is then that team that played against 
53      Juventus °l’altra   [sera. 
        Juventus  the other evening 
       Juventus °the other [evening. 
54 B:                     [Che gli abbiamo dato quattro pappini. [E’=  
                            That it have.1p given four   slaps    Is 
                         [To whom we gave four goals.          [It’s= 
55 A:                                                             [Hhh 
 [Hhh 
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56 B:  =quella li’ °insom[ma eh ho      capito° 
        That   there in sum  eh have.1s understood 
       =that one °in the end eh I understood° 
 
57 A:                  [hhu hhu hh 
                       [hhu hhu hh 
 
Djugordel is the name of a football team who played the night before against Juventus, an 
Italian football team which B proudly supports. What seems clear from the extract is that A is 
producing a reference to a football team by referring to a park. The problem here is not the 
name of the park itself, but rather the inferential process that B has to make in order to 
recognize the reference to the football team as something familiar to him. When A looks at B 
during the silence at line 51, and B not only does not respond but does not even look up 
towards him, A explicates this inferential process and therefore why he mentioned the fact 
that the long channel leads to that park. B’s reaction at line 54 and 55 confirms that he 
understands A’s talk as a further pursuit. B not only displays recognition of the reference, but 
he also stresses that he understood “eh ho capito” (eh I understood). Thus, this is another 
example in which a practice of a verbal pursuit described by Pomerantz is actually preceded 
by an attempt to solicit uptake using gaze.  
The last two examples illustrate that, in face-to-face interaction, visible behavior is 
routinely deployed before (or sometimes after) verbal pursuits to pressure for a response. In 
what follows I show how the practices described throughout § 3.4 modify our understanding 
of what a speaker does when a response is not provided in a timely fashion. 
 
3.5 Schemes of Pursuits 
 
Section 3.4 examined what speakers do when a FPP does not get an immediate 
response. At the beginning of § 3.3, this chapter presented  two ways in which a response can 
be secured if it is not produced in overlap or in a timely fashion:  
 
 3.                    A: FPP       Silence 
        Time                                            B: SPP 
 
 
            
 4.                      A: FPPb     Silence      A: FPPp 
                 Time            B: SPP 
 
203
Scheme 3 illustrates the situation where a response occurs after some silence without any 
pursuit by the speaker of the FPP, while Scheme 4 illustrates the situation where a speaker 
produces a verbal pursuit after some silence, and, at that point, obtains a response. However, 
throughout § 3.4 I have shown multiple variants to these schemes that include both verbal 
and visual pursuits. 
The first two variations consist of producing an “incremental modification” of the 
FPP as soon as the FPP reaches completion and before the recipient has delayed any response 
(see § 3.4.2). I showed that this incremental modification can be done verbally or simply 
through gaze. The schemes are as follows:  
3b)                      A: FPP      Incr. Modif.    B: SPP 
         Time 
                                      
3c)                      A: FPP       Silence      B: SPP
         Time 
I then showed that speaker gaze can be used to pursue a response ,after some silence and that 
usually the recipient responds promptly to this pursuit (see § 3.4.4). The scheme looks as 
follows: 
                                                                 
3d)                      A: FPP     Silence        B: SPP 
                     Time 
Next I showed that gaze pursuits sometimes does not obtain an immediate response by the 
recipient, but rather a delayed one. This is normally due to the dispreferred nature of the 
response (see § 3.4.5). The scheme looks as follows: 
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3e)                  A: FPP     Silence     Silence      B: SPP 
                     Time 
I then showed that sometimes the gaze pursuit can be abandoned before any response occurs 
because the lack of response may suggest that no response will actually be produced or 
because the recipient displays ‘thinking’ about an answer, and therefore that the pursuit has 
been successful. A dispreferred answer usually occurs nonetheless after more delay and 
usually this is attributable to a competing activity. In these cases, the occurrence of a 
response is not necessarily caused by the gaze pursuit, yet the practice of pursuing via gaze is 
deployed and then subsequently abandoned (see § 3.4.5). The scheme looks as follows: 
                                                       
3f)                   A: FPP   Silence       Silence      Silence   B: SPP 
         Time 
The schemes 3c-3f have not been described before and yet they are patterns that occur 
repeatedly in dyadic face-to-face interactions. More importantly, the patterns 3c-3f occur 
without the occurrence of any verbal pursuit and they seem to play an important role in the 
occurrence of a response. If we then consider situations in which a verbal pursuit occurs, we 
should add to scheme 4 the following three schemes: 
     
4b)                     A: FPPb     Silence       A: FPPp     B: SPP 
                      Time 
     
4c)                      A: FPPb     Silence      A: FPPp      Silence      B: SPP 
Time
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4d)               A: FPPb      Silence      A: FPPp   Silence      A: FPPp2     B: SPP 
       Time 
Scheme 4b represents all those cases of double pursuits in which a response is first 
pursued only by speaker gaze and then verbally (usually while sustaining the gaze towards 
the recipient). We have seen examples of this pattern in § 3.4.9.2, in § 3.4.9.4 and in §3.4.10. 
Scheme 4c represents those cases of double pursuits in which a response is initially pursued 
only verbally and the second pursuit is done through speaker gaze (see § 3.4.9.1). Finally 
scheme 4d represents those cases in which both pursuits are done verbally and with gaze. In 
only two cases in my dataset, a response is pursued three times, and in both cases the third 
pursuit is done with both modalities (verbally while looking at the recipient). No response in 
my database is pursued more than three times. 
If we consider all of the above schemes one after the other we can see that our initial 
knowledge of pursuing patterns has been considerably enhanced. Moreover, we can see a 
gradation of pursuing practices and pursuing possibilities that go from an immediate verbal 
post-positioned modification, to a single gaze pursuit, to a combination of verbal and visual 
pursuits. While each occurrence has a discrete beginning (the looking at the recipient or the 
beginning of the verbal pursuit), the difference between schemes 3c and 3d is based on the 
time elapsed between the end of the FPP and the beginning of the speaker’s looking up 
towards the recipient. Similarly, the difference between 3d and 3e is based on the time a 
recipient takes to respond to the gaze pursuit. From an objective point of view, we are 
differentiating patterns in terms of the timely occurrence of specific practices, which would 
mean simply adding time as a variable for our model. Yet, I have shown that the transition 
relevance place is segmentable into more specific points of particular interactional relevance. 
The occurrence of a modification of a FPP, or of a response before any silence or delay, is 
perceivable and has very different interactional consequences and implications than the 
occurrence of a verbal pursuit or of a response after some noticeable silence. In other words, 
once we map gaze practices onto interactionally relevant places, more fine-grained schemes 
can be differentiated and other types of orderly behavior can be observed. The most 
important point here is not that these different patterns can be observed, but rather that 
participants in interaction regularly differentiate them, as the multiple examples shown in § 
3.4 illustrated.  
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Moreover, the kind of patterns that can be identified, in terms of how the different 
modalities can be deployed to pursue a response, appear to play an important role. The fact 
that no instances were found of some specific patterns (e.g., using the same modality in the 
first pursuit to pursue a second time, or moving from using both modalities in the first pursuit 
to using only one in the second) suggests that gaze and talk can have a combinatorial effect. 
Moreover, it suggests that gaze and talk can likely be ranked in terms of the degree of 
pressure they exert, where gaze may be the least pressuring, a verbal pursuit may be the next 
step and a verbal pursuit produced while gazing towards the addressee is an even stronger 
means to pursue a response.  
Once we reach this level of granularity and once we see how a speaker can deploy 
her/his gaze to pressure a recipient for a response after a FPP, it is also possible to extend 
these observations to similar environments, where the relevance for a response is not as 
strong. In what follows I present four other environments in which we can see how speaker 
gaze can be used to obtain a response by a recipient. 
 
3.6 Gaze Pursuits in Different Sequential Environments 
 
Until now we have observed how speakers can use gaze to pressure for a response 
either during the production of a FPP (§ 3.3) or in the transition relevance place following it 
(§ 3.4). In all of the previous examples the participants were engaged in turn-by-turn talk 
(Sacks et al., 1974), alternating those turns mainly through question-answer sequences. 
However, there are other sequential environments in which gaze can be deployed to pursue a 
response by a recipient. In what follows I show what happens in two other sequential 
environments:  
1. within a storytelling;  
2. after a laughable item is produced (e.g., joke).  
 
I then look at two additional environments in which gaze can be deployed to pressure for a 
response, this time during a TCU, rather than at the transition relevance place. These two 
environments are:  
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a) after a preliminary component of a TCU; 
b) after a recognizable reference. 
 
3.6.1 During a Telling 
 
Among the ways in which participants make a response relevant is through the use of 
tag questions. During the course of a telling, a teller can provide references to individuals, 
places or events that are supposed to be part of shared knowledge or constitute the common 
ground (e.g., Clark & Brennan, 1991) for the successful reception of the telling. At specific 
points, a teller can verify whether the recipient recognizes a specific reference by using tag 
questions (see 'try marking' in Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). We will see in § 3.6.3.2 that, in 
addition to tag questions, a teller can also use gaze to elicit a response, not at just any point 
but while producing recognizable references.  
The following example illustrates a telling during which the teller uses a tag question 
to verify that the recipient knows the movie he is talking about. The recipient does not 
respond and response is then pursued through gaze. This interaction takes place in a car and 
the participants are friends traveling towards a mountain resort. A is the driver and B is 
sitting in the middle of the back seats, with his head forward between the two front seats. A 
and B are talking about the movie, Pulp Fiction. Our focus is the gaze behavior during the 
silence at line 12. 
 
(3.27) 3PDRIVING-massaggio 43:56  
 
01 A:  E   poi  mi e’ piaciuto molto come attore (.) anche:: (1.5) 
       And then me is liked    a lot as   actor      also 
       And then I liked a lot as an actor (.) also:: (1.5) 
 
02     come cazzo si  chiama (1.0) Bruce Willis. A me:: 
  how  dick  cl. call.3s      Bruce Willis  to me 
       what the hell is his name (1.0) Bruce Willis. To me:: 
 
03 B:  Ah che  fa    il [pugile 
       Oh that do.3s the boxer 
       Oh who plays the [boxer 
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04 A:                  [Per me ha  saputo fare il  suo ruolo  
                        For me has known  make the his role 
                      [In my opinion he managed to play his role 
05     mol[to bene 
very   well 
      ve[ry well 
06 B:    [Fa      il pugile [lui 
          Make.1s the boxer  he 
         [Plays the boxer  [he 
07 A:                      [((Nods))
08 A:  Comunque: e’ incredibile_ cioe’  se tu  guardi  ogni  
       Anyway    is incredible   I mean if you look.2s every 
       Anyway: it is incredible_ I mean if you look at every 
09     singola st- scena ogni singola storia vedi 
       single      scene every single story  see.2s  
       single st- scene every single story you see  
10     dei paradossi incredibili tipo .hh cominciano a parlare e  
of  paradoxes incredible  like     begin.3p   to speak  and 
       incredible paradoxes like .hh they start talking and 
                                             
11     discutono un’ora (.) del    massaggio dei    piedi no? 
       discuss.3p one hour  of the massage   of the feet no 
       they talk for one hour (.) about foot massage no? 
             
12        (0.4)   (0.2)  (0.3)  (0.1)           
                      (1.0) 
                       
13 B:  Io non me lo ricordo     bene 
       I  not me it remember.1s well 
       I do not remember it well 
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14 A:  E   vabbe’. Poi dopo   c’e’   Bruce Willis che e’ sto uomo duro, 
       And alright then after cl is Bruce Willis that is this man tough 
       And alright. Then there is Bruce Willis who is this tough man,  
 
15     cattivo e   tutto che  sta   con  la  donna piu’ buona  
       nasty   and all   that stays with the woman more good 
   nasty and so on that is together with the sweetest woman  
 
16     del    mondo 
       of the world 
       on   Earth 
 
Both participants in this fragment are looking ahead at the beginning of this example. B has 
indicated, at lines 3 and 6, that he has seen the movie (i.e., he can remember which role Bruce 
Willis played). During the silence at line 12, though, B does not react to the tag question 
(“they talk for one hour about foot massage no?”). A has indeed started describing some of 
the things that he considers “incredible paradoxes” (see line 10) and the first item he provides 
is this one-hour conversation. This is supposed to be a recognizable reference for B, as 
someone who has seen the movie, but B does not respond to it. After a silence of 0.6 seconds 
the teller pursues response through gaze by turning his head towards the recipient and gazing 
at him. The recipient has clearly perceived the head turning of the driver and his gaze given 
that B’s face is few centimeters behind A, positioned in between the head rest of the two 
front seats. At line 13, B accounts for why he has not responded yet: he does not remember 
the movie very well. This has consequences for the design of A’s multi-unit turn, given that 
he resumes speaking at line 14 and modifies his way of describing the characters (see lines 
14-15 in which A describes the character of Bruce Willis as if B has not seen the movie). 
This example shows an extreme case in which the teller would turn his head away from the 
road and his driving task to look at the main recipient sitting behind him, in order to pursue 
uptake rather than pursuing response verbally. Such an exaggerated move suggests that 
pursuing a response through gaze is not the same as pursuing it verbally. Moreover, this 
example is interesting because it shows a situation in which, after the response, what follows 
is not another question or assessment by the speaker of the initial FPP but rather the 
resumption of the telling. By inserting a tag question (at which point the driver is not looking 
towards the recipient) the speaker makes relevant the production of a response and when one 
is not provided promptly, response is pursued by gaze.  
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someone who has seen the movie, but B does not respond to it. After a silence of 0.6 seconds 
the teller pursues response through gaze by turning his head towards the recipient and gazing 
at him. The recipient has clearly perceived the head turning of the driver and his gaze given 
that B’s face is few centimeters behind A, positioned in between the head rest of the two 
front seats. At line 13, B accounts for why he has not responded yet: he does not remember 
the movie very well. This has consequences for the design of A’s multi-unit turn, given that 
he resumes speaking at line 14 and modifies his way of describing the characters (see lines 
14-15 in which A describes the character of Bruce Willis as if B has not seen the movie). 
This example shows an extreme case in which the teller would turn his head away from the 
road and his driving task to look at the main recipient sitting behind him, in order to pursue 
uptake rather than pursuing response verbally. Such an exaggerated move suggests that 
pursuing a response through gaze is not the same as pursuing it verbally. Moreover, this 
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3.6.2 After a Laughable Item 
 
The second sequential environment I investigate is that which occurs following the 
production of a laughable item such as a joke or a quip. The unsuccessful delivery of many 
jokes in interaction and the lack of general sanctioning suggests that laughing is the preferred 
reaction to a joke (Sacks, 1974) and so when it does not occur in response, it is noticeably 
absent. The following example provides some evidence that laughter can be pursued with 
gaze when it is missing. 
In example 3.28 the speaker of the laughable turn is the driver of the car (A), who 
pursues a response by turning almost completely towards the main recipient (B), who is 
sitting in the back of the car. In the interaction preceding this extract, A informed the other 
two passengers that there are engineers paid to develop a pasta shape, which improves the 
amount of sauce that attaches to it. A clearly indicates his negative stance towards this fact 
first by saying that there are people who work on ridiculous issues and then by asking the 
rhetorical question at line 1: “which kind of problem is it?” Our focus is the gaze behavior 
during the silence at line 7. 
 
(3.28) 3PDRIVING-gin 13:10  
 
01 A:  Cioe’  che  problema e’¿ 
       I mean what problem  is 
       I mean which kind of problem is it¿ 
 
02     E   quelli che studiano (0.4) che   reazione  
  And those that study.3p       which reaction  
       And those who study (0.4) which reaction  
 
03     hanno   i    pesci=l’ho      letto sulla Settimana Enigmistica 
       have.3p the fish  it have.1s read  on the Settimana Enigmistica 
       fish have=I read it on the Crosswords Magazine  
 
04     .hh [che reazione hanno(0.2) i   pesci se sottoposti a=  
            which reaction have.3p  the fish  if exposed    to 
       .hh [which reaction have (0.2)  fish if= 
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05 B:      [he he ha ha 
           [he he ha h 
06 A:  = ubriacatura da   gin: 
         drunk       from gin 
       = made drunk with gin: 
             
07        (0.7)   (0.2)   (0.1)  
                  (1.0)     
         
08   B: [he he he he  ((See Figure 3.2)) 
       [he he he he 
 
Figure 3.2. A’s head turned towards B, who starts laughing (line 8)    
The turn at line 1 is uttered while the speaker is looking ahead at the street and while making 
a “mano a borsa” gesture, often associated with rhetorical questions (Kendon, 1995). The 
way this turn is designed displays that it is not a real question but rather a way of displaying 
his negative stance. At line 2 A starts another TCU that projects the utterance of another type 
of job towards which he adopts the same stance. Before getting to the punch line of this 
funny announcement, he interrupts and begins a parenthetical sequence (Mazeland, 2007)
with a turn (‘I have read…’) that makes explicit the source of this information. This is 
responded with a laughter by B at line 5 in overlap with A’s resumption of his announcement 
(‘which reaction…’) that is completed at the end of line 6. B’s laughter is not to the projected 
main gist of the telling (Norrick, 2010) concerning weird jobs, but rather towards the source 
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of information that he cites (the crossword magazine), clearly not the most commong type of 
news source.The turn that ends at line 6 does not get any immediate uptake. For 0.7 seconds 
nothing happens, until the driver, who is driving on the highway, turns all the way around 
towards B. Once A’s gaze reaches B, B starts laughing. The point here is that it is not just the 
beginning of the turning of the head that pursues a response (or at least that this behavour 
displays that the speaker expects a response); rather, it is actually the engagement of mutual 
gaze by the participants and then the holding of the mutual gaze that achieves 
uptake/response. This shows that the same practice described in the previous examples can 
work during a silence following a funny remark.  
 
 
3.6.3 Pursuing Uptake Mid-TCU 
In what follows we will see two environments in which gaze can be used during the 
course of a TCU to obtain some uptake to a specific action: 
 
a) during a silence following a preliminary component of a TCU; 
b) during a silence following a recognitional reference. 
 
3.6.3.1 After a Preliminary Component 
 
The practice of looking up towards a recipient during silence can also occur after the 
preliminary component of a TCU.27 When a participant produces a preliminary component of 
a compound TCU another speaker has “semi-permeable” access to the turn (Lerner, 1996b). 
As Lerner (1996b: 241-242) puts it:  
 
While distinctly different in social and interactional terms from TCU 
possible completion as a place of transition relevance, preliminary 
component completion also provides a place for another participant to 
begin speaking. […] Preliminary component completion provides an 
opportunity for another to begin speaking even when no form of 
elicitation is evident and the first speaker continues on without 
hesitation. 
                                                
27 With compound TCU I refer to the type of TCU identified by Lerner (1991, 1996a) that includes a 
preliminary component that more or less projects the shape of the TCU as a whole and a possible form for the 
final component of the TCU. The most typical example would be an ‘If X, then Y’ construction. 
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In this section we will see that gaze can also work as a resource to elicit a response by the 
other participant in this environment. In particular, if silence follows the preliminary 
component, the speaker can look up towards the recipient and by doing this s/he solicits a 
response. 
In the following example (continued from 3.24) A and B are talking about a teaching 
assistant and B has assessed him in negative terms. A has defended him citing his CV, and 
line 36 is B’s teasing response to A’s effort. The focus is the gaze behavior at line 42. 
(3.29) 2PLUNCH1-scarso 6:40 
35     (0.5) 
36 B:  E’      diventato scarso 
       Have.3s become   insufficient 
He became bad
37      (1.5) 
38 A:  No perche’ noi adesso lo vediamo li’   che  fa (0.4)che  
       No because we  now    him see.1p there that do.3s   that  
No because now we see him there doing (0.4) that 
39     l’han       preso come:: come tutore sembra un po’ portaborse 
       him have.3p taken as     as   tutor  look   a  bit servant     
       they got him as:: as a tutor he looks a bit like a servant but  
40     pero’ in realta’ (1.0) gia’   se l’hanno preso per fare
       but   in reality      already if him had taken to  do 
      actually (1.0) already if they got him to do  
41     quella roba  li’_ 
       that   stuff there 
that thing_
                   
42          (0.9)   (0.4)       (0.5) 
                    (1.8) 
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of information that he cites (the crossword magazine), clearly not the most commong type of 
news source.The turn that ends at line 6 does not get any immediate uptake. For 0.7 seconds 
nothing happens, until the driver, who is driving on the highway, turns all the way around 
towards B. Once A’s gaze reaches B, B starts laughing. The point here is that it is not just the 
beginning of the turning of the head that pursues a response (or at least that this behavour 
displays that the speaker expects a response); rather, it is actually the engagement of mutual 
gaze by the participants and then the holding of the mutual gaze that achieves 
uptake/response. This shows that the same practice described in the previous examples can 
work during a silence following a funny remark.  
 
 
3.6.3 Pursuing Uptake Mid-TCU 
In what follows we will see two environments in which gaze can be used during the 
course of a TCU to obtain some uptake to a specific action: 
 
a) during a silence following a preliminary component of a TCU; 
b) during a silence following a recognitional reference. 
 
3.6.3.1 After a Preliminary Component 
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a compound TCU another speaker has “semi-permeable” access to the turn (Lerner, 1996b). 
As Lerner (1996b: 241-242) puts it:  
 
While distinctly different in social and interactional terms from TCU 
possible completion as a place of transition relevance, preliminary 
component completion also provides a place for another participant to 
begin speaking. […] Preliminary component completion provides an 
opportunity for another to begin speaking even when no form of 
elicitation is evident and the first speaker continues on without 
hesitation. 
                                                
27 With compound TCU I refer to the type of TCU identified by Lerner (1991, 1996a) that includes a 
preliminary component that more or less projects the shape of the TCU as a whole and a possible form for the 
final component of the TCU. The most typical example would be an ‘If X, then Y’ construction. 
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In this section we will see that gaze can also work as a resource to elicit a response by the 
other participant in this environment. In particular, if silence follows the preliminary 
component, the speaker can look up towards the recipient and by doing this s/he solicits a 
response. 
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43      ((After 1.5 seconds of silence B makes disaffiliative facial  
expression see Figure 3.3))
 
Figure 3.3. B’s facial expression at line 43.
                       
44 A:  per curare il  corso °c’e’     un motivo° 
       to  cure   the course there is a  reason 
      to take care of the course °there is a reason° 
45     (0.5) 
A’s turn at line 38 is responsive to B’s negative stance towards the teaching assistant and to 
the turn at line 36 in which she teases A. In response, A provides another piece of evidence to 
support his positive stance towards the teaching assistant. But this evidence is provided 
through a compound TCU (lines 40-44). It should be noted that without taking into account 
the visible behavior of the participants, the silence at line 42 would be glossed as a simple 
pause in A’s speech, which is then resumed and completed at line 44. However, by 
neglecting the participants’ gaze behaviors we would miss the interactional events that occur 
during that silence. In the context of disagreement between A and B, the gist of the second 
component of the TCU is easily projectable after the preliminary component “but if they got 
him to do that thing”. At this point, following Lerner (1996b), we could say that the other 
participant could start speaking, but she does not. On the other hand, in most of the examples 
shown in this chapter, by withholding speech the speaker provides an opportunity for the 
other participant to interject and possibly complete her/his turn. The silence is therefore 
created by the additional absence of talk by the recipient. There cannot be any collaborative 
completion given the disagreement, so what is the speaker doing by remaining silent at this 
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point? His use of gaze during the silence displays that he is actually trying to secure a 
response from B, and indeed he gets one. She does not talk but while closing her eyelids she 
raises her eyebrows making a disaffiliative facial expression (see Figure 3.3). This visible 
behavior displays that she does not accept A’s account.  At this point, A produces a self-
repair replacing the generic “per fare quella roba li’” (to do that thing) with the specific “per 
curare il corso” (to take care of the course) and completes the compound TCU in a soft voice. 
Note that B’s facial expression only makes sense by relying on the fact that the speaker (B) is 
looking at her.  
What is striking is not only the use of gaze to solicit a response, but rather the way in 
which the speaker displays a clear orientation towards the possible relevance of recipient 
response (after a preliminary component of a compound TCU). The speaker orientation 
towards the possible relevance of a response at that point is further displayed by the fact that 
he produces the second component with a soft voice looking at his dish and that B does not 
respond. A had designed this turn to end at line 41 or at least to get responded to at that point 
and behaved accordingly, only to then complete the compound TCU once the preliminary 
component has failed to elicit a response aligning with A’s stance towards the teaching 
assistant. Looking at the way gaze is deployed provides us with additional information about 
the speaker’s orientation towards her/his own talk. In particular, it shows us that the turn was 
designed as a “trail off”. Moreover, we can see that the speaker’s turn becomes a compound 
TCU when the trail off is not responded to, rather than being designed from the beginning as 
a compound TCU and interrupted because of contingent actions. 
 
3.6.3.2 After a Recognizable Reference 
 
Another environment in which looking towards the recipient during a silence 
effectively pursues uptake is after a recognizable reference. The term “recognitional” is 
usually employed in CA to indicate a reference to a person or a place that invites the recipient 
to find who or what among the people or places s/he knows the speaker was referring to. That 
is to say, it is a reference designed to be recognizable by the recipient (Sacks & Schegloff, 
1979; Schegloff, 1996b). The term “recognizable reference” is a more general category and 
includes things like technical terms and names of objects and animals in addition to names of 
people or places. Participants, indeed, orient towards the relevance of getting such things 
recognized and understood by recipients before continuing with their talk.  
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includes things like technical terms and names of objects and animals in addition to names of 
people or places. Participants, indeed, orient towards the relevance of getting such things 
recognized and understood by recipients before continuing with their talk.  
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In previous work on reference, Auer (1984) has described a specific sequential format 
called “indexicality marker/continuer”, which refers to practices deployed in producing a 
reference to people or objects that tends to elicit a continuer as a response. He explicitly 
states that this is not a classic adjacency pair because, in contrast to an offer and its 
acceptance, the second part of the format is optional. He suggests this is the case because “the 
recipient may ignore the referring party’s orientation to the potential problem status of the 
referential item, that is, he or she may choose not to acknowledge it” (Auer, 1984: 645). 
When Auer describes the ways in which the reference can become the first item of this 
specific sequential format, he refers to the act of “try marking” (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979) 
and to the use of language specific demonstratives and specific techniques for displaying 
hesitancy like short pauses, repeated onsets, lengthening of sonorants etc. He analyzed audio-
recordings of face-to-face interactions and therefore could not observe speaker gaze as an 
additional (crucial) element that contributes to the occurrence of a recipient response on the 
mentioning of a recognizable reference. In particular, speaker gaze towards the recipient is 
often already deployed on the production of the reference, so that by the time the reference is 
produced, (and in particular, if some silence follows) the recipient knows that some uptake is 
expected. In Auer’s work, the focus is on practices that point to achieving reference as one of 
the main locally relevant activities for the participants. In the examples that follow, we 
should also acknowledge the relevance of recognizing the reference in order to understand 
what is going to be said next by the teller. 
The response soliciting practice here presented tends to occur in the midst of multi-
unit turns, and what follows is usually a re-engagement into the turn by the speaker. The 
following two examples show how this practice works. Example 3.30 illustrates the 
occurrence of this practice in this environment. The main difference with the previous 
examples is the occurrence of a gaze shift by the speaker during the production of the 
recognizable reference, and not just during the following silence. Prior to the beginning of 
this fragment, A began telling B about the planned visit of two guys she met on vacation. At 
line 1 and the beginning of line 2, the participants close off a repair on a reference to where 
the two guys are from.  
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(3.30) 2GSOFA-biondo 14:12  
01 B:  Vabbe’ hhu hh[u  
Alright  
       Alright hhu hh[u 
                                                   
02 A:  [Vabbe’fatto sta che c’e’: Rindi (0.2)  
                     Alright fact stays that there is Rindi 
                    [Alright the fact is that there is: Rindi (0.2) 
                             
03       quello di  [Spe-  hhh]a si’ che e’ malato quindi =  
         that from  Spe-    oh   yes that is sick so 
         the one from [ Spe-  hhh]a yes who is sick so = 
04 B:   ((annuendo))  [Il biondo] 
                      The blonde 
        ((Nodding))  [The blonde] 
05 A:  = non son venuti .hh poi  oh Antonio non l’ho        sentito  
         not  be.3p come    then oh Antonio not him have.1s heard 
       = they didn’t come .hh then oh Antonio I didn’t hear from him  
06 A:  quindi_
       so 
       so_ 
07     (1.0)  
At line 2 A refers to one of the two guys by using his nickname (Rindi) and then remains 
silent for 0.2 seconds. While referring to Rindi she also looks at B, who is already looking at 
her. At this point, A makes the reference more explicit and she tries again by saying “the one 
from Spe-“ but her talk is interrupted by B who demonstrates her recognition of the person A 
is talking about (“the blonde one” at line 4) (Heritage, 2007). A immediately confirms the 
identification of Rindi as “the blonde” (“yes”) during her turn at line 3 and then proceeds 
with the telling. At this point, A is providing B with an opportunity to display recognition not 
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At line 2 A refers to one of the two guys by using his nickname (Rindi) and then remains 
silent for 0.2 seconds. While referring to Rindi she also looks at B, who is already looking at 
her. At this point, A makes the reference more explicit and she tries again by saying “the one 
from Spe-“ but her talk is interrupted by B who demonstrates her recognition of the person A 
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by using a vocal trymarker or by displaying hesitation, but by looking up and remaining 
silent immediately after the reference instead of continuing her telling. Given the absence of 
uptake, A proceeds by further specifying the reference while B produces a display of 
understanding in overlap with it.   
Example 3.31 shows a similar pattern, only this time the looking up by the speaker 
occurs on the last syllable of the recognizable reference (the Chemistry Department) and after 
some silence the recipient responds with an acknowledgment token. In this example, the 
participants are having dinner together and they have been commenting on the fact that one 
of their professors is a ‘player’ and is considered very good-looking by many students. A has 
just said that only men behave like that, before B counters that women would also do so. Our 
focus is what happens between lines 2 and 4. 
(3.31) 2GCOLL-chimica 24:17  
                                    
01 B:  Ma   no dai     anche una donna se tu  adesso vai 
       Well no come on also  a   woman if you now    go.2s 
      Well no come on also a woman ((would do it)) if you now go 
         
02     a Chimica 
       to Chemistry 
      to the Chemistry Department 
       
03    (0.3)       
              
04 A:  mm     hm ((annuendo)) 
       mm     hm 
      mm     hm ((nodding)) 
      
05    (.) 
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06 B:  vieni   circondata_ 
       come.2s surrounded 
       you get surrounded_ 
07    (.) 
08 A:  mh mh[hh] hmm hmm 
       mh mh[hh] hmm hmm 
09 B:       [da] 
             by 
           [by] 
10 B:  da milioni  di chimici che: che  vogliono solo te 
       by millions of chemists that that want.3p  only you 
      by millions of chemists tha:t that desire only you 
In order to counter A’s claim that only men exploit their attractiveness with students, B tries 
to present a scenario in which A could find herself acting in the same way. B starts by 
defining the environment in which A could find many good-looking male students and she 
does so by saying “if you now go to the Chemistry Department…” The reference to the 
Chemistry Department is of crucial importance because A has to recognize the reference to 
an environment in which most of the students are young men and they are good-looking (they 
had mentioned previously that some of their attractive friends study Chemistry). Before 
stopping talking at line 3, B looks up towards A and sustains mutual gaze until A confirms 
recognition of the reference and B can then continue with constructing a plausible scenario 
for a comparison of women’s and men’s behavior. In this example we again see that a 
speaker not only momentarily interrupts her speech to allow the recipient to confirm 
recognition of a specific reference (here the Chemistry Department), but also looks up 
towards the recipient and sustains gaze through the silence to show that a response is relevant 
at that point. 
In general, it is of particular importance to recognize that the practice of looking 
towards a recipient during a telling can indeed secure a response; however, it does so either 
because it occurs on a new reference to a recognizable item, sometimes verbally produced to 
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further solicit a response (see, e.g., Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Auer 1984), or because the gaze 
occurs on or after a tag question that already makes relevant a response. This is a crucial 
specification to the much broader and less specific claim by Bavelas, Coates and Johnson 
(2002) about the symbolic function of gaze during a telling: if the speaker looks at the 
recipient, s/he wants that recipient to respond with an acknowledgment token or a continuer. 
§ 3.6.1 and § 3.6.3.2 provide a more specific claim about the particular environments in 
which gazing towards an addressee may solicit a response, a specification based on the 
interactional relevance of specific objects in conversation such as new references and tag 
questions. 
 
3.7 Why Gaze Now? 
 
Gaze pursuits contribute a partial solution to a crucial interactional problem: how can 
a participant get a response to what she has just said without actually asking again? Phrasing 
here is important. Let’s start by focusing on “a response”. One of the questions participants 
may unconsciously ask themselves in interaction is “why that now?” (Schegloff & Sacks, 
1973). During a silence, once the speaker looks up towards the recipient it is very likely the 
recipient will ask herself/himself “why gaze now?” and also “what from me now?” It is clear, 
indeed, that participants in interaction are not dealing with gaze just as an epiphenomenon 
that happens to co-occur with talk. Nor do they treat it simply as a way of displaying 
attention, even though its relationship with attention might be the root of the successful use of 
the gaze practices here described. When deployed in certain sequential environments, 
recipients instead perceive speakers’ gaze behavior as a way of doing specific actions in 
interaction. The way in which gaze pursuit is understood, as can be seen in how it is 
responded to, depends on the sequential environment in which it occurs. Notwithstanding the 
general characterization of this gaze as “response needed”, gaze is not really symbolic and is 
instead mainly doing an indexical job. That is to say, in an environment in which some 
response could be relevant and/or appropriate, by looking towards the recipient the speaker 
appears to be asking the recipient to go back to what has just been said or done and to deal 
with it in an appropriate way. If we look at the kind of responses that participants get by 
deploying gaze in the sequential positions described in this chapter, we notice that they are 
not random ways of displaying uptake, but are in fact appropriate to the types of possible 
responses made relevant by the occurrence of a specific FPP (like a request for confirmation 
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that gets a yes/no answer or jokes that get delayed laughter). The evidence that the speaker is 
looking for some uptake when the gaze is deployed is provided by the cases in which gaze 
pursuit fails and then a verbal pursuit is performed. This makes plausible the indexical 
function of gaze in this context and at the same time displays how it relates to the terms used 
in framing the general question at the beginning of this section (“to what she has just done”).  
The question of which sequential environment gets a pursuit is valid also for verbal 
pursuits. Noticing how something can be pursued does not always tell us why something gets 
pursued in the first place. And even if it is true that speakers mainly pursue responses to 
FPPs, this chapter has also shown that other things can be pursued. The main gaze practice 
described here occurs during silence following a FPP, and also a joke, a recognizable 
reference and a preliminary component of a TCU. As Davidson (1984) and Pomerantz (1984) 
have shown, one possible reading of silence after a FPP is the projection of upcoming 
disagreement, or, at least trouble. I have also tried to show that another potential issue 
regarding silence after a FPP is actually recognizing that something could or should be 
responded to when it does not constitute a turn boundary. Gaze is certainly one of the 
resources participants rely on. In sum, the environment in which the practice of pursuing a 
response gets deployed is one in which something has failed and the progressivity (Schegloff, 
1979, 2007b; Stivers & Robinson, 2006) has been halted.   
The affordances of gaze (Gibson, 1979) are particularly important and lead us to the 
issue raised by the expressions “without being heard” and “asking again” that I used at the 
beginning of this section. The use of gaze allows the recipient to produce visible responses. 
Indeed, many of the actual responses produced by participants following its deployment are 
only visible or have a visible component. These responses range from nods, to gestures, to 
smiles, to facial expressions that display their stance towards the previous action.28 Perhaps 
this is why the very occurrence of gaze in pursuing responses has simply gone unnoticed 
because so often it, like other visible responses, is neglected. Looking carefully at the silences 
in the sequential environments described here, it should be noted that what could otherwise 
be understood as simple pauses in the course of the speaker’s turn are actually gaps, in which 
some pursuit occurs. Moreover, gaze pursuit is so often successful that the return to the 
speaker’s turn after a visible response becomes an indication of its effectiveness. Gaze often 
goes unnoticed.  
                                                
28 Looking at eight different types of response tokens, Gardner (2001: 251) stressed that “each does distinctive 
interactional work, and that it is misleading to assume that they can be lumped together as a homogeneous group 
of ‘minimal responses’”. This is also true for the visible responses I am describing here. 
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further solicit a response (see, e.g., Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Auer 1984), or because the gaze 
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that gets a yes/no answer or jokes that get delayed laughter). The evidence that the speaker is 
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For a recipient, the possibility of neglecting speaker gaze and the possibility of 
responding just with a gesture or a facial expression allows him/her to minimize the public 
aspect of the pursuit. If the recipient responds after a verbal pursuit, s/he will be heard as 
having not answered the first question, while if the answer comes after the gaze, he will 
simply be heard as having delayed his answer. And, the fact that often this answer is 
dispreferred makes the occurrence of a pursuit even less noticeable. By allowing a visible 
answer, speakers also permit an easier way out for the recipients. A disagreement can be 
resolved without explicitly stating that the participants hold opposite views on the matter. 
With a gesture or a facial expression the recipient can display her/his orientation towards the 
previous turn without making explicit the exact elements on which s/he disagrees. This 
means that what actually goes on the record for that specific conversation may be quite 
different from what is conveyed visibly. 
From the speaker’s point of view, by using gaze to pursue response s/he will not be 
heard to be asking “again”, but rather as having increased pressure for a response, without 
any modification. Sometimes when the gaze pursuit fails, the speaker abandons the pursuit 
without using verbal turns and moves on with the conversation (in my dataset the pursuits 
that get abandoned after the first attempt are only gaze pursuits). Another advantage of using 
gaze pursuits for the speaker is the possibility of asking the recipient to respond without 
changing the direction of preference. It has been previously shown that one way participants 
orient to the delay in responding is by modifying the FPP in order to facilitate an answer by 
the recipient (e.g., Davidson, 1984). But gaze cannot and does not do that. Rather, gaze 
points back to what happened and displays the relevance of response. Nothing gets changed 
in the structure or semantics of the initial action that should be responded to. One possible 
implication is that the speaker assumes that the action has been perceived and understood, but 
what is missing is a response. Speakers appear to treat their prior turn as “problem free”. 
Rather than assuming trouble for the recipient and therefore orienting towards the possible 
dispreference of the response, it is pursuing the action as it is and it is pushing for a response 
to what has just been said or done.  
On a more general level, we can say that what favors the use of this practice in the 
sequential positions previously described is the different impact and interactional 
accountability of visible behavior compared to verbal behavior and the fact that gaze can be 
used before moving one step further and using talk to ask again, usually while sustaining the 
gaze towards the recipient.  
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3.8 Summary 
 
In the first part of this chapter I provided evidence that the occurrence of speaker and 
recipient gaze during a FPP has different effects in terms of the provision of a response and 
its timely delivery. Speaker gaze works to elicit a response while recipient gaze works to 
encourage the timely delivery of the response. If the participants engage in mutual gaze, the 
occurrence of a timely response is even more likely. In the second part of this chapter I 
analyzed how gaze can be used to pursue a missing response in the transition relevance place 
following a FPP. In particular, I showed how the timing of gaze towards recipients is 
organized, its effectiveness, its possible limits and how it relates to other ways of pursuing a 
response, mainly by deploying verbal resources. Finally, in the third part of this chapter I 
showed how the knowledge accumulated in the first two parts of the chapter accounts for 
practices observable in other sequential environments in which the occurrence of a response 
can be relevant, although it is not normally considered conditionally relevant. I then showed 
how gaze plays a role in obtaining responses in these environments.  
Further, I provided a characterization of sequential contexts in which a speaker 
manages to solicit and obtain a response by looking towards the recipient during silence. 
Although not exhaustive, these contexts can be divided into two broad types, with more 
specific characterizations:  
 
1) In the transition relevance place: 
a. After a first pair part 
b. After a joke 
 
2) In a silence mid-TCU: 
a. After a preliminary component of a TCU 
b. After a recognizable reference 
 
These environments have been previously characterized as distinct in terms of the sequential 
implications of the completion of each of these items. On the other hand, they still initiate 
interactional formats that make response or a display of understanding as the relevant next 
action. Speaker gaze towards the recipient in these environments seems to solicit not just a 
response but also an analysis of the previous action performed by the person looking towards 
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the recipient, which then gets responded to in an appropriate way. Moreover, this practice is 
context sensitive; that is, recipient understanding depends on the interactional environment in 
which the practice occurs.  
The first part of this chapter showed that the occurrence of gaze during a FPP can 
affect the likelihood of obtaining a response. The success of gaze pursuits further underscores 
this claim. Finally, the fact that the same practice (using gaze to pressure for a response) can 
be seen to work in similar ways across different sequential environments could suggest a 
reconsideration of the notion of “response relevance” as something not necessarily given but 
potentially constructed in each utterance by design. And when the recognition of response 
relevance fails or no answer is produced because it is dispreferred, gaze can come into play 
by upgrading the relevance of a response by the recipient. 
As shown in chapter 2, the usual analysis of gaze as a tool meant simply to regulate 
the turn-taking system is not appropriate, because the exchanging of turns is not the main 
goal of the conversation nor the cause of a conversation in the first place, even though 
changes of speakership regularly occur. Rather turn-taking is a mechanism through which 
actions can be performed and reacted to. The sequential environment and the specific actions 
performed by the person who looks up towards the other must be taken into account, as these 
two things play a key role in who speaks next. The work by Torres et al. (1997) that shows 
how Kendon’s suggested rules about gaze behavior and turn-taking are not as systematic as 
originally claimed, demonstrates that we are still far from having a predictive model of gaze 
behavior in interaction if we keep focusing only on the level of turns of talk. 
Looking back at the practice of pursuing a response through gaze and considering the 
claims about the regulatory function of gaze, it might be claimed that gaze actually works as 
a sanctioning look, like “the Look” described by Mardi Kidwell (2005), rather than as 
soliciting response. That is to say, by looking at the recipient the speaker is sanctioning 
her/him for not responding earlier and the recipient responds because of the sanctioning. This 
does not seem to be the case. There is no evidence in the behavior of recipients that speaker 
gaze towards them is interpreted as sanctioning their behavior. There is never any apology or 
account for not having responded before, apart from example 3.26, in which the account 
about not remembering the movie is actually due to the fact that previously the recipient had 
claimed to remember it by mentioning the role of Bruce Willis in Pulp Fiction. What the gaze 
pursuit is doing, then, is not sanctioning but rather soliciting response.  
Finally, looking at the different resources and modalities a participant can mobilize to 
obtain a response when a response is missing, we can appreciate even more the effort a 
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speaker makes any time s/he is producing a sequence-initiating action: make a move and 
pursue it if the recipient is not cooperative. Even though few FPPs remain unresponded to, 
some nevertheless do. Gaze, then, can be used to minimize the likelihood of this outcome, 
and, in this respect, its contribution to social interaction and human sociality is substantial.  
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4 Gaze Withdrawal in Sequence Closing 
 
 
One routinely presumes on a mutual understanding that doesn’t quite exist. What one obtains is a 
working agreement, an agreement ‘for all practical purposes’. But that I think is quite enough.  
Goffman (1976: 261) Replies and responses  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Turns of talk commonly form sequences of action, which are often further combined 
to form courses of action. Once a sequence reaches possible completion, it is sometimes 
expanded by producing further related talk, while in other cases it is not. A current claim 
about when sequences get expanded is that  “preferred responses tend to lead to closing the 
sequence, while dispreferred responses regularly lead to expansion of the sequence” 
(Schegloff, 2007b: 117). As to how they get expanded, there has been extensive work on the 
verbal resources (e.g., oh, okay) and the action types (e.g., assessments, other initiation of 
repair) through which participants expand a base sequence (see Schegloff, 2007b for a 
detailed overview of these resources). However, little is known about the role that visible 
resources play in the closure of a sequence or a course of action and about the participants’ 
online-orientations toward the relevance of (or likelihood of) a sequence expansion. 
In chapter 2 I showed how recipients differentially deploy gaze while listening to the 
beginnings of different sequential organizations (i.e., an extended telling or an adjacency pair 
sequence), so I focused on the start of sequences and courses of actions. In chapter 3 I 
showed how speakers can use gaze to pressure for a response during the production of a first 
pair part (FPP) turn and to pursue responses when they are not forthcoming. In other words, I 
focused on what happens to a participant’s gaze during a first action and between a first and a 
second action of a sequence. In this chapter, I investigate how people manage the 
interactional development of courses of actions1 and the role that gaze plays in them by 
focusing on how participants manage the possible completion of a sequence and/or a course 
of action. Specifically I investigate how gaze contributes to the interactional achievement of 
                                                
1 “Courses of actions” is used here to refer to any interactional project that requires more than one turn to be 
fully accomplished. So an adjacency pair (FPP + SPP) becomes a course of action in the sense that without the 
SPP (e.g., acceptance, granting, etc.) the FPP cannot be considered accomplished or completed (e.g., an offer, a 
request, etc.). Anytime a participant reacts with something to make some first action successful is referred to as 
“a course of action”.  
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sequence closure. I continue focusing mainly on sequences of talk and courses of action 
rather than single turns and speaker-hearer relationships within turns.2 
 Interactional actions commonly make relevant some responsive behavior or at least 
ratification by another participant in order to be treated as satisfactory. Understanding when a 
speaker is starting a new course of action rather than continuing a previous one is a difficult 
task, for both participants and analysts, and therefore requires sophisticated analysis of the 
conversation. It has consequences for what a recipient can and cannot do next. What appears 
to be the same item produced in the same sequential position could be followed by different 
sequential outcomes (sequence closure versus more sequential talk). For example, if after a 
FPP such as “do you want to play football today?” I say “it is a beautiful day”, I will be heard 
as dealing with the question in some way, and the other participants will try to understand my 
response in terms of the possible relevance induced by its contiguous production (Grice, 
1975; Levinson, 1983; Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 1968; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). If, for 
example, I am only talking about the weather and I am not dealing with the prior speaker’s 
FPP, then that same speaker may do something in order to deal with the possible 
misunderstanding (e.g., initiate repair).  
 
We may wonder about when and why some sequences are expanded and others are 
not and whether sequence completion and silence is an interactional achievement or the 
natural byproduct of selfishly motivated behavior (e.g., the participant who should speak next 
does not take the floor or suddenly changes topic). For participants in interaction, it is crucial 
to understand and detect whether and when they need to say or do something in particular. 
These “degrees of freedom”3 are clearly not only related to the turn-taking structure (e.g., 
whether the turn is possibly complete) but also to sequences of talk (e.g., whether what 
somebody has just said is a FPP, SPP or something else that does not make conditionally 
relevant further talk, but allows for it) and to sequences of actions. So, for example, if I make 
a request, I can start with a pre-pre turn (Schegloff, 1980) (e.g., Can I ask you something?), 
then I can move to a pre-request (Sacks, 1992 [1964-72]: 685-692 et passim, Vol. I; Terasaki, 
                                                
2 As the completion of a course of action usually co-occurs with the completion of a turn and the completion of 
a sequence, focusing on gaze during courses of action necessarily requires analyzing gaze behaviors occurring 
during turns. However, such turns will not be considered in isolation or in terms of how the rights to produce a 
next bit of talk are allocated, but in terms of their contribution and position within a larger structure: a course of 
action. 
3 This notion is not being used to refer to what participants “are capable” of doing (because in theory, one is 
capable of saying anything at any time) but to what participants will be “heard to be doing”, for which they can 
be held accountable.  
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2004 [1976]) (e.g., Do you have plans for tomorrow evening?) and finally I can initiate the 
request (e.g. Could you give me a ride to the airport?). The possibilities of blocking or 
derailing a request are clearly oriented to by the requester who gives the other participant a 
chance to pre-empt her/his request with, for example, an offer. Understanding where we are 
in a course of action and the degrees of freedom we have at any interactional point provides 
us with tools to project what is relevant next. If somebody is telling us a story that has been 
launched with “something terrible happened to me yesterday” and in the midst of it we say 
“oh, that’s really terrible”, we might be misunderstanding where we are in the course of 
action that the teller had projected and we may also show that we mis-projected the place and 
time in which a display of understanding was relevant. Our ability to parse behavior and 
courses of action is summarized nicely by Byrne (2006: 478): “When we notice someone 
engaged in activity, we see not only how their body moves and what effects those movements 
are having on other things, but we also see what it means. The meaning of action includes 
what is likely to happen next, as a consequence of what has been done already; and what 
overall result is to be expected from the activity, in short, why it is being done”. In this 
chapter, I analyze gaze behavior along the same lines.  
My claim here is that gaze can be used to communicate where we are in a course of 
action when we approach a sequence boundary, at least in dyadic conversations. That is, 
ceteris paribus, whether we are ready to close the sequence and treat what just occurred or is 
occurring as a possible last component of the action-in-progress or whether we expect that 
action-in-progress to develop further.  
 
This chapter will focus in particular on sequence expansion and sequence completion 
using an analysis of the relationship between gaze behavior and talk-in-interaction in 
naturally occurring data. I focus on what happens at possible sequence boundaries and I show 
how sustained gaze by even one of the participants in the transition relevance place 
(henceforth TRP) displays an orientation toward the relevance of more talk or general uptake 
by the other co-participant. On the other hand, gaze withdrawal at possible sequence 
completion displays an orientation toward the possibility of ending the sequence. This 
withdrawal allows both participants to re-orient toward other ongoing activities as primary in 
a local hierarchical structure of activities. It also marks what just preceded as a possible 
closure of the prior sequence of talk and the prior course of action or even a number of 
successive such sequences. In other words, it marks what preceded it as the possible 
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speaker is starting a new course of action rather than continuing a previous one is a difficult 
task, for both participants and analysts, and therefore requires sophisticated analysis of the 
conversation. It has consequences for what a recipient can and cannot do next. What appears 
to be the same item produced in the same sequential position could be followed by different 
sequential outcomes (sequence closure versus more sequential talk). For example, if after a 
FPP such as “do you want to play football today?” I say “it is a beautiful day”, I will be heard 
as dealing with the question in some way, and the other participants will try to understand my 
response in terms of the possible relevance induced by its contiguous production (Grice, 
1975; Levinson, 1983; Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 1968; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). If, for 
example, I am only talking about the weather and I am not dealing with the prior speaker’s 
FPP, then that same speaker may do something in order to deal with the possible 
misunderstanding (e.g., initiate repair).  
 
We may wonder about when and why some sequences are expanded and others are 
not and whether sequence completion and silence is an interactional achievement or the 
natural byproduct of selfishly motivated behavior (e.g., the participant who should speak next 
does not take the floor or suddenly changes topic). For participants in interaction, it is crucial 
to understand and detect whether and when they need to say or do something in particular. 
These “degrees of freedom”3 are clearly not only related to the turn-taking structure (e.g., 
whether the turn is possibly complete) but also to sequences of talk (e.g., whether what 
somebody has just said is a FPP, SPP or something else that does not make conditionally 
relevant further talk, but allows for it) and to sequences of actions. So, for example, if I make 
a request, I can start with a pre-pre turn (Schegloff, 1980) (e.g., Can I ask you something?), 
then I can move to a pre-request (Sacks, 1992 [1964-72]: 685-692 et passim, Vol. I; Terasaki, 
                                                
2 As the completion of a course of action usually co-occurs with the completion of a turn and the completion of 
a sequence, focusing on gaze during courses of action necessarily requires analyzing gaze behaviors occurring 
during turns. However, such turns will not be considered in isolation or in terms of how the rights to produce a 
next bit of talk are allocated, but in terms of their contribution and position within a larger structure: a course of 
action. 
3 This notion is not being used to refer to what participants “are capable” of doing (because in theory, one is 
capable of saying anything at any time) but to what participants will be “heard to be doing”, for which they can 
be held accountable.  
229
2004 [1976]) (e.g., Do you have plans for tomorrow evening?) and finally I can initiate the 
request (e.g. Could you give me a ride to the airport?). The possibilities of blocking or 
derailing a request are clearly oriented to by the requester who gives the other participant a 
chance to pre-empt her/his request with, for example, an offer. Understanding where we are 
in a course of action and the degrees of freedom we have at any interactional point provides 
us with tools to project what is relevant next. If somebody is telling us a story that has been 
launched with “something terrible happened to me yesterday” and in the midst of it we say 
“oh, that’s really terrible”, we might be misunderstanding where we are in the course of 
action that the teller had projected and we may also show that we mis-projected the place and 
time in which a display of understanding was relevant. Our ability to parse behavior and 
courses of action is summarized nicely by Byrne (2006: 478): “When we notice someone 
engaged in activity, we see not only how their body moves and what effects those movements 
are having on other things, but we also see what it means. The meaning of action includes 
what is likely to happen next, as a consequence of what has been done already; and what 
overall result is to be expected from the activity, in short, why it is being done”. In this 
chapter, I analyze gaze behavior along the same lines.  
My claim here is that gaze can be used to communicate where we are in a course of 
action when we approach a sequence boundary, at least in dyadic conversations. That is, 
ceteris paribus, whether we are ready to close the sequence and treat what just occurred or is 
occurring as a possible last component of the action-in-progress or whether we expect that 
action-in-progress to develop further.  
 
This chapter will focus in particular on sequence expansion and sequence completion 
using an analysis of the relationship between gaze behavior and talk-in-interaction in 
naturally occurring data. I focus on what happens at possible sequence boundaries and I show 
how sustained gaze by even one of the participants in the transition relevance place 
(henceforth TRP) displays an orientation toward the relevance of more talk or general uptake 
by the other co-participant. On the other hand, gaze withdrawal at possible sequence 
completion displays an orientation toward the possibility of ending the sequence. This 
withdrawal allows both participants to re-orient toward other ongoing activities as primary in 
a local hierarchical structure of activities. It also marks what just preceded as a possible 
closure of the prior sequence of talk and the prior course of action or even a number of 
successive such sequences. In other words, it marks what preceded it as the possible 
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completion of an interactional project. This chapter, therefore, furthers our understanding not 
only of gaze but also of the sequential organization of social action. 
In what follows, I first provide qualitative and then quantitative evidence for the claim 
that gaze withdrawal at possible completion of a sequence constitutes a bid for closing the 
course of action and displays an understanding of the current interactional project as 
complete. The first set of examples illustrates the practices concerning the role of gaze in 
sequence closure or sequence expansion. Then, the results of statistical analyses of a large 
corpus of data will be reported in order to show the validity and robustness of the claims. 
Further, all of the cases that do not appear to follow the predicted pattern will be examined 
and accounted for and the normativity of the gaze practices here investigated will be 
discussed. Finally, the implications of this work for research on visible behavior and human 
cognition in interaction will be addressed.  
 
4.2 Background 
 
In chapter 1, I discussed existing claims about the relationship between gaze and turn 
taking (see, e.g., Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Goodwin, 1981; Kendon, 1967). In chapters 2 and 3, 
I argued that these claims are problematic because gaze seems to be organized around the 
actions that participants perform and the sequential organization of those actions. In this 
chapter, I address the issue of closure of courses of action and in particular the role that gaze 
plays in it. 
Schegloff and Sacks’ article entitled Opening up Closings (1973) was one of the first 
works to show how larger activities can be brought to closure, and it provided one of the first 
detailed analyses of the interactional resources deployed to accomplish such closure. In this 
work the authors described the details of closing a phone conversation by outlining not only 
one of the first accounts of the sequential organization of talk-in-interaction but also 
demonstrating the importance of understanding social practices as solutions to interactional 
problems. By showing that closing a conversation is usually not done abruptly, by dropping 
the telephone or by running out of the room, but is instead negotiated through sequential talk, 
Schegloff and Sacks showed that reaching social agreement on when something is over is 
complex, orderly and normatively organized. While dedicating most of their analysis to 
telephone conversations and “continuously sustained talk”, the authors suggest that in face-
to-face interactions of “continuing states of incipient talk”, not every completion of a 
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sequence represents the end of the conversation. Continuing states of incipient talk occurs in 
situations such as two individuals eating together, or sitting in close proximity for an 
extended amount of time (e.g., people studying in the library, individuals sitting close to one 
another in situations such as travelling together or sitting in a waiting room). In these 
situations talk could emerge and fade and long silences can occur between spates of talk 
without the need for the participants to produce greetings or farewells (i.e., without the need 
of performing more ritualistic opening or closing of conversations). In these situations, the 
possibility of conversation remains open until the other participant(s) physically leaves the 
shared environment. Consequently, not every beginning or end of a sequence requires the 
deployment of specific verbal resources to mark them as such. Nonetheless, sequence closure 
is sometimes necessary to be able to re-engage competing activities or to move to a new 
course of action.  
In further work aimed at unveiling how participants in interaction expand a sequence 
of talk in conversation and bring it to closure, Schegloff (e.g., 2007b) distinguished 
“minimal” and “non-minimal post-expansions”: 
 
The import of “minimal”, however, is not limited to an arithmetical 
count of number of turns which happen to follow the second pair part 
[…] [but] rather, that the turn which is added is designed not to 
project any further within-sequence talk beyond itself; that is, it is 
designed to constitute a minimal expansion after the second pair part. 
It is designed to move for, or to propose, sequence closing (a move 
which may be aligned with by recipient, or not). (Schegloff, 2007b: 
118) 
 
He terms these minimal post expansions “sequence closing thirds” which can take different 
forms or combinations, the most common of which are, in American English, “oh”, “okay” 
and assessments.  There are also what he calls “post completion musings”, or “postmortems”, 
which are utterances that can occur after the apparent completion of a sequence and yet they 
do not constitute the beginning of a new sequence but rather a sort of delayed analysis or 
assessment of the prior sequence and are usually produced as “outlouds” (Goffman, 1981c). 
Among the types of non-minimal post expansions perhaps the most common are the other-
initiation of repair and related newsmarks (e.g., “is he?”, “really?”) and challenges of the 
SPP, all of which work to modify or clarify what was said or done with the SPP. There are 
also other non-minimal post-expansions that elaborate or modify what was done with the FPP 
of the base sequence, which Schegloff (2007b: 162) terms “first pair part reworking post 
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expansion”. Finally, of particular relevance for the analysis presented in this chapter is what 
Schegloff (2007b: 181) calls “sequence closing sequences”, which are sequences designed to 
close long sequences or topics. They are usually composed of three turns:  
 
1) a turn that proposes the possible closing of the sequence or topic-in-progress [e.g., 
repetitions of words used in the launching of a sequence or a topic, summaries, 
assessments (“that’s too bad”, “it’s too boring”), idiomatic or aphoristic formulations 
of the upshot of the sequence ( “they have a problem”) (see Drew & Holt, 1998)]; 
 
2) a turn that collaborates in closing down the topic by affiliating with the stance 
displayed in the prior turn (e.g., a preferred response, such as “yeah”); 
 
3) a third move by the initiator of the sequence closing sequence that ratifies the 
recipient alignment with the closing proposal, usually by producing a closing token or 
assessment (e.g., “it was too much”, “I don’t know”). 
 
All of these different types of expansions and the resources to accomplish them show that 
achieving a sequence’s closure is not a simple matter, and, it is often a cooperative process. 
This is true even in the case of foreshortened and “virtually unilateral” sequence endings, as 
they require the other participants to at least accept and ratify the closure without insisting on 
resumption of the previous sequence. The most important aspect of sequence closure 
(although, to some extent, the least obvious one) is that closure does not simply happen, but 
rather is achieved by participants, who deploy specific and recognizable forms of closure. 
The issue of the recognizability of forms of closure will be further addressed later in the 
chapter. 
Keeping these aspects of sequence closure in mind, one important question is what 
role visible behavior plays in the recognizability of specific forms of closure. Besides 
Goffman (e.g., 1963) seminal work on how participants enter sustain and exit “focused” and 
“unfocused interactions” through their whole body, the first scholar who clearly introduced 
the idea that visible behavior can be deployed to mark shifts between units of behavior during 
an interaction was Scheflen (1964). By looking at how participants in psychotherapeutic 
interactions shift posture while talking, he suggested that visible behavior can provide a side 
view of what participants are projecting or how they understand what it is currently being 
done in the interaction. In a similar fashion, Schegloff (1998) showed how the postural 
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configurations of participants in a face-to-face interaction can display their current allocation 
of attention and commitment to possible competing engagements (e.g., talking to someone 
while also eating or working with a computer) in the surrounding environment. More recently 
Mondada (2006) has shown how participants in a meeting in an architect’s office can 
multimodally project completion of a turn and project which next action they will produce 
themselves, though shifts to a new activity might be resisted by the other participants. 
Participants can project their incipient shift to a next activity gesturally and by moving 
objects on the table (plans of buildings) and as such modifying the current “contextual 
configuration” (Goodwin, 2000a). By placing these actions when turn completion is 
approaching, they can publicly display what they are about to do next and as such allow other 
participants to pre-empt or align with the suggested shift to a new activity. This idea of 
visible behavior as a tool for displaying participants’ understanding and processing of 
conversational units will be central to the argument put forward in this chapter.  
If we focus more specifically on the previous research conducted on gaze, one major 
work of interests is Goodwin’s (1981) seminal Conversational Organizations: interaction 
between speakers and hearers. In this book he talks about gaze behavior as a way of 
displaying attention and (dis)engagement in the conversation, or more precisely, a display of 
the type of participation framework the participants are engaged in. From this perspective, 
looking away is noticeable and potentially sanctionable because it displays diminished 
engagement in the conversation. On the other hand, engagement in a competing activity (e.g., 
eating) provides a ready account for looking away rather than at the interlocutor's face and 
thus makes it less sanctionable. However, this claim also implicitly suggests that participants 
are relatively free to remove their gaze from co-participants, provided that they direct it 
toward another activity in which they are engaged. This dissertation has already shown and 
will continue showing in this chapter how this claim appears to be problematic. Indeed, as 
chapter 2 shows, some activities require more sustained gaze by the recipient toward the 
speaker (e.g. tellings) or by the speaker toward the recipient (e.g. questions) than others, 
suggesting that this relative freedom actually depends on the gaze expectations associated 
with the ongoing course of action. Moreover, this chapter will show that different sequential 
positions might indicate that gaze withdrawal should have different import, in particular with 
respect to the organization of gaze withdrawal at sequence possible completion. Finally, 
participants appear to calibrate their looking toward competing activities so that they do not 
disrupt the progressivity of the talk; that is, for example, they might look toward a glass and 
pick it up to drink when they expect they won’t have to produce the next turn at talk (see, 
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e.g., example 4.7 in this chapter), so that drinking will not create a silence when talk would 
be otherwise expected.  
Few more words about this groundbreaking work, however are necessary. In chapter 
3 of Conversational Organizations, Goodwin presents claims that will strongly resonate with 
what will be shown later in this chapter, and yet differ from my claim in quite crucial ways. 
He claims, in particular, the following: 
 
1. “Displays of mutual disengagement characteristically occur during lapses in the 
conversation.” (1981: 98)  
 
2.  “A speaker might use presence or absence of gaze toward recipient to display 
whether or not a next utterance is expected from the recipient. However, speakers 
look away from their recipients quite frequently during talk without in any way 
proposing that their recipient may/should start to disengage from the talk. […] 
Recipients do not attend to the gaze withdrawal as an isolated event, but rather 
analyze it with reference to other activities [((not linguistic ones, but physical 
ones))] the speaker is performing at that moment.” (1981: 104-105) 
 
3. “[If a] speaker continues to gaze at recipient after his talk is brought to 
completion; recipients treats such gaze as proposing the continued relevance of 
conversation and puts aside another activity he was about to perform.” (1981: 
108) 
 
The fundamental difference between his claims and mine consists in the conception of 
what gaze withdrawal does and to which conversational structure gaze is mainly related to. In 
his conception, gaze withdrawal displays diminished or complete disengagement with the 
conversation and usually allows engaging with a competing activity (e.g., smoking, eating). 
The meaning of gaze toward the other participant is that another utterance is expected from 
the other participant (quote 2), while a participant usually is not expected to continue gazing 
at the recipient when the former has brought the talk to completion (quote 3). Finally, 
Goodwin says that “most mutual disengagements occur during lapses in the conversation” 
(quote 1). One can easily notice how he refers to “talk completion”, “next utterance”, 
“disengagement with the conversation” and not to any specific structure in the conversation 
that the participant can systematically rely on to make sense of gaze withdrawal (see quote 
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2). To make sense of gaze withdrawal he suggests looking at what other activities the other 
participant might be engaged in, not to any specific structure present in the talk (see quote 2). 
What I will show in this chapter is that gaze withdrawal can be deployed to coordinate 
sequence closure and achieve closure of a course of action. As such, coordinated gaze 
withdrawal contributes to generating the lapses in the conversation and it does not simply 
occur during lapses in the conversation, as a consequence of them. Moreover, it does not 
simply indicates that a next utterance is expected, but rather than some sequence expansion is 
expected, so sequentially appropriate next talk, not just continuation of the conversation. And 
the direction of both participants eyes (in a dyadic interaction) is not relevant vaguely when 
“the talk is brought to completion” (whatever this might mean), nor simply during the 
completion of any turn at talk, but more specifically in relation to moments in which 
sequence possible completion and possible completion of a course of action co-occur.  
One additional piece of evidence concerning the different approaches here comes 
from a look at his transcripts, when compared to the ones you have seen in this dissertation 
and the ones you will see in this chapter. In his transcripts, Goodwin (1981) only shows a 
couple of utterances and what is happening to the participants’ gaze at that specific point in 
time, but the reader does not know what had been said and done before both with talk and 
with their bodies, how the participants got there, and often what the course of action was. No 
detailed analysis is made, in that chapter, of what is going on in the talk, in terms of social 
actions and their sequential organization. To summarize, what is missing from Goodwin’s 
account is a detailed description of how gaze behavior can be interpreted in relation to what 
is going on through the talk, rather than in relation to what else is going on in terms of 
competing activities. What is missing is a focus on the sequential organization of talk and its 
role in structuring what participants are doing with their talk and with their bodies. With their 
eyes, participants do not just display engagement and disengagement “with the talk”, but with 
the specific course of action sequentially developed both through talk and visible behavior. 
And the “closure” that they are coordinating is not simply the closure of a topic, or of a 
stretch of talk, but rather the closure of a sequence or sequences of social actions, unified by a 
specific interactional project. So much so that it is not necessarily the case that mutual gaze 
withdrawal leads to silence and lapses (although often they do so) or to re-engagement in 
some competing activity. Sometimes it simply allows re-engagement in another interactional 
project developed through talk that had been interrupted or derailed to accomplish something 
else, also through talk (see, e.g., Example 4.4). Notice, however, that while I emphasize the 
importance of relying on a more fine-grained understanding of what participants are doing 
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235
2). To make sense of gaze withdrawal he suggests looking at what other activities the other 
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235
236
through their talk, to establish more precisely at what level of order gaze is organized, my 
claim concerns the organization of social action (accomplished in whichever modality) in 
face-to-face interaction and is not limited to talk-in-interaction, as it might otherwise appear.  
These specifications will become more meaningful as we advance through the 
chapter, however, it is of absolute importance emphasizing that they do not diminish the 
insightfulness and in many ways correctness of Goodwin’s observations concerning the 
correlation between gaze withdrawal with displays of minimal engagement and potential 
attempt to closing an exchange.4 
Expanding on their previous work on gaze, Goodwin & Goodwin (1987) talk about 
gaze withdrawal as a way of displaying diminished participation in the activity, and discuss 
assessments as a resource for closing topics and mutual orientation. Interestingly, though, in 
all examples shown in that paper, gaze withdrawal is not followed by immediate topic closure 
but rather by further talk (at least an additional TCU) either by the participant who withdraws 
gaze (if s/he was the speaker) or by the current speaker (if the person withdrawing gaze is the 
recipient). As will be shown later in this chapter, gaze withdrawal is a resource for making a 
bid for closure, or for displaying a specific understanding of the ongoing development of the 
course of action. By bidding for closure, participants display diminished participation in the 
activity.  
To summarize, this chapter reports the initial investigations on conversational closure 
by looking at how sequences of talk and courses of action reach possible completion, when 
and how actual completion is achieved and what visible behavior contributes to it. In order to 
understand what happens at sequence completion, we first need to acknowledge that 
sequence completion also constitutes turn completion, and, as such, the issues of transition 
relevance and speaker transition need to be addressed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 While the level of granularity differs, Goffman’s focus in Behavior in Public Places (1963), in particular in 
terms of how participants display involvement in an interaction, is quite similar to the one Goodwin attempted 
to pursue in Conversational Organizations (1981). 
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4.3 Transition Relevance Places 
 
In the previous chapters, turn constructional units (TCUs) and TRPs were discussed 
as the building blocks of turns and the place in which transition to a next speaker is possibly 
relevant, respectively. The notion of TRP, and therefore possible turn completion, is 
particularly relevant for the systematicity of the behavior that will be presented in this 
chapter. As discussed previously, a TRP is a delimited time period and not a singular moment 
in time. According to Schegloff (2007b: 4):  
 
As a speaker approaches the possible completion of a first TCU in a 
turn, transition to a next speaker can become relevant: if acted upon, 
the transition to a next speaker is accomplished just after the possible 
completion of the TCU-in-progress. Accordingly, we speak of the span 
that begins with the imminence of possible completion as the 
“transition-relevance place”. 
 
 The fact that turn transitions do not only start at possible completion but also as a 
speaker approaches possible completion is empirically demonstrated by the timing of 
overlapping speech (see, e.g., Jefferson, 1973; 1983, 1986, 2004c; Schegloff, 2000a). The 
fact that transition relevance is not a point in time but rather a period of time becomes 
particularly important in terms of the projectability of possible turn and sequence completion 
and what participants can do during a TRP. In what follows, I analyze TRPs that lead to 
sequence closure and places in which, through gaze, participants leave open or even push for 
sequence expansion, although verbally the sequence could have reached possible completion. 
By doing so, this chapter shows how gaze behavior can be used to modify the interactional 
import of a TRP and thereby affect the development of a course of action. 
 
4.4 Possible Sequence Completion 
 
This section shows that when both participants avert their gaze from the other before 
or at possible sequence completion, the sequence is treated as complete and what follows is 
nearly always another course of action. On the other hand, when participants continue 
looking at each other once they have reached possible sequence completion, the sequence is  
usually treated as not yet complete, and it is consequently expanded until both participants 
avert their gaze or re-orient toward other activities at the next sequence possible completion. 
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Some categorical and terminological choices need to be explained here before 
proceeding with the analysis. First, if our focus is what happens at possible sequence 
completion, then a further specification is needed: what counts as a sequence expansion? In 
this chapter I will consider two types of expansions as constituting sequence expansion: 
 
1) Prior speaker self-selects and adds a turn to the sequence;  
 
2) Current speaker self-selects and adds another TCU to the turn that already  
reached possible sequence completion. 
 
Both expansion types will be considered expansions of a sequence and it will be argued that 
gaze behavior has a possible impact on their (non-)occurrence.  
Second, given that we are dealing with the behavior of two individuals at possible 
sequence completion, it is clear that the logical possibilities are not only 2 (i.e., no gaze or 
mutual gaze) but rather 4, including situations in which only the speaker or only the recipient 
look at the other (in the table, A= Speaker and B= Recipient): 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Although I am using numbers to indicate the possible combinations, these four configurations should not be 
understood as ranked options.  
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Table 4.1 List of possible gaze configurations at possible sequence completion, their symbolic 
representation, their meaning and examples that show how they work. 
Configuration Symbolic 
Representation6 
Meaning Examples 
1
 or  
Participants not 
looking at each other 
4.1-4.5 
2
 
Both participants 
gaze at each other 
4.6 and 4.7 
3
 or  
Only current speaker 
continues gazing 
while recipient is 
looking away 
4.8 and 4.9 
4
 or  
Only current 
recipient continues 
gazing while speaker 
is looking away 
4.8 and 4.10 
In what follows I will show how participants reach one of these gaze configurations at 
each possible sequence completion; that is, what happens to their gaze orientation before, and 
at, sequence completion. The four possible configurations represent a specific state in a 
specific interactional moment and the way in which participants get there might have 
important consequences in terms of how their gaze behavior is interpreted. Conversation is a 
dynamic process and any picture taken at a specific moment in that process, while valuable 
and crucial for quantification purposes, may also result in an oversimplification of the data. 
By showing how participants achieve these configurations, I hope to capture both the 
systematicity of gaze behavior at sequence completion and the complexity of the 
environment that participants quickly and efficiently navigate in order to implement 
appropriate gaze behavior at the right point in time. 
One way of operationalizing these four possible configurations is distinguishing 
participants not simply in terms of A or B but in terms of their current participation role at the 
time the sequence reaches possible completion: that is, whether they are speaker or recipient 
                                               
6 While there is only one way of looking at one’s face in terms of gaze direction, there are many ways of “not 
looking” at someone, including closing the eyes or looking at some object in the surrounding environment. For 
simplicity, in Table 4.1 I provide only two of the many symbolic representations of “not looking at the other 
participant”. Other ways can be found among the gaze symbols in Appendix B. 
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of the last turn. Indeed, it is clear that these distinct participation statuses offer different 
options for participants in terms of sequence expansion: the current speaker can expand the 
sequence by adding another TCU to her/his turn, while the current recipient can self-select 
and produce a new turn of talk that expands the sequence.  
In all of the examples that will be presented, the sequences will end with gaze 
withdrawal by both participants (or, at least with participants not looking at each other, if 
they withdrew before sequence completion). This provides additional evidence for the claim 
that the function of gaze configuration 1 is bidding for closure. In some examples, multiple 
sequence possible completions will be shown, which means that more than one gaze 
configuration might be implemented by the participants during the course of action presented. 
Before presenting some examples of these four configurations, one final point is in 
order. When participants reach possible completion of a sequence, they might also reach a 
point in which the course of action underway could be considered completed. If, for example, 
someone requests information, once this information is provided the course of action could 
be considered complete (Schegloff, 1968, 2007b). Often the successful completion of a 
course of action entails the occurrence of multiple sequences of talk linked together by the 
more general gist of what the participants are doing together (e.g., booking a flight on the 
phone, Lee, 2008). In addition, there are courses of action that are not continuously sustained 
and can be momentarily abandoned, only to be returned to later in the conversation (e.g., 
instruction giving, gossiping, issuing multiple related requests). If this is the case, one should 
consider each “episode of a course of action” as a place that needs to reach some closure 
before the conversation can move to another episode or to other courses of action. The focus 
of this chapter, then, will be the achievement of closure of “episodes of courses of action”. 
And, these courses of action can have just one episode, clearly delimited as a unit in the 
conversation, or can be constituted by multiple episodes that take place in different moments 
of the conversation.7  
Apart from greetings and farewells, a look at the structure of conversational 
exchanges in face-to-face interaction shows that many other sequences are complete with the 
production of just two turns of talk, one by the initiator of the action and one by the person 
responding to it. And yet, it often happens that the sequence gets expanded. How this 
                                                
7 Notice here that I am treating “episodes of courses of action” as a unique category, whereas Schegloff (2007a, 
2007b) has otherwise divided and labeled these as “base sequence (adjacency pair)s”, “expanded sequences”, 
“sequences of sequences” and “larger threads”. The reason for subsuming them under one label is that 
participants’ gaze behavior seem to treat and contribute to their closure in the same way, without requiring 
further distinction. Evidence for this claim will be provided later in the chapter. 
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happens will be discussed in the following section. A closer look at courses of action that are 
accomplished through only two turns of talk shows something systematic happening around 
their possible completion: participants withdraw their gaze from one another and tend to enter 
silence following turn completion. What follows is usually some engagement in another 
course of action or (re-)engagement in another course of action. 
4.4.1 Configuration 1: Gaze Down at the Possible Completion of a Sequence 
This section shows how configuration 1 in Table 4.1 can be achieved, namely: a course of 
action reaches completion after a SPP and, at possible sequence completion, the participants 
are not looking at each other. It also illustrates how participants’ gaze behavior reveals their 
projection of possible sequence completion and how they interactionally manage the potential 
completion of the sequence. 
The most obvious possible reason why participants are not looking at each other at 
possible sequence completion is that they had already not been looking at each other during 
the sequence. Example 4.1 illustrates a two-turn sequence produced while two young men are 
looking at pictures A took during his holidays. While flipping through them, B sometimes 
stops and asks questions about the pictures. In this excerpt, B asks A about an object in the 
picture and points to it with his index finger.  
(4.1) 2PCOMP-carta 10:17  
01     (1.0) 
                 
02 B:  Cos’e’ quella roba  la’  ((indicando)) 
       What is that  thing there 
      What is that thing there  ((pointing to the picture))    
        
03     (0.6) 
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04 B:  [La carta] 
        The paper 
      [The paper] 
                 
05 A:  [E’ il coso   per la c]arta 
        Is the thing for the paper 
      [It is the thing for the p]aper 
        
06     (0.3)  
07   ((B turns picture album and they start looking at new picture))
        
08     (1.3) 
                     
09 B:  Ma  dove  siete  a  dormire scusa? 
       But where are.2p to sleep   excuse me 
      But where are you sleeping excuse me? 
B’s request for information (line 2) gets answered by A (line 5) at the same time as B offers a 
candidate answer himself. The speaker of the initiating action (B) continues looking at the 
picture for 0.3 seconds after the answer and then shifts his gaze toward the next picture. He 
then asks A the question at line 9 and starts another sequence of talk unrelated to the previous 
one. All of this is done without any gaze between the participants. Indeed, they sustain their 
orientation toward the pictures they are both looking at, and, at possible sequence 
completion, neither participant looks at the other and what follows is a new sequence. 
If participants do not look at each other during the course of a sequence it is not 
surprising that they do not look at each other once that sequence reaches possible completion. 
Example 4.2 shows a case in which participants engage in mutual gaze and withdraw from it 
before reaching possible completion of the sequence, but still at a place in which the possible 
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completion is projectable. The result is that both participants are not looking at each other 
once possible completion is actually reached.  
In the following excerpt, two young men are sitting in B’s room and B is helping A 
prepare for an exam. At the beginning of this fragment, B is looking at a computer screen 
apparently searching for useful information for A. B has just said that the book called 
“Treetti” is useful for one subject that they have to study (radiography), but not for the one 
they have been talking about (ultrasound) (lines 1-2). B then suggests, however, that it is the 
book that they have to use to prepare for the exam (line 8). Our target is the sequence that 
starts at line 6 and ends at line 10. 
(4.2) 2PEXAM-letto 45:49 
01 B:  pero’ il  Treetti va   bene per radiografia.  
       but   the Treetti goes well for radiography 
      but Treetti is good for radiography. 
02     Per ecografia  non dice niente 
       For ultrasound not says nothing 
      Concerning ultrasounds it does not say anything 
03    (0.3) 
       
04 A:  mm 
       mm 
      mm 
       
05    (0.2) 
                      
06 A:  Ma  l’hai      letto tutto il  Treetti¿ 
       But it have.2s read  all   the Treetti 
       But have you read it all the Treetti¿ 
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07    (0.2)     (2.2) 
           (2.4) 
                                                         
08 B:  No   del Treetti devi fare le prime:  Cioe’  le prime pagine 
       No   of  Treetti must do   the first I mean the first pages 
      No  of Treetti you must do the firs:t I mean the first pages 
                                       
09     che  poi  sono (1.0) (0.6)   (0.2) quelle che: son 
       that then are                       those  that are 
       that then are        (1.8)         those tha:t are 
                      
10     schematizzate  sugli appunti di Marini. 
       schematized    on the notes of Marini 
      schematized on Marini’s notes. 
        
11     (7.0) 
12 B:  Pero’   cioe’  e’ bella radiografia. 
       However I mean is nice  radiography 
       However I mean radiography is nice.  
A’s question at line 6 is topically coherent with B’s prior talk but constitutes a new sequence 
given that it is an indirect question about how much of the book should be studied. The 
occasion for their meeting, and the general activity they are involved in (exam preparation) 
are the background for understanding B’s answer to A’s question and why this is not treated 
as problematic. B does not treat A’s turn at line 6 as a request about how B knows about the 
information he just provided about radiography and ultrasound, but rather as a return to 
business and, as such, as a request for relevant information in terms of preparing for the 
exam.  
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The participants are not looking at each other during B’s production of the request for 
information at line 6, but B turns toward the recipient during the silence, after it is clear that 
the answer will not be provided promptly. During the silence at line 7, B looks at the 
recipient to pursue uptake (see chapter 3). B’s response at line 8 is type conforming in its 
beginning (i.e., he answers ‘no’) (Raymond, 2003) but it is also dispreferred. At the same 
time, a simple “yes” or “no” by B would not display appropriate recognition and 
understanding of the action line 6 implements. A does not look away after the “no”8 but 
rather keeps looking until the initiation of self-repair at line 8 “I mean”. The turn at line 8 is 
syntactically possibly complete after “pages”, though pragmatically saying that A has to 
study only the first pages of the book is not really helpful unless the specific pages are 
specified. Mutual gaze occurs when the most important information of the turn is delivered: 
the pages to be studied are those presented in the schema in the professor’s notes. Once this 
information is underway, both participants withdraw from mutual gaze before B utters the 
last few words of the turn (Marini’s notes), yet when those last words are easily projectable 
by A. Marini is the name of the professor who teaches the course A has to prepare the exam 
for. By the time he hears “the first pages, that are the ones that are schematized” he can 
recognize the reference by B, which in this case can only be the professor’s notes. The 
speaker of the sequence initiating turn is the first to look away and the other immediately 
follows. They both look away before reaching the actual completion of the turn but at a place 
in which the point of completion is projectable. In this example, then, we see that both 
participants are looking away before reaching possible completion of the sequence and what 
follows is not an expansion of the sequence but rather a long silence and then a completely 
different sequence. 
Example 4.3 shows a sequence in which the participants do not look at each other 
during the sequence initiating turn and they engage in mutual gaze only in the responsive 
turn. Indeed, the last person looking withdraws her gaze exactly at sequence possible 
completion and they enter a silence until a new course of action begins. In this excerpt, two 
participants co-complain and then visually display to each other that the sequence is 
complete. The participants are sitting facing each other and they have been studying together 
for a while. A few minutes earlier B asked A to stop studying for the day because she has a 
                                                
8 It will later be shown that if the sequence initiating action is simply a request for confirmation, then the 
speaker who sought confirmation will systematically look away after obtaining a confirming answer. In this 
case, the answer is disconfirming and the turn at line 6 is not a request for confirmation but rather a request for 
information. The participants’ gaze behavior, then, conforms to the action implemented and to the relevance of 
further explanation by the current speaker. 
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headache. Before the beginning of this fragment, the two of them were joking about what A 
has done while B was on the phone with her mother. The target sequence is the one between 
lines 9 and 11. 
(4.3) 2GSTUDYING-testa  29:07  
01 B:  hh [  ha                 ha   ] 
       hh [  ha                 ha   ] 
02 A:     [Q(h)uello che  devi    leg]gere  
           That      that must.2s read 
         [You have to re]ad  
03     (0.4) 
04 A:  hh hu 
       hh hu 
05     (0.9) 
06 B:  .hhh 
       .hhh 
07     (0.7) 
           
08 B:  Okay quindi   (0.3) 
       Okay therefore 
      Okay therefore (0.3) 
                                      
09 A:  .h No io veramente son scarburatissima ho      un mal di testa  
          No I  really    am  out of steam    have.1s a  bad of head    
      .h No I am really out of steam I have a headache    
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10     anch'io 
       also I 
      as well 
                 
11 B:  Anch'io c' ho      mal di testa 
       Also I  cl have.1s bad of head 
      I have a headache too 
              
12         (1.1)       (0.3) 
                 (1.4) 
                                         
13 A:  Poi  ho      detto sara'   il raffreddore sara': il-  
       Then have.1s said  will be the cold       will   the 
Then I said it will be the cold it will be: th-
            
14     i   postumi dell'influenza, (0.5)  
       the effects of   flu               
      the side effects of the flu, (0.5) 
At line 8 B responds to the joke initiated by A before the beginning of this extract. The turn 
at line 9 starts with an inbreath and a “joke-to-serious” ‘no’ (Schegloff, 2001), which marks 
the upcoming talk as not part of the joke but rather as something serious. A continues the turn 
by producing two complaints about how she feels, and B responds to the second one. Then 
silence follows, and the sequence could be complete at this point. At line 13, however, A 
starts a telling about what she thought could have been the cause of her not feeling well.  
Focusing on lines 9-10, we see that the recipient, B, is not looking at the speaker 
during the two complaints and only begins to turn after the TRP at line 9 “mal di testa” 
(headache) and immediately before responding at line 11. During the responsive turn at line 
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11, the recipient, A, looks at the speaker, B, for most of the time and closes her eyes only 
when the trajectory of the turn is clearly projectable (the speaker repeats the same words used
by A during the second complaint). The current speaker, B, is the last one who looks away 
and she does so as soon as she completes the last word of her turn. Similar to the previous 
examples, the participants are not looking at each other once the possible completion of the 
sequence has been reached and the sequence is not expanded. Also, as in the previous 
example (4.2), the gaze withdrawal is not simultaneous but rather serial: first, the speaker of 
the sequence initiating turn withdraws gaze, then the recipient of that turn does so. 
In example 4.3 a bit of silence follows the completion of the sequence and only later 
talk is resumed. If the sequence is not produced as a completely new course of action but 
rather as a side sequence, what usually follows the completion of the sequence is not a lapse, 
but rather a resumption of the previous course of action. The next example (4.4) shows how 
participants coordinate their gaze withdrawal approaching the possible completion of a side 
sequence. In this example, two girls are chatting while sitting at a table before going out for a 
drink. They have not seen each other for a few weeks and are catching up. Before the 
beginning of this fragment, B, who is visiting A, counters A’s prior statement about the 
sports at the Olympic games (i.e., that they are boring and the sports all look the same).  The 
sequence gets derailed by a change in A’s posture that attracts B’s attention. B asks whether 
A is trying to do some “zen” and they laugh about it, especially when A makes explicit that 
she doesn’t even know what “doing zen” means. The excerpt begins with A’s turn at line 9, 
which follows laughter by both participants. Notice the pattern of gaze behavior at lines 10 
and 11 and what happens at the possible completion of the sequence at line 11. 
(4.4) 2GC-zen 30:08 
                  
09 A:  (Tu  non s(h)ai) zen.  [(my) zen 
        You not know.1s zen    my   zen 
      (you don’t k(h)now) zen. [(my) zen 
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10 B:                          [Mi   fai    finire¿ 
                                Me   make.2s finish 
                              [Do you let me finish¿ 
        
11 A:  S c u s a h= 
       Sorry 
      Sorry h= 
                                                         
12 B:   =hhu allora ginnastica ritmica sono tutti diversi,  basket  
             alright gymnastice rytmic are  all   different basketball 
       =hhu well then gymnastics they are all different, basketball 
                                  
13      cosa e’ tutto uguale¿ E’ una partita di basket.    Pallavolo 
        what is all   same    Is a   game    of basketball Volleyball 
       what is all the same¿ It is a basketball game. Volleyball 
At line 10 B sanctions A for not letting her continue talking about the Olympic games. A 
offers an appropriate response at line 11 by apologizing, which demonstrates recognition of 
the action performed by B’s talk as a rebuke. The apology is followed by a minimal laugh 
token and B reciprocates this laughter by producing a laugh token at the beginning of her talk 
(line 12). The laugh tokens arguably display A’s and B’s stance toward B’s possibly 
confrontational move (i.e., the sanction). Specifically, both of them seem to treat it as non-
serious, mitigating the possibility of further conflict. Thus, it becomes a meta-comment about 
the prior sequence.  
The course of action (sanction-apology) is complete after “scusa” (line 11), and we 
see again a correspondence between the completion of the sequence and gaze withdrawal by 
both participants. At the beginning of the sanction, A and B engage in mutual gaze, which 
extends through the TRP at the end of B’s rebuke. During the last syllable of “scusa” (sorry), 
B lowers her gaze and looks down at the table. Immediately after this move by B, A lowers 
her gaze too, and this occurs in the TRP during the laugh token. In this example, the 
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withdrawal of gaze does not lead to a lapse, but instead to a re-engagement into a larger 
course of action that had been momentarily suspended. Still, the gaze withdrawal occurs at 
sequence possible completion and the side sequence is indeed treated as complete.  
In example 4.3, silence follows the completion of the sequence and a completely new 
course of action is produced next. Example 4.4, instead, shows a side sequence at which 
completion participants re-engage the previously interrupted course of action. The following 
example (4.5) shows that participants can withdraw their gaze from the other at sequence 
completion, though the current speaker adds a TCU to the turn that is topically related but not 
action-related to the sequence just completed. The participants in example 4.5 are the same as 
in example 4.3, though in this excerpt they are talking about their friends. B has just finished 
her glass of iced tea while A is telling a story. At line 2, B makes explicit her desire to get 
another glass (the bottle is sitting in between A and B on the floor). The target sequence for 
the relevant gaze behavior is between lines 5 and 7.  
(4.5) 2GSTUDYING-vuoi 36:28 
01 A:  E’ un trattore che  ti  passa   so[pra] 
       Is a  tractor  that you pass.3s above 
      (She) is a tractor that runs ov[er you 
                                                 
02 B:                                    [Ne] vorrei un altro po’ 
                                          It want.1s a  other bit 
    I would like another bit of [it] 
      
03    (0.3) 
          
04 A:  Pr[ego  prego] 
       Please  please 
      Pl[ease please] ((please go ahead and help yourself)) 
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05 B:   [Tu lo vuo]i? 
         you it want 
       [Do you wan]t it? 
        
06    (0.1)   (0.1) 
         (0.2) 
                           
07 A:  hh No grazie °Bevi     pur te° 
          No thanks drink.2s     you 
      hh No thanks °Please drink° 
       
08    (0.7) 
                                 
09 A:  tlk! E  nel senso che  tipo quando io mi son lasciata con  Marco 
           And in  sense that like when   I  me   left.1s    with Marco 
      tlk! And meaning that like when I broke up with Marco 
At line 2, B requests more iced tea and at line 4, A grants permission for her to help herself. 
During the silence at line 3, B lowers her head and torso by moving toward the bottle of tea 
on the floor and looks in that direction. The turn at line 4 is overlapped by the offer at line 5 
during which A looks at the speaker. During the following silence, A looks away while B 
starts looking up toward her and they never engage in mutual gaze. A rejects the offer at line 
7 orienting first toward the format of the prior turn (as a question making relevant a response) 
and then to the action (an offer) it is a vehicle for (noyes-no question but also declining the 
offer, thanksoffer) (Schegloff, 1984, 1995, 2007b). At this point the offer sequence is 
possibly complete and indeed the recipient of the last turn (B) turns her head toward the right, 
looks away and picks up the bottle of tea. The lifting of the bottle of tea co-occurs with the 
TCU produced with soft voice that A adds to her turn: “bevi pur tu” (please you drink). The 
fact that it is produced sotto voce, and that it is again a go-ahead for B who is already picking 
up the bottle, makes the turn either redundant or potentially a re-doing of line 4 (which had 
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been produced in overlap). Given that A is the host and B the guest, the TCU produced sotto 
voce saying “bevi pur te” might be a way of enacting being a proper host by insisting that the 
guest goes ahead and helps herself with the tea. By the time the offer is rejected, both 
participants are looking away and what follows is an invitation to proceed with the drinking. 
At possible sequence completion, then, both participants are looking away from each other 
and the offer sequence is complete. In this specific case what follows is not immediate re-
engagement into the story telling that had been interrupted by the side sequence, but rather a 
redoing of the granting of the request (line 7), that had been previously overlapped (line 4). 
Then a bit of silence follows and the story telling is resumed. 
The five examples here presented have in common that when the sequence reaches 
sequence possible completion, neither participant is looking at the other and what follows is 
not an expansion of that sequence but rather a new course of action or the resumption of a 
course of action that had been interrupted by the very occurrence of the target sequence. As 
has been shown, the way in which participants get there can differ. Later in the chapter I 
address the issue of who usually initiates the withdrawal and why this does not occur 
simultaneously by both participants. For the moment, the evidence presented shows that 
when both participants coordinate their gaze behavior so that neither is looking at the other at 
sequence possible completion, both parties treat the sequence as complete. I now provide 
additional evidence for this claim by presenting examples of what happens when participants 
keep looking at each other at possible sequential endings. 
 
4.4.2 Configuration 2: Gaze Up by Both Participants at Possible Completion of 
a Sequence 
 
The previous section showed that when two-turn sequences do not get expanded, 
either before or at possible sequence completion, both participants withdraw from looking at 
each other. The claim is that looking away before or at completion of a responsive turn 
displays an orientation toward the possible completeness of the sequence and therefore 
constitutes a bid for closing the sequence. If this claim is correct, then two patterns of 
behavior should be observable:  
 
1. If participants continue looking at each other at possible sequence 
completion then the sequence gets expanded; 
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2. when an expanded sequence finally reaches completion, we should still see 
that participants withdraw their gaze by the time of actual sequence 
completion. 
The following cases exemplify these patterns and the second gaze configuration: both 
participants keep looking at each other. In example 4.6, the participants are looking at 
pictures together and at the beginning of this fragment they are looking at a picture of the 
dome of St. Peter’s church in Rome. The target here is the gaze behavior at possible sequence 
completion at lines 12, 13 and at the end of line 14. 
(4.6) 2PCOMP-pagato 9:33  
         
08      (1.0) 
                                
09 B:  Soccia quanto   hai pagato per entrar qua.  
       Wow    how much have paid  for enter  here 
       Wow how much did you pay to enter here.  
10     (0.2)     
        
11 B:   Die[ci  
        Ten 
        Te[n 
                          
12 A:      [Poco.  °Un euro. Due euro neanche 
            Little. One euro two euro neither 
          [Little.° One euro. Not even two euros 
       
13     (.) 
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been produced in overlap). Given that A is the host and B the guest, the TCU produced sotto 
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14 B:  Ah    beh 
       Oh    well 
      Oh    well 
       
15    (1.9) 
At the beginning of this extract, both participants are oriented toward the pictures on the table 
(see line 8). At line 9, B first produces an appreciative outloud (Goffman, 1981c) “soccia” 
(wow), most likely about what he is seeing in the picture (the dome of St. Peter’s church in 
Rome). Then he asks how much it costs to visit the church. However, the recipient does not 
look at the speaker at all during this turn. While producing the beginning of it, the speaker 
shifts his gaze and head orientation from the pictures to A. At line 9, B turns his head and 
looks at A while A continues looking at the picture through the following silence and only 
looks at B when he begins to answer at line 12. Similarly to example 4.2, here too the answer 
is further refined during its delivery (it goes from “little” to “one euro” to “not even two 
euros”) and the participants sustain mutual gaze throughout the turn. The first point of 
possible completion is after “poco” (little)9 and the second one after the next bit “1 euro”. 
The participants keep looking at each other after both of these. Speaker A adds another TCU 
to his turn, which becomes the next point of sequence possible completion (not even two 
euros) and still the participants sustain the mutual gaze. They keep looking at each other also 
during the following silence until B starts line 14 that constitutes a sequence closing third 
turn (Schegloff, 2007b), the most minimal expansion of a sequence. During the turn at line 
14, the first person to look away is the person who started the sequence at line 9 and then A 
looks away immediately afterwards, at turn completion and they re-engage the activity that 
had been momentarily interrupted (looking at pictures). As was the case in the previous 
examples, the gaze withdrawal is not simultaneous and the first person who withdraws from 
mutual gaze is the person who started the sequence and the other immediately follows, 
thereby treating the sequence as complete. 
9 Like example 4.2, pragmatically it is not particularly informative to respond with “little” to a question asking 
“how much”. However, the out-loud and the question at line 9 may indicate an expectation of an answer such as 
“a lot of money”. If this is the case, then “little” is potentially sufficient to counter the assumption that seems to 
be built into the question. The fact that A produces a more specific answer, on the other hand, suggests that 
either he is treating the first TCU of his turn as not adequately informative or he is unsure and therefore deals 
with both possibilities. 
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Example 4.7 shows a similar pattern of participants’ sustained gaze followed by gaze 
withdrawal before completion, only in this case, one participant looks away before 
approaching possible completion and the other waits to withdraw until the last syllable of the 
last word of the turn. Moreover, this sequence is expanded twice before it is actually treated 
as complete. Before entering the 15-seconds lapse (line 1), the participants were discussing 
the location of a cinema and the fact that this was news for A. During the lapse, both A and B 
re-engaged eating, the other ongoing activity. They did not look at each other during this 
silence and instead remained oriented toward their dishes until 0.6 seconds before B starts 
speaking. B looks at A before speaking and continues looking at him into her turn. The focus 
here is the participants’ gaze behavior at the end of the turns at lines 4, 6 and 8. 
(4.7) 2PLUNCH1-lezione 4:28   
                     
01    (14.4)    (0.6)
           (15.0) 
               
02 B:  Che     lezione  hai 
       Which   lesson   have   
Which lesson do you have
          
03      (0.3)  (0.5) 
            (0.8) 
              
04 A:    tch!   (0.3)  Trigonometria 
Trigonometry  
        tch!   (0.3)  Trigonometry     
    
         
05      (0.7) 
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06 B:  Che palle. 
       That balls 
      How boring. 
         
07      (0.9)    
                                                               
08 A:  Laboratorio.=  E’ l’ultima volta prima dell’esame. 
       Laboratory     Is the last time  before the exam 
       Laboratory.=It is the last time before the exam. 
         
09       (3.5) 
               
10 B:  E   l’esame   cos’e’? 
       And the exam  what is it 
      And what is the exam about? 
While B inquires about a lesson A has to attend in the afternoon, A wipes his lips with a 
napkin. Before answering, he puts down the napkin while gazing at B. Then, he turns to the 
right averting her gaze, produces a click sound (tch!) while apparently cleaning his teeth with 
his tongue and then turns back to her and answers the question: “Trigonometry”. At the end 
of line 4, the sequence is possibly complete but both participants sustain mutual gaze. A then 
moves his right hand toward his glass on the table and B continues taking a bite of bread. If 
the sequence were complete, it would be possible for them to just do these actions, withdraw 
from mutual gaze and fully orient toward these competing activities. However this is not 
what happens. During the silence at line 5 B chews his food and then offers a third position 
assessment of A’s response: “Che palle” (How boring). Thus, at a possible sequence 
boundary participants are in mutual gaze and one expands the sequence with a minimal post-
expansion. At the end of line 6, the sequence again reaches possible completion. However, at 
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that point, and during the silence at line 7, B and A again sustain mutual gaze and what 
follows is another expansion of the sequence, this time by A.  
During the sustained mutual gaze across the silence at line 7, A brings a glass of water 
toward his mouth. At this point, he could be drinking, and therefore display that he cannot, at 
least not in that moment, produce further talk, or he could hold the glass and say something 
else. This sustained gaze displays an orientation toward the sequence as not yet complete and 
invites sequence expansion by the other participant. Moreover, B’s assessment at line 6 is a 
negative one and invites a second assessment that affiliates or disaffiliates with it (Pomerantz, 
1984a). At that point, A does not lower the glass nor does he start drinking; instead, he holds 
it just in front of his face and produces the two TCUs at line 8.  Both TCUs account for the 
fact that he has to go to this class. The first TCU (“laboratorio”, laboratory) refines the 
responsive turn at line 4, in the sense that it further specifies what the lesson will be about, 
but both TCUs deal with the assessment produced by B. They appear to be either a way of 
disaffiliating with the idea that the lesson is going to be boring or a way of justifying his 
going, even if it is boring.10  
At the end of the turn at line 8, the sequence is yet again possibly complete. Both 
participants have withdrawn from looking at each other; A starts drinking and what follows is 
a lapse of 3.5 seconds and then a question that initiates a new sequence. The silence at line 9 
differs from the previous silences in the sequence in that neither participant is looking at the 
other nor at a common object. Rather, both look toward the next relevant object that can also 
stand for the next relevant activity: A looks at the glass and starts drinking. B looks down at 
her plate and puts the fork with the food into her mouth. In this example, at different points of 
possible completion of the sequence, the participants continue looking at each other, and 
what follows is not a new sequence, but an expansion of the current sequence. In this way, 
the participants display an understanding of the interactional project as not being over until 
the completion of A’s turn at line 8, when both participants have finally withdrawn from 
looking at the other. 
Contrary to what we observed in all of the previous examples, in this case the speaker 
of the current turn (recipient of the sequence initiating turn) withdraws his gaze after the first 
                                                
10 A piece of data from the same interaction shows that the latter is the best explanation for A’s turn at line 8. 
Approximately 30 minutes after this fragment, when A is preparing to leave, he says that he does not feel like 
going to class and B immediately suggests he does not go and stays with her. A’s response is that B should 
convince him to go and not insist that he does not go to class. This explains what could have driven A in 
responding with the turn at line 8 rather than with an assessment: pre-empting a recognizable course of action 
(i.e., B’s attempt to convince A not to go to class and stay with her instead). 
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TCU, while the recipient withdraws her gaze later, on the last syllable of the last word of the 
turn. We will later see in which cases it tends to happen that the recipient of the sequence 
initiating turn is the first to withdraw gaze (usually in the case of disagreements or when a 
participant wants to end the course of action unilaterally).  
The two examples presented in this section provide further evidence for the claim 
that, by withdrawing their gaze from the other participant before possible sequence 
completion, interactants treat the sequence as complete. Specifically, we saw that if 
interlocutors continue looking at each other at possible sequence completion, the sequence 
typically gets expanded. 
 
4.4.3 Configurations 3 & 4: Gaze Up By One Participant at Possible Sequence 
Completion 
 
As indicated in § 4.4, in addition to the two possible configurations previously 
discussed, in which both participants do the same thing (i.e., both withdraw from looking 
toward the other or both maintain looking toward the other), it is possible that only one of the 
two participants continues looking while the other has already looked down or away once 
possible completion of the sequence is reached. In what follows, I show examples of these 
gaze configurations (3 and 4, respectively). Here we ask whether sequence expansion occurs 
only when both interactants treat a sequence as incomplete or whether one interactant is 
sufficient. 
If just one participant shows an orientation to the sequence as not yet over, the 
sequence normally gets expanded. Example 4.8 shows that mutual gaze is not required for the 
occurrence of sequence expansion and it shows examples of configurations 3 and 4. Here a 
multi-unit turn is in progress. The sequence in question is a departure from this turn-in-
progress [an “oblique sequence” (Koenig, 2007)] that could potentially derail the 
development of the multi-unit turn. At line 1, A is explaining to B how to prepare a pasta 
recipe and how much pasta he will need. Lines 1 and 2 are part of the multi-unit turn that 
constitutes A’s explanation. Our target is the gaze behavior between lines 3 and 9. 
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(4.8) 2PPLAN-settanta 10:10   
01 A:  beh  vabbe’  in quaranta sono poi quattro kili  
       well alright in forty    are  then four   kilos 
      well alright for forty ((people) it is then four kilos 
02     di pasta non e’ che siano p::oi tan[ti 
       of pasta not is that are  then  many 
      of pasta which is not then so:: mu[ch 
                                                           
03 B:                                    [°Quanti erano quand’eravamo 
                                           How many were when were.1p 
                                        [°How many were when we were 
                                                           
04     via  eran    di piu’? Settanta sessanta [settanta persone°] 
       away were.3p of more  seventy  sixty     seventy  people 
away there were more? Seventy sixty [seventy people°]
                                                    
05 A:                                         [Erano sessant:otto]  
                                               Were.3p sixty-eight 
                                             [There were sixty:eight] 
         
06     mi sembr[a  
       me seem.3s 
      it seem[s to me 
             
07 B:         [mm 
               mm 
              [mm      
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08    (0.3)   (0.1) 
          (0.4) 
           
09 A: °Sessanta intorno° 
       Sixty    around 
      °About sixty° 
       
10    (0.6) 
                                             
11 A: E::::  (0.6)  (2.2) non so      quanto   sia utile  perche’  
      An:::d              not know.1s how much is  useful because 
      An:::d (2.8) I don’t know how much is useful because 
12    non ho      mai fatto altrimenti pero’ loro ci mettevano: 
      not have.1s ever made otherwise  but   they cl. put.3p 
     I have never done it differently but they were puttin:g 
At lines 3-4 B starts an oblique sequence, asking how many people were present at the scout 
camp in which A and B worked together in the kitchen. B provides a candidate answer to his 
own question, and then at line 5, A answers. At the end of line 5 the sequence is possibly 
complete, although B continues looking at A and A looks back at him while adding “mi 
sembra” (it seems to me). On the last sound of “sembra” and while producing the 
acknowledgment token at line 7, B, the speaker of the sequence initiating turn, closes his eyes 
while A keeps looking at him.  
Again, at the end of line 6 (and 7, given that they overlap) the sequence could be 
possibly complete but one participant, A, continues looking at the other. During the silence at 
line 8, B looks again at A, who adds, with soft voice, an alternative SPP to the one he 
produced at line 5. At the end of “sessanta” (sixty), A, the current speaker, looks down 
toward the menu he has on the table, while the recipient, B, looks away only at the 
completion of the turn. During the silence at line 10, both participants are looking away from 
each other (A toward the menu and B downward as he bites his nails). Subsequently, A 
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resumes his multi-unit turn starting with the conjunction “e” (and) and resetting the pitch to 
the level he had at the end of line 2 (see e.g. Couper-Kuhlen 2004 on the function of pitch 
reset). Two things should be noted about this example:  
1) at possible completion of the sequence only one person sustains gaze, and, in this 
case, it is the same individual who adds a turn to the sequence (A);  
2) even in the case of obliques, participants seem to orient to the possible completion 
of the sequence by withdrawing their gaze (in this case, B does it twice) only to look 
up again once the extended telling is resumed (see chapter 2). 
Example 4.9 shows a case in which the speaker of the SPP continues looking at the 
other participant once possible sequence completion has been reached and the sequence gets 
expanded (gaze configuration 3). The participants are sitting facing each other and A, the 
host, has just sanctioned B for leaving possible stains on the tablecloth. At line 1, B provides 
an account in response to the sanctioning and line 3 is another sanction, this time for shaking 
the knife. The target is the sequence at lines 5-8 and in particular the gaze behavior at 
completion of the turn at line 6. 
(4.9) 2GC-paura 30:44   
01 B:  Appunto non te  la voglio  sporcare allora tiro    su cosi’
       Indeed  not you it want.1s stain    so     pick.1s up so 
      Indeed I do not want to stain it so I pick it up like this 
02    (0.3) 
                      
03 A:  Si’  no non agitare il  coltello 
       Yes  no not shake   the knife 
Yes  no do not shake the knife
          
04    (0.3)   (0.6) 
          (0.9) 
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08    (0.3)   (0.1) 
          (0.4) 
           
09 A: °Sessanta intorno° 
       Sixty    around 
      °About sixty° 
       
10    (0.6) 
                                             
11 A: E::::  (0.6)  (2.2) non so      quanto   sia utile  perche’  
      An:::d              not know.1s how much is  useful because 
      An:::d (2.8) I don’t know how much is useful because 
12    non ho      mai fatto altrimenti pero’ loro ci mettevano: 
      not have.1s ever made otherwise  but   they cl. put.3p 
     I have never done it differently but they were puttin:g 
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each other (A toward the menu and B downward as he bites his nails). Subsequently, A 
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05 B:  Hai     p(h)aura che  te  lo [lanci] 
       Have.2s fear     that you it  throw 
       Are you af(h)raid that I will [throw] it to you 
                                      
06 A:                              [hh s(h)i’] ((annuendo)) 
                                    hh yes 
                                   [hh y(h)es] ((nodding)) 
               
07 B:  °Senti  sta s c[(h)e m]a°  
        Listen this idiot 
      °Listen to this id[(h)io]t° 
                    
08 A:              [tzac] ((facendo gesto di tagliare)) 
                    tzac 
                  [tzac] (( doing gesture of cutting)) 
       
09    (0.4) 
                                                              
10 A:  .hh ↑Beh   insomma e   quindi    dopo un po’ mi annoio 
            Well  so      and therefore after a bit me bore.1s 
       .hh ↑Well  so and therefore after a bit I get bored 
A is looking at the knife B is holding in her hand while she sanctions B at line 3. A keeps 
looking at the knife during the first part of the silence, and only looks up toward B, smiling, 
after 0.3 seconds. At line 5, B teases A and produces the question with a smile and a laugh 
token. A responds with laughter, a nod and “yes” (which deals with the question format of 
the previous turn). At this point, the sequence is possibly complete, but A, the speaker of the 
responsive turn, continues looking at B. B produces a negative assessment (joking) with soft 
smiley voice while A mimics the act of cutting with a knife and produces the sound at line 8. 
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At the completion of B’s turn at line 7 A looks down and then looks at her right wrist (see 
line 9) until she resumes the topic of how much she does not like watching sports on TV, 
which was the topic of the conversation between A and B before A sanctioned B for leaving 
stains on the table cloth. The resumption of the prior topic is marked by a pitch reset which, 
like in example 4.8, marks the difference with the talk just concluded (Couper-Kuhlen 2004). 
In this example, we see again that at possible completion of a sequence (line 6), when the 
current speaker continues looking at the addressee, the sequence gets expanded. At the same 
time, the same participant (at this point the recipient) looks away by the time the sequence 
reaches next possible completion (line 7) and what follows is resumption of a previous course 
of action as opposed to more talk regarding the same sequence. 
Example 4.10 shows what happens if only the recipient of the turn that brought the 
sequence to possible completion keeps looking at the other participant once possible 
completion is reached (gaze configuration 4): namely, the sequence gets expanded. Here, the 
participants resume talking about the exam that A has to take soon. In example 4.7, which 
occurred approximately 1 minute earlier, B had asked about the lecture that A has to attend in 
the afternoon. During the silence at line 1, both participants are oriented toward their dish and 
are eating. Lines 2 and 3 are produced while both participants maintain the orientation toward
their food. Our target is the gaze behavior during the sequence that starts at line 3 and ends at 
line 14. 
(4.10) 2PLUNCH1-esame 5:22      
01    (4.5) 
                
02 A:  No appunto quindi [e::] 
       No indeed  so     an::d 
      No   indeed   so [an::d]  
                               
03 B:                    [L’es]ame e’ scritto, 
                          The exam is written 
 [The e]xam is written,   
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04    (.) 
         
05 A:  Scritto.   Si’.  
       Written    Yes 
      Written.   Yes. 
     
06    (.) 
                                   
07 A:  °Cioe’  scritto, sul    fogli[o.° 
        I mean written  on the paper 
      °I mean written, on the pape[r.°       
                                                                   
08 B:                            [Non e’ in laboratorio, 
                                  Not is in laboratory 
                                 [It is not in the laboratory, 
        
09      (0.5) 
                                        
10 A:  E’ in laboratorio ma  devi    usare il computer  
       Is in laboratory  but must.2s use   the pc 
      It is in the laboratory but you have to use the pc 
      
11     (.)  
                
12   ((B frowns her eyebrows see Fig. 4.1))  
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Figure 4.1. B frowning. 
                                                    
13 A:  Pero’ utilizzi il computer non per fare l’esame  
       But   use.2s   the pc      not to  do   the exam 
      But you use the pc not to do the exam 
                                                               
14     ma  per tirarti giu’ per fare i   calcoli      sostanzialmente 
       but to  take    down to  make the calculations essentially 
      but to take down to make the calculations essentially 
        
15     (11.0) 
16 B:  hm, ieri      sera    hai     parlato con  il  prof:  
       hm  yesterday evening have.2s talked  with the professor 
       hm, yesterday evening did you talk to the professor: 
17     (0.8) giovanissimo¿ 
             very young 
      (0.8) very young¿  ((the very young professor)) 
At line 3 B interrupts A’s turn and requests confirmation regarding the exam’s format. This is 
a sequence initiating turn that A first confirms with a non type-conforming answer at line 5 
(written), followed by a type-conforming one (“si’”). Focusing on the participants gaze 
behavior, we can see that B looks up toward A at the end of the word “scritto” (written) and 
keeps looking at B after the completion of the next TCU and into the following silence. 
Therefore, it is the recipient of the SPP at line 5 (“written yes”) who continues looking at the 
other’s face at possible completion of the sequence and engenders sequence expansion. First, 
we see that A also looks up and adds a TCU at line 7 (“I mean written on the paper”) that 
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other’s face at possible completion of the sequence and engenders sequence expansion. First, 
we see that A also looks up and adds a TCU at line 7 (“I mean written on the paper”) that 
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clarifies his response. At completion of this TCU, B continues looking at A and starts a next 
turn at line 8 that continues asking about the exam format. Again, possible sequence 
completion at the end of line 7 is passed with the recipient of that turn continuing to look at 
the current speaker. The FPP of a post-expansion (line 8) produces a candidate understanding 
about the exam not being in the laboratory, and at line 10 disconfirms it, indicating that it will 
be in the laboratory. B continues looking at A during the gap at line 9 and during line 10, 
where A looks up toward B as well so that they engage in mutual gaze. This means that at 
completion of line 10, which is yet another possible sequence completion point, the 
participants continue looking at each other. As we can see, the sequence is expanded yet 
again. At line 12, B furrows her eyebrows producing a facial expression comparable to a 
verbal repair initiation (by displaying a problem in understanding it seems to invite further 
clarification). At lines 13-14 A clarifies his previous utterance and again brings the sequence 
to possible completion. The last participant who looks away is the current speaker, A (who 
was the recipient of the sequence initiating turn), and he does so on the word “calcoli” 
(calculation) which represents the first projectable sequence completion in the turn. The 
following word, indeed, mitigates the idea that during the exam the only thing computer’s 
could be used for is “to make the calculations” by saying “essentially”. So we see that by the 
time the participants reach the next possible sequence completion both of them have 
withdrawn their gaze and what follows is a long lapse during which participants re-engage 
eating. At line 16, B starts a completely new sequence and course of action and asks A about 
what he did the previous evening at the end of a lesson he attended.  
To sum up, in this example there are multiple possible completion points for the 
sequence: at line 5; at line 7; at line 10; and at line 14. However the sequence is only actually 
completed at the end of the turn at line 14. In terms of gaze behavior, we can see that while at 
line 5 and 7 B kept looking at A, and at the end of line 10 both participants kept looking at 
the other, at line 14 both participants have withdrawn their gaze before reaching actual 
completion and what follows is a lapse and then a new course of action. 
In this section I have outlined how the gaze behavior of one participant treats the 
sequence as not yet complete and usually engenders sequence expansion. By the time both 
participants withdraw their gaze approaching or at the next point of possible completion of 
the sequence, the sequence is treated as complete. 
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4.5 Gaze Behavior’s Relationship To Courses of Action 
 
Example 4.10 showed us something very important: in terms of gaze behavior, 
participants treat the completion of a sequence in a “sequence of sequences” (Schegloff, 
2007b) or of the first sequence of a topic proffering as a sequence requiring expansion. 
Indeed, in such cases participants continue looking at each other, therefore orienting toward 
the relevance of producing additional related talk. If this holds for other cases, it might tell us 
something about the similarities between a course of action realized through a single 
sequence and a course of action realized through multiple sequences. In this section, I further 
investigate this issue. 
The sequential organization of talk allows the interactive accomplishment of action in 
interaction. We know that a base adjacency pair develops when participants attempt to 
perform some action and we know that such a pair can be repeatedly expanded and still 
understood as one course of action. However, Schegloff (2007b: 195) stresses the following 
point: 
 
Although successive sequences may often be less closely linked than 
successive turns are, there can be particular ties of relevance between 
several sequences that serve to extend our sense of coherence and 
organizational relatedness of a stretch of talk beyond the boundaries 
of a single base sequence and its expansions.  
 
These successive sequences can be deployed to perform a course of action that requires the 
accomplishment of many specific steps before reaching actual completion.  
In the same way in which I argued against the idea of gaze being simply related to the 
organization of turn-taking, I would like here to argue against the idea of gaze as simply 
organized around sequences. Instead, I suggest that what drives participant’s gaze behavior is 
their understanding and recognition of action in interaction. Given that each sequence can be 
used to accomplish action in interaction, a completion of a sequence often ends up also 
constituting the completion of the course of action the participants were involved in. Notice 
that the completion of a sequence also constitutes the possible completion of a turn, the 
completion of a TCU, the completion of a word, the completion of a syllable, etc. Of all the 
things that reach completion I will focus here on places where a difference between 
completion of a single sequence and completion of a course of action can be observed. As 
mentioned in § 4.4, I am particularly concerned with the completion of “episodes of courses 
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of action”, which can be distinguished by their contiguity in the conversation. As Schegloff  
(2007b) pointed out, there are stretches of talk in which the completion of a sequence does 
not represent the completion of the larger recognizable course of action. If we want to be able 
to distinguish between sequences and courses of action in terms of what is driving the gaze 
withdrawal of the participants, then we should analyze what happens to gaze in these 
sequences of sequences. 
In what follows, three types of evidence will be provided in support of the claim that 
gaze is organized by reference to the courses of action participants produce and not just to 
sequences of talk: 
 
1) Participants do not treat the completion of each sequence as a point of actual 
completion if it is a part of a recognizable larger course of action. Instead, participants 
sustain an orientation toward the other participant’s face that displays an 
understanding that the course of action is still ongoing. Once the course of action 
reaches possible completion, both participants withdraw from looking at each other 
and the course of action is normally treated as complete. 
2) If one participant looks at the other while trying to accomplish a course of action, 
once this course of action is clearly no longer accomplishable or is neglected by the 
other participant, the first participant withdraws her/his gaze, therefore orienting 
toward the course of action and not necessarily to sequential structures. 
3) If a participant plans to shift to a new course of action s/he normally looks away 
first, marking the possible end of a prior course of action before starting a new one. 
 
Examples 4.11-4.13 provide evidence for the first point, examples 4.14 and 4.15 
provide evidence for the second point and example 4.16 provides evidence for the third point.  
 
4.5.1 Completion of Sequence vs. Completion of Course of Action 
 
In considering the first point, the following three examples show that participants 
continue looking at each other during the development of multiple sequences that constitute 
one course of action, and they withdraw their gaze once the course of action is recognizably 
complete. Before the beginning of example 4.11, A is giving B advice about what to cook for 
a boyscout camp. The instruction-giving is momentarily interrupted by A, who starts a side 
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course of action at line 2. The focus is the participants’ gaze behavior at the end of lines 3, 6, 
9, 11 and 12. 
(4.11) 2PPLAN-conosciuto 13:05  
01     (0.4) 
                                 
02 A:  uhm  dov’e’   che  ci siamo conosciuti [noi a] 
       uhm  where is that cl are  met          we  at 
       uhm  where is  it  that  we first met [at] 
                                                 
03 B:                                       [A Sant’]Eustazio 
                                             At Sant’Eustazio 
   [At Sant’]Eustazio 
                                                         
04 A:  Tra-  Sant’Eutizio ((annuendo)) ti ricordi      che  ci  
       Between Sant’Eustazio           you remember.2s that cl 
      Betwe- Sant’Eutizio ((nod)) do you remember that 
                          
05     facevan mangiare pomodoro con  la  cipolla?
       make.3p eat      tomato   with the onion 
      they were making us eat tomato with onion? 
       
06 B:  Si’ 
       Yes 
       Yes 
       
07     (.) 
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course of action at line 2. The focus is the participants’ gaze behavior at the end of lines 3, 6, 
9, 11 and 12. 
(4.11) 2PPLAN-conosciuto 13:05  
01     (0.4) 
                                 
02 A:  uhm  dov’e’   che  ci siamo conosciuti [noi a] 
       uhm  where is that cl are  met          we  at 
       uhm  where is  it  that  we first met [at] 
                                                 
03 B:                                       [A Sant’]Eustazio 
                                             At Sant’Eustazio 
   [At Sant’]Eustazio 
                                                         
04 A:  Tra-  Sant’Eutizio ((annuendo)) ti ricordi      che  ci  
       Between Sant’Eustazio           you remember.2s that cl 
      Betwe- Sant’Eutizio ((nod)) do you remember that 
                          
05     facevan mangiare pomodoro con  la  cipolla?
       make.3p eat      tomato   with the onion 
      they were making us eat tomato with onion? 
       
06 B:  Si’ 
       Yes 
       Yes 
       
07     (.) 
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08 A:  E   col  prezzemolo, 
       And with parsley, 
       And with parsley, 
             
09 B:  Si’ ((annuendo)) 
Yes
      Yes ((nod)) 
                                                  
10 A:  Ottimo.    Quindi se avete   della cipolla in piu’ mettetela 
       Excellent. So     if have.2p some onion    in more put.2s it 
       Excellent. So if you have some onions left put it 
                                         
11     insieme  ai  [pomodo]ri. E’ molto buona
       together with tomatoes   is very  good 
      together with [tomato]es. It is very good 
               
12 B:  ((annuendo)) [°Si’°] 
                      Yes 
      ((nods))     [°Yes°] 
        
13      (1.1) 
                                                         
14 A:  .hh Allora riso al   pomodoro .hhh e’ il risotto. 
           Then   rice with tomato        is the risotto 
       .hh Then rice with tomato ((sauce)) .hhh it is the risotto. 
A’s question at line 2 is answered at line 3, but at possible completion of the sequence, B 
continues looking at A. A receives the piece of information (the place where they first met; 
line 4) and then moves on to a next sequence asking B whether he remembers what the chef 
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of that boyscout camp served them. The first request for recognition is answered at line 6 and 
the second one at line 9. The two participants sustain mutual gaze throughout the silences and 
during all of these turns. Then at line 10, A assesses the fact that B remembers what they 
were eating at the camp where they met and this allows A to move on with the planned 
course of action, which is to provide B with some additional advice on a recipe. The advice at 
line 11 is accepted at line 12 and A adds a strong positive assessment after the acceptance (it 
is very good). After accepting the advice, A looks away, while B keeps looking at A until his 
strong assessment is complete. At this point, he then also looks away. After some silence 
(line 13), A resumes the previous course of action (i.e., reading the instructions on the recipe 
in front of him) after having completed the current one (i.e., providing advice about how to 
improve a recipe).  
While we may be tempted to consider this entire stretch of talk a series of pre-
expansions followed by the base sequence at lines 10-11, I would rather suggest that this is a 
sequence of sequences that accomplishes one side course of action. This side course of action 
is certainly relevant for the larger activity of A’s instructing B, but that activity reaches 
completion at the end of lines 11-12. If we consider the general organization of action of this 
example we can represent it in this way: participants are involved in the activity of giving and 
receiving instructions for preparing specific recipes. Within this larger framework, each 
recipe can be taken as a step in the activity and can potentially be treated as a single course of 
action, or an episode of the larger course of action. In particular, A moves out of the details of 
one recipe and provides general advice on how to prepare specific ingredients. As such, there 
are multiple sequences of talk that accomplish very specific actions; actions that are 
functional to the accomplishment of all of the above levels.  
Taking a closer look at this example in terms of action, we can see that A is 
providing some general advice to B, but in order to do this he has to make sure that B is 
capable of recognizing the quality and taste of what he is suggesting. There is no clear logical 
way of establishing that a question about where the two participants first met could project 
that onion with tomatoes is tasty. However, by proceeding step by step we can see how A 
displays the link between these two items and their relevance for B. By doing this, he 
constructs one course of action performed through multiple sequences. Thus, this example 
shows that if participants can recognize a sequence initiating action as a possible first move 
in a larger course of action, they can sustain their orientations toward the other participant 
until that course of action is complete, independently of the ending and starting of other 
sequences along the way. 
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Example 4.12 is similar to 4.11 and shows an even more elaborate course of action 
performed through multiple sequences, which ends with gaze withdrawal by both 
participants. Before the beginning of this extract, A has mentioned that he is planning to 
bring his scooter (il Ciao) from his hometown to the university town where he now lives. B 
had previously mentioned possible problems regarding newer gasoline not being appropriate 
for the old scooter. A rejected this suggestion, justifying the scooter’s safety by citing his 
grandfather (i.e., if his grandfather gave it to him then it must be working). They change topic 
for a while until B returns to it at line 29.
(4.12) 2PLUNCH1- Il Ciao 13:53 
                        
29 B:  Il  Ciao funziona? 
       The Ciao work.3s 
      The Ciao works? 
         
30      (0.5) 
           
31 A:  Si’ che  funziona 
       Yes that works 
      Yes it works 
       
32    (0.2)      
               
33 B:  Tuo nonno        lo usa¿ 
       Your grandfather it use.3s 
      Your grandfather uses it¿    
       
        
34     (0.2) 
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35 A:  Sempre usato 
       Always used 
      Always used       
                                                      
36 B:  Non l’ ho      mai vis[to   tuo  nonno   girare] col Ciao= 
       Not it have.2s ever seen    your grandpa ride    with Ciao 
      I have never se[en your granfather riding] with the Ciao= 
                                                   
37 A:                       [Chiaro     che non  fa    i duecento]
                             Clear      that not do.3s the two-hundred 
                           [Clearly it doesn’t get to two hundred] 
                 
38 A:  =Non l’  hai     mai  visto? 
        Not him have.2s ever seen 
      =You have never seen him? 
         
39      (0.5) 
       
40 B:  No hha 
       No hha 
      No hha 
                                
41 A:  Ci   credo      che  non l’  hai     mai visto. (.)  
       Cl   believe.1s that not him have.2s ever seen 
      Of   course you have never seen him. (.)  
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42     Perche’ non lo  usa.= 
       Because not it  uses 
      Because he doesn’t use it.= 
          
43     =Ah e(h)cco 
        Oh t(h)here it is 
      =Oh the(h)re it is         
         
44      (1.3) 
                     
45 B:  La  tua  nonna   gi(h)rare col C(h)iao  
       The your grandma ride      with Ciao    
      Your grandmother ri(h)ding with the C(h)iao  
                 
46     non l’  ho      mai vi(h)sta 
       not her have.1s ever seen 
      I have never s(h)een her ((either))   
      
           
47    (2.0)   (3.0)   ((A shakes his head)) 
          (5.0) 
47 B:  Io il casco  te  lo presto (0.8) e   poi::  
       I the helmet you it lend.1s      and then 
       I will lend you the helmet (0.8) and the::n  
48     prima o  poi  te  lo compri 
       first or then you it buy.2s 
      sooner or later you buy it ((for yourself)) 
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At line 29, B again challenges A’s claim that the scooter is working. This is meant as a tease, 
because previously B had criticized A for indicating a desire to bring the scooter to town and 
then coming up with multiple excuses for not doing so later on. In this context, asking 
whether  the scooter is working is meant as a tease, to pre-empt a possible future excuse for 
not bringing the scooter to town: it is not working. The answer at line 31 displays his stance 
toward the tease and constitutes a po-faced response (Drew, 1987) to the tease. That is, he not 
only produces an affirmative answer but he also adds “che funziona” (it works) indicating 
that this is something already discussed. At this point both participants keep looking at each 
other and neither of them backs down. B escalates the challenge/tease by asking whether A’s 
grandfather uses the scooter (and therefore doubting the fact that the scooter actually works). 
Again, A answers positively (sustaining the challenge), but B continues doubting that his 
grandfather does use the scooter (line 36). Lines 38 and 40 are an inserted repair sequence 
produced with sustained mutual gaze, and at lines 41-42, A responds to B’s challenge/tease 
confirming that his grandfather indeed does not use it anymore (notice that A did say that his 
grandfather has always used the scooter, not that he is using it at the moment).  
The end of line 42 marks a point of possible sequence completion but the participants 
sustain mutual gaze. B produces a sequence closing third that teases A by claiming that he 
confirmed what she already knew: that the scooter does not actually work. However, she 
soon realizes that the only thing ruled out is that A’s grandfather is using the scooter, but not 
that someone else is using it and so she adds a teasing next turn where she says that she has 
not seen A’s grandmother using the scooter either. B keeps looking at him while uttering line 
45-46. However, A has already re-oriented his gaze away from her and reacts to the tease by 
shaking his head but not responding verbally (which could lead the course of action to be 
further expanded). After 2 seconds of silence B looks away and begins eating (line 47). Then 
she starts a new sequence about her willingness to lend him her helmet. At this point, the 
course of action about the scooter and the fact that it does not work is complete and this new 
talk about the helmet, while being topically related, constitutes a new course of action. 
In this example, just as in example 4.11, we have seen that participants sustain their 
gaze toward each other across multiple sequences and yet they look away at a certain point, 
when the larger course of action is possibly complete (in this case, challenging that the 
scooter works).  
Finally, example 4.13 provides further evidence of the relationship between gaze 
withdrawal from the other participant and course of action, rather than sequence, completion. 
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In this example, B is visiting A, and, at the very beginning of their interaction, B appears to 
seek an invitation from A to go out with her and her friends. Our focus is the gaze behavior at 
each sequence possible completion: lines 2, 4, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18. 
(4.13) 2GGOSS-stasera 00:15 
                               
01 B:  .hh A(h)l l o r a stas(h)era cos’ e’ che  fate 
           So            tonight    what is that do.2s 
       .hh S(h)o t(h)onight what are you doing 
                   
02 A:  Eh    andiamo a  Villa Chiara= 
       Eh    go.1p   to Villa Chiara 
       Eh    we go to Villa Chiara= 
                               
03 B:  =Ma  a  che   ora  vi  incontrate 
        But at which hour you meet.2p 
       =But at what time do you meet 
                                
04 A:  Vado  alle nove e   mezza dalla Gloria. 
       Go.1s at   nine and half  to    Gloria 
       I go to Gloria’s (house) at nine thirty. 
          
05    ((B annuisce)) 
((B nods)) 
06   ((some turns with side sequence omitted)) 
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07 B:             [Nove e   mezza ma] andate subito      a  Villa  
                   Nine and half  but go.2p  immediately to Villa  
                  [Nine thirty but] do you go immediately to Villa  
                
08     Chiara alle nove e   mezza?= 
       Chiara at   nine and half 
       Chiara at nine thirty?= 
                          
09 A:  =Con- le  dieci con  gli altri. 
With the ten   with the others
       =With- at ten with the others. 
        
10     (0.4) 
          
11 A:  Ci  incontriamo. 
       Cl. meet.1p 
 We meet.   
        
12     (0.6) 
            
13 A:  Ci [v i e n i? 
Cl. come.2s
      Will [you come? ((to Villa Chiara)) 
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14 B:    [Io   esco       alle nove_ (0.5) ah io pero’ se arrivo  
          I    get.1s out at   nine        oh I  but  if arrive.1s 
[I    get out (of work) at nine_ (0.5) oh but if I come
               
15     arrivo    a mezzanotte eh 
       arrive.1s at midnight eh 
      I arrive at midnight eh 
          
16    (0.6) ((A displays shocked facial expression see Fig. 4.2)) 
       
Figure 4.2. A’s facial expression during line 16. 
            
17 A:  Alle nove esci? 
       At   nine get.2s out 
      At nine you get out (of work)? 
      
18 B:  E[h 
       Eh 
      Y[es ((confirming something already said)) 
       
19 A:   [Cazzo ((Poi A annuisce, guardando in basso)) 
         Dick 
       [Shit ((and then A nods, looking down)) 
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20     (0.6)      (1.2) 
             (1.8) 
                
21 A:  Domani   sera    che  fai? 
Tomorrow evening what do.2s
      Tomorrow evening what do you do? 
       
22     (0.5) 
At line 1, the recipient starts looking at the speaker before the speaker turns toward her and 
the participants engage in mutual gaze. At the completion of line 2, both participants continue 
looking at each other and the same happens at the end of lines 4 and 8 and 10. These all 
constitute possible completions of a sequence for the three adjacency pair sequences that 
begin with the questions at line 1, 3 and 6-7. Each of the 3 questions can be analyzed as a 
request for information by B about A’s plans for the night, probably meant to get an 
invitation by A. During the silence at line 11, A, the person who has been asked about her 
plans, continues looking at B and at line 12 resolves to invite B to go out with her and her 
friends. B’s SPP at lines 13-14 is an indirect answer to A’s invitation at line 12. B is 
providing her schedule indicating when she might be joining them, and again, both at 
completion of the first TCU of line 13 (I get out at nine) and at the end of line 14, the 
participants sustain mutual gaze. They sustain mutual gaze during the following silence and 
into the next adjacency pair sequence (a repair sequence; lines 16-18). A, the person who 
produced the actual invitation, looks away while producing the negative assessment at line 
18, which displays the unlikelihood that A and B will meet that night. B continues looking at 
A briefly into the silence at line 19 and then looks away as well. At this point, they withdraw 
their gaze for 1.2 seconds until A resumes asking about B’s plans for the following evening. 
Although topically related to the previous course of action and clearly occasioned by the 
failed invitation, A’s turn at line 20 starts a different episode of the course of action as it is 
asking about B’s plans for the following day. Furthermore, as observable in both participants’ 
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participants sustain mutual gaze. They sustain mutual gaze during the following silence and 
into the next adjacency pair sequence (a repair sequence; lines 16-18). A, the person who 
produced the actual invitation, looks away while producing the negative assessment at line 
18, which displays the unlikelihood that A and B will meet that night. B continues looking at 
A briefly into the silence at line 19 and then looks away as well. At this point, they withdraw 
their gaze for 1.2 seconds until A resumes asking about B’s plans for the following evening. 
Although topically related to the previous course of action and clearly occasioned by the 
failed invitation, A’s turn at line 20 starts a different episode of the course of action as it is 
asking about B’s plans for the following day. Furthermore, as observable in both participants’ 
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behavior, A’s turn at line 20 was not projectable at line 18 and during the silence at line 19 
both participants act as if the course of action is complete.   
In this example, then, we again see that participants sustain mutual gaze across 
multiple sequences that constitute a larger course of action and withdraw from looking at the 
other participant only when the course of action appears to be complete (at line 19), when at 
least one participant has produced a bid for closure (in this case, when A withdrew her gaze 
while producing line 18). Together with the two other examples in this section, these three 
examples show that participants orient toward the completion of sequences that are part of a 
larger course of action in a similar way as they do toward the completion of an inserted repair 
sequence in a base sequence. This confirms that participants’ gaze orients toward the 
accomplishment of the projectable course of action more than toward the completion of a 
single sequence. 
 
4.5.2 Is the Course of Action Still Accomplishable? 
 
The second piece of evidence that participants’ gaze behavior displays an orientation 
toward the completion of a course action consists of showing how participants orient toward 
the failure of a projectable course of action, independent of whether the sequence is actually 
complete. Examples 4.14 and 4.15 are instances of this kind of orientation. 
In example 4.14, B is visiting A to chat and eat dessert. The excerpt starts with the 
participants discussing whether they should finish the cake on the table in front of them. This 
leads to a brief discussion of what they each had for dinner. Our focus is the course of action 
that starts at line 6. 
 
(4.14) 2GC-pizza 17:10 
 
01 A:  Ah dici   ce la magnamo tutta= 
       Oh say.2s cl it eat.1p  all 
       Oh you say we will eat it all= 
 
02 B:  =No oh che tutta L(h)uisa. Con calma [che  io sono obe:sa 
        No oh what all  Luisa     With calm  that I  am   obese 
       =No oh what all L(h)uisa. Calm down [that I am obe:se   
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03 A:                                       [Anche perche’ io  
                                             Also  because I 
                                           [Also because I  
                                               
04     mi sono mangiata una pizza intera a  cena. 
       me has  eaten    a   pizza whole  at dinner 
       ate a whole pizza for dinner. 
              
05      (1.0)    (0.2) 
            (1.2) 
                 
06 B:  Ma  dove  hai     mangiato? Qui? 
       But where have.2s eaten     Here 
      But where did you eat? Here? 
         
07      (0.4) 
       
08 A:  Si’. 
       Yes 
      Yes. 
                
09 B:  E   hai     mangiato da sola? 
       And have.2s eaten    alone 
      And did you eat alone? 
              
10 A:  No.  Con  la  mamma. 
       No.  With the mum 
      No.  With mum. 
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behavior, A’s turn at line 20 was not projectable at line 18 and during the silence at line 19 
both participants act as if the course of action is complete.   
In this example, then, we again see that participants sustain mutual gaze across 
multiple sequences that constitute a larger course of action and withdraw from looking at the 
other participant only when the course of action appears to be complete (at line 19), when at 
least one participant has produced a bid for closure (in this case, when A withdrew her gaze 
while producing line 18). Together with the two other examples in this section, these three 
examples show that participants orient toward the completion of sequences that are part of a 
larger course of action in a similar way as they do toward the completion of an inserted repair 
sequence in a base sequence. This confirms that participants’ gaze orients toward the 
accomplishment of the projectable course of action more than toward the completion of a 
single sequence. 
 
4.5.2 Is the Course of Action Still Accomplishable? 
 
The second piece of evidence that participants’ gaze behavior displays an orientation 
toward the completion of a course action consists of showing how participants orient toward 
the failure of a projectable course of action, independent of whether the sequence is actually 
complete. Examples 4.14 and 4.15 are instances of this kind of orientation. 
In example 4.14, B is visiting A to chat and eat dessert. The excerpt starts with the 
participants discussing whether they should finish the cake on the table in front of them. This 
leads to a brief discussion of what they each had for dinner. Our focus is the course of action 
that starts at line 6. 
 
(4.14) 2GC-pizza 17:10 
 
01 A:  Ah dici   ce la magnamo tutta= 
       Oh say.2s cl it eat.1p  all 
       Oh you say we will eat it all= 
 
02 B:  =No oh che tutta L(h)uisa. Con calma [che  io sono obe:sa 
        No oh what all  Luisa     With calm  that I  am   obese 
       =No oh what all L(h)uisa. Calm down [that I am obe:se   
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03 A:                                       [Anche perche’ io  
                                             Also  because I 
                                           [Also because I  
                                               
04     mi sono mangiata una pizza intera a  cena. 
       me has  eaten    a   pizza whole  at dinner 
       ate a whole pizza for dinner. 
              
05      (1.0)    (0.2) 
            (1.2) 
                 
06 B:  Ma  dove  hai     mangiato? Qui? 
       But where have.2s eaten     Here 
      But where did you eat? Here? 
         
07      (0.4) 
       
08 A:  Si’. 
       Yes 
      Yes. 
                
09 B:  E   hai     mangiato da sola? 
       And have.2s eaten    alone 
      And did you eat alone? 
              
10 A:  No.  Con  la  mamma. 
       No.  With the mum 
      No.  With mum. 
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11 B:  Ah::::  
       Oh 
      Oh:::: 
         
12      (0.2) 
                           
13 B:  Perche’ non me lo hai     detto. Potevo   venire. 
       Because not me it have.2s said   Could.1s come 
       Why didn’t you tell me. I could have come. 
At lines 3-4, A announces that she ate a whole pizza for dinner, affiliating with B’s stance 
against eating the whole cake. A is trying to cut the cake and as soon as she looks up at B (the 
end of silence at line 5), B asks a question (line 6). This FPP is a wh-question that gets turned 
into a yes-no question by adding a candidate answer. After a short silence, A responds with a 
type-conforming answer, at which point the sequence could be over. But the participants are 
still looking at each other. And what follows is a new sequence that starts with another yes-no 
question (line 9); however, it is also understandable as part of the same course of action. This 
time, A looks at the cake before answering at line 10, while B looks down at the cake at the 
beginning of the second TCU of that turn (“with mum”). Thus, the first aversion of gaze 
occurs as soon as B hears the first TCU of that turn (“no”), but the course of action is not 
over despite her averted gaze. At this point, B produces a minimal post-expansion that claims 
information receipt (Heritage, 1984), while both participants are looking down (see § 4.7.1). 
Finally, B makes the interactional plan of the two previous questions explicit: that is, she 
complains about not having been invited for dinner (line 13). Indeed, B has only been invited 
for dessert whereas it is quite common and ordinary to be invited for both dinner and dessert. 
In this sense, only being invited for dessert is a noticeable, and perhaps accountable, action.   
As we have seen in example 4.11, it is not completely clear what kind of action B is 
projecting. That is, at the end of the question at line 6, A does not know that B is going to 
complain about the fact that she was not invited for dinner, though it is possible to recognize 
the link between the two events. At lines 6 and 9, B checks whether A could have actually 
invited her for dinner. While A’s answer to the question at line 6 allows B to continue this 
283
course of action, the first TCU at line 10 (“no”) blocks it. By saying that she did not have 
dinner alone, A blocks the possible complaint by B. At the same time, the fact that she had 
dinner with her mum, whom B knows quite well, would make it less problematic in terms of 
making explicit her disappointment for not having been invited for the pizza. The production 
of the complaint at line 13 could be a post hoc adjustment to the new information (“with 
mum”), rather than a failure of gaze withdrawal as a way of orienting toward closure of the 
course of action. By looking away after the “no” at line 10, B treats that response as blocking 
and the course of action as potentially over. A subsequently lowers her gaze, but by adding 
the TCU about her mum, she leaves open the possibility of further talk by B, which indeed 
occurs. The main point here is that the participants sustain mutual gaze across two different 
sequences of talk that are both part of the same projected course of action. A could continue 
if the answers to B’s question were always preferred. However, this is not the case after the 
second question and we can see a clear orientation to this by the person who initiated the 
course of action, who withdraws her gaze.  
Example 4.15 shows something similar, although there is no sustained gaze across 
multiple sequences of talk. In the following excerpt, B is visiting A to fix his computer. At 
line 10, B mentions what he is going to do. Our focus is the quip at line 17, where A plays 
with the double meaning of the word “importa”: to import and to care. 
(4.15) 2PCOMP-battuta 06:32 
                          
10 B:  ↑Ora (1.2) io dovrei cercare di- file importa. 
        Now       I should  try     to  file import. 
      ↑Now (1.2) I should try to- file import. 
         
11      (1.4) 
       
12 B:  °uhh  
        uhh 
      °uhh  
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11 B:  Ah::::  
       Oh 
      Oh:::: 
         
12      (0.2) 
                           
13 B:  Perche’ non me lo hai     detto. Potevo   venire. 
       Because not me it have.2s said   Could.1s come 
       Why didn’t you tell me. I could have come. 
At lines 3-4, A announces that she ate a whole pizza for dinner, affiliating with B’s stance 
against eating the whole cake. A is trying to cut the cake and as soon as she looks up at B (the 
end of silence at line 5), B asks a question (line 6). This FPP is a wh-question that gets turned 
into a yes-no question by adding a candidate answer. After a short silence, A responds with a 
type-conforming answer, at which point the sequence could be over. But the participants are 
still looking at each other. And what follows is a new sequence that starts with another yes-no 
question (line 9); however, it is also understandable as part of the same course of action. This 
time, A looks at the cake before answering at line 10, while B looks down at the cake at the 
beginning of the second TCU of that turn (“with mum”). Thus, the first aversion of gaze 
occurs as soon as B hears the first TCU of that turn (“no”), but the course of action is not 
over despite her averted gaze. At this point, B produces a minimal post-expansion that claims 
information receipt (Heritage, 1984), while both participants are looking down (see § 4.7.1). 
Finally, B makes the interactional plan of the two previous questions explicit: that is, she 
complains about not having been invited for dinner (line 13). Indeed, B has only been invited 
for dessert whereas it is quite common and ordinary to be invited for both dinner and dessert. 
In this sense, only being invited for dessert is a noticeable, and perhaps accountable, action.   
As we have seen in example 4.11, it is not completely clear what kind of action B is 
projecting. That is, at the end of the question at line 6, A does not know that B is going to 
complain about the fact that she was not invited for dinner, though it is possible to recognize 
the link between the two events. At lines 6 and 9, B checks whether A could have actually 
invited her for dinner. While A’s answer to the question at line 6 allows B to continue this 
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course of action, the first TCU at line 10 (“no”) blocks it. By saying that she did not have 
dinner alone, A blocks the possible complaint by B. At the same time, the fact that she had 
dinner with her mum, whom B knows quite well, would make it less problematic in terms of 
making explicit her disappointment for not having been invited for the pizza. The production 
of the complaint at line 13 could be a post hoc adjustment to the new information (“with 
mum”), rather than a failure of gaze withdrawal as a way of orienting toward closure of the 
course of action. By looking away after the “no” at line 10, B treats that response as blocking 
and the course of action as potentially over. A subsequently lowers her gaze, but by adding 
the TCU about her mum, she leaves open the possibility of further talk by B, which indeed 
occurs. The main point here is that the participants sustain mutual gaze across two different 
sequences of talk that are both part of the same projected course of action. A could continue 
if the answers to B’s question were always preferred. However, this is not the case after the 
second question and we can see a clear orientation to this by the person who initiated the 
course of action, who withdraws her gaze.  
Example 4.15 shows something similar, although there is no sustained gaze across 
multiple sequences of talk. In the following excerpt, B is visiting A to fix his computer. At 
line 10, B mentions what he is going to do. Our focus is the quip at line 17, where A plays 
with the double meaning of the word “importa”: to import and to care. 
(4.15) 2PCOMP-battuta 06:32 
                          
10 B:  ↑Ora (1.2) io dovrei cercare di- file importa. 
        Now       I should  try     to  file import. 
      ↑Now (1.2) I should try to- file import. 
         
11      (1.4) 
       
12 B:  °uhh  
        uhh 
      °uhh  
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13      (0.7) 
       
14 B:  Tch! 
       Tch 
      Tch! 
         
15      (0.6) 
       
16 B:  Qu[a 
       Here 
      He[re 
                   
17 A:    [E:   ce ne importah¿ 
          An:d cl cl import 
        [An:d do we careh¿ 
         
18      (2.0) ((A smiles looking at B)) 
           
19 B:  Apri   rubrica. 
       Open   address book 
      Open   address book. 
         
20      (0.4) 
At line 17, A produces a quip while looking toward B, who continues looking at the 
computer screen. Line 17  (“and do we care?”) is hearable as either asserting a position 
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(Schegloff, 1984) or a quip, so either agreement or laughter are appropriate responses to it. 
And yet, neither occurs. After 2 seconds of silence, during which A sustains his gaze toward 
B, B indicates his engagement with fixing the computer problems, thereby indicating that he 
is not going to react to A’s “and do we care?” (line 17). Interestingly, A looks away and re-
orients toward the screen after the first word of line 19 (“open”).  
To briefly summarize, both examples 4.14 and 4.15 have shown that as soon as one 
participant blocks a course of action, the eyes of the other participant move away from them 
and, as a result, the blocked participant re-engages in competing activities. This displays a 
clear sensitivity toward the accomplishment of a course of action rather than simply the 
completeness of a sequence. 
 
4.5.3 Looking Away Before Starting a New Course of Action 
 
The third and final piece of evidence of the importance of courses of action and action 
completion for participants gaze behavior can be observed in example 4.16 (and later in 
example 4.25). If the claim is that participants withdraw their gaze to display an orientation 
toward the completeness of a course of action rather than a sequence, then we should see that 
before new courses of action participants look away from each other. This, however, need not 
be performed by both participants, as they could have different understandings of the actual 
completion of the course of action. Nonetheless, if the function of the withdrawal is 
systematic, then even if there are unilateral departures and one participant starts a new course 
of action while interrupting another one, this person should look away before actually starting 
the new course of action, therefore marking the action-in-progress as over and allowing for 
the possibility that something new can be produced. This is illustrated in example 4.16.  
In this excerpt, the participants have been talking about possible summer plans, and B 
has complained about the fact that she will be alone for a few days near the end of August 
because her boyfriend is going away with friends. While producing a turn that suggests A is 
treating the course of action as complete (“yes, I understood”; line 3), at line 7 A looks away 
immediately before starting a completely different topic and course of action. Our focus is 
what happens at line 7. 
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13      (0.7) 
       
14 B:  Tch! 
       Tch 
      Tch! 
         
15      (0.6) 
       
16 B:  Qu[a 
       Here 
      He[re 
                   
17 A:    [E:   ce ne importah¿ 
          An:d cl cl import 
        [An:d do we careh¿ 
         
18      (2.0) ((A smiles looking at B)) 
           
19 B:  Apri   rubrica. 
       Open   address book 
      Open   address book. 
         
20      (0.4) 
At line 17, A produces a quip while looking toward B, who continues looking at the 
computer screen. Line 17  (“and do we care?”) is hearable as either asserting a position 
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(Schegloff, 1984) or a quip, so either agreement or laughter are appropriate responses to it. 
And yet, neither occurs. After 2 seconds of silence, during which A sustains his gaze toward 
B, B indicates his engagement with fixing the computer problems, thereby indicating that he 
is not going to react to A’s “and do we care?” (line 17). Interestingly, A looks away and re-
orients toward the screen after the first word of line 19 (“open”).  
To briefly summarize, both examples 4.14 and 4.15 have shown that as soon as one 
participant blocks a course of action, the eyes of the other participant move away from them 
and, as a result, the blocked participant re-engages in competing activities. This displays a 
clear sensitivity toward the accomplishment of a course of action rather than simply the 
completeness of a sequence. 
 
4.5.3 Looking Away Before Starting a New Course of Action 
 
The third and final piece of evidence of the importance of courses of action and action 
completion for participants gaze behavior can be observed in example 4.16 (and later in 
example 4.25). If the claim is that participants withdraw their gaze to display an orientation 
toward the completeness of a course of action rather than a sequence, then we should see that 
before new courses of action participants look away from each other. This, however, need not 
be performed by both participants, as they could have different understandings of the actual 
completion of the course of action. Nonetheless, if the function of the withdrawal is 
systematic, then even if there are unilateral departures and one participant starts a new course 
of action while interrupting another one, this person should look away before actually starting 
the new course of action, therefore marking the action-in-progress as over and allowing for 
the possibility that something new can be produced. This is illustrated in example 4.16.  
In this excerpt, the participants have been talking about possible summer plans, and B 
has complained about the fact that she will be alone for a few days near the end of August 
because her boyfriend is going away with friends. While producing a turn that suggests A is 
treating the course of action as complete (“yes, I understood”; line 3), at line 7 A looks away 
immediately before starting a completely different topic and course of action. Our focus is 
what happens at line 7. 
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(4.16) 2GGOSS-insomma 05:25 
                               
01 B:  volevo  far qualcosa  tipo mm non so      anche a  m- m-
        want.1s do  something like mm not know.1s also  to m- m- 
        I wanted to do something like mm I don’t know also to m- m- 
 
                                            
 02     me va    ben[issimo magari Rave]nna delle robe   cosi’.   
        me go.3s very well  maybe  Ravenna  some  things so 
        for me it is tot[ally fine maybe Ravenna or things like that. 
 
                               
 03 A:               [Si’ ho      capito] ((annuendo)) 
                      Yes have.1s understood 
                     [Yes I understood ] ((nodding)) 
 
          
04       (0.3) 
            
 05 B:  Pero’ °insomma°.  
        But   so 
        Well °so°.   
 
         
 06     (0.2) 
 
                             
07 B:  No guard[a mi] e’ disp[iaciuto 
        No look    me  is sad 
        No loo[k I]  was   sa[d 
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 08 A:          [Tlk!]        [↑A:h ti volevo     dire la  cosa  
                 Tlk           Oh you wanted.1s say  the thing 
                [Tlk!]        [↑O:h I wanted to tell you the thing 
 
                                                              
09      della Gloria<beh  niente  io so      che:: insomma la Gloria=  
         of    Gloria   well nothing I  know.1s that I mean   Gloria 
         about Gloria<well nothing I know tha::t I mean Gloria= 
At line 3, A acknowledges B’s previous turn and explicitly states that she understands what B 
means by it. Nonetheless she continues looking at B, who produces a postmortem (Schegloff, 
2007b: 142) turn at line 5. At line 7, B produces another turn, apparently pursuing further 
affiliation with her unfortunate circumstances, but at this point A has already looked away. In 
overlap with B’s affiliation-seeking turn, she starts a completely new course of action. She 
projects this through prosodic, lexical and visual means: first, with a pitch reset at the 
beginning of this new TCU (Couper-Kuhlen 2004); second, by using a verbal preface that 
marks this new talk as distinct from what came before (“I wanted to tell you about”); and 
third, by looking away immediately before starting this new TCU. What follows is a long 
discussion about the attitude of a friend of theirs, a clearly different topic than the one of their 
previous conversation. This example shows that the normative association between looking 
away when the course of action can be considered complete or blocked can also be found in
the behavior of a single participant, who performs it without necessarily waiting for the 
other’s alignment. 
Examples 4.11 to 4.16 both contribute evidence that participants orient toward the 
completion of courses of action more than toward the completion of a sequence of talk, 
although most of the time the completion of one constitutes the completion of the other. The 
next section provides quantitative evidence that further supports the claims presented in this 
chapter. 
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(4.16) 2GGOSS-insomma 05:25 
                               
01 B:  volevo  far qualcosa  tipo mm non so      anche a  m- m-
        want.1s do  something like mm not know.1s also  to m- m- 
        I wanted to do something like mm I don’t know also to m- m- 
 
                                            
 02     me va    ben[issimo magari Rave]nna delle robe   cosi’.   
        me go.3s very well  maybe  Ravenna  some  things so 
        for me it is tot[ally fine maybe Ravenna or things like that. 
 
                               
 03 A:               [Si’ ho      capito] ((annuendo)) 
                      Yes have.1s understood 
                     [Yes I understood ] ((nodding)) 
 
          
04       (0.3) 
            
 05 B:  Pero’ °insomma°.  
        But   so 
        Well °so°.   
 
         
 06     (0.2) 
 
                             
07 B:  No guard[a mi] e’ disp[iaciuto 
        No look    me  is sad 
        No loo[k I]  was   sa[d 
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 08 A:          [Tlk!]        [↑A:h ti volevo     dire la  cosa  
                 Tlk           Oh you wanted.1s say  the thing 
                [Tlk!]        [↑O:h I wanted to tell you the thing 
 
                                                              
09      della Gloria<beh  niente  io so      che:: insomma la Gloria=  
         of    Gloria   well nothing I  know.1s that I mean   Gloria 
         about Gloria<well nothing I know tha::t I mean Gloria= 
At line 3, A acknowledges B’s previous turn and explicitly states that she understands what B 
means by it. Nonetheless she continues looking at B, who produces a postmortem (Schegloff, 
2007b: 142) turn at line 5. At line 7, B produces another turn, apparently pursuing further 
affiliation with her unfortunate circumstances, but at this point A has already looked away. In 
overlap with B’s affiliation-seeking turn, she starts a completely new course of action. She 
projects this through prosodic, lexical and visual means: first, with a pitch reset at the 
beginning of this new TCU (Couper-Kuhlen 2004); second, by using a verbal preface that 
marks this new talk as distinct from what came before (“I wanted to tell you about”); and 
third, by looking away immediately before starting this new TCU. What follows is a long 
discussion about the attitude of a friend of theirs, a clearly different topic than the one of their 
previous conversation. This example shows that the normative association between looking 
away when the course of action can be considered complete or blocked can also be found in
the behavior of a single participant, who performs it without necessarily waiting for the 
other’s alignment. 
Examples 4.11 to 4.16 both contribute evidence that participants orient toward the 
completion of courses of action more than toward the completion of a sequence of talk, 
although most of the time the completion of one constitutes the completion of the other. The 
next section provides quantitative evidence that further supports the claims presented in this 
chapter. 
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4.6 A Systematic Practice 
 
The previous sections provided qualitative evidence for two claims about the 
organization of gaze behavior: 
 
1) If a possible sequence completion is treated by participants as the actual 
completion of the course of action, they will not be looking at each other after the 
completion of the sequence; 
2) If participants sustain their gaze toward the other once they reach possible 
sequence completion, this engenders sequence expansion.  
 
This section provides further evidence of the regularity of the patterns exemplified 
thus far. The following results are based on having coded gaze behavior and whether a 
sequence/course of action was possibly complete in 10 minutes of Italian dyadic interactions 
for each of the 10 different interactions11 (total of 100 minutes). The data were also coded in 
terms of whether the sequence/course of action was actually expanded or not. Participant 
gaze behavior was coded by considering where the participants were looking 0.2 seconds 
after the completion of the turn that constitutes possible completion of a sequence. Time was 
not measured in terms of speed of current speech (that is to say, using a participant 
perspective) but rather using software (ELAN, see chapter 1) that measures the time that 
passes between the completion of a turn and the beginning of another. For this reason, I 
added a 0.2 window to the actual completion of the turn, which approximately corresponds to 
what conversation analysts consider the amount of time that normally elapses during turn 
transitions and corresponds to the average turn latency described in Stivers et al. (2009).12  
The criteria for coding sequences were based on the categories outlined by Schegloff 
in Sequence Organization in Interaction (2007b). As mentioned in § 4.4, I considered 
sequence expansion not only in terms of new turns produced by other participants, but also 
additional TCUs produced by the speaker who has brought the sequence to possible 
completion. Both of these situations were considered sequence expansion. Moreover, if the 
turn following a possible completion of a sequence was considered an expansion of the 
                                                
11 The interactional data coded for this chapter correspond to that used in chapters 2 and 3 and further described 
in Appendix A.  
12 See de Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield (2006) and Stivers et al. (2009) for work on turn taking that uses “atomic 
clock” time rather than the more local participant’s speaking speed. But see Jefferson (1988) for an argument 
against using “clock measured time”.  
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current course of action, then this was coded as expansion. If two sequences were part of 
what Schegloff (2007b: 195-216) calls a “sequence of sequences”, the second one would not 
be coded as “expansion” of the first one, since the course of action would only be considered 
complete at the completion of the second sequence. This follows from the claim outlined in § 
4.5 that participants orient toward the possible completion of the course of action started with 
the sequence initiating action and not simply to the completion of each step, unless, of 
course, they can be considered different episodes of a course of action and each episode can 
be considered complete by itself. For example, if A asks B how difficult each of her next 
three exams will be, the course of action cannot be complete once B has provided an answer 
concerning one exam. It is only after B has provided information about all three exams that 
the course of action can be considered possibly complete. On the other hand, if A asks B 
what she did on Friday night, and, after the answer is provided A then asks about Saturday 
night, the completion of the sequence concerning Friday night does constitute the possible 
completion of that initial course of action. The subsequent question about Saturday night was 
not clearly foreseeable earlier. In other words, possible completion of a sequence is coded as 
such only when further talk by another participant is not projectable by the design of the 
sequence initiating action alone.  
These coding measures yielded 469 instances of possible completions of sequences 
and simultaneously of courses of actions. Table 4.2 illustrates the frequency of sequence 
expansion following sequence possible completions.  
 
Table 4.2 Distribution of sequence expansions following possible sequence completion 
Sequence Expanded Instances 
Yes 270 (57.6% ) 
No 199 (42.4%) 
Total 469 (100%) 
 
The information in this Table shows that just over half of possible completions of sequences 
are followed by sequential expansion. Thus, even though participants might orient toward 
specific interactional moments as making closure relevant next, it does not mean that the 
course of action is actually treated by both participants as complete, and further sequentially 
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4.6 A Systematic Practice 
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2) If participants sustain their gaze toward the other once they reach possible 
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11 The interactional data coded for this chapter correspond to that used in chapters 2 and 3 and further described 
in Appendix A.  
12 See de Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield (2006) and Stivers et al. (2009) for work on turn taking that uses “atomic 
clock” time rather than the more local participant’s speaking speed. But see Jefferson (1988) for an argument 
against using “clock measured time”.  
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current course of action, then this was coded as expansion. If two sequences were part of 
what Schegloff (2007b: 195-216) calls a “sequence of sequences”, the second one would not 
be coded as “expansion” of the first one, since the course of action would only be considered 
complete at the completion of the second sequence. This follows from the claim outlined in § 
4.5 that participants orient toward the possible completion of the course of action started with 
the sequence initiating action and not simply to the completion of each step, unless, of 
course, they can be considered different episodes of a course of action and each episode can 
be considered complete by itself. For example, if A asks B how difficult each of her next 
three exams will be, the course of action cannot be complete once B has provided an answer 
concerning one exam. It is only after B has provided information about all three exams that 
the course of action can be considered possibly complete. On the other hand, if A asks B 
what she did on Friday night, and, after the answer is provided A then asks about Saturday 
night, the completion of the sequence concerning Friday night does constitute the possible 
completion of that initial course of action. The subsequent question about Saturday night was 
not clearly foreseeable earlier. In other words, possible completion of a sequence is coded as 
such only when further talk by another participant is not projectable by the design of the 
sequence initiating action alone.  
These coding measures yielded 469 instances of possible completions of sequences 
and simultaneously of courses of actions. Table 4.2 illustrates the frequency of sequence 
expansion following sequence possible completions.  
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Table 4.3 Participant expanding the sequence when sequence gets expanded 
Who expands Instances 
Current Speaker 89 (33%) 
Other Participant 181 (67%) 
Total 270 (100%) 
 
Table 4.3 shows that in two thirds of the sequences that get expanded, it is the person who 
was the recipient of the turn that constituted possible completion of the sequence who 
actually expands the sequence/course of action, and not the current speaker. Yet notice that in 
one third of cases, the speaker who brought a sequence to possible completion adds at least 
another TCU. 
 
The first factor to consider in terms of what could affect sequence closure is the 
sequential structure of the actions immediately preceding possible completion of the 
sequence (see Schegloff, 2007b). Indeed, if we consider more precisely what kind of 
sequential structure had just reached possible completion, Table 4.4 shows that the data can 
be divided into three main categories. 
 
Table. 4.4. Types of sequential structure culminating in a point of possible completion of the 
sequence/course of action. 
Sequential Structure Acronym 
Base Sequence BS13 
Post-Expansion of the Base Sequence Post Ex. BS 
Sequence Closing Third SCT 
 
A base sequence (BS) is usually made of two adjacently paired turns produced by two 
different speakers. It constitutes the core of the course of action, and any pre-expansion or 
post-expansion has to do with completing the base sequence. If we think about an invitation, 
for example, we know that its delivery makes structurally and interactionally relevant the 
occurrence of an acceptance or rejection by the other participant. Now, the actual delivery of 
an invitation might be preceded by pre-sequences aimed at checking whether the person who 
is going to be invited might actually accept the invitation. Moreover, inserted sequences can 
                                                
13 BS is the structure that precedes possible completion of a sequence only if there are no post-expansions of it. 
So, BS and Post Ex. BS are mutually exclusive for this coding. 
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occur between the invitation and the occurrence of the acceptance, for example, to make sure 
that both participants understand the terms of the invitation. However, once an acceptance or 
rejection is produced, the base sequence reaches a point of possible completion and further 
expansions, by means of post-expansions of the base sequence (Post Ex. BS), are thought to 
occur in three circumstances:  
 
1) when the SPP of the base sequence is interactionally dispreferred; 
2) when there is some disagreement between the participants; 
3) if something about the SPP is unclear  and requires further clarification.  
 
However, both a base sequence and its post-expansions, which usually take the 
sequential form of adjacently pair turns, can also be followed by SCT turns. These SCT turns 
take the form of a single turn aimed at closing the sequence rather than expanding it. This 
does not mean, however, that the entire course of action necessarily achieves closure once a 
SCT turn is produced. Table 4.5 shows which sequential structures precede the possible 
completions of a sequence and Table 4.6 and Figure 4.3 show how often each one gets 
expanded. 
 
Table 4.5 Types of sequential structures that precede possible completion of a sequence. 
Preceding Sequential Structure Instances 
BS  265 (56.5%) 
Post Exp. BS  141 (30.1%) 
SCT  63 (13.4%) 
Total 469 (100%) 
 
Table 4.6 Distribution of sequence expansion after specific sequential structures 
Preceding 
Sequential 
Structure 
Expanded Not Expanded Total 
BS 158 (59.6%) 107 (40.4%) 265 (100%) 
Post Exp. BS 88 (62.4%) 53 (37.6%) 141 (100%) 
SCT 24 (38.1%) 39 (61.9%) 63 (100%) 
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of sequence expansion vs. non-expansion following specific sequential 
structures 
Table 4.5 shows that just over half of the sequence possible completions in the data set occur 
after a BS and only 13.4% occur after a SCT turn. However, Table 4.6 and Figure 4.3 show 
that distinguishing between these different sequential structures might be relevant in terms of 
what is likely to follow next. Indeed, while sequence expansion is more likely than no 
expansion after a base sequence, it is much less likely after a SCT. Indeed, a SCT is 
significantly more likely to lead to sequence closure than a BS or a PEBS (χ2 (2)= 11.59; 
p<.01). These sequential structures occur while people are co-present and face-to-face, and 
although SCTs may make sequence closure more relevant, different gaze behaviors can still 
be implemented on top of these sequential structures. Previous research on telephone 
conversations suggests that SCTs are especially designed to make sequence closure relevant 
next by functioning as a bid for closure (see Schegloff, 2007b: 118-148). Hence, the 
sequential structure that precedes sequence completion is an additional variable that might 
affect the occurrence of sequence expansion. 
A second variable is the preference of the turn that precedes possible completion of 
the sequence. One of the reasons a sequence may get expanded is that the last turn was 
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interactionally dispreferred14 and engendered either an account by the current speaker (e.g., 
accounting for why s/he cannot accept an invitation to a party) or the production of further 
talk by the other participant (e.g., seeking accounts, negotiating disagreements). Table 4.7 
shows how often the turn that preceded sequence possible completion is analyzed as a 
preferred one and Table 4.8 and Figure 4.4 show how often this is correlated with sequence 
expansion.  
 
Table 4.7 Preference of turn preceding sequence possible completion 
Preference of turn Instances 
Preferred 297 (63.3%) 
Dispreferred 172 (36.7%) 
Total 469 (100%) 
 
 
Table 4.8 Sequence expansion by preference of the turn preceding possible sequence completion 
Preference of turn Sequence expanded Sequence not 
expanded 
Total 
Preferred 145 (48.8%) 152 (51.2%) 297 (100%) 
Dispreferred 125 (72.7%) 47 (27.3%) 172 (100%) 
 
                                                
14 See chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of preference and dispreference in terms of social action.  
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interactionally dispreferred14 and engendered either an account by the current speaker (e.g., 
accounting for why s/he cannot accept an invitation to a party) or the production of further 
talk by the other participant (e.g., seeking accounts, negotiating disagreements). Table 4.7 
shows how often the turn that preceded sequence possible completion is analyzed as a 
preferred one and Table 4.8 and Figure 4.4 show how often this is correlated with sequence 
expansion.  
 
Table 4.7 Preference of turn preceding sequence possible completion 
Preference of turn Instances 
Preferred 297 (63.3%) 
Dispreferred 172 (36.7%) 
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Figure 4.4 Sequence expansion by preference of the turn preceding possible sequence completion 
Table 4.7 shows that approximately two thirds of the turns leading to possible 
sequence completion are interactionally preferred responses to the preceding actions. These 
numbers reveal either a tendency by recipients of FPPs to “play along” and cooperate 
interactionally and produce actions that are structurally preferred, or the ability of speakers of 
FPPs to avoid producing FPPs that would yield a dispreferred response. 
On the other hand, Table 4.8 and Figure 4.4 show that the preference of the turn preceding 
sequence completion affects the likelihood that any participant will expand the sequence. 
While expansion follows a dispreferred turn in 73% of the cases, it appears that a preferred 
turn does not necessarily lead to sequence closure, as this occurs only half of the time. A 
dispreferred turn, however, is significantly more likely to lead to sequence expansion than a 
preferred one (χ2 (1)= 25.37; p<.0001). 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 documented the relevance of gaze behavior to sequence 
expansion. This means that gaze should be considered another variable affecting sequence 
expansion. Table 4.9 shows that in slightly more than half of possible completions of a 
sequence, at least one participant was still looking at the other. 
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Table 4.9 Distribution of sequence possible completions with respect to gaze behavior  
Coding Instances 
Both participant gaze away from each other 196 (41.8%) 
At least one participant gazes at other 273 (58.2%) 
Total 469 (100%) 
 
Considering the claims outlined in § 4.4 and 4.5, we should expect that if participants 
are not looking at each other at possible sequence completion then a sequence expansion is 
less likely to occur, while if they keep looking, then the sequence is more likely to be 
expanded. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show that this is indeed the case. Figure 4.5 represents the 
two distributions graphically. In 83% of the cases in which both participants are looking 
away, the sequence is not expanded, and, on the other hand, in 87% of the cases in which at 
least one participant looks at the other, the sequence gets expanded.  
 
Table 4.10 Distribution of sequence expansions in relation to gaze down by both participants 
Coding Instances 
Gaze down  Sequence ends 163 (83.2%) 
Gaze down  Sequence continues 33 (16.8%) 
Total 196 (100%) 
 
 
Table 4.11 Distribution of sequence expansions in relation to gaze up by at least one participant 
Coding Instances 
Gaze up       Sequence ends 36 (13.2%) 
Gaze up  Sequence continues 237 (86.8%) 
Total 273 (100%) 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of sequence expansion in relation to participant’s gaze behavior 
To investigate whether participants’ gaze predicted sequence expansion 
independently of the sequential position and preference of the turn, a logistic regression 
model was fitted to the data using the standard error corrected for the clustering of sequences 
in the 10 interactions.  The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 4.12 as an 
odds ratio with the 95% confidence interval. 
Table 4.12 Results of logistic regression predicting sequence expansion in relation to gaze toward
addressee, sequential placement of the turn and preference of the turn.15 
Variables Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Gaze to other participant 31.02*** 16.47, 58.41 
Sequential position 0.39*** 0.22, 0.69 
Preference of turn 0.45** 0.26, 0.78 
Table 4.12 shows that if at least one participant keeps looking at the other at sequence 
possible completion, then the odds that the sequence will be expanded increase 31 times, in 
contrast with a situation in which both participants are looking away. The odds increase even 
                                               
15 *** denotes p<.001; ** denotes p<.01 
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if we take into account the sequential position and the preference of the turn, though much 
less than if we simply consider their gaze behavior. The results were adjusted for interactions 
so that one particular interaction would not bias the general result.  
These results provide further quantitative evidence of the association between gaze 
behavior and sequence expansion: when participants look away, they treat the sequence as 
complete, and if they keep looking at each other, this routinely engenders sequence 
expansion. However, as outlined in Table 4.1 in § 4.4, there are not simply two possible gaze 
configurations when two participants reach sequence completion but in fact four. The 
following tables show a more fine-grained representation of the data using the four categories
outlined in Table 4.1 in § 4.4 (participants not looking at each other, both participants looking 
at each other, only the speaker looking at the recipient or only the recipient looking at the 
speaker). Table 4.13 illustrates how many instances of each gaze configuration occurred in 
the 100 minutes of data analyzed. Table 4.14 shows how often each gaze configuration at 
possible sequence completion was followed by a sequence expansion. Figure 4.6 provides a
graphical representation of the distribution presented in Table 4.14.  
Table 4.13 Distribution of the four gaze configurations at possible sequence completion points 
Gaze configuration Instances 
1                      
196 (41.8%) 
2                      
121 (25.8%) 
3                   
78 (16.6%) 
4                      
74 (15.8%) 
Total 469 (100%) 
The information presented in this table demonstrates that both participants sustain their gaze 
toward each other’s face in less than half of the cases in which at least one person keeps 
looking at the other (121/273 = 44.3%). Given that the participants did not always engage in 
mutual gaze (see Table 4.15 below), the distribution of gaze configurations 3 and 4 does not 
necessarily mean that in half the cases one participant treated the sequence as possibly 
complete while the other did not. On the other hand, the number of instances of gaze 
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if we take into account the sequential position and the preference of the turn, though much 
less than if we simply consider their gaze behavior. The results were adjusted for interactions 
so that one particular interaction would not bias the general result.  
These results provide further quantitative evidence of the association between gaze 
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complete, and if they keep looking at each other, this routinely engenders sequence 
expansion. However, as outlined in Table 4.1 in § 4.4, there are not simply two possible gaze 
configurations when two participants reach sequence completion but in fact four. The 
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the 100 minutes of data analyzed. Table 4.14 shows how often each gaze configuration at 
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configurations 3 and 4 indicates that these two configurations actually occur regularly and are 
not just atypical cases of the gaze configuration 2. 
Table 4.14 Distribution of gaze configurations followed by sequence expansion 
Gaze configuration Instances of Sequence expansion 
1 33/196 (16.8%) 
2 115/121 (95.0%) 
3 61/78 (78.2%) 
4 61/74 (82.4%) 
 
Figure 4.6 Distribution of gaze configurations followed by sequence expansion 
The data shown in Table 4.14 (and Figure 4.6) indicates that although sequences tend 
to be expanded rarely after gaze configuration 1, they get regularly expanded after 
configurations 2, 3 and 4. However, the likelihood of a sequence expansion following 
configurations 3 and 4 is significantly less than after gaze configuration 2 (χ2 (2)= 13.87; 
p<.001). This is a reasonable finding given that the occurrence of gaze configuration 2 
indicates that both participants are treating the current course of action as incomplete, while 
configurations 3 and 4 mainly occur when only one participant treats the course of action as 
incomplete. The above results show that configurations 2, 3 and 4 are alike in that in all 
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cases, sequence expansion is more likely than sequence closure; however, the probability of a 
sequence expansion depends on which specific gaze configuration occurs at sequence 
possible completion.  
Now that we have a clearer picture of the strong association between the occurrence 
of specific gaze configurations and the expansion of courses of action, a closer look at the 
data can provide us with a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms at play, which 
lead to these correlations. First of all, both participants do not always look at each other 
during the turn(s) that lead(s) to possible sequence completion. Table 4.15 shows that 
although both participants look at each other in two-thirds of the sequential structure 
preceding a possible completion of a sequence, in 21% of these cases only one participant 
looks toward the other, while 12% occur without any participant gaze toward the other.  
 
Table 4.15 Occurrence of gaze toward other participant before sequence completion 
Gaze behavior Instances 
No gaze at all 56 (11.9%) 
Only one participant looks 97 (20.7%) 
Both participant look at each other 316 (67.4%) 
Total 469 (100%) 
 
The high number of sequential structures produced without any gaze (i.e., almost 12%) can 
be explained mainly in two ways:  
 
1) both participants are looking toward something else, usually because of 
competing activities such as eating, drinking, or reading;  
2) many of the sequential structures in which no gaze occurs are actually 
sequence closing third turns. 
 
Table 4.16 and Figure 4.5 show that 80% of the time, both participants look at each 
other during post-expansions of base sequences (Post Ex. BS), while they do so only 50% of 
the time during sequence closing thirds (SCT). They also show that approximately one 
quarter of base sequences and sequence closing third turns are produced with only one 
participant looking at the other. 
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configurations 3 and 4 indicates that these two configurations actually occur regularly and are 
not just atypical cases of the gaze configuration 2. 
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Figure 4.6 Distribution of gaze configurations followed by sequence expansion 
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incomplete. The above results show that configurations 2, 3 and 4 are alike in that in all 
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Table 4.16 Gaze behavior during sequential structures preceding sequence possible completion 
Gaze BS Post Exp. BS SCT 
No gaze at all 37 (14.0%) 4 (2.8%) 15 (23.8%) 
Only one 
participant looks 
64 (24.2%) 17 (12.1%) 16 (25.4%) 
Both participants 
look at each other 
164 (61.9%) 112 (79.4%) 32 (50.8%) 
Total 265 (100%) 141 (100%) 63 (100%) 
 
Figure 4.7 Gaze behavior during sequential structures preceding sequence possible completion 
The data presented in Table 4.16 and Figure 4.7 suggest an interesting association between 
the co-occurrence of specific gaze behaviors (e.g., the small number of post-expansions 
produced with no gaze compared to the relatively large number of sequence closing thirds 
produced with no gaze) and the tendency of these structures to be followed by sequence 
expansion or not, as described in Table 4.6. One possible explanation for this association is 
that participants provide multiple simultaneous cues to the other participants in terms of their 
interpretation of the gist of the ongoing course of action and whether it might be brought to 
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closure or not. Alternatively, the association between sequential structures (and 
conversational units) and sequence expansion might be actually driven by the gaze behavior 
implemented during them. The first explanation seems more probable than the second, 
mainly because of evidence from telephone conversations. However, further work comparing 
such conversations with a larger corpus of video-recorded, co-present interaction is necessary 
in order to establish this conclusively. 
Finally, while describing what was happening in terms of gaze in the examples in § 
4.4 and 4.5, it was reported that the first person to withdraw gaze when both participants end 
up in configuration 1 (i.e., both participants look away at sequence completion) was the 
person who had initiated the course of action. If we focus on the 85 sequence possible 
completions in which configuration 1 is achieved, after both participants had looked toward
the other, an interesting finding emerges. Table 4.17 shows the distribution of sequence non-
expansion in relation to who looks away first. 
Table 4.17 Distribution of sequence expansion by which participant first looks away preceding gaze 
configuration 1 ( ) 
First who looks away Sequences expanded Sequence not expanded 
Initiator of course of action 5.9% (3/51) 94.1% (48/51) 
Other participant 23.5% (8/34) 76.5% (26/34) 
Table 4.17 indicates that when the first person who looks away is the person who initiated the 
course of action, sequence closure is significantly more likely (Fisher Exact test p< .05) than 
when the first person looking away is the recipient of the turn initiating the course of action.  
This section has shown how multiple factors affect the occurrence of sequence 
expansion (e.g., type of sequential structure and preference of what preceded the sequence 
possible completion). If both people sustain gaze toward each other at possible completion of 
a course of action, then the course of action is usually expanded, while if both participants 
look away, the course of action is usually brought to closure. Moreover, if only one 
participant keeps looking at the other at possible completion of the course of action, the 
course of action is likely to be expanded, though this is significantly less so than if both 
participants were looking at each other in the same sequential environment. Finally, if the 
first person who looks away is the initiator of the course of action, when both participants 
have been looking at each other, the course of action is more likely to be brought to closure at 
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closure or not. Alternatively, the association between sequential structures (and 
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the first possible completion of the sequence than if the first person looking away is the 
recipient of the initiating action. 
In what follows, cases that do not exhibit this pattern will be considered and an 
interactional account for their occurrence provided. 
 
4.7 “Deviant Cases” 
 
Although § 4.6 documented the regularity of the patterns outlined in § 4.4, an 
argument that these patterns are normative requires not only that they usually occur but that 
participants are oriented to their non-occurrence. Thus, in this section the 5% of cases in 
which both participants keep looking and the sequence does not get expanded are examined.  
 
4.7.1 Gaze Up  No Sequence Expansion 
 
Previously, the claim has been made that if both participants sustain their gaze toward 
each other, the sequence is treated as incomplete and should be expanded. However, the 
quantitative distribution of cases shows that in 6 cases of mutual gaze at possible completion 
of the sequence, the sequence does not get expanded.16 A closer look at these cases shows 
that sequence expansion does not occur for the following reason: in the context of a challenge 
or reiterated disagreement, avoiding expansion averts conflict and resists aligning with the 
other participant. 
Example 4.17 represents a case in point. In this example, a complaint does not get an 
immediate response and the response is pursued through gaze (see chapter 3). However, a 
response is performed gesturally, although it is not clear whether it is appropriately 
responding to the complaint or doing teasing. The person who initiated the complaint is the 
first person who looks away, although she does briefly look up again to monitor what the 
other participant is doing. The participant who produces the SPP then looks away, and, at this 
point, also the initiator of the sequence withdraws her gaze and re-engages the competing 
activity of eating. At the beginning of this excerpt, A complains about the fact that there was 
no surprise inside an Easter chocolate rabbit she recently bought (line 2). Our focus is the 
gaze behavior during line 5. 
                                                
16 The following analysis will not present all 6 deviant cases but the argument put forward nevertheless holds for 
them all. 
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(4.17) 2PLUNCH1-sorpresa 9:12 
01      (2.5) 
                                        
02 A:  Io ci son rimasta male che non c’ era  la sorpresa. 
       I  cl. am left    bad that not cl. was the surprise 
       I was disappointed because there was not the surprise.  
   ((Inside the chocolate rabbit)) 
                      
03         (1.0)     (0.2)     (1.3) 
                      (2.5) 
04 ((B makes gesture + facial expression like “what a pity”, Fig. 4.8)) 
 
Figure 4.8. Frame representing line 4 
                 
05      (0.2) (0.3)  (0.6)   (0.1)       (6.3) 
                       (7.5) 
06 A:  Beh insomma Angela ha vinto l’  Erasmus ad Heidelberg (0.2)  
       Well in sum Angela has won  the Erasmus at Heidelberg 
Well Angela won the Erasmus for Heidelberg (0.2)
A pursues a response to the complaint during the silence at line 3 by looking toward the 
addressee who withholds responding to the gaze pursuit for 1.3 seconds, until he produces a 
facial expression and a mildly empathetic gesture that can be glossed as “what a pity” (it 
appears ironic). Immediately afterwards, A looks down briefly but B keeps looking. A looks 
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up again but this time B looks down. A looks down as well and they re-engage eating for 
some seconds. Then, at line 6, A starts a completely new course of action telling B some 
news about a mutual friend. 
The fact that A looks up again and sustains brief mutual gaze after the responsive 
gesture suggests she either treats the gesture as insufficient as a response or she is checking 
whether B was actually teasing her; however, by the time B looks down, she aligns with A by 
also looking down and re-engaging with eating. On the other hand, B had just been accused 
by A of having eaten the entire chocolate rabbit and A has admitted his fault. Thus, he is 
clearly withholding response also after the engagement of mutual gaze at line 3. After the 
accusation, A seeks an affiliative response while B may continue looking to understand what 
A is trying to do and whether she is possibly launching a telling.17 This means that at possible 
sequence completion both participants could be orienting toward the possibility of sequence 
expansion for very different reasons. And, besides these reasons, A looks away first but then 
also looks back to monitor whether B has actually aligned with her gaze withdrawal (A is the 
person who initiated the sequence). 
Participants may also resist providing a response or a sequence expansion and evade 
the situation by unilaterally starting a new course of action, at a point in which further 
sequential talk was expected instead. In example 4.18, A has just reported to B that some of 
their colleagues did not attend one of their colleague’s husband’s funeral. After admitting that 
she did not go either, B also admits that she has not even called this colleague (presumably to 
give her condolences). In the telling that follows (lines 4-8), A reports that someone else did 
not go to the funeral and did not call their colleague and yet the colleague who lost her 
husband decided to call the one who had not attended the funeral after receiving a text 
message. Our target here is what happens during the silence at line 12. 
 
(4.18) 2PERLINE-chiamata 14:12  
 
01     (1.4) 
 
02 B:  Io non l’ho        chiamata 
       I  not her have.1s called 
       I did not call her 
 
                                                
17 Notice that some of the features of line 2 correspond to the ones discussed in chapter 2 as being usually 
associated with beginnings of extended tellings. 
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03      (0.4) 
04 A:  .hhh Io so      che  Marco le ha mandato un messaggio
       .hhh I  know.1s that Marco her has sent  a  message 
       .hhh I know that Marco sent her a sms 
05     dicendo=scusandosi del fatto che non: non l’aveva  
       saying  apologizing of fact  that not not her had 
      saying=apologizing for the fact that not he had not  
06     chiamata e   che  non si sentiva di chiamarla   e   lei  
       called   and that not cl felt    of calling her and she 
      called her and that he had not felt like calling her and she 
                                      
07     l’ha chiamato  e   ha  detto °ma  no insomma (.)  
       him has called and has said   but no I mean 
      called him and she said °but no I mean (.) 
                
08     si sono parlati° 
       cl are  talked 
      they talked°       
 
        
09     (0.7) 
              
10 B:  L’ha    chiamato lei, 
       Him has called   her 
      She called him, 
        
11 A:  Si’ 
       Yes 
      Yes 
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12     (3.5)    (0.3) 
           (3.8)     
                           
13 B:  ↑Sai     dove  sono stata? 
        Know.2s where have been 
      ↑Do you know where I have been? 
        
14     (0.8) 
15 B:  Cs- uh::::: sabato   sera (0.5) sono andata a  casa della  
           uh      Saturday evening    have gone   to home of 
      Cs- uh::::: Saturday evening(0.5) I went to the house of 
After A’s report, B asks A for confirmation about her understanding that the widow actually 
called the person who did not attend the funeral of her husband and this is confirmed by A
(line 11). At this point, the request for confirmation is complete and so is A’s telling. Given 
that B has not gone to the funeral and has not called her colleague, A’s telling is an attempt at 
consoling B for not having done what is expected with regards to their mutual colleague’s 
situation. Moreover, once A confirms that their colleague called someone who did exactly 
what B has done, it would seem possible for B to acknowledge A’s action in some way (e.g., 
state that she, too, could send a text message to their colleague). This means that this point 
represents possible sequence completion (the end of line 11). However, a closer look at the 
interactional contingencies of the course of action they are engaged in suggests that further 
sequential talk by B might occur at this point. Both participants keep looking at each other for 
3.5 seconds (line 12), until B looks down and starts a complete new course of action at line 
13 (where she projects the delivery of a telling that starts at line 15). By starting a new course 
of action, B does not publicly acknowledge A’s telling as a candidate solution to B’s 
problem, and at the same time, B does not state that she will do anything to fix the situation 
she was complaining about. By starting a new sequence, she avoids accepting or rejecting 
A’s indirect advice.  
307
The fact that B looks away 0.3 seconds before starting a new course of action also 
becomes a public display to A that she will not continue on the previous course of action. 
Indeed, it is interesting that before moving to a new course of action, and after having 
sustained mutual gaze, the speaker of the new sequence first withdraws from mutual gaze and 
only then starts the new turn of talk. While it could be claimed that there are cognitive 
reasons for looking away before producing a new turn of talk (see, e.g., Kendon, 1967 who 
claims that speakers look away before speaking to help planning their turn), it is significant 
that this looking away does not occur before every turn of talk, but rather before starting a 
new course of action once another one is still potentially open. Thus, in example 4.18 we 
have seen that in a situation in which some talk by one participant is potentially relevant—
though not conditionally relevant—next, that participant can resist providing such talk, and 
actually evade the situation by starting a completely new course of action. 
This section has shown how the few cases in which participants sustain mutual gaze 
and the sequence does not get expanded are explainable by providing a closer look at the 
interactional contingencies relevant in the local context in which they occur. Such “deviant” 
cases all involve one participant resisting aligning with the other and they also tend to occur 
in the context of (in)direct conflict or sanctioning. Such situations mainly demonstrate two 
things. First, that participants treat the sustaining of mutual gaze in this context as unusual or 
problematic, and, consequently, either repeatedly monitor what the other participant is doing 
with her/his eyes (see example 4.17), or unilaterally depart from the mutual gaze by looking 
away and starting a complete new course of action (example 4.18). In both examples, 
participants disengage from mutual gaze before the beginning of the next turn of talk, thereby 
displaying a clear orientation toward the normativity of gazing away to mark sequence 
completion. While they initially orient to possible sequence expansion at a TRP by sustaining 
their mutual gaze, during this TRP one participant initiates closing by looking away. This 
move toward closure can be acknowledged and “mirrored” by the other participant (4.17) or 
can be ignored (4.18) so that what follows is a unilateral closing and the beginning of a new 
course of action. Second, both examples confirm that transition relevance can be extended 
through time (metaphorically, it is a place and not a point). As a consequence, these examples 
suggest that limiting analysis to numbers (as is necessary for quantitative coding), which 
treats the TRP in terms of a very limited amount of time around turn completion, may mask 
our understanding that apparently ‘deviant’ cases are not actually deviant but in fact display 
the same orientation toward the norm as the other examples. If the norm is to expand the 
sequence when participants keep looking at each other at possible completion of a course of 
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The fact that B looks away 0.3 seconds before starting a new course of action also 
becomes a public display to A that she will not continue on the previous course of action. 
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with her/his eyes (see example 4.17), or unilaterally depart from the mutual gaze by looking 
away and starting a complete new course of action (example 4.18). In both examples, 
participants disengage from mutual gaze before the beginning of the next turn of talk, thereby 
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treats the TRP in terms of a very limited amount of time around turn completion, may mask 
our understanding that apparently ‘deviant’ cases are not actually deviant but in fact display 
the same orientation toward the norm as the other examples. If the norm is to expand the 
sequence when participants keep looking at each other at possible completion of a course of 
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action, then not expanding indicates some form of resistance. Returning to the cases that did 
not fit the proposed pattern sheds additional light on the nuances of how gaze behavior is 
related to sequence organization and the organization of action in interaction. 
 
4.8 Discussion 
 
This chapter outlines specific patterns of gaze behavior occurring when participants 
approach possible completion of a course of action, and shows their interactional uses. It is an 
empirical and methodological issue to show that participants orient toward a gesture, posture, 
facial expression or gaze behavior as a practice for doing something and not toward 
something else in the conversation. It is also an issue to show that there is a possible causal 
link between the occurrence of visible behavior and the reactions that participants produce. 
As Schegloff (2004: 22) states:  
Efforts to ground analytic characterizations of conduct in interaction 
in the demonstrable orientations of the participants are subject to 
challenge if the participants do not overtly announce such 
orientations. […] How in that case can a claim be warranted? Or how 
can such a linkage be disputed if there are theoretical grounds for 
expecting it? In general, how do we know anything about the 
orientations of persons to their environment, setting, "umwelt," 
"context," etc., or specific aspects of it, without their articulate 
expression? Can we know such things, and, if so, how? 
 
This work has provided support for specific characterizations of visible behavior as effective 
interactional moves. Such characterizations are possible by building up collections of 
examples that take into account different variables and by choosing aspects of behavior that 
are visible, ostensive and can be enacted by other participants as well.  
The general findings presented in this chapter are the following: 
 
When a sequence can end,  
1. if both look away, it usually will end.  
2. otherwise it will usually be expanded. 
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Qualitative and quantitative evidence for these claims has been provided and all the cases that 
do not seem to fit with the predicted pattern have been accounted for. Some questions remain 
in terms of the import of these findings, and, in what follows, I outline some of them. 
First of all, these gaze practices confirm something conversation analysts have long 
argued about the relationship between sequences and actions (e.g., it is not always the case 
that a course of action is accomplished via a single sequence of talk; see, for example, 
Schegloff, 2007b). In addition, however, this chapter shows how participants orient toward 
action completion rather than only sequence completion. As shown in § 4.5, gaze is sensitive 
to participants’ understanding of where they are in a course of action. If gaze is sustained by 
participants once they get to possible completion of a sequence, this displays an orientation 
toward that sequence as one step within a course of action. A course of action that can be 
projected by what gets said and done in every single sequence. Gaze withdrawal, on the other 
hand, deals with action closure. It signals closure even when the action cannot be 
accomplished because of specific contingencies. So, for example, a glance at example 4.14 
might suggest that what precedes a complaint are just two different sequences that request 
specific information. But if we look at the gaze behavior of the participants, we can see that 
they orient toward each sequence as one step in a larger course of action or interactional 
project. In differentiating between “sequences” and “interactional project”, or more 
specifically between “sequences” and “courses of action”, this chapter follows a distinction 
previously suggested by Clark (1996) and Schegloff (2007b) and currently further 
emphasized by Levinson (in press). In particular, this chapter provides further empirical 
evidence for the necessity of this distinction. 
This chapter has also addressed Schegloff’s work on sequence organization and his 
recent distinction between the unit “sequence” and courses of action performed through 
multiple sequences. The analysis put forward here suggests through their gaze behavior, 
participants orient toward completion of courses of action independently of whether those 
actions are accomplished through a single sequence or multiple ones. It therefore confirms 
the relevance of showing the close relationship between these extended courses of action and 
single sequences.  
There are a number of reasons for distinguishing single sequences of talk from 
“sequences of sequences”. Apart from noting their labels and structural similarities, it is also 
important to see what participants make of them. As far as gaze behavior is concerned, this 
chapter shows that participants more than orienting toward these two structures, orient toward 
the accomplishment of courses of action. A completion of a course of action naturally 
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participants orient toward completion of courses of action independently of whether those 
actions are accomplished through a single sequence or multiple ones. It therefore confirms 
the relevance of showing the close relationship between these extended courses of action and 
single sequences.  
There are a number of reasons for distinguishing single sequences of talk from 
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important to see what participants make of them. As far as gaze behavior is concerned, this 
chapter shows that participants more than orienting toward these two structures, orient toward 
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constitutes also the completion of a sequence of talk or of a sequence of sequences. This is 
because sequences refer to a structure related to the relationship between turns produced by 
different participants, while course of action refers to what participants are trying to do via 
those turns, in other words their illocutionary force (Austin, 1962). This work also further 
contributes to research on sequence organization by showing an orientation by both 
participants toward the adjacency pair as not only a possible unit for building action, but the 
most minimal sequence (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Considering only the range of actions 
presented in this chapter (and not for example sequences of talk that might occur in a 
classroom interaction), a sequence with a third position turn is treated as an expanded 
sequence. This does not mean, however, that there are no actions that by default require more 
than two turns (e.g., summons-answer-reason for the summons). It simply shows that there 
are many sequences for which two turns are necessary and sufficient. 
A more general point throughout this dissertation concerns what gaze can tell us about 
how participants process and analyze what is happening on-line and where they are in the 
development of a course of action. This is crucial for performing appropriate next actions and 
avoiding accountability for misunderstanding of which action was expected from us. We 
show others how we understand what has just happened in terms of being the possible end of 
the course of action or not. And, gaze can be an additional window into how others 
understand where they are in the ongoing sequence. Coordination of closure is not additive. It 
is mutual. An individual can show an orientation toward the norm (as I have shown 
throughout this chapter), but cannot usually accomplish efficient closure unless the other 
aligns with it at a certain point. One can try to initiate closure, but this does not mean that 
s/he can easily accomplish it (see example 4.17).  
These last considerations resonate with what Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 290) wrote 
about closing a conversation:  
 
The ‘closing problem’ is […] a problem for conversationalists; […] 
closings are to be seen as achievements, as solutions to certain 
problems of conversational organization.  
 
Why is closure achieved when both participants coordinate their withdrawal of gaze before or 
at possible completion? Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 297) explained the necessity of two 
utterances produced by different speakers to do openings or closings of conversations: 
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By an adjacently positioned second, a speaker can show that he 
understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is willing to go along 
with that. Also, by virtue of the occurrence of an adjacently produced 
second, the doer of a first can see that what he intended was indeed 
understood, and that it was or was not accepted.  
 
The adjacent positioning of gaze withdrawal is relevant for coordinating sequence closure. If 
gaze toward the other participant at possible completion of a sequence indicates that a 
possible expansion could occur, then no-gaze by both participants in the same sequential 
position indicates an implicit agreement toward non-expansion. 
But who should initiate closure and what are the consequences? As we have seen, it is 
rare that one interactant lowers her/his gaze then looks up briefly to check whether the other 
is looking down too. Accordingly, there must be some kind of preference for the initiation of 
closure by one of the participants in a way that allows the other one to recognize the action 
and possibly (dis)align with it. Throughout this chapter it was noted that often the person who 
first withdraws her/his gaze is the person who initiated the entire course of action and the 
other usually follows. Table 4.17 provided quantitative evidence that the participant who 
looks away first affects the likelihood of the occurrence of sequence expansion. There are 
obvious reasons for this such as the usual order of gaze withdrawal: if a participant is trying 
to accomplish some action, once that action is accomplished, s/he can display her/his 
satisfaction by closing it down. As far as that individual is concerned, nothing further is 
necessary. However, it can happen that the person who initiated the course of action looks 
away but at that point the course of action is potentially changing its trajectory (see, for 
example, 4.17-4.18). Or, it is possible that the person who looks away first is not the person 
who started the ongoing course of action, but is nevertheless the one who wants to end it, 
possibly to initiate a new one. These possibilities show that every completion is, indeed, an 
interactional achievement as it deals with the contingencies of what can happen during the 
development of a course of action. Moreover, this shows an asymmetry of agency in action 
sequences: the one who instigates the action sequence is the 'owner' of it, meaning that he/she 
has a greater right to determine its closure or expansion (Enfield, 2011). 
I have already stressed that this gaze behavior has the double feature of being context 
free and context sensitive at the same time. All four of the gaze configurations can occur and 
the implications remain the same, independent of the conversational topic and of the 
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participants.18 This makes it “context-free”. On the other hand, as shown in § 4.7, local 
contingencies can account for what appears to be, at least, slight deviation from the usual 
pattern. This makes it “context-sensitive”. 
How can people project whether a turn is a first pair part or the beginning of a 
sequence of sequences? That is, how do people know that something is a pre-sequence rather 
than a base sequence? The fact that participants sustain mutual gaze at completion of 
sequences, which are part of larger courses of action, confirms that people can systematically 
distinguish a pre-sequence from a base sequence. Our capacity to project what will come next 
in a conversation and display our understanding on-line is a crucial feature that allows our 
interactions to proceed so rapidly and effectively, a matter taken up in the conclusions. 
A final, more general question to address here concerns whether gaze withdrawal is 
doing closing. Is it proposing closure? Is it displaying participants’ engagement in the 
conversation? Or is it just an emergent structure of the concurrent occurrence of closure of 
the sequence? In other words, is gaze withdrawal a signal people use or is it something that 
co-occurs with sequence closure, but does not play any specific role in expanding or closing 
the sequence? By looking away and not looking back at the other participant, one displays a 
stance toward and an understanding of the course of action that can be aligned with or not by 
the other participant. One participant’s gaze withdrawal does not make anything 
conditionally relevant, but it does make a bid for closing. If the gaze withdrawal is aligned by 
the other participant, then closure can occur and usually does occur. If not aligned, usually 
some sequence expansion will occur. The claim here is that gaze negotiates sequence closure 
in cases where closure is in principle problematic; while in more routine cases, it may merely 
signal understanding that the sequence is complete. In other words, it can be both a signal and 
a symptom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 It is an open empirical question whether the meaning of gaze behavior at possible sequence completion 
changes in specific institutional settings. It is, on the other hand, very likely affected by culture. 
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5  Conclusions 
 
 
In all viable systems, there must be an area where the individual is free to make choices so as to 
manipulate the system to his advantage. 
Leach (1962: 133) On Certain Unconsidered Aspects of Double Descent Systems 
 
 
5.1 The Findings 
 
This dissertation has examined how humans use their eyes and their bodies during 
face-to-face interactions. Previous research on eye gaze in face-to-face interaction claimed 
that gaze behavior was affected by variables exogenous to the interaction (e.g., gender, age, 
social status; see, e.g. Ellsworth & Ludwig, 1972; Kleinke, 1986 for reviews), that it displays 
the degree of engagement of participants in the conversation (e.g., Argyle & Cook, 1976; 
Goffman, 1963; Goodwin, 1981), that it has a regulatory role in turn taking (e.g., Duncan, 
1975; Kendon, 1967) and, finally, that it has a role in implementing social actions, depending 
on its context and delivery (e.g., Kidwell, 2005, 2009; Sidnell, 2006). This dissertation 
provides several key findings that necessitate a rethinking of some of these claims.  
 Chapter 2 shows that when a person is the recipient of a multi-unit telling, they will 
tend to direct their gaze to the speaker during the first turn of that telling. But when a person 
is the recipient of the first turn of an adjacency pair, they do not show a particular tendency in 
gaze behaviour. As such gaze is used differently depending on the social actions and 
activities in which interactants are involved. Interactants are shown to have different norms 
for gazing at their co-interactants depending on whether they are involved in extended multi-
unit turns (extended tellings) or turn-by-turn talk (adjacency-pair-based sequences). In the 
former context, listeners should gaze at speakers within the completion of the first TCU of 
the projected telling. By contrast, in turn-by-turn talk such as question-answer sequences, 
listener gaze is not treated as normatively required during the first TCU of the sequence 
initiating action. This poses a puzzle for how, within the first TCU, listeners ascertain 
whether or not they are hearing the first TCU of an extended telling or a single TCU 
announcement, for instance. The answer lies, at least in part, in the fact that listeners rely on 
“fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), based on the semantic domains 
entailed in the utterance, to recognize the course of action the speaker is initiating. For 
312
312
participants.18 This makes it “context-free”. On the other hand, as shown in § 4.7, local 
contingencies can account for what appears to be, at least, slight deviation from the usual 
pattern. This makes it “context-sensitive”. 
How can people project whether a turn is a first pair part or the beginning of a 
sequence of sequences? That is, how do people know that something is a pre-sequence rather 
than a base sequence? The fact that participants sustain mutual gaze at completion of 
sequences, which are part of larger courses of action, confirms that people can systematically 
distinguish a pre-sequence from a base sequence. Our capacity to project what will come next 
in a conversation and display our understanding on-line is a crucial feature that allows our 
interactions to proceed so rapidly and effectively, a matter taken up in the conclusions. 
A final, more general question to address here concerns whether gaze withdrawal is 
doing closing. Is it proposing closure? Is it displaying participants’ engagement in the 
conversation? Or is it just an emergent structure of the concurrent occurrence of closure of 
the sequence? In other words, is gaze withdrawal a signal people use or is it something that 
co-occurs with sequence closure, but does not play any specific role in expanding or closing 
the sequence? By looking away and not looking back at the other participant, one displays a 
stance toward and an understanding of the course of action that can be aligned with or not by 
the other participant. One participant’s gaze withdrawal does not make anything 
conditionally relevant, but it does make a bid for closing. If the gaze withdrawal is aligned by 
the other participant, then closure can occur and usually does occur. If not aligned, usually 
some sequence expansion will occur. The claim here is that gaze negotiates sequence closure 
in cases where closure is in principle problematic; while in more routine cases, it may merely 
signal understanding that the sequence is complete. In other words, it can be both a signal and 
a symptom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 It is an open empirical question whether the meaning of gaze behavior at possible sequence completion 
changes in specific institutional settings. It is, on the other hand, very likely affected by culture. 
313
 
5  Conclusions 
 
 
In all viable systems, there must be an area where the individual is free to make choices so as to 
manipulate the system to his advantage. 
Leach (1962: 133) On Certain Unconsidered Aspects of Double Descent Systems 
 
 
5.1 The Findings 
 
This dissertation has examined how humans use their eyes and their bodies during 
face-to-face interactions. Previous research on eye gaze in face-to-face interaction claimed 
that gaze behavior was affected by variables exogenous to the interaction (e.g., gender, age, 
social status; see, e.g. Ellsworth & Ludwig, 1972; Kleinke, 1986 for reviews), that it displays 
the degree of engagement of participants in the conversation (e.g., Argyle & Cook, 1976; 
Goffman, 1963; Goodwin, 1981), that it has a regulatory role in turn taking (e.g., Duncan, 
1975; Kendon, 1967) and, finally, that it has a role in implementing social actions, depending 
on its context and delivery (e.g., Kidwell, 2005, 2009; Sidnell, 2006). This dissertation 
provides several key findings that necessitate a rethinking of some of these claims.  
 Chapter 2 shows that when a person is the recipient of a multi-unit telling, they will 
tend to direct their gaze to the speaker during the first turn of that telling. But when a person 
is the recipient of the first turn of an adjacency pair, they do not show a particular tendency in 
gaze behaviour. As such gaze is used differently depending on the social actions and 
activities in which interactants are involved. Interactants are shown to have different norms 
for gazing at their co-interactants depending on whether they are involved in extended multi-
unit turns (extended tellings) or turn-by-turn talk (adjacency-pair-based sequences). In the 
former context, listeners should gaze at speakers within the completion of the first TCU of 
the projected telling. By contrast, in turn-by-turn talk such as question-answer sequences, 
listener gaze is not treated as normatively required during the first TCU of the sequence 
initiating action. This poses a puzzle for how, within the first TCU, listeners ascertain 
whether or not they are hearing the first TCU of an extended telling or a single TCU 
announcement, for instance. The answer lies, at least in part, in the fact that listeners rely on 
“fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), based on the semantic domains 
entailed in the utterance, to recognize the course of action the speaker is initiating. For 
313
314
example, while TCUs that initiate tellings often have a first person (singular or plural) 
subject, contain time references to the past or the future, indicate epistemic access to the 
events reported, and/or mention a third person not previously discussed, first TCUs that 
initiate adjacency pairs often have a second person (singular or plural) subject and contain 
deictics and modal verbs. The different categories of words that participants choose to design 
their sequence initiating actions provide cues to the recipients about whether that turn is the 
beginning of an extended telling or the first pair part of an adjacency-pair-based sequence.1 
The findings of this chapter provide a refining of Goffman’s (1981a) analysis of the different 
types of hearers that may occur in a social situation. Goffman differentiated between 
“official” and “unofficial” participants. Within “official” participants, he distinguished 
“addressed” and “unaddressed” recipients and among the “unofficial” he differentiated 
“eavesdroppers” from “overhearers”, “bystanders” and “audiences”. Chapter 2 shows that 
within the category of “addressed recipients”, we can further distinguish a recipient of an 
extended telling from a recipient of the first pair part of an adjacency pair sequence. This 
added specification refines our understanding of participation in a social situation and 
recognizes the behavior that an individual is expected to implement for acting as an attentive 
and “addressed” recipient. These findings, then, indicate the need for a recontextualization of 
many of the prior claims about gaze, in particular the ones developed in experimental 
settings, since those studies did not usually take into account the content of the conversation 
and the social actions performed through each turn at talk. Moreover, the findings reported in 
chapter 2 suggest that prior studies suffered from the methodological problem of not 
controlling for conversational activity type, to be discussed further in § 5.2. 
 Chapter 3 describes the way gaze can be used to mobilize recipient response in 
conversation. Whereas previous work focused on vocal resources and how they might be 
implemented to pursue recipient response, the findings reported in this chapter reveal that 
gaze alone is sufficient to mobilize response. And, it shows that this can be done not only at a 
transition relevance place but also in the context of a story telling, after a laughable or as a 
try-marker. These findings suggest that gaze is a resource for doing far more in interaction 
than was previously shown. Specifically, chapter 3 shows how, even in the context of silence, 
speaker gaze can mobilize recipient response and this finding adds to prior literature on 
pursuits and on linguistic features that might be deployed for mobilizing responses, such as 
syntax or prosody. 
                                                
1 See Levinson (in press) for an overview of action formation and action ascription in social interaction. 
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 Finally, Chapter 4 discusses how speakers navigate the closure of sequences. The 
analysis shows that participants orient to the relevance of gaze withdrawal at sequence 
completion when this coincides with the completion of a course of action. This contrasts with 
previous studies that argued that gaze was primarily related to turn taking. The data reported 
in this chapter show that participants’ gaze is sensitive to where participants are in a course of 
action. When participants can and want to close a sequence, they will tend withdraw their 
gaze. In contexts where gaze is not withdrawn, sequences are expanded until they can be 
closed in the absence of interactants’ gaze. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize how the chapters of this dissertation have explored both 
the speaker’s and the recipient’s gaze behavior at the beginning, during and at completion of 
the interactional environments discussed in chapter 2, namely, Extended-Telling Sequences 
(ETS) and Adjacency-Pair-Based Sequences (APBS). 
 
Table 5.1 Speaker and recipient gaze behavior documented for ETS. 
 First TCU During telling Possible completion 
Speaker (Minimally Ch. 2) (Minimally Ch. 3) (Minimally Ch. 4) 
Recipient Ch. 2 Ch. 2 Ch. 4 
  
 
Table 5.2 Speaker and recipient gaze behavior documented for APBS. 
 First TCU2 Between FPP and 
SPP 
Possible completion 
Speaker Ch. 3 Ch. 3 Ch. 4 
Recipient Ch. 2, Ch. 3 Ch. 3 Ch. 4 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that this dissertation has documented both participants’ gaze 
behavior in both sequential environments. This is the first work to extensively document the 
systematicity of gaze behavior at this level of granularity, and the first to show such a strong 
correlation between gaze behavior and the overall interactional project, the participants’ goals 
and the actions participants accomplish. The analyses here presented suggest that the 
principal units around which gaze behavior in face-to-face conversation is organized are not 
just turns at talk, but rather the achievement of course of action and the organization of the 
                                                
2 See also Rossano (2010) and Rossano et al. (2009) for work on gaze during the first TCU of APBSs, with a 
focus on questions. 
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sequential structures that were used in order to do so. Some specific gaze behaviors may be 
related to other cognitive or biological factors, rather than a particular sequential environment 
(e.g., closing one’s eyes during a word search to facilitate a lexical search, and looking at 
objects before, and at times during, reaching for them, respectively). While it might be 
tempting to interpret the examples just mentioned as deviations from the interactional order 
outlined in this dissertation, I rather see them as additional factors affecting the orderliness of 
gaze behavior. They could also be interpreted as part of the “natural meaning” of gaze: It 
remains to be established what takes precedence between the biological, cognitive/processing 
and interactional factors when their outcome would convey conflicting signals (for example 
if one would like to grab a glass but also continue the sequential development of a course of 
action, withdrawing gaze from the addressee at possible sequence completion to look toward 
the glass might be problematic and be misinterpreted). Note also that the regulatory functions 
of gaze behavior reported in this dissertation are not independent of what is done and said 
during any interaction and the courses of actions accomplished within that interaction, and so 
they do not apply to every single turn at talk. 
 
 
5.2 Methodological Contribution 
 
Harvey Sacks once remarked that “the important theories in the social sciences have 
tended to view a society as a piece of machinery with relatively few orderly products, where, 
then, much of what else takes place is more or less random” (1984: 21). He was, with 
Garfinkel (1967), one of the first to suggest that orderliness of social conduct in social 
interaction should be an assumption, rather than an exception, otherwise social life and social 
understanding for practical purposes would be impossible. This dissertation extends Sacks’ 
claim by showing that not only talk-in-interaction, but also gaze behavior in talk-in-
interaction is orderly and not random. To discover the orderliness of gaze behavior, I focused 
on a series of practices implemented through gaze. Following Heritage (2011: 213), I use the 
term “practice” in the following way:  
 
A 'practice' is any feature of the design of a turn in a sequence that (i) 
has a distinctive character, (ii) has specific locations within a turn or 
sequence, and (iii) is distinctive in its consequences for the nature or 
the meaning of the action that the turn implements. 
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For example, one of the practices described in this dissertation is pursuing responses 
through gaze. The practice consists of a speaker looking toward the recipient at the TRP 
following a sequence-initiating action that has not yet been responded to. The “distinctive 
consequences” are that recipients often interpret this gaze behavior as a pursuit and upon its 
occurrence provide a response. Part of the “distinctive character” of the social action 
implemented through this gaze behavior is that a response is pursued without officially 
treating the lack of response as evidence of forthcoming dispreferred response or trouble in 
hearing or understanding (an argument developed in chapter 3).  
To identify and analyze some of these different practices implemented through gaze 
in social interaction, I relied on a systematic investigative method that developed through the 
following steps:  
Step 1: A detailed analysis of a corpus of interactional fragments led to the 
development of a characterization of a practice, of the variables relevant for the occurrence 
and effectiveness of the practice and of the interactional environment in which the practice 
would usually occur (e.g., recipients looking toward speakers during the first TCU of an ETS 
or an APBS).  
Step 2: Using a different portion of the dataset, the data were then coded for multiple 
factors to establish the systematicity of the practice and test its effectiveness statistically 
within a specific interactional domain (e.g., by selecting all first TCUs of ETS and APBS in 
the dataset and verifying how often recipients would look toward speakers if they were not 
already looking).  
Step 3: Deviant cases were analyzed to assess the accuracy of the initial 
characterization of the practice (e.g., by looking at what happened in the instances in which a 
recipient did not look at the speaker within the first TCU of an ETS).  
The method of analysis here reported can be summarized as follows: 
 
Single instances model of practice test reliability of practice account for deviant cases 
 
To analyze the corpus of interactional fragments (step 1) from a qualitative 
perspective, I adopted the methods of conversation analysis (CA). Pomerantz (1990: 231) 
outlines three types of claims analysts often provide:  
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a. A characterization of the social action investigated (e.g., offer, request, invitation);  
 
b. Analyses of methods [i.e. practices] used by the interactants for accomplishing that 
action;  
 
c. A detailed characterization of the sequential features and interactional 
consequences of those method(s) [practices].  
 
After developing a characterization of the possible practice from a corpus of possible 
instances (step 1 of my methods above) as Pomerantz proposes, in step 2 I did not look for 
more instances of the same practice (e.g., I did not look for all the times in which a recipient 
might look at a speaker during a first TCU of an ETS or an APBS). Rather, I looked for the 
slot relevant for the occurrence of that practice and investigated the gaze behavior that 
occurred in that slot, coding what happened, interactionally, after the implementation of the 
practice or the occurrence of any alternative gaze behavior in that “slot”. By doing so, I have 
attempted to test the accuracy of my characterization of the practice and its function by 
attempting to falsify it (Popper, 1959 [1934]).  
In step 2 of each chapter this dissertation combines qualitative observations developed 
through CA with quantitative methods in order to document the robustness and reliability of 
the practices investigated across the data. The use of quantitative methods has been debated 
within CA. On one hand, there are strong proponents of the inclusion of frequencies and 
statistics in analytic reports, especially in the context of applied research (e.g., Robinson, 
2007; Heritage, 1999). On the other hand, there are those who consistently warned about 
losing track of the specificity of each instantiation of every interactional practice when they 
are grouped for the purposes of abstract quantification (e.g., Schegloff, 1993, 1997). 
Quantitative methods nevertheless continue to be adopted by some CA scholars. Sometimes 
the frequencies of the distribution of some interactional phenomenon are provided (Egbert, 
1996; Ford & Thompson, 1996; Jefferson, 2004b), while other times, correlations between 
interactional phenomena are described (e.g., social action performed through talk and 
occurrence of applause in political speeches, see Heritage & Greatbach, 1986). Perhaps most 
often, quantitative approaches are applied in the context of institutional settings, in order to 
assess the association between an interactional phenomenon and some exogenous variable, be 
it time (e.g., in Clayman, Heritage, Elliott, & McDonald, 2007), race or class (e.g., in Stivers 
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& Majid, 2007) or prescribing outcomes or provider perception (e.g., in Mangione-Smith, 
Stivers, Elliott, McDonald, & Heritage, 2003). Most recently, some conversation analysts 
have used quantitative methods for analyzing ordinary conversation from a cross-cultural 
perspective (e.g., Fox et al., 2009; Rossano et al., 2009; Stivers et al., 2009). By combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods, the findings significantly enhance our understanding of 
the functions of gaze in social interaction by showing the practices described to be recurrent, 
systematic and reliable in their production. I have addressed the problems of quantitative 
work by a) first establishing the validity of the practices I am counting, and b) not allowing 
the 'deviant' cases to be dismissed as mere noise. 
This dissertation also shows the advantages of relying on large corpora in that it 
reveals the robustness of specific claims about interactional practices. One of the goals of 
building a corpus of instances of a practice is to assess the systematicity of that practice and 
what factors might play a role in its deployment and effectiveness (see, e.g., Schegloff, 
1996a, 1997). Single-case analyses can help us appreciate the complexity of a practice or 
raise the possibility that a practice might deal with a specific interactional issue (e.g., 
Goodwin, 1979). However, if one describes an interactional phenomenon as a practice but 
only looks at a single example then s/he is simply hypothesizing that this behavior is not 
idiosyncratic but is, in fact, a practice. A more systematic investigation (including an analysis 
of a large corpus of data and examples that range in terms of type of interaction and the 
participants involved) is necessary to confirm that hypothesis and identify its normative 
implications. Notice here that the contrast is not between doing single-case analyses and 
developing large corpora, as both options are important and central components to the 
enterprise of understanding social behavior. The contrast rather lies in the goals of the 
analytic enterprise. Indeed, the issue often lies in the attempt of making general claims about 
the normative dimensions or systematic implementation of some behavior relying on data 
from a single interaction or a single participant in that interaction. This is problematic for two 
reasons: 
 
1) Idiosyncratic behaviors exist and, even in a normative system, sometimes 
participants “let [them] pass” (Garfinkel, 1967) or avoid displaying an 
orientation to a violation (e.g., Robinson, 2007) either because they are 
familiar with the idiosyncratic behavior of that individual or they want to 
avoid altering the progressivity of the conversation (Schegloff, 2007b); 
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2) Confirmation biases exist and we tend to notice the existence of 
infrastructures and practices when they fail or break down. So, without 
attempting to falsify a claim, the risk is to present something that is actually 
not normative nor typical as if it were normative or typical. 
 
An inductive approach to the data investigated in this dissertation might have led to 
presenting 3 examples of recipients not looking at the speaker at the beginning of an ETS 
(see chapter 2) as evidence of a practice aimed at avoiding looking at speakers at beginning 
of tellings, or 6 examples of sequence closure after sustaining mutual gaze at possible 
sequence completion (see chapter 4) as evidence of a practice aimed at suggesting sequence 
closure via sustaining mutual gaze at possible completion of a sequence. In both cases, such a 
report would not account for whether such behaviors are representative or rather atypical. 
Typicality can be even more difficult to assess since certain behaviors can occur in a specific 
environment in a significant number of cases and yet not be the ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ thing to 
do. For example, Rossano et al. (2009) showed that in approximately 75% of questions in 3 
unrelated languages (out of 300 questions per language), speakers look toward their 
addressee. This means that for each language, the authors of this study could have presented 
up to 75 instances (the remaining 25% of the cases) in which the speaker did not look toward 
the addressee during questions and claimed the behavior to be “typical” for the speakers of 
those languages. In doing so, they would have represented a behavior that occurs only 
approximately one fourth of the time as representative of the default strategy or most 
common gaze behavior for naturally occurring questions in each of the three languages. One 
of the tasks for the analyst remains accounting for the occurrence of cases either considered 
deviant, or that do not follow the usual deployment or effectiveness of the practice identified. 
For all these reasons, it seems clear that combining qualitative and quantitative methods can 
only add strength to our claims, rather than weaken them. According to Max Weber (1978 
[1922]: 12):  
 
A correct causal interpretation of typical action means that the process 
which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both adequately grasped 
on the level of meaning and at the same time the interpretation is to 
some degree causally adequate. […] even the most perfect adequacy 
on the level of meaning has causal significance from a sociological 
point of view only insofar as there is some kind of proof for the 
existence of a probability that action in fact normally takes the course 
which has been held to be meaningful. For this there must be some 
321
degree of determinable frequency of approximation to an average or a 
pure type. 
 
A closer look at the data presented in Table 5.3 can further illustrate the importance of 
combining the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to social interaction. 
In the previous chapters, statistics concerning participants’ gaze behavior during 10 minutes 
selected from each interaction were reported (for more details about each interaction, see 
Appendix A). Table 5.3 reports the total percent and amount of time each participant in each 
interaction looks toward the other participant’s face and the amount of time the two 
participants engaged in mutual gaze. 
 
Table 5.3 Summary of frequency and duration of participants’ gaze toward each other and of mutual 
gaze. 
Name of Extract Time Gaze AB Time Gaze BA Time Mutual Gaze 
2PERLINE 02:36 (26%) 02:35 (26%) 01:29 (15%) 
2GC 05:30 (55%) 04:56 (49%) 03:18 (33%) 
2GSOFA 07:44 (77%) 08:06 (81%) 06:17 (63%) 
2GGOSS 06:55 (69%) 08:59 (90%) 06:08 (61%) 
2GSTUDYING 06:07 (61%) 05:22 (54%) 03:20 (33%) 
2PCOMP 00:54 (9%) 02:31 (25%) 00:35 (6%) 
2PLUNCH 03:32 (35%) 04:04 (40%) 02:00 (20%) 
2PPLAN 04:06 (41%) 03:35 (36%) 01:49 (18%) 
2GCOLL 04:53 (49%) 03:01 (30%) 02:10 (22%) 
2PEXAM 03:56 (39%) 01:37 (16%) 01:14 (12%) 
 
There are mainly three ways of interpreting the data reported in Table 5.3, but what I wish to 
highlight is how uninformative and arguably unproductive it is to simply report how long 
each participant looked toward the other during a particular interaction. The first way would 
consist in explaining the numbers as idiosyncrasies of the participants, related to individual 
differences (e.g., participant B in 2PCOMP, a young man, looks at participant A 9% of the 
time, while in 2GGOSS participant B, a young woman, looks at participant A 90% of the 
time). Another way of interpreting those numbers would assume that they are actually 
orderly, but would use macro-categories such as gender or type of relationship between the 
participants to account for them. A, third, alternative, interpretation, grounded in the 
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2) Confirmation biases exist and we tend to notice the existence of 
infrastructures and practices when they fail or break down. So, without 
attempting to falsify a claim, the risk is to present something that is actually 
not normative nor typical as if it were normative or typical. 
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which has been held to be meaningful. For this there must be some 
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degree of determinable frequency of approximation to an average or a 
pure type. 
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participants’ behaviors in the interactions, is to examine the activities the participants are 
engaged in during the interactions under investigation. For example, participant B in 
2PCOMP spends the majority of his time looking at a computer screen and a picture album, 
while participant B in 2GGOSS is mainly engaged in listening to participant A’s extended 
tellings. Keeping in mind these different activities, if we then consider the examples of these 
participants’ gaze behavior presented throughout this dissertation, such behavior does not in 
fact reflect any individual idiosyncrasies. Moreover, regarding the relationship between these 
two participants and their co-interlocutors, there is no doubt that they are all very close 
friends, but the 2PCOMP interaction is full of quips, jokes and teases to a much greater 
extent than the 2GGOSS one. So according to the relationship variable, there should not be 
much of a difference, but there is difference in terms of the activities that are performed 
throughout the interaction. The fact that the amount of mutual gaze in interaction does not 
necessarily indicate the degree of intimacy of the participants, contrary to what has been 
previously claimed in the literature (see, e.g., Thayer & Schiff, 1974), is confirmed by 
comparing any of the interactions in Table 5.3. For example, comparing the 2GC interaction 
(33% of time spent in mutual gaze) and 2PERLINE (15%), there is no difference in gender in 
terms of participants in the interactions, as all participants are women. In terms of the 
intimacy of the relationship, one might expect that the ones who are closer and better friends 
would look at each other more than the others. However, the two friends in 2GC had a 
problematic interaction in that they disagreed on multiple occasions during that conversation 
and as a consequence they stopped seeing each other after that interaction, while the 
participants in 2PERLINE have remained very good friends. On the other hand, the activities 
the participants are involved in, the type of sequences they produce and the amount of silence 
that occurs vary significantly. In 2GC, the participants are engaged in catching up over 
dessert and they produce multiple extended tellings. In 2PERLINE, the participants are also 
catching up, but while one is instructing the other on how to make flowers with beads. A 
large part of their conversation develops in turn-by-turn talk and they produce only few 
extended tellings. Also, to work on the manual task both of them must pay attention to the 
materials they are manipulating and as we know, this requires visual focus on the items that 
need to be picked up and moved. Like the previous two interactions compared, the 
participants in 2GC and in 2PERLINE do not show any noticeable deviation in terms of their 
gaze behavior as described in the terms of this dissertation. In other words, what participants 
do with their eyes in any interaction, regardless of the variation in terms of exogenous factors 
such as gender or degree of intimacy, can be explained across individuals mainly by taking 
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into account the activities they are engaged in, the actions they perform through their talk and 
the sequential environment in which their gaze behavior occurs. Thus, it is crucial to analyze 
and report exactly what the participants are doing during an interaction, both with their 
bodies and with their talk, if we want to understand any individual’s gaze behavior. So, for 
example, rather than simply assuming that men look at each other less than women (see, e.g., 
Ellsworth & Ludwig, 1972), we might look at the nature of the interaction and the kinds of 
conversational activities men engage in as compared to women. Individual differences may 
of course exist, as may gender differences, but what has previously been reported as striking 
individual differences, gender effects, or clear indicators of the participants’ relationship, 
might better be explained and accounted for by focusing on the structure of participants’ talk 
in relation to the tasks and competing activities, they are engaged in. Thus, this dissertation 
not only provides evidence of the significant relationship between gaze, talk, action and 
activities but also highlights the importance of re-evaluating previous claims in light of a 
more nuanced understanding of this relationship in talk-in-interaction. 
Along these lines, another methodological contribution of this dissertation concerns 
the focus on the relationship between what people are doing through their gaze behavior and 
their talk. Often analysts tend to focus only on talk or only on visible behavior and fail to 
appreciate the intricate connection between the two. In recent CA work, some authors have 
resisted using similar categories to describe the organization and function of talk and visible 
behavior in social interaction, for example, by suggesting that “there is no reliable empirical 
evidence for treating physically realized actions as being in principle organized as adjacency 
pairs” (Schegloff, 2007b: 11). For others, “[…] nonverbal conduct is subordinate to the 
verbal conduct with which it is intermeshed; it’s probably true to say that none of the 
practices, devices or patterns identified in CA research are shaped or altered in any 
significant ways by accompanying nonverbal conduct” (Drew, 2005: 78). Yet, a number of 
scholars of social interaction have repeatedly indicated and demonstrated the importance of 
integrating visible and verbal behavior in the analysis of what participants are doing during 
an interaction. Some have done this, approaching the issue from a multimodal perspective 
and with a special interest in the organization of participation in social activities, like Charles 
Goodwin (e.g., 1981, 1986c, 2000a, 2006) and Lorenza Mondada (e.g., 2002, 2006, 2007), 
others by approaching it from a more linguistic perspective, like Nick Enfield (e.g., 2001, 
2005, 2009a), or from a gestural and communicative perspective, like Jürgen Streeck (e.g., 
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1993, 1994, 2003, 2009) and finally by combining their contributions in  edited volumes 
(e.g., Streeck, Goodwin, & LeBaron, 2011).  
This dissertation has attempted to follow the path indicated by these scholars in terms 
of integrating visible and verbal behavior in the analysis of social interaction. Indeed, one of 
the central aims of this work has been to show how an analysis of talk and an analysis of gaze 
behavior can be combined, and how the analysis of one informs the analysis of the other. In 
addition to that, this dissertation has also shown some ways in which gaze behavior does 
“shape” or “alter” the accompanying verbal conduct. The practice of pursuing a response 
through gaze, or the practices concerning gaze behavior at possible sequence completion, for 
example, add to our basic knowledge of sequence organization. An understanding of action in 
interaction, of sequence organization and of the relevance of responses to sequence initiating 
actions is needed to capture what is going on in face-to-face interactions. Moreover, an 
understanding of the organization of gaze cannot and should not be developed by looking at 
eye movements in isolation. In this respect, while the goal of documenting as many 
interactional practices as possible is crucial for those interested in the organization of social 
interaction, it appears that a broader perspective on the role and organization of visible 
behavior and gaze in social interaction is necessary. With few exceptions, in particular, the 
work of Charles Goodwin (e.g., 1979; 1980; 1981) and Mardi Kidwell (e.g., 2005, 2009), 
most recent work on gaze in interaction has not approached it as a system in its own right, for 
example, by describing its ‘grammar’ in relation to other interactional systems. Indeed, most 
studies have either investigated gaze as just one component of a more complex range of 
visible resources (and therefore, as not deserving its own attention), or more disconcertingly, 
have reduced the interactional environment to some set of dichotomous exogenous variables 
(e.g., gender, power asymmetries, some aspect of the relationship between participants, etc.) 
and correlated them with particular gaze behaviors. By contrast, this dissertation shows the 
power of gaze in social interaction, accepting its membership in a vast array of visible 
resources that participants can rely on during social interactions, but also emphasizing the 
existence of a system, which can be described and appreciated once the interactional 
environment is investigated at a more fine-grained level of complexity. 
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5.3 Implications for a Model of Gaze Behavior in Social Interaction 
 
One of the goals of this investigation has been to provide more precise descriptions of 
the mechanisms at play in participants’ gaze behavior so that, for example, robots or avatars 
may be programmed to use their eyes in a more human-like fashion during interaction with 
human beings. The gaze practices reported in this dissertation are better understood in terms 
of their semiotics, rather than in terms of norms and rules. Here is how these practices work: 
if I do X, I mean to convey Y, if I do not do X, I mean to convey Z (see quote from Sacks, 
1972 above). What this is meant to capture is that ‘doing X’ has one meaning and ‘not doing 
X’ has a different meaning, and the relevance and accountability of each behavior can be 
assessed taking into account the sequential environment of the talk. Practices are not usually 
accountable per se, but the actions they implement might have normative implications or 
their absence might be considered accountable. Consider, for example, the practice of using 
gaze to pressure for a response, presented in chapter 3. It is not the case that the participant 
who produced a FPP must look toward the recipient or is expected to do so. That is, the 
occurrence of that practice (i.e. using gaze to pressure for response) is not normative and 
other similar practices might be implemented instead (see Stivers & Rossano, 2010 on 
different ways of mobilizing response). However, that same participant might look toward 
the recipient in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining a response. By doing so, s/he 
might appear to put more pressure on the recipient, but there may be occasions where that 
might not the preferred thing to do. When speaker gaze toward the recipient occurs in 
specific sequential environments, however, it does increase pressure for a response, and, as 
such, it might have important interactional consequences. This means, for example, that 
while one does not have to use gaze to pursue a response, once gaze has been used to pursue 
it, a response might be normatively expected. The occurrence of a pursuit is what creates a 
normative expectation for a response. It is important to keep in mind that this is potentially 
different for other gaze practices, such as the one presented in chapter 2 (recipient gaze 
toward the speaker during the first TCU of an ETS). In that case, there may be a normative 
expectation that recipiency will be displayed through recipient gaze toward the speaker, 
rather than in some other way. Here, the occurrence of that specific practice for displaying 
recipiency, rather than alternative verbal one, might be normatively expected in that 
sequential position. 
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It is important to remember, here, that the effectiveness of a practice or the occurrence 
of behavioral regularity (e.g. the fact that most questions are produced with speaker gaze 
toward the recipient) should not, per se, be taken as evidence of the existence of a norm about 
it (see Bicchieri, 2006 for the difference between conventions and social norms). As Weber 
(1978 [1922]: 30) reminds us:  
 
Many of the especially notable uniformities in the course of social 
action are not determined by orientation to any sort of norm which is 
held to be valid, nor do they rest on custom, but entirely on the fact 
that the corresponding type of social action is in the nature of the case 
best adapted to the normal interests of the actors as they themselves 
are aware of them. 
 
So, in using gaze to pursue a response, one might say that its deployment would depend on 
the interactional situation and whether the participants have an interest in pursuing a response 
without modifying the terms of the sequence initiating action. Alternatively, participants 
might interpret the delay in responding as due to a problem in hearing (e.g., they could repeat 
the sequence initiating turn) or prefiguring a dispreferred response (e.g., the speaker could 
produce a modified version of the sequence initiating turn where s/he might either back down 
or change the polarity of the initiating turn to allow for the production of a rejection as 
preferred response).3  
Another important aspect to consider for the investigation of gaze in interaction 
concerns the semiotic resources that eye movements can use to accomplish specific 
communicative or regulatory functions. After all, the view of gaze as simply “on” or “off” 
(i.e., that participants either look at the other participant or not) is symptomatic of an 
inadequate understanding of how gaze works. Participants in interaction do not simply have 
the option of either looking at the other participants’ faces or not looking at them. As the 
symbols used to represent gaze behavior in this dissertation show (see Appendix B), there are 
clearly more than two options. For example, looking at an object relevant for a competing 
activity (e.g., eating), is a different type of engagement than looking at a bare wall, just as 
looking middle distance, or looking upward (e.g., when somebody is thinking) is different 
from closing both eyes. In any of these cases, the orientation of the eyes with respect to the 
orientation of the head might affect the interpretation of a specific gaze behavior as well. 
                                                
3 For example, after a lack of response following “would you like to go to the cinema tonight?”, the speaker 
might pursue a response with “or would you prefer another day?”. A “no” in response to the first question can 
become a “yes” to the second one. As such, a dispreferred response to the first question can become a preferred 
response to the second question, produced as a pursuit. 
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Clearly, looks that are not directed toward somebody’s face are not all equal in terms of their 
relevance and meaning for a recipient. Each look will be interpreted in terms of its relevance 
for the ongoing interaction and some looks will be more noticeable than others. 
Aside from the complex ways of doing “not looking”, two additional aspects of gaze 
contribute to their semiotic power: timing and duration. What this dissertation has shown is 
that, in order to understand the function of any particular gaze behavior, it is not enough to 
look at the composition of participants’ gaze but it is in fact crucial to also examine its 
position, with respect to the participants’ talk. Thus, it is not the case that, for example, any 
gaze withdrawal will work as a bid for closure nor that any speaker look toward the recipient 
will mobilize response, but that gaze can be used in those ways in some specific sequential 
environments. Similarly, the duration of a specific gaze behavior has important implications 
for its interpretation. For example, closing one’s eyes for a second during a conversation 
might be understood as a way of displaying thinking; however, closing one’s eyes for a 
longer duration (e.g., 5 or 6 seconds) might invite an alternative interpretation (e.g., the 
person may be not feeling well or has stopped listening). The same applies to participants’ 
looks toward objects. Glancing at a glass before reaching for it might project that the object 
will be picked up, but a look toward that same glass for 5 or 6 seconds might suggest 
something else (e.g., recipient disengagement). In fact, there is a “natural duration”4 of looks 
toward people, objects and empty spaces that relates to what else is going on in the 
conversation. Gaze behavior that extends beyond that natural duration, will be taken to mean 
something else. Accordingly, the particular meaning of a gaze behavior will also be affected 
by how long it lasts. It will also be affected by its placement in a course of action. Therefore, 
it is not enough to take into account whether a participant is looking at another one. Rather, it 
is crucial to map participants’ gaze behaviors onto the social actions the participants are 
involved in. And, only at that point, can the specific meaning of that gaze behavior emerge.  
A final core interest of this dissertation has been to try to specify gaze behavior with 
sufficient precision that one could, in principle, program an avatar to perform adequate gaze 
behavior—in practice, this can only be done within very limited domains at the present time 
(e.g. in the context of ETS, or during the TRP or at possible completion of a sequence), for 
reasons to be spelled out in what follows. There are (at least) four main constraints that could 
affect, for example, the occurrence and duration of mutual gaze, but would be difficult for 
                                                
4 See Morris (1957) on “typical intensity” of a signal from an ethological perspective. 
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the sequence initiating turn) or prefiguring a dispreferred response (e.g., the speaker could 
produce a modified version of the sequence initiating turn where s/he might either back down 
or change the polarity of the initiating turn to allow for the production of a rejection as 
preferred response).3  
Another important aspect to consider for the investigation of gaze in interaction 
concerns the semiotic resources that eye movements can use to accomplish specific 
communicative or regulatory functions. After all, the view of gaze as simply “on” or “off” 
(i.e., that participants either look at the other participant or not) is symptomatic of an 
inadequate understanding of how gaze works. Participants in interaction do not simply have 
the option of either looking at the other participants’ faces or not looking at them. As the 
symbols used to represent gaze behavior in this dissertation show (see Appendix B), there are 
clearly more than two options. For example, looking at an object relevant for a competing 
activity (e.g., eating), is a different type of engagement than looking at a bare wall, just as 
looking middle distance, or looking upward (e.g., when somebody is thinking) is different 
from closing both eyes. In any of these cases, the orientation of the eyes with respect to the 
orientation of the head might affect the interpretation of a specific gaze behavior as well. 
                                                
3 For example, after a lack of response following “would you like to go to the cinema tonight?”, the speaker 
might pursue a response with “or would you prefer another day?”. A “no” in response to the first question can 
become a “yes” to the second one. As such, a dispreferred response to the first question can become a preferred 
response to the second question, produced as a pursuit. 
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Clearly, looks that are not directed toward somebody’s face are not all equal in terms of their 
relevance and meaning for a recipient. Each look will be interpreted in terms of its relevance 
for the ongoing interaction and some looks will be more noticeable than others. 
Aside from the complex ways of doing “not looking”, two additional aspects of gaze 
contribute to their semiotic power: timing and duration. What this dissertation has shown is 
that, in order to understand the function of any particular gaze behavior, it is not enough to 
look at the composition of participants’ gaze but it is in fact crucial to also examine its 
position, with respect to the participants’ talk. Thus, it is not the case that, for example, any 
gaze withdrawal will work as a bid for closure nor that any speaker look toward the recipient 
will mobilize response, but that gaze can be used in those ways in some specific sequential 
environments. Similarly, the duration of a specific gaze behavior has important implications 
for its interpretation. For example, closing one’s eyes for a second during a conversation 
might be understood as a way of displaying thinking; however, closing one’s eyes for a 
longer duration (e.g., 5 or 6 seconds) might invite an alternative interpretation (e.g., the 
person may be not feeling well or has stopped listening). The same applies to participants’ 
looks toward objects. Glancing at a glass before reaching for it might project that the object 
will be picked up, but a look toward that same glass for 5 or 6 seconds might suggest 
something else (e.g., recipient disengagement). In fact, there is a “natural duration”4 of looks 
toward people, objects and empty spaces that relates to what else is going on in the 
conversation. Gaze behavior that extends beyond that natural duration, will be taken to mean 
something else. Accordingly, the particular meaning of a gaze behavior will also be affected 
by how long it lasts. It will also be affected by its placement in a course of action. Therefore, 
it is not enough to take into account whether a participant is looking at another one. Rather, it 
is crucial to map participants’ gaze behaviors onto the social actions the participants are 
involved in. And, only at that point, can the specific meaning of that gaze behavior emerge.  
A final core interest of this dissertation has been to try to specify gaze behavior with 
sufficient precision that one could, in principle, program an avatar to perform adequate gaze 
behavior—in practice, this can only be done within very limited domains at the present time 
(e.g. in the context of ETS, or during the TRP or at possible completion of a sequence), for 
reasons to be spelled out in what follows. There are (at least) four main constraints that could 
affect, for example, the occurrence and duration of mutual gaze, but would be difficult for 
                                                
4 See Morris (1957) on “typical intensity” of a signal from an ethological perspective. 
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machines to measure and compute. Yet, they play a clear role in the organization of gaze 
behavior in social interaction. They include: 
 
1) A BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINT: Mutual gaze can create arousal and be 
interpreted as flirting or threatening. The amount of arousal acceptable between 
individuals may vary and be affected by multiple variables. 
 
2) A SOCIO-CULTURAL CONSTRAINT: Looking at the other participant may be 
used to display recipiency, commitment to the course of action and sustained 
attention. Moreover, gaze behavior might be an important semiotic resource for 
managing social relations.5 Yet this might vary from activity to activity and from 
culture to culture.  
3) AN INFORMATION PROCESSING CONSTRAINT: Looking at each other could 
be related to minimizing problems in hearing, speaking and understanding and to 
facilitate the information exchange (e.g., looking at lip movements to better 
understand speech, or looking at faces to read facial expressions associated with the 
content of the talk). Yet there might be individual differences in terms of people 
capacities to process information with and without the visual modality, in particular in 
individuals with cognitive impairments. Moreover, information processing during a 
conversation might at times require to look at the gestures of the other participant, 
rather than their face. 
 
4) AN ATTENTION CONSTRAINT: There is a strong association between focus of 
attention and where people direct their eyes, so looking away from a speaker can 
suggest shift in a focus of attention or momentary lack of attention. 
  
Clearly, there is a relationship between these constraints and they might have a 
cascading effect on one another. The possibility of exceeding arousal (biological constraint) 
might lead people to look away from time to time. However, at least in some cultures, 
looking is a way of displaying sustained engagement (social constraint), so looking away 
should be limited to things that are not cognitively demanding. For example, looking at 
                                                
5 As Enfield (2009b: 60) suggests “human pragmatics is about using semiotic resources to try to meet goals in 
the realm of social relationships”. As such, gaze might be one of these resources and yet the ways in which it 
might help managing social relationships might be culturally specific. 
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objects in the environment (e.g., pens, glasses, food) would be interactionally acceptable as 
long as such objects are not too cognitively demanding. However, engagement with these 
objects might be related to competing activities, and focusing on them as such, might mean 
diminished attention (attention constraint) to the ongoing interaction. It might also mean 
potentially reduced capacity in fully processing the information obtainable by looking at the 
other participant’s face (information processing constraint). At the same time, it is important 
to note that people might look at each other to perceive emotions and/or take a particular 
stance toward something rather than to parse words or better process information. Indeed, it 
is possible that the processing of emotions plays a major role in the development of the social 
brain and in the processing of the face (e.g., Adolphs, 2009; Grossmann & Johnson, 2007; 
Grossmann, Johnson, Farroni, & Csibra, 2007; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Spezio, 
Huang, Castelli, & Adolphs, 2007). Finally, when one thinks of information processing 
during a conversation, the main focus is usually on information provided through lip 
movements or facial expressions. Yet we know that much information is provided through 
speech-accompanying gestures and their uptake might at times require fixating on the 
gestures themselves. In general, we know that interactants fixate on very few gestures, but 
also that the likelihood of an addressee fixating a gesture increases under the following three 
circumstances:  
 
1. When speakers first look at their own gestures (Gullberg & Holmqvist, 1999, 
2006; Gullberg & Kita, 2009); 
 
2. When a gesture is produced in the periphery of gesture space in front of the 
speaker’s body (Gullberg & Holmqvist, 1999, 2006);6 
 
3. When a gestural movement is suspended momentarily in mid-air and goes into a 
hold (Gullberg & Holmqvist, 1999, 2006; Gullberg & Kita, 2009). 
 
These variables, then, have to be compared with the actual effect on uptake of the 
information conveyed by the gestures. Indeed, while addressees’ fixation of gestures 
produced by speakers is affected by the above variable, it appears that the only one that 
actually affect uptake of gestural information is speakers previous fixation of their own 
                                                
6 Though see Gullberg & Kita, 2009 for evidence that suggests otherwise. Their criticism is that the claim at 
point 2 has been made in situations in which the variables 1-3 were often conflated. 
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objects in the environment (e.g., pens, glasses, food) would be interactionally acceptable as 
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gestures themselves. In general, we know that interactants fixate on very few gestures, but 
also that the likelihood of an addressee fixating a gesture increases under the following three 
circumstances:  
 
1. When speakers first look at their own gestures (Gullberg & Holmqvist, 1999, 
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gestures. So direct fixation of a gesture does not necessarily entails better uptake of the 
information that it is conveying. 
To summarize, an optimal account of gaze behavior should not only account for when 
people look at each other and when they do not, but also for what they are doing when they 
are (not) looking at each other and why they might do that. And, an optimal description of the 
gaze machinery needs to take into account not only what people usually do, but the 
biological, cognitive and social constraints under which they do it. Thus, I have suggested an 
approach that requires a basic understanding of four different levels of organization (see § 
1.1): 
 
1. Individual 
 
2. Micro-social (Dialogical/Conversational) 
 
3. Macro-social/Cultural 
 
4. Species-specific 
 
In order to be able to completely understand what humans do when they interact with each 
other, these four different levels of organization are a reminder that, in any interaction: 
 
1. We have individual cognition and individual memories of our previous 
interactions.  
 
2. We use the interactional machinery we believe we share with other interactants and 
we recipient-design our communications and actions, because of what we know about 
others. 
 
3. Our actions are informed by what we deem socially and culturally appropriate.  
 
4. We are biological organisms, with specific limits and capacities and our bodies 
have evolved for specific adaptive purposes.  
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The findings reported in this dissertation, the methods deployed to investigate gaze 
behavior and, more generally, the interest in a broader approach to gaze in interaction will 
hopefully constitute a contribution to current research on the organization of social 
interaction and the practices deployed to sustain it. 
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Appendix A: Information about the Data 
 
 
Interactions used for qualitative and quantitative purposes  
 
1) 2GC 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both females 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: A’s house (kitchen) 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: in front of each other, sitting at a dinner table 
 
2) 2GCCOLL 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both females 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: housemates and friends 
LOCATION: in the kitchen of the house they share 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: in front of each other, sitting at the dinner table 
 
3) 2GGOSS 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both females 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: A’s house (kitchen) 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: 90 degrees, sitting at table 
 
 
 
333
334
4) 2GSOFA 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both females 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: a friend’s living room.  
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: 90 degrees, sitting on two couches with a coffee table near 
both of them 
 
5) 2GSTUDYING 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both females 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: A’s bedroom in A’s house  
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: A is sitting on a bed facing B, who is sitting at a 90 degree 
corner at a desk, but often turns chair to face A. 
 
6) 2PCOMP 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: A’s bedroom in A’s house 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: side-by-side at a desk, both facing a computer 
 
7) 2PERLINE 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both females 
AGE: A is in her 30s, B is 50 
RELATIONSHIP: friends and colleagues 
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LOCATION: in B’s house (kitchen) 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: in front of each other, sitting at the dinner table 
 
8) 2PEXAM 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: B’s bedroom in B’s house 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: A is sitting on a chair, while B is sitting at a 90 degree angle,  
in front of a desk,  looking at a computer, but often turns chair to face A. 
 
9) 2PPLAN 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: A’s living room in A’s house 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: in front of each other, on 2 couches 
 
10) 2PLUNCH 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: A is male, B is female 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Couple 
LOCATION: B’s house (kitchen) 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: 90 degrees, sitting at table 
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Interactions used only for qualitative purposes  
 
11) 2PRON1 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Housemates 
LOCATION: in the kitchen of the apartment they are sharing 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: in front of each other at the dinner table 
 
12) 3PDRIVING 
PARTICIPANTS: 3  
GENDER: all males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: in A’s car 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: A is driving, C is in the passenger seat and B is sitting the 
back seats, leaning forward in between A and C 
 
13) 3PMARIA 
PARTICIPANTS: 3  
GENDER: two females and a male 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Housemates 
LOCATION: in the kitchen of the apartment they are sharing 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: two women in front of each other at the dinner table, man at 
the head of the table at a 90 degree angle from both of them 
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Appendix B: Transcription Conventions 
 
Transcription Conventions for the Talk 
 
The symbols used in the transcriptions in this article follow the notation system 
developed by Gail Jefferson (see, for example, Jefferson 2004a) for conversation analytic 
research.  
 
1. Temporal and sequential relationships 
 
[  A left bracket indicates the onset of overlapping speech 
] A right bracket indicates the point at which overlapping utterances end 
= An equals sign indicates contiguous speech 
(0.5) Silences are indicated as pauses in tenths of a second 
(.)  A period in parentheses indicates a micro-pause (less than two tenths of a second) 
 
2. Aspects of speech delivery 
 
.  A period indicates a falling intonation contour 
,  A comma indicates continuing intonation 
?  A question mark indicates rising intonation contour 
¿ An inverted question mark indicates a rise stronger than the comma but weaker 
than the question mark 
_  An underscore indicates flat intonation contour 
: Colons indicate lengthening of preceding sound (the more colons, the longer the 
lengthening) 
-  A hyphen indicates an abrupt cutoff sound 
yes  Underlining indicates emphatic stress  
YES  Upper case indicates noticeably increased amplitude or pitch reset 
°yes°  The degree sign indicates noticeably decreased amplitude in speech 
>yes<  Indicates talk that is noticeably faster than surrounding talk 
<yes>  Indicate talk that is noticeably slower than surrounding talk 
336
336
 
Interactions used only for qualitative purposes  
 
11) 2PRON1 
PARTICIPANTS: 2  
GENDER: both males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Housemates 
LOCATION: in the kitchen of the apartment they are sharing 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: in front of each other at the dinner table 
 
12) 3PDRIVING 
PARTICIPANTS: 3  
GENDER: all males 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Friends 
LOCATION: in A’s car 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: A is driving, C is in the passenger seat and B is sitting the 
back seats, leaning forward in between A and C 
 
13) 3PMARIA 
PARTICIPANTS: 3  
GENDER: two females and a male 
AGE: In their early 20s 
RELATIONSHIP: Housemates 
LOCATION: in the kitchen of the apartment they are sharing 
SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: two women in front of each other at the dinner table, man at 
the head of the table at a 90 degree angle from both of them 
 
 
 
337
Appendix B: Transcription Conventions 
 
Transcription Conventions for the Talk 
 
The symbols used in the transcriptions in this article follow the notation system 
developed by Gail Jefferson (see, for example, Jefferson 2004a) for conversation analytic 
research.  
 
1. Temporal and sequential relationships 
 
[  A left bracket indicates the onset of overlapping speech 
] A right bracket indicates the point at which overlapping utterances end 
= An equals sign indicates contiguous speech 
(0.5) Silences are indicated as pauses in tenths of a second 
(.)  A period in parentheses indicates a micro-pause (less than two tenths of a second) 
 
2. Aspects of speech delivery 
 
.  A period indicates a falling intonation contour 
,  A comma indicates continuing intonation 
?  A question mark indicates rising intonation contour 
¿ An inverted question mark indicates a rise stronger than the comma but weaker 
than the question mark 
_  An underscore indicates flat intonation contour 
: Colons indicate lengthening of preceding sound (the more colons, the longer the 
lengthening) 
-  A hyphen indicates an abrupt cutoff sound 
yes  Underlining indicates emphatic stress  
YES  Upper case indicates noticeably increased amplitude or pitch reset 
°yes°  The degree sign indicates noticeably decreased amplitude in speech 
>yes<  Indicates talk that is noticeably faster than surrounding talk 
<yes>  Indicate talk that is noticeably slower than surrounding talk 
337
338
hh  The letter ‘h’ indicates audible aspirations (the more hs the longer the breath) 
.hh A period preceding the letter ‘h’ indicates audible inhalations (the more hs the 
longer the breath) 
y(h)es h within parentheses within a word indicates aspiration, possibly laughter 
 
3. Other notational devices 
 
(guess)  words within single parentheses indicate likely hearing of that word  
((coughs)) information in double parentheses indicate additional details  
(       )  empty parentheses indicate hearable yet indecipherable talk 
 
 
Multi-linear transcription conventions (see Sidnell, 2009: xvii) 
 
The conversations reported in this dissertation are in Italian. To facilitate comprehension, 
I used three-line transcripts where the first line is a broad phonetic representation of the talk in 
the original language and follows the notations reported above. The second line is a morpheme-
by-morpheme gloss using a combination of word-by-word translation and abbreviations to 
indicate particles and other functional items that do not admit of a direct translation into English. 
The third line presents an idiomatic English gloss, meant to capture, as close as possible, the 
contextual meaning of the utterance. 
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Symbols for Gaze Orientations 
    = Mutual gaze 
 = A looks away and B looks away 
    = A looks down oriented towards B. B looks away 
  = A looks away. B looks down oriented towards A 
    = A and B are looking down in front of them 
   = A looks at B. B looks down 
= A looks at B. B looks away
   = B looks at A. A looks down 
 = B looks at A. A looks away 
   = A looks down. B eyes closed 
  = A eyes closed. B looks down 
    = A eyes closed. B eyes closed 
    = A looks at B. B eyes closed 
   = A eyes closed. B looks at A 
 = A away. B eyes closed 
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Symbols for Gaze Orientations 
    = Mutual gaze 
 = A looks away and B looks away 
    = A looks down oriented towards B. B looks away 
  = A looks away. B looks down oriented towards A 
    = A and B are looking down in front of them 
   = A looks at B. B looks down 
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  = A turns towards B who is looking down 
 = A turns towards B who is already looking at A 
 = A raises gaze towards B who is looking down 
   = A raises gaze towards B who is already looking at A 
= A looks away B looks mid distance up left  
    = A looks away B looks mid distance up right 
= A looks down B looks mid distance up left 
= A looks down B looks mid distance up right
 = B turns towards A who is looking down 
  = A raises gaze towards B who is looking down 
  =A looks mid distance up left. B is looking away  
    = A looks mid distance up left. B is looking down 
 = A looks mid distance up right. B is looking away 
  = A looks mid distance up right. B is looking down 
  = A turns towards B who is looking away 
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  = B turns towards A who is already looking at B 
   = B raises gaze towards A who is looking away 
  = B turns towards A who is looking away 
   = B raises gaze towards A who is already looking at B 
= B raises gaze towards A who is looking down
     =  A looking at B. B looks mid distance up right 
 = A mid distance right. B eyes closed 
  = A mid distance right. B looking at A 
 = A mid distance left. B looking at A 
    = A looking at B. B mid distance right 
   = A looking at B. B mid distance left 
 = A looking at object. B looking away 
 = A looking at object. B looking down 
= A looking at object. B eyes closed
 = A looking at object. B looking at A 
 = A looking at object. B raises gaze towards A 
= A looking at object. B mid distance left 
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  = A turns towards B who is looking down 
 = A turns towards B who is already looking at A 
 = A raises gaze towards B who is looking down 
   = A raises gaze towards B who is already looking at A 
= A looks away B looks mid distance up left  
    = A looks away B looks mid distance up right 
= A looks down B looks mid distance up left 
= A looks down B looks mid distance up right
 = B turns towards A who is looking down 
  = A raises gaze towards B who is looking down 
  =A looks mid distance up left. B is looking away  
    = A looks mid distance up left. B is looking down 
 = A looks mid distance up right. B is looking away 
  = A looks mid distance up right. B is looking down 
  = A turns towards B who is looking away 
341
  = B turns towards A who is already looking at B 
   = B raises gaze towards A who is looking away 
  = B turns towards A who is looking away 
   = B raises gaze towards A who is already looking at B 
= B raises gaze towards A who is looking down
     =  A looking at B. B looks mid distance up right 
 = A mid distance right. B eyes closed 
  = A mid distance right. B looking at A 
 = A mid distance left. B looking at A 
    = A looking at B. B mid distance right 
   = A looking at B. B mid distance left 
 = A looking at object. B looking away 
 = A looking at object. B looking down 
= A looking at object. B eyes closed
 = A looking at object. B looking at A 
 = A looking at object. B raises gaze towards A 
= A looking at object. B mid distance left 
341
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 = A looking at object. B mid distance right 
 = A looking at object. B turns gaze towards A 
 = A looking at one object. B looking at a different object 
 = A looking away. B looking at object 
 = A looking down. B looking at object 
 = A eyes closed. B looking at object 
 = A looking at B. B looking at object 
 = A raises gaze towards B. B looking at object 
 = A mid distance left. B looking at object 
 = A mid distance right. B looking at object 
 = A turns gaze towards B. B looking at object 
 = A and B looking at the same object 
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Samenvatting 
 
Wat betekent het om te kunnen zien en om gezien te kunnen worden door anderen? Wat 
doen we met onze ogen als we met elkaar praten? Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe mensen hun 
ogen en hun lichaam gebruiken tijdens onderlinge ontmoetingen, en het zet de patronen in hun 
gedrag uiteen. In het bijzonder laat het zien hoe personen uit een bepaalde cultuur (Italianen uit 
Emila-Romagna, een streek in Noord-Italië) kijken tijdens natuurlijk voorkomende 
tweegesprekken in hun huis. Het doel is om enkele van de gewoonten en normen uiteen te zetten 
die deze personen hanteren, en zo te komen tot een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de structuren 
van kijkgedrag in menselijke interacties en ons begrip te verfijnen van de wijze waarop mensen 
deelnemen aan sociale situaties. Bovendien leidt een onderzoek naar kijkgedrag in onderlinge 
ontmoetingen ertoe dat we beter begrijpen hoe deelnemers omgaan met hun rechten en plichten 
in interactie, vooral met betrekking tot samenwerken, agency en de verantwoording van sociale 
handelingen. Het belicht ook de fijnmazige afstemming en organisatie van beurtwisselingen en 
sequenties van sociale activiteiten. De nadruk in dit proefschrift ligt op de manier waarop 
deelnemers kijken aan het begin, in het midden en aan het eind van een spraaksequentie. De 
resultaten hiervan dragen bij aan een algemener begripskader van de wijze waarop mensen in 
interacties hun ogen gebruiken, vooral als we ze in een vergelijkende en ontwikkelingscontext 
bezien. Bovendien verschaffen deze resultaten computerdeskundigen en deskundigen op het 
gebied van kunstmatige intelligentie belangrijke informatie over hoe voorspelbaar de blikrichting 
van gespreksdeelnemers is en in welke mate een robot of avatar dit zou kunnen nabootsen. 
 
Data en methode 
Om te kunnen analyseren en begrijpen hoe gespreksdeelnemers omgaan met de grenzen van 
talige handelingssequenties heb ik een reeks video-opnames gemaakt van natuurlijk 
voorkomende interacties waarbij mensen samen eten, kaartspelen, koken, koffiedrinken of in een 
auto reizen. De deelnemers hebben geen script of instructie gekregen met betrekking tot het 
verloop van hun gesprekken. De opgenomen interacties ontstonden op natuurlijke wijze, en 
hadden dus ook plaatsgevonden onafhankelijk van mijn verzoek om de deelnemers te mogen 
filmen, waardoor deze situaties en het verloop van de gesprekken spontaan zijn en niet 
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geënsceneerd. In de meeste situaties was er sprake van tweegesprekken, hoewel er ook enkele 
driegesprekken zijn gebruikt om te kunnen komen tot fundamentele inzichten over de organisatie 
van het kijkgedrag. Details over de deelnemers,  de situatie, de locatie, en de hoofdactiviteit  van 
elke opgenomen interactie worden vermeld in Appendix A. 
 Gelet op de nadruk op de systematische organisatie van kijkgedrag in relatie tot sociale 
handelingen, die vooral tot stand komen door middel van talige interacties, had ik een 
methodologie nodig die mij in staat zou stellen om specifieke conversatiestructuren te analyseren 
en te identificeren. Conversatie Analyse (hierna: CA) verschafte dit raamwerk. Deze methode 
richt zich meer op actie en interactie dan op taal of taalkundige categorieën. CA stelt de 
onderzoeker in staat om recht te doen aan de fijnmazigheid van interacties en details te 
analyseren zonder de macrostructuren, zoals sequentieorganisatie en de globale overall-
organisatie van de activiteit uit het oog te verliezen. Bovendien voorkomt de focus op het 
perspectief van de gespreksdeelnemers, hun oriëntatie op en interpretatie van de handelswijze 
van de andere gespreksdeelnemers, een ad hoc-gebruik van categorieën en labels, en een analyse 
die niet terug te voeren is op de data doordat ze niet ondersteund wordt door de principes waar de 
gespreksdeelnemers zelf zich op richten. Deze convergentie tussen het perspectief van de 
onderzoeker en dat van de deelnemers, de kern van conversatieanalytisch onderzoek, is in dit 
proefschrift volledig opgenomen: ik heb niet eenvoudigweg beschreven wanneer mensen hun 
ogen bewegen, maar ook vastgelegd welke gevolgen voor de interactie een verschuiving van de 
blikrichting kan hebben.    
De hier gerapporteerde data zijn echter niet alleen kwalitatief geanalyseerd. Inzichten uit 
andere disciplines zijn gebruikt in de algemene analyse van de data. Ik ben begonnen met een 
kwalitatieve analyse van bepaalde delen van de interacties, waarbij ik vergelijkingen heb 
gemaakt van interacties waar bepaalde interactionele handelingen en praktijken tentoongespreid 
leeken te worden. Na het uiteenzetten van de basale interactionele kenmerken van elke activiteit, 
ging ik terug naar de data en codeerde systematisch wat er in een bepaald aantal minuten 
(meestal tien minuten, zoals in ieder hoofdstuk aangegeven), die willekeurig uit elke interactie 
gekozen werden, gebeurde. De codering werd toegepast op de variabelen die eerder waren 
geïdentificeerd als cruciaal voor de onderzochte interactionele handeling. Vervolgens heb ik 
statistische analyses (vooral logische regressies) uitgevoerd om significante correlaties tussen de 
variabelen en belangrijke predictoren van bepaalde resultaten vast te stellen. De kwantitatieve 
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analyse diende ertoe om de organisatie van bepaald gedrag te identificeren en te kwantificeren, 
door de empirische hypothese over de functie van bepaald kijkgedrag die uit het kwalitatief 
onderzoek naar voren kwam te falsificeren (Popper, 1959 [1934]).  
Om de details van de spraak en het zichtbare gedrag in iedere interactie te annoteren, heb 
ik gebruik gemaakt van de software ELAN (http://www.lat-mpi.eu/tools/elan/), die is ontwikkeld 
op het Max Planck Instituut voor Psycholinguïstiek om onderzoekers in staat te stellen om van 
dezelfde interactie tegelijk meerdere opnames (audio en video) te bekijken en te annoteren.  
Om in geschreven transcripties van de conversaties ook het kijkgedrag van de deelnemers 
weer te geven, heb ik een nieuw transcriptiesysteem ontwikkeld, dat in Appendix B is 
opgenomen.  
 
De resultaten 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe mensen hun ogen en hun lichaam gebruiken tijdens 
onderlinge ontmoetingen. Eerder onderzoek naar kijkgedrag in gesprekken stelde dat het 
kijkgedrag beïnvloed werd door factoren van buiten het gesprek (bijvoorbeeld geslacht, leeftijd 
en sociale status; zie bijvoorbeeld Ellsworth & Ludwig, 1972; Kleinke, 1986), dat het kijkgedrag 
de mate van betrokkenheid van de deelnemers aan gesprek aantoont (bijvoorbeeld Argyle & 
Cook, 1976; Goffman, 1963; Goodwin, 1981), dat het een regulerende rol heeft bij 
beurtwisselingen (bijvoorbeeld Duncan, 1975; Kendon, 1967) en, ten slotte, dat het een rol heeft 
bij het in gang zetten van sociale handelingen, afhankelijk van de context en de uitvoering ervan 
(e.g., Kidwell, 2005, 2009; Sidnell, 2006). Dit proefschrift bevat diverse belangwekkende 
uitkomsten die een heroverweging van een aantal van deze stellingen noodzakelijk maken. Die 
uitkomsten worden uiteengezet in drie empirische hoofdstukken (de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4).  
Hoofdstuk 2 toont aan dat de recipiënten van een vertelling hun blik naar de verteller 
richten gedurende de eerste beurt van de vertelling. Wanneer een persoon echter recipiënt is van 
de eerste beurt van een aangrenzend paar, laten ze geen bijzondere tendens zien in hun 
kijkgedrag. Als zodanig worden blikken anders gebruikt, afhankelijk van de sociale handelingen 
en activiteiten waarbij gespreksdeelnemers betrokken zijn. Dit plaats ons voor een raadsel met 
betrekking tot de wijze waarop luisteraars nagaan of ze bijvoorbeeld te maken hebben met de 
eerste beurtopbouweenheid (BOE) van een langere vertelling  of met een aankondiging 
bestaande uit één BOE. Het antwoord ligt, ten minste gedeeltelijk, in het feit dat luisteraars 
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vertrouwen op zogenaamde “fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer en Goldstein, 1996), 
gebaseerd op de semantische domeinen in de uiting, om te herkennen wat voor handelingsproject 
de spreker begint. Beurtopbouweenheden die een telling initiëren, bevatten bijvoorbeeld vaak 
een onderwerp in de eerste persoon (enkelvoud of meervoud) en een verwijzing naar het 
verleden of de toekomst. Ook geven sprekers hun epistemische toegang aan met betrekking tot 
de gebeurtenissen die worden gemeld en/of maken zij melding van een derde persoon die niet 
eerder is besproken. Eerste beurtopbouweenheden die een aangrenzend paar  inleiden, bevatten 
daarentegen vaak een onderwerp in de tweede persoon (enkelvoud of meervoud), alsook 
deiktische woorden en  modale werkwoorden. De verschillende woorden waarmee 
gespreksdeelnemers hun sequentie initiërende handelingen vorm geven, maken de ontvangers 
duidelijk of het hier gaat om het begin van een uitgebreide vertelling of om het eerste paardeel 
van een aangrenzend paar (e.g. Schegloff, 2007). De resultaten uit dit hoofdstuk verschaffen ons 
een verfijning van Goffman’s (1981a) analyse van de verschillende typen luisteraars. Goffman 
onderscheidt ‘officiële’ en ‘officieuze’ gespreksdeelnemers. Binnen de ‘officiële’ deelnemers 
maakte hij een nader onderscheid tussen ‘aangesproken’ en ‘niet aangesproken’ recipiënten. 
Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat binnen de categorie ‘aangesproken recipiënten ’ ook nog onderscheid 
kan worden gemaakt tussen recipiënten van een uitgebreide vertelling en recipiënten van het 
eerste paardeel van een aangrenzend paar. Deze nadere precisering verfijnt ons inzicht in het 
interactionele participatiekader en herkenning  van het gedrag dat iemand geacht wordt te tonen 
om een aandachtig en ‘aangesproken’ recipiënt  te zijn. Deze uitkomsten wijzen dan ook op de 
noodzaak van een hercontextualisatie van veel van de eerdere stellingen met betrekking tot het 
kijkgedrag. Vooral die stellingen die in een experimentele setting tot stand zijn gekomen, 
aangezien die studies doorgaans geen rekening hielden met de inhoud van de conversatie en de 
sociale handelingen die uitgevoerd worden in  gespreksbeurten (dat wil zeggen, of de deelnemers 
elkaar eenvoudige vragen stelden of elkaar een verhaal vertelden). 
 Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de manier waarop het kijken kan worden gebruikt om in een 
gesprek de ontvanger er toe aan de zetten een reactie te geven. Waar eerder werk de nadruk legde 
op verbale middelen en hoe die ingezet kunnen worden om een reactie van de ontvanger te 
ontlokken, laten de bevindingen in dit hoofdstuk zien dat alleen een blik al genoeg is om een 
reactie te krijgen. Tevens laat de analyse zien dat dit niet alleen kan worden gedaan op een 
plaats-relevant-voor-beurt-overdracht, maar ook in de context van het vertellen van een verhaal, 
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na iets grappigs of als een ‘try-marker’. In het eerste deel van dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat de 
blikken van sprekers en recipiënten gedurende een eerste paardeel verschillende effecten hebben 
ten aanzien van de productie en het timing van de recipiënt reactie. Het kijken van de spreker 
naar de recipiënt is bedoeld om een respons uit te lokken terwijl het kijken van de recipiënt naar 
de spreker bedoeld is om een tijdig respons te bevorderen. Als de gespreksdeelnemers elkaar 
aankijken is een tijdig response zelfs nog waarschijnlijker. In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk 
analyseer ik hoe het kijken gebruikt kan worden om een ontbrekende recipiëntreactie te 
ontlokken op een plaats-relevant-voor-beurt-overdracht na een eerste paardeel. In het bijzonder 
laat ik zien hoe de timing van het kijken naar de recipiënt is georganiseerd. Ook laat ik de 
effectiviteit ervan zien, net als de mogelijke begrenzingen ervan en hoe het zich verhoudt tot 
andere (verbale) manieren om een recipiëntreactie te ontlokken. Ten slotte, laat ik in het derde 
deel van dit hoofdstuk zien hoe de kennis die in de eerste twee delen van het hoofdstuk is 
opgebouwd toepasbaar is in andere gebruiksomgevingen waarbij een respons van de recipiënt 
relevant is (bijvoorbeeld na een grap of na een verwijzing naar iets bekends zoals de naam van 
een gezamenlijke vriend), ook in omgevingen waar het respons normaal gesproken niet als 
conditioneel relevant wordt gezien. Vervolgens laat ik zien hoe de blikrichting van de spreker 
een rol speelt in het verkrijgen van een recipiëntreactie in deze sequentiële contexten.  
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien hoe sprekers het einde van een sequentie bepalen. Reeksen van 
beurten vormen doorgaans handelingssequenties die vaak verder gecombineerd worden tot een 
uitgebreid handelingsproject. Als een sequentie eenmaal een mogelijk punt van voltooiing 
bereikt heeft, wordt deze dus soms uitgebreid met een reeks beurten terwijl dit in andere gevallen 
niet gebeurd. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoek ik hoe het kijkgedrag bijdraagt aan de interactionele 
handeling van het beëindigen van een sequentie. Ik laat zien dat gespreksdeelnemers zich richten 
op de relevantie van wegkijken aan het einde van een sequentie als dit samenvalt met het 
beëindigen van het grotere handelingsproject waar de sequentie deel van uitmaakt. Dit in 
tegenstelling tot eerdere studies die stelden dat het kijken vooral te maken had met 
beurtwisselingen. Als gespreksdeelnemers een mogelijk sequentie-einde naderen en zij het 
handelingsproject willen afsluiten, zullen zij de neiging hebben om weg te kijken. In het geval er 
niet wordt weggekeken wordt het handelingsproject en dus de sequentie uitgebreid tot ze kunnen 
worden afgesloten zonde oogcontact tussen de deelnemers. Daarmee breidt dit hoofdstuk ons 
inzicht uit in niet alleen het kijkgedrag maar ook in de sequentiële opbouw van sociale 
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handelingen. Een algemene vraag die in dit hoofdstuk wordt opgeworpen is of wegkijken in 
zichzelf beëindiging betekent. Door weg te kijken en niet terug te kijken naar de andere 
gespreksdeelnemer neemt iemand een houding aan ten opzichte van de gang van zaken waar de 
andere deelnemer zich wel of niet op kan afstemmen. Het wegkijken van één gespreksdeelnemer 
maakt geen bepaalde reactie conditioneel relevant, maar het is wel een poging tot en voorstel 
voor beëindiging van de handeling. Als de andere gespreksdeelnemer zich afstemt op het 
wegkijken kan het beëindigen van het handelingsproject daadwerkelijk plaatsvinden en 
doorgaans vindt dit dan ook plaats. Als er niet wordt afgestemd, volgen er doorgaans nog enkele 
sequentie-uitbreidingen. De stelling is dat het kijkgedrag sequentiebeëindiging bewerkstelligt in 
gevallen waarbij de beëindiging in principe problematisch is; terwijl het in meer routineuze 
gevallen vooral een blijk is van begrip dat de sequentie compleet is. Met andere woorden het 
kijkgedrag kan zowel blijk geven van als een symptoom zijn voor sequentiebeëindiging. 
Ten slotte verschaft dit proefschrift een methodologisch raamwerk dat gebruikt kan 
worden om de hier besproken resultaten uit te breiden naar verwante gesprekscontexten of 
interacties die voorkomen in andere culturen of bij dieren. De bevindingen zouden een nuttige 
verbetering moeten verschaffen van onze huidige kennis met betrekking tot oogbewegingen en 
kijkgedrag tijdens sociale interacties en zijn mogelijk in het bijzonder nuttig voor onderzoekers 
die geïnteresseerd zijn in toepassingen voor kunstmatige intelligentie of het bestuderen van 
cross-culturele interacties. 
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